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T he Causes and Consequences 
of the War 



The Causes and Con- 
sequences of the War 

By YveS Gliyot, Late French Minister of 
State, Principal Editor of the "Journal des Economist es." 
Translated by F. Appleby Holt, B.A., LL.B. 



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NEW YORK: 

BRENTANO'S 

1916 









rr.'Mi ;r, Gnat £r ■.:*■, r. 



■3 1 7 1935 



PREFACE 

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Preface 

a permanent feature of international relations. Our business is not 
to foster them but to prepare to consign them to oblivion. 

Neither passion nor revenge, but foresight, must inspire the treaty 
to come. 

I have hoped to contribute something towards it by trying to 
eliminate worn-out dynastic traditions, old diplomatic formulae for 
so long accepted as international currency, the untruths and half- 
truths of historical law, vague ideas about races and nationalities, 
inexact and deceptive catchwords, and to replace them by the solid 
conception, after the manner of Bentham, of a utilitarian policy. 

Yves Guyot. 



VI 



PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION 

I am very happy to present this book to the English public, which 
has always shown me great kindness. Among the Press notices of 
the first French edition none gave me greater pleasure than that of 
Mr. A. J. Wilson, the well-known editor of the Investors' Reviezv, 
who recommended my book to his readers, and added : 

" This notice cannot be closed without a word of commendation in regard 
to the lucid risumes of history embraced in the book. Where we have tested 
these we have found them correct ; as, for example, in Chapter IV. of Part III., 
devoted to the historical causes of the war — where we get a most lucid review 
of the history of Prussia and Austria from 1847 to 1866."* 

From another quarter, M. Paul Muller, an Alsatian of wide literary 
knowledge and a specialist in the history of his country, wrote to me : 

" The prospectus of your book ought to have given prominence to the section 
devoted to the history of Franco-German diplomacy from 1871 to 1914. You 
are the first to give a clear recital of the facts in forty pages." 

I value very highly these words of appreciation and others of the 
same tenor, for the object I put before me in undertaking this work 
was to present the facts in a manner which all could understand, not 
with a view to fostering prejudice and inflaming passion, but in the 
hope, as far as possible, of extracting from the truth the materials 
necessary to the formation of sound judgments. 

The text has undergone no change, and there have been no mistakes 
to correct. Subsequent events and additional documents that have 
been published since the book was written have only confirmed 
what I said. 

I. — The Pact of KoNOPisHTf 

Certain new and recent revelations as to the beginning of the war 
have been published and are of importance. 

* Investors' Review, September 4th, 1915. 

t The authority on this topic is Mr. H. Wickham Steed, who has discussed it in 
The Nineteenth Century and After. 

vii 



Preface to the English Edition 

I have referred to the suspicions which gathered round the Sarajevo 
crime at the outset. Confirmation is now forthcoming. The family 
of the Hapsburgs comprises eighty Archdukes and Archduchesses, 
all subject to their head, the Emperor Francis Joseph, guardian of the 
" Family Law." They are all equally interested in the preservation 
of their family rights and inheritance. In May, 1896, the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand became heir to the throne on the death of his father, 
the Archduke Charles Louis, brother of Francis Joseph, and was 
sent on a voyage round the world. On his return he became a regular 
visitor to the Archduke Frederick at his palace in Vienna and his 
castle at Pressburg. The Archduchess was under the impression that 
he wished to marry her eldest daughter, but discovered one day that 
he was wooing one of her maids of honour, the Countess Sophie Chotek, 
of a noble but poor Bohemian family. She promptly showed him 
the door, but the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was not to be turned 
from his purpose of rescuing the girl from the convent to which she 
fled, and marrying her. 

The price of his triumph over the Emperor's resistance was his 
submission, on June 1st, 1909, to a humiliating ceremony, at which 
he was compelled, before the assembled members of his family, to 
renounce on oath the right of his children to succeed to the throne. 
The Emperor then laid this renunciation before the Austrian Parlia- 
ment, which duly recorded it, and the Hungarian Parliament, which 
incorporated it in the Constitution. The relations of the Archduke 
and his wife with the other members of the Royal Family were a 
mixture of cruel humiliation and jealous hatred. 

The new wife was allowed the title of Duchess of Hohenberg, which 
only gave her precedence in the Court ceremonies after all the Arch- 
duchesses, even the youngest of them. The Archduke tried in vain 
to procure for her the title of Archduchess. The Emperor's flat 
refusal was dictated mainly by the consideration that, in virtue of the 
Pragmatic Sanction of 1 722-1 723, that title would have given to the 
children of the marriage the succession to the throne of Hungary, 
and, as the husband would be Emperor of Austria, to the throne of 
Austria also. 

Three children were born of the marriage : the Princess Sophie 
Hohenberg in 1901, Prince Charles Maximilian in 1902 and Prince 
Ernest in 1904. Francis Ferdinand in no wise desisted from his 
efforts to assure their future, though the other members of the family 
persisted in regarding them as interlopers. It was plain that he 

viii 



Preface to the English Edition 

could only alter the situation by some change in his personal position, 
such as might be produced by a war. As a clerical of clericals he had 
a bitter hatred of Italy. He was the head of the War Party, which 
was exasperated when war was avoided in 1909 after the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzgovina. 

Never very balanced in mind and the victim of some disease which 
has only been hinted at, though its attacks were far from infrequent, 
he pursued a restless and perilous policy which was inspired by his 
almost insane hatred of Jews, Hungarians and Italians. 

The Emperor William decided to make use of the jealousies and 
humiliations of the Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenberg. True, 
the fanatical clericalism of the Archduke stood in his way, but after 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzgovina he established direct contact 
with him, and lent a sympathetic ear to his schemes for solving the 
Southern Slav question in favour of the Hapsburg dynasty and 
Catholicism by opening the road to Salonica. In 1909 the Kaiser 
invited the Archduke and his wife to Potsdam. 

On June 12th, 19 14, they received him, accompanied by Admiral 
von Tirpitz, at their castle of Konopisht in Bohemia. During this 
visit the Emperor of Germany is said to have proposed to the Archduke 
an arrangement, the terms of which have been sent to Mr. Henry 
Wickham Steed, for ten years the foreign correspondent of The Times 
at Vienna and now its foreign editor. 

The Kaiser seems to have suggested to the Archduke and his wife 
the formation of two kingdoms : one, comprising Poland, Lithuania 
and the Ukraine, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, would 
be given to the Archduke and would form the inheritance of his elder 
son, while the other, to be governed by his second son under his 
direction, would be composed of Bohemia, Hungary and the larger 
part of the Slav districts of Austria, with Serbia and the Slav coasts 
of the Adriatic. The Kaiser promised to hand over a part of the 
Duchy of Posen to the first kingdom, and, as compensation, German 
Austria with Trieste, under the government of the Archduke Charles 
Francis Joseph, would be annexed to the German Empire. 

There would be a perpetual military and economic alliance between 
the German Empire, the Kingdom or Empire of Poland and the new 
Kingdom of Bohemia, Hungary and the Southern Slavs. That 
alliance, master of the Balkans and the routes to the East, would 
become the arbiter of Europe. No Power would be able to prevent 
Germany from annexing Belgium and Holland. 

ix 



Preface to the English Edition 



II. — The Sarajevo Crime 

On June 28th, fifteen days later, the Archduke and his wife were 
assassinated at Sarajevo. 

The police of Sarajevo had received orders from the military 
authorities to make no special preparations for the Archduke's visit, 
which was exclusively their affair. There were only one hundred 
and twenty police agents on a route of more than three and a half 
miles. The first bomb was thrown by a young man named Cabrino- 
vitch, the son of an Austrian police agent, who had spent part of 
the previous winter at Belgrade on some suspicious task or other. 
Nothing had been done for the Archduke's safety. No measures 
were taken after his call at the Town Hall, when he started out for the 
hospital. Another young man, Princep, a son of the Chief of the 
Secret Service in Bosnia, stationed himself at the corner of a street 
and killed the Archduke and his wife with three shots from his 
revolver. General Potiorek, who was in command at Sarajevo, 
remained Governor. He received the command of the first army 
which invaded Serbia and after his defeat was pronounced insane and 
shut up in an asylum. Says Mr. Wickham Steed : 

" In the light of the ascertained facts concerning the production of the anti- 
Serbian forgeries employed by Austria during the Annexation crisis of 1908-9, 
and exposed during the Friedjung trial of December, 1909, it would certainly 
not be beyond the power of Austro-Hungarian Secret Service agents to work 
up a plot at Belgrade or at Sarajevo, were it considered desirable, for reasons of 
Imperial policy, either to ' remove ' obnoxious personages or to provide a 
pretext for war." 

The funeral arrangements, carried out by Prince Montenuovo 
in accordance with the Emperor's wishes, were such as to confirm all 
suspicions. Mr. Steed's conclusion is this : 

" If, however, the Emperor Francis Joseph and the Imperial Family obtained, 
before or after the assassination, knowledge of an agreement such as that alleged 
to have been made between the Archduke and the Emperor William at Kono- 
pisht, much that has hitherto been obscure would become intelligible." 

As this pact envisaged the abandonment, by the heir to the Austrian 
Empire, of the hereditary provinces of the Hapsburgs to the German 
Empire, it must have aroused intense uneasiness and disgust in the 
Imperial Family. 



Preface to the English Edition 

Lorali, the Transylvanian priest who offered himself for election 
to the Roumanian Chamber, but withdrew to avoid embarrassing the 
Roumanian Government, declared in his election address that he 
possessed documents which proved that Count Tisza and certain 
Austro-Hungarian high officials were the authors of the Sarajevo 
crime. 

If Count Tisza actually procured the assassination of the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand in order to rid the Hungarians of a man they 
detested and the Imperial Family of the ill-starred couple, and if 
his ultimate motive was to have an excuse for a war against Serbia, 
he may congratulate himself on his immediate success, but he must 
be somewhat uneasy as to the final result. 

The Emperor Francis Joseph, in his rescript of July 5th, 1914, did 
not appear to intend making the assassination a pretext for war. 
He denounced it as " the work of a small band of maniacs," and 
declared that " he would continue to pursue the policy which seemed 
to him most likely to further the welfare of his people." Nevertheless, 
the Ballplatz, instructed by the Wilhelmstrasse, launched an ulti- 
matum on the 14th of July. Francis Joseph hesitated to sign it, 
but at length gave way under pressure from the War Party, and 
especially Count Tisza, who became more and more the dominating 
figure. Count Berchtold, in spite of appearances, was only a tool 
during these events, and he eventually disappeared without leaving 
traces behind him, and gave place to Baron Burian, who is only Tisza's 
vassal just as Tisza is Wilhelm II. 's vassal. 

What a fine pretext the Sarajevo crime afforded him ! 

He pushed Austria-Hungary into the conflict. Instead of appear- 
ing in the role of aggressor, he chose that of faithful ally, taking up 
the task of inflicting just punishment on the authors and actors of 
a hideous crime against a prince ! All sovereigns and princes should 
owe him a debt of gratitude. 

III. — The Assassination of Prince Yusuf Izzedin 

On February 3rd, 1916, the Young Turk Government informed the 
world of the death of Prince Yusuf Izzedin in the following communique : 

" May God grant long life to His Imperial Majesty ! In consequence of the 

malady from which he suffered so long, His Highness the Heir to the Throne 

ommitted suicide at half-past seven this morning in the bedroom of the harem 

xi 



Preface to the English Edition 

pavilion of the summer-house at Zindjirly, by opening the veins of his left 
arm. 

" The death of His Highness has caused His Imperial Majesty the Sultan 
and the Imperial Government the most profound grief." 

All those who read that communique came away convinced that the 
Young Turks had had recourse to a time-honoured practice on the 
shores of the Bosphorus. They had made the heir to the throne 
" commit suicide." 

Information from many quarters confirms that suspicion. The 
Prince was neither a Young Turk nor an old Turk. He was a Turk, 
and, as such, hated by Enver Pasha, the tool of Germany. After the 
bombardment of Odessa by the Turkish fleet he indicated his dis- 
approval in no uncertain manner. From that moment he was 
doomed. 

When the Sultan fell ill in the summer of 191 5, a conference was 
called at the house of Hai'ri Bey, the Sheik-ul-Islam, at which Enver 
Pasha, Talaat Pasha, Bedri Bey, the Prefect of Police, the Vice- 
President of the Turkish Parliament, and the Prince's own doctor 
took part. Hussein Djahid pointed out that the supply of munitions 
was in danger of giving out, and that if the Allies won Yusuf Izzedin 
might be useful in obtaining better terms of peace. These ideas 
met with a hostile reception. If the Sultan died and Yusuf Izzedin 
succeeded him, the Committee of Union and Progress were likely to 
lose its mastery and find a master. Enver Pasha was strongly in 
favour of " removing " the Prince at once. Certainly his substitute, 
Prince Mahid-ed-Din, did not offer complete guarantees of com- 
placency, but they recognized the difficulty of killing off the whole 
Imperial Family and so resolved to run the risk of acquiescing in his 
accession to the throne. 

There were several other meetings, but nothing decisive was 
settled, owing to external events, until after the evacuation of the 
Dardanelles by the Allies, when the Committee considered that the 
time was ripe for putting their scheme into execution. The friends 
of the Prince are certain that the assassination was planned at the 
German Embassy and carried out by his orderly officer, Hassan Bey. 

No European doctor, not even a German doctor, would sign the 
certificate of suicide and finally it was given by nineteen Turkish 
doctors, including in their number the Director of the Army Medical 
Services, one of Enver Pasha's creatures, the oculist Essad, a friend 
of Talaat Bey, an accoucheur, Omer, who had made a fortune out of 

xii 



Preface to the English Edition 

the Turkish Red Cross, Kassim Izz-ed-Din, a member of the secret 
section of the Committee of Union and Progress, Halid, a spy and 
friend of the head of the Secret Police, and, lastly, the Prince's own 
doctor, who had voted in favour of his death at the meeting in the 
house of the Sheik-ul-Islam. 

Yusuf Izzedin was assassinated on the day before he was to start 
for Europe. He had wired to the United States Minister at Sofia 
to arrange an appointment. 

This murder was committed on the shores of the Bosphorus ; yet 
the Young Turks, who are entirely responsible for it, had claimed that 
they overthrew the " red " Sultan, Abdul Hamid, to put an end to 
the crimes which had distinguished his rule. They were cynically 
repeating his policy. But they were not the sole criminals. They 
were urged on and assisted by the representatives of the nation 
which boasts of possessing the most advanced Kultur of the human 
race. 

This crime is an outstanding proof of the backwardness of German 
civilization. It is in the same category as the crimes of her soldiers 
in Belgium and other occupied countries, acts like the destruction of 
Louvain and the murder of Miss Cavell, the exploits of her submarines, 
and the hypocritical lies by which her Government has sought to 
justify her conduct. 



IV. — New Details of German Manoeuvres 

When The Times unfolded the story of the letter it was intended 
to publish and which was to be reproduced by the Wolff Bureau,* 
it did not give the name of the writer. It has done so since and 
revealed the name of Herr Ballin, President of the Hamburg-American 
Line. 

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said in his speech on December 2nd, 
1914 : " At the beginning of June, 1914, I informed the British 
Government that I had knowledge of secret Anglo-Russian proposals 
for a naval convention. I pointed out that such proposals involved 
great dangers to the peace of Europe."! This story, told with the 
object of presenting Germany as the object of a sinister persecution, 
compelled to defend herself, was a mere invention. On October 28th, 

* See Part I., ch. xvi., infra. t See Part I., ch. xvi., infra. 

xiii 



Preface to the English Edition 

191 5, Sir Edward Grey stated that " there was no naval or military 
agreement with Russia . . . prior to the agreement of September 5th, 

1914." 

V. — The Peace Conditions 

I feel I have nothing to change as regards the conditions of peace 
which I suggested. 
I said : 

" I say nothing of Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro, because the settlement 
of the questions which interest them will only be of secondary importance 
when the time for negotiations arrives."* 

The events which took place in the Balkans in the month of Sep- 
tember have done nothing to shake that opinion. 

The diplomatists of the Triple Entente attempted to revise the 
Treaty of Bucharest to the advantage of Bulgaria at the expense of 
Serbia, Greece and Roumania. When they disastrously failed they 
hastened to attribute that failure to the French and English publicists 
and members of Parliament who had dared to express the opinion 
that the occupation of Constantinople by Russia was the only possible 
solution of the question of the Straits. I myself held that view, and 
have seen no reason to change it. I ask those who were so anxious to 
shift the responsibility for their mistakes on to others if they were 
ignorant of Ferdinand's past, his close connection with the House of 
Hapsburg and William II., his attack in 191 3 on the Serbs and Greeks, 
and the loan, payable in munitions of war, which he contracted at 
Berlin early in 1915.+ 

The terrible events which were the logical consequence of the 
unaccountable errors of English, French and Russian diplomacy 
have added a horrible page to the history of martyred Serbia. 

On November 2nd Mr. Asquith declared that the maintenance of 
Serbian independence was one of the essential aims of the Allies. 
This is not enough. Serbia must form a State or Federation with 
the Southern Slavs. I distrust both the origin and the tendency of 
the insidious question which is sometimes raised : " Will Serbia be 
strong enough not to abuse her aggrandizement ? " 

We hear little of what is taking place in Bohemia and Croatia. 
Yet such news as comes through shows that the Austro-Hungarian 
Government have intensified their repressive measures. Early in 

* See p. 312. f See the Appendix: The Bulgarian Question. 

xiv 



Preface to the English Edition 

March Dr. Liebknecht said in the Prussian Landtag that " in Austria 
persecution has been worse than anything hitherto experienced. ,, 
When the Emperor Francis Joseph ordered the execution of all the 
surviving officers of the 28th Czech Regiment of Infantry, which 
surrendered almost en bloc to the Russians, he proved that the war has 
done nothing to reconcile the conflicting sentiments and interests 
which keep the nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire apart.* 
In the Hungarian Parliament Urmauzy denounced the treachery of 
the Czech troops in Serbia, while M. Kelemen put a question as to the 
serious disorders in Szegedin caused by Czech officers and men who 
were transferred there from Bohemia. It seems that they fraternized 
with Roumanian officers and men, joined in singing Roumanian 
national songs and the Slav national hymn, Onward, Slavs! and 
overtly displayed their hatred of the Magyars. M. Kelemen dropped 
his interpellation on a hint from Count Tisza and the President of the 
Chamber that a discussion of the affair would be contrary to the 
national interest.! 

I have ridiculed the triumph of German diplomacy in replacing 
Italy by Turkey in the Triple Alliance. To-day Italy has added her 
armed strength to that of the Triple Entente. I paid a visit to Rome 
and Milan in December and came away with a feeling of perfect con- 
fidence in her fixity of purpose. The vote of the Italian Parliament on 
the 1 8th of March, giving a majority of 394 to 64 to the Salandra 
Ministry, proves that my confidence rested on a solid basis. Like 
Japan, she has adhered to the Compact of London signed on Sep- 
tember 6th, 1914, by Great Britain, France and Russia, providing 
that none of these nations would conclude peace separately. This 
in itself is sufficient to make her at war with Germany as well as 
Austria-Hungary. 

Great Britain has forced Germany to hide away her Dreadnoughts 
and rely entirely on a submarine war, which has done nothing but 
add to her execrable record. England has not only won and 
maintained maritime supremacy for the Allies, but has succeeded in 
raising an army of more than three millions, while more than five 
million men voluntarily offered themselves for service. 

One Saturday evening, towards the end of January, I was in 
London in the company of one of the directors of munition making. 

* See the Journal des ficonomistes, January, 1916 : La Situation Inter- 
nationale, p. 19; 

t The Journal des DSbats, March 6th : News from Bucharest* 

XV 



Preface to the English Edition 

He suggested a visit to a munitions factory the next day. " But 
to-morrow is Sunday," I said. " Sunday does not exist so far as 
munitions are concerned," he replied. 

The Allies are not sufficiently informed of each other's efforts. 
The Russians have shown that their leadership is of the first order, 
and that the rank and file are magnificent both in attack and defence. 
Notwithstanding difficulties of supply, and at times even the lack 
of arms and munitions, they have fought the Austro-German armies 
to a standstill ; by taking Erzrum and Trebizond they have demon- 
strated once more the unity of purpose which inspires the Allies. The 
Turks have turned their backs on Egypt and abandoned their design 
of cutting the Suez Canal for the benefit of Germany. They are less 
anxious than ever to co-operate in the attack on Salonica and the 
alarmists who anticipated the presence of a Turkish army in Cham- 
pagne and Artois may recover their composure. Instead of setting out 
to conquer Persia and the Persian Gulf, they are thinking more of the 
defence of Constantinople. William II. 's great schemes for extending 
German domination to the East have not materialized. 

In 19 14 the Germans rushed upon Paris. In the epic battle of the 
Marne they were driven back. In October they assaulted the Ypres- 
Armentieres front with Calais as their objective. Their onslaught 
was broken. In April, 19 15, they made a violent attack upon the 
Yser front. It was the only great offensive they attempted on the 
West front in the course of that year. In February of this year 
they began a terrific battle before Verdun. Again they have failed 
to break our lines. In this long-drawn conflict the French soldier has 
made up for the grave technical defects in our military preparations 
by his heroism and resource. His courage, determination and will 
to conquer, combined with the exhaustion of the German reserves,* 
enable us to look forward to overwhelming victory. 

Having secured supremacy at sea, the Allies have the resources of 
the world at their disposal, limited only by economic considerations. 
Great Britain has shown that she is what she has always been, the 
greatest financial Power in the world — an argument in favour of Free 
Trade which is unanswerable. 

True, the Allies had in their midst a number of Germanomaniacs, 
who were hypnotized by the victors of Sedan, and agreed with the 
Kulturkrieger (Intellectuals) in dating the economic greatness of 

* See the articles of M. L. Gcawy, the Journal des Economistes, February, 
191 5, January and March, 19 16, 

xvi 



Preface to the English Edition 

Germany from that event. They forgot that the era of Sedan coin- 
cided with certain discoveries and inventions which have been far 
more beneficial to Germany than the war indemnity of 187 1. The 
Bessemer process, the Martin-Siemens furnace, the Gruner process, 
known as " Thomas and Gilchrist " — all date from that period. 
These inventions, the product of English and French brains, have 
made the metallurgical fortune of Germany.* The development of 
her industry in dyes manufactured from coal-tar was due to the 
discoveries of an Englishman, Perkins, and Verguin, a chemist of 
Lyons. If the Germans have made a better use of those discoveries 
than the English and French, they have to thank, not Bismarck, nor 
Von Moltke, but the chemist Liebig, who introduced the practical 
study of chemistry at Giessen in 1827. 

The transformation of industry has done far more for the prosperity 
of German industry than her victories in 1870. Those victories and 
the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine imposed upon her a crushing 
military burden and a disquieting policy, the evil effects of which 
she has felt as much as those against whom it was directed and which 
has finally led to the present cataclysm. 

The fatal results of the triumph of militarist over economic policy, 
patent though they are, have not deterred those Germanomaniacs, 
who, in their patriotic zeal for England and France, desire to make 
their countrymen adopt German imperialism, which is only the 
exploitation of the weak by the strong.f Confusing war, which is an 
affair between States, and commercial intercourse, which is an affair 
between individuals, these enemies of Germany, saturated with 
" Germanism," help to complicate the problem of the political and 
economic future of Europe. They are a prey to doubt and hesitation 
when it is shown that the only guarantee of future peace is the dissolu- 
tion of the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
yet they are spoiling for an economic war after the conclusion of peace. 
Their arguments, inspired by the old spirit of monopoly and com- 
mercial jealousy, are the same as those used against England by 
them and their fathers before them. 

They talk of an economic war and dream of a treaty of peace 

* See La MUallurgie Allemande, by Fritz Thyssen. Revue Economique Inter- 
nationale, June 20th, 191 1. 

I L'Imperialisme Economique, by Yves Guyot. Journal des Economistes, 
March, 191 3. — La Jalousie Commerciale et les Relations Internationales, by 
Yves Guyot (Pamphlet of the Ligue du libre-echange}. 

xvii B 



Preface to the English Edition 

which will usher in an era of commercial boycotting. They would 
like to obliterate from Central Europe its population of 115 to 120 
million individuals, who will need food and commercial intercourse, 
and whose foreign trade before the war was worth hundreds of 
millions. They would forbid the Russians to sell wheat and barley 
to the Germans, and the French to buy German coke and coal from 
the Ruhr mines for the blast-furnaces of the Briey district. 

The effect of such a policy would be not only to maintain a state 
of war after the conclusion of peace, but to reveal conflicting interests 
among the Allies. It is elementary that in these days no nation, not 
even a group of nations, can be altogether self-sufficing.* If we 
attempt to set up an economic system which can only have the effect 
of fostering the passion for revenge of our beaten foes, we shall be 
behaving as slavish imitators of the Germans and Turks. We make 
war because we are determined to have peace. That peace can only 
be permanent if the beaten nations cease to hanker after the im- 
perialistic madness which has brought them to defeat and ruin, if 
they are able to resume their national life and if they know that the 
road to prosperity lies through well-directed energy and productive 
activities. In that case, moral dissolution will follow political dissolu- 
tion, but otherwise the hope of a permanent peace is vain. It is for 
this reason that I emphasize the distinction between the political 
and economic solutions. 

From the first days of the war English, French and Russian states- 
men have declared that the struggle can only end with the destruction 
of Prussian militarism. Militarism is only an effect, and its 
destruction involves the dissolution of the German Empire and the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as the end of the Hapsburg and 
Hohenzollern dynasties. 

Mr. Shadwell, who has special information of the situation in 
Germany, says : 

" The war cannot be ended by negotiation or compromise, because no treaty 
of peace concluded with Germany would be worth the paper it is written on. 
None of the neutral countries trusts Germany now. Those nearest to her are 
armed to the teeth and anxiously watching their frontiers day and night, because 

* See the Journal des Economistes : Les Problemes Economiques apres la 
Guerre. August and September, 191 5. — Journal de la Societe de Statistique, 
March, 1916 : Le Commerce International en 191 5. Communication de M. Yves 
Guyot. — " The Economic Policy of the Allies at the Conclusion of the War." 
Lecture to the Political and Economic Circle of the National Liberal Club, 
March 30th, 1916. 

xviii 



Preface to the English Edition 

they know that their neutrality would be violated to-morrow if the Germans 
thought they could violate it with advantage. A neutral observer, who has 
recently studied the feeling in Switzerland, says that even the German-Swiss, 
who are sympathetic to Germany, do not trust her (The Times, December 17th)."* 



VI. — The Economic War 

The solution of the economic problem implies the abolition of 
protective duties in the countries of the Central Powers. Only in 
this way can the German market be kept open to Alsace and Lorraine 
after their re-incorporation with France. Great Britain, too, should 
retain her Free-Trade policy. The British working man who has 
joined the army will not expect to find on his return home that the 
prices of his bread and bacon have been increased by protective duties. 
France cannot continue to treat England, Belgium and Holland as 
economic enemies. She cannot refuse most-favoured-nation treat- 
ment to the United States of America. France can only rebuild her 
ruins if she obtains the necessary implements and materials at the 
lowest possible price. She can hope to recover her export trade only 
by reducing to a minimum her cost price, which will in any case be 
raised by the interest on the debt and the rapid repayment of 
advances by the Bank to the State. 

Immediate necessities and the vital importance of preventing fresh 
wars compel us to return to long-term commercial treaties with a 
marked bias in the direction of Free Trade. Here a Colbertist will 
mockingly interrupt to remind me that " the votes of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce and the Conference of five hundred delegates 
of British Chambers of Commerce on the 29th of February show that 
the British have broken the idol of Free Trade." The English Press 
tell us that Mr. Bonar Law has expressed his approval of a scheme 
of the French Government for a commercial war against Germany. 
" That means an offensive and defensive alliance of the Allies against 
the German Powers." 

I cannot discuss here the weight that should be given to the votes of 
those Chambers of Commerce. I admit that though thirty out of 
thirty-three members of the Committee of the Manchester Chamber 
of Commerce opposed the vote they have not been re-elected. But 
I may mention that Mr. Bonar Law was President of the Tariff Reform 
Committee before he became the Unionist leader. 

* See the Nineteenth Century and After, January, 19 16 : The Only Way to 
Lasting Peace. 

xix B* 



Preface to the English Edition 

The fact is that at the moment we are all militarists, and it 
is hardly surprising that militarism is subduing and reforming 
economics. Under its influence any reaction is possible. The anti- 
quated prejudices of the mercantile system have come to the front 
once more, thanks to the revival of that spirit of monopoly and 
commercial jealousy which inspired the wars between Holland and 
England, France, Holland and England, Spain and England, and 
which led to the prohibition of trade in wheat and wool between 
France and England. The object of such a system is to maintain 
a continental blockade in time of peace.* 

It is said that the British Government desire to supplement the 
London Compact with another by which each of the Allies undertakes 
not to make a separate commercial agreement with their enemies 
without the approval of all the others. If this suggestion is accepted, 
the protectionists of France will lose that free hand in tariff questions 
of which they were so proud. We shall see what success will attend 
the efforts of the protectionists of the different Allied nations to 
find a basis of agreement for an alliance in an economic war.f I 
suspect that the attempt will lead to differences which can only 
weaken the strength of the political alliance. The present war, 
like its predecessors, has not vitiated the economic argument which 
Tooke enunciated in the Petition of the City Merchants in 1820 : 
" The principle of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the 
dearest, which inspires the dealings of any individual merchant, is 
equally valid and commendable when applied to the commercial 
dealings of whole nations." 

The war has not undermined any of the economic truths set out in 
the Manifest? de la Ligue du libre-e change. In particular, it has not 
vitiated the proposition, vehemently combated by the German, 
Friedrich List, that it is not States, but individuals, which have com- 
mercial dealings. " Free Trade " means commercial dealings between 
individuals without the intervention of an over-ruling third party. 
It has for long been adopted as the best system for the internal trade 
of nations with an advanced civilization, and it must become the 
basis of international trade. 

Yves Guyot. 
April, 19 16. 

* See Yves Guyot : Rapport General de V Exposition Franco-Britanuique de 
1908. 

f See Journal des ficonomistes, Vol. XLVI., p. 36. 

XX 



CONTENTS 

PART I 
THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE WAR 

CHAPTER I 

THE STARTING POINT 

The Sarajevo trial — No connection between the assassination of the Arch- 
duke and the war .......... 3 

CHAPTER II 

THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA AND THE DECLARATIONS OF WAR 

The Austro-Hungarian claims and demands — Reply of the Serbian 
Government — Intentional coincidences — M. Poincare's visit to Russia 
— The attitude of the German Government — D-marches of the am- 
bassadors — Austria, Germany and Russia — Declaration of war on 
Russia on the 1st of August — Declaration of war on France on the 
2nd of August — A tissue of falsehoods ...... 5 

CHAPTER III 

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY AND THE SLAVS 

Austria expelled by Prussia — Bismarck, the " Man of Blood and Iron " — 
Andrassy — Discord within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — Russia 
not the author of Pan-Slavism — The Austrian Government and the 
Slavs — The Emperor Nicholas and John Sobieski — The hegemony of 
the Balkans — The Treaty of Berlin — The independence of Serbia — 
The Germans and Magyars numerically inferior to the Slavs — Bulgaria 
and Eastern Roumelia — Annexation — The Germans and Magyars 
versus the Slavs — " The Pig War " — The declaration forced on Serbia 
by Count Aehrenthal — The trial of Dr. Fried jung . . . 13 

CHAPTER IV 

THE GERMAN AUTOCRACY 

The Hohenzollerns — Voltaire's description of Frederick William — 
Frederick II. — Bismarck — The wars of 1866 and 1870 — Political 
motives for war — The Constitution of the German Empire — Germany 

xxi 



Contents 

is not a nation — The Bundesrat — The King of Prussia as Emperor — 
Peace and war are outside the province of the Reichstag — Divine 
Right of the Emperor — His absolutist declarations . . . .21 

CHAPTER V 

THE KAISER'S GOVERNMENT 

The Constitution of 1871 and the Chancellor — William II. his own Chan- 
cellor—William II.—" The will of God "— *' The instrument of the 
Most High " — Government by force and fraud — Diplomatic illusions — 
" I mean to be loved " — Bismarck on his hereditary pathology . . 26 

CHAPTER VI 

POLICE GOVERNMENT AND ESPIONAGE 

Niebuhr on Police Government — The Precetto — The police system in 
Austria — Two Archdukes killed in less than twenty-five years — The 
assassination of Rudolph — Criticism in connection with the assassina- 
tion of Francis Ferdinand and his wife — The administration of justice 
in Austria — Espionage as the foundation of diplomacy and strategy — 
The Ultimatum, the Czar and M. Poincare — German miscalculations 
in Russia, France and Belgium — Great Britain — The Turks — Italy — 
An accumulation of errors . . . . . . . • 3 1 

CHAPTER VII 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND RUSSIA 

Prussia and Russia after 1772 — Bismarck and Russia in 1877 — The Treaty 
of Berlin — Fears of a Franco-Russian Alliance — The Austro-German 
Alliance — Russian hatred of Germany — Bismarck — Bismarck and 
Constantinople — The Re-Insurance Treaty of 1884 — Bismarck's 
speech of February 6th, 1888 — Schemes against Russian credit — The 
Russian loan in Paris of December 10th, 1888 — The accession of 
William II. — Prince Hohenlohe's account of the rupture with Bis- 
marck — The Triple Alliance in 1891 — William II. 's scheme — The 
Franco-Russian Alliance — German diplomacy and its results . . 38 

CHAPTER VIII 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND GREAT BRITAIN 

The policy of Great Britain — The Balance of Power and naval supremacy — 
Bismarck and Great Britain — The Franco-Egyptian crisis — The 
colonial policy of France — The French Protectionists — " Grasping 
the Trident " — " Our future is on the sea " — Naval policy and world- 
power — Opposition in the Reichstag — The Navy League — Anglophobia 
— Treitschke — Kiao-Chau — Turkey — The Mohammedans — Polynesia 
— Africa — The telegram to Kruger — Von Billow's confessions — Central 
and South America — Holland and Belgium — The blockade of Russia — 

xxji 



Contents 

Megalomania — Picrochole — " Great Britain will not move " — Popular 
illusions about English German ophiles — Mr. Lloyd George's speech at 
the Guildhall on the ist of July, 191 1 — Rage against England . . 44 

CHAPTER IX 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 

Bismarck's policy after Sadowa — Not extended to France — The peril of 
1875 — Its true character — Colonial policy and Anglophobia in France 
— Alsace-Lorraine — Boulangerism — Bismarck and preventive wars — 
Opposition in the Reichstag — The Schnaebele affair — The Raon-1'Etape 
affair — The isolation of Alsace — The Emperor William II. — A policy 
of threats and favours — The visit of the Empress Frederick — Retalia- 
tion on Alsace — The ambitions of William II. — The Franco-Russian 
Alliance of 1894 . . . . . . . . . -53 

CHAPTER X 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 
ALGECIRAS 

Bismarck a reluctant advocate of colonial policy — Opposition in the Reichs- 
tag — New Guinea — Angra Pequefia and Great Britain — Togoland 
and the Cameroons — The Berlin Conference of 1885 — Subsidies for 
German shipping — Caprivi's opposition to colonial expansion — The 
Anglo-French Agreement of April 12th, 1904 — The Franco-Spanish 
Agreement — The resignation of Von Biilow — The Emperor William's 
rage — Herr von Kiihlmann and M. Saint-Rene Taillandier — William 
II. 's visit to Tangier — Germany's insolent demands — " We stand 
behind Morocco with our full strength " — The Algeciras Conference — 
German manoeuvres are checked — Von Biilow and the " isolation " of 
Germany — German diplomacy as seen by the Frankfort Gazette . 62 

CHAPTER XI 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 
AGADIR 

The affair of the deserters — The interview with the Kaiser recorded by the 
Daily Telegraph — Germany's threatening attitude — The agreement of 
February 9th, 1909 — The annexation of Bosnia and Herzgovina — 
Germany " in shining armour " — The Agadir coup — Herr von Kiderlen 
Wachter's declarations to Herr Class, President of the Pan-Germanic 
League — Germany's object — Uncertainty — Morocco and the Congo — 
" Our place in the sun " — German indifference to the Algeciras Con- 
vention — The arrangement of November 4th, 191 1 — "Diplomatic 
ethics " — The five threats to France — Biilow's confession — The motives 
for Germany's ill-will — The routes through Alsace and Lorraine . . 69 

xxiii 



Contents 
CHAPTER XII 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND ITALY 
Italy left in the lurch by Prussia in 1866 — Germany, Tunis and Italy — 
The Prussian legation at the Vatican — Affronts to Italy — The Triple 
Alliance of May 20th, 1882 — Its renewal in 1902 — Austria and the 
Italians — Albania — Italy and Tripoli — The Kaiser provides the 
Turks with submarine mines — Italy replaced by Turkey in the Triple 
Alliance — Signor Giolitti's Note to Austria on the Serbian question — 
Prince Bulow and Italy ........ 76 

CHAPTER XIII 

THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
Beust, Francis Joseph and Andrassy — Reasons for the Treaty of 1879 — 
The self-abasement of the Austrian Emperor — The subordination 
of Austria-Hungary to Germany — Dismemberment the inevitable 
consequence .......... 82 

CHAPTER XIV 

THE NEW TRIPLE ALLIANCE 
Bismarck and the Eastern Question — William II. and Turkey — Accusation 
of wholesale bribery made by the Foreign Office — The lenience of the 
British and French Ambassadors towards the Turks — Enver Pasha — 
How the alliance was made — The Jehad — Allah and the " Old God of 
Konigsberg " — " The Sick Man " — Von Billow's mistake . . .85 

CHAPTER XV 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND THE SMALL STATES 
Luxemburg — Gladstone and Belgium — William II. 's hopes — Herr von 
Jagow and the British Ambassador — Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's 
tirade — Germany covets Antwerp and the Netherlands — The Emden 
failure — The Annexation programme — Professor Lasson — Intimida- 
tion of small states ......... 89 

CHAPTER XVI 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY. ITS METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
The letter to The Times and the Wolff telegram — Herr von Bethmann-Holl- 
weg's contradictory arguments — The aggressive and defensive aspects 
of the Triple Alliance — Threats to England — Fatuity — Germany con- 
fesses she created the Triple Entente — Great Britain guilty of not 
accepting German hegemony of Europe — German attempts to break 
up the Entente — Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg unable to save appear- 
ances — The responsibility for the war — Against Belgium — Against 
Japan — Violation of the Hague Convention of 1907 — Germany's argu- 
ments, false both in law and fact — " Touching a hair of a German " — 
A confession of German psychology — German political incapacity — 
Biilow's admission- — Hypocritical and overbearing diplomacy . . 96 

xxiv 



Contents 



PART II 
THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE WAR 

CHAPTER I 

PRODUCTIVE versus MILITARIST CIVILIZATION 

Their different characters — Germany's methods of expansion — Werre — 
Treitschke's theories of the holiness and divinity of war — War versus 
Law — War is an instrument of constraint ; commerce, of freedom — 
Some apologists of war — A test for the professors — War always ends 
with peace ........... 107 

CHAPTER II 

THE POPULATION OF GERMANY 

" The rights of over-populated countries " — Emigration has almost ceased 
in Germany — The populations of Belgium and Germany compared — 
The area at their disposal — The Torrid Zone — An argument for the 
Neo-Malthusians — The Slavs — The absurdity of the extermination 
theory . . . . . . . . . . 109 

CHAPTER III 

THE THEORY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY 

Economic science a cameral Science — The Historical School — National 
Economy — The Congress of Eisenach — Adolph Wagner and Schmoller 
— Reaction against the disciples of Adam Smith — A summary of the 
economic doctrine — Frederick List — His conclusions . . .112 

CHAPTER IV 

THE ZOLLVEREIN AND THE TARIFF OF 1879 

The Zollverein — Bismarck's inconsistent policy — How his protectionist 
policy encouraged Socialism — The rural and industrial populations — 
Germany's nerve-centre lies west of Berlin — The importance of the 
Rhine Province and Westphalia . . . . . . .117 

CHAPTER V 

ACTIVE PROTECTION AND THE AGRARIAN INTEREST 

The demands oi the Agrarians — The tariffs of 1885 and 1887 — Bismarck's 
mistake — Action against Russia — Caprivi's concessions — Anger of the 
agrarians — Their appeal to the Kaiser — Agrarian v. Industrial policy 

XXV 



Contents 

— Prince Hohenlohe and the great estates — Coalition between the 
great landowners and the great manufacturers — The low standard of 
living of the working-class — The import of grain — The " Import 
Certificates " — Agricultural " Dumping " — The export of rye to 
Russia — The advantages of import certificates — Bounties on spirits — 
Agricultural syndicates and the great landowners . . . .120 

CHAPTER VI 

THE GERMAN SYNDICATES AND DUMPING 

The Syndicates are monopolies of sales, not of production — They date from 
the Tariff Law of 1879 — The syndicates and the chemical industry — 
Herr Liefmann on the disappearance of economic individualism— Cost 
price and market price — The fight against the customer — The con- 
sumer exists for the producer — The Potash Syndicate — Waste — The 
limitation of production — The Rhenish- Westphalian Syndicate 
imports coal — Over-production — The consumer's revenge — The dis- 
appearance of the small-scale producer — The combines — A fictitious 
method of keeping up prices only prolongs crises — The impossibility 
of controlling prices — The Prussian Industrial State and the syndi- 
cates — " Dumping " — How it favours the foreigner — Rotterdam — 
Export bounties for finished products — An unexpected result — Ger- 
man and English sheet-iron — List's theory of national economy means 
a present to the foreigner — Attacks on foreign industries — The Nobel 
Dynamite Trust Company, Limited — The European Petroleum Combine 
and the Deutsche Bank — Industry and the Banks — Financiers and the 
syndicates — Some conclusions . . . . . . .127 

CHAPTER VII 

COAL-MINING. THE METALLURGICAL AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES IN 

GERMANY 

Comparative figures of coal production — The reserves of coal — The produc- 
tion and consumption of iron — Some comparative figures — Exports — 
Realization of stocks — Pig iron and steel as raw material — The 
chemical industry — The distribution of coal among the various 
industries . . . . . . . • • • -136 

CHAPTER VIII 

ANGLO-GERMAN TRADE 

The syndicates are the great export-machines — British and German trade 
from 1904 to 191 3 — Anglo-German trade — The German figures — The 
difference between f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices — The British figures — The dis- 
crepancies — German exports always higher — Special lines of trading — 
Class I., foodstuffs — Class II., raw materials— Class III., manufactured 
articles — Class IV., miscellaneous —Totals — British re-exports — British 
exports into Germany and the German tariff . . . . • 143 

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Contents 
CHAPTER IX 

MARITIME RIVALRY 

Palmerston and the German navy — Ships without ports — " Kolossal " — 
The great German steamship lines — The British and German fleets — 
Naval construction — The share of the German mercantile marine in 
maritime traffic — " Tramps " disregarded by the Germans — Prestige 
as a motive for maritime enterprise — Export bounties and subsidies — 
Charges against Great Britain — The German Empire and the " Free- 
dom of the Seas " . . . . . . . . . .150 

CHAPTER X 

FRANCO-GERMAN TRADE 

Article 1 1 of the Treaty of Frankfort — The trade of France with her chief 
customers and sources of supply — French and German statistics — The 
chief imports of France — Coal, machinery, grain — French exports of 
raw materials — Foodstuffs and chemical products — The skin and fur 
trade — Seed for sowing — The textile industries — Jewellery — Toys — 
Motor-cars — Interruption of the normal expansion of Franco-German 
trade . . . . . . . . . . . .154 

CHAPTER XI 

HOSTILE ECONOMIC PRACTICES 

What is a commercially " closed " State — Fichte, Oldenburg and Wagner 
— The Chancellor's protectionist views — Their effect on the elections — 
The 1909 tariff — Additions to the number of articles — Article 103 — 
Discrimination — No exchange of cattle between France and Germany — 
Threats and recriminations — Article 15 of the Law of 1892 — Germany's 
reply — Sparkling wines and brandies — Analyses — The Comite da 
Commerce Francais avec V Allemagne — German railway rates — Export 
fever in Germany — The Press agitation of 1913 — Commercial jealousy, 
economic ignorance, hypocritical and unfair practices . . .161 

CHAPTER XII 

THE OPEN DOOR 

The Open Door — The Journal de Geneve and Algeria — German trade in 

Algeria 167 

CHAPTER XIII 

COLONIAL AMBITIONS AND ILLUSIONS 
German Colonial Policy — " Land hunger " — -Settlement colonies in Africa 
— Massacre of the natives — No outlets for the German population — 
Theories and facts — Kiao-Chau — German interests in Morocco — 
Navigation for prestige — Economic pretexts to cover political aims — 
" Extending the frontiers "........ 169 

xxvii 



Contents 
CHAPTER XIV 

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 

Frederick Barbarossa and William II. — German friendship for Abdul 
Hamid — The Konia-Bagdad railway — Financial arrangements — The 
French Government's part — A check in England — The Franco- 
German Agreement of February 15th, 1914 — Horns-Bagdad — Diplo- 
matic mysteries — German trade in Turkey . . . . .174 

CHAPTER XV 

ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND IMPERIALISM 

A contradiction — Pacific declarations of industrials and financiers — Their 
arguments — They were self-evident — " The economic organization of 
Germany was fashioned for peace " — Exchange is the affair of indi- 
viduals, policy of Governments — The Kaiser as commercial busybody 
— The Sultan as his customer — The Professors of Economics stray 
from their subject — Economic Imperialism — Military interests — Herr 
Thyssen's Anglophobia — French iron mines owned by Germans — Raw 
material — Germany's large imports from Russia and Great Britain — 
Great Britain her best customer — Economic considerations abandoned 
— " Prestige " — The War Party — Harden's exhortations — A sum- 
mary — The real end and its attainment by appeal to the passions . 180 

CHAPTER XVI 

THE PROFITS OF WAR. THE WAR INDEMNITY OF 1871 

Maximilian Harden — The bandit view of war — The indemnity of 
^200,000,000 — The cost to Germany of the war of 1870 — How much 
recovered through the indemnity ? — How the indemnity was paid — 
Gold movements in Germany — Loss on the sale of silver — How the 
indemnity was used — The Vienna crisis — Bismarck's view of the effects 
of the indemnity — Mr. Norman Angell's hypothesis — The effect of the 
indemnity on prices and wages — The indemnity cost Germany dearly . 187 

CHAPTER XVII 

THE BURDEN OF ARMAMENTS 

The Seven- Year and Five- Year Bills — The Reichstag's opposition — The 
Laws of March 27th, 191 1 ; June 14th, 1912 and July 3rd, 1913 — The 
Slav Peril and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech on April 7th, 191 3 
— An ever-expanding budget — The accumulation of debt between 
1900 and 1909 — The subscriptions to the loans of March, 1913 — The 
levy on property — Its character — Miscalculations — Incitements to 
waste — The naval and military expenditure of the German Empire 
imposed a similar burden on other countries . . . . .193 

xxviii 



Contents 
CHAPTER XVIII 

THE FACTOR OF SOCIALISM 

The spread of Socialism — Its influence at the polls — Agrarians and Socialists 
— The protection of foodstuffs — The failure of the Insurance Scheme 
— The fall in wages in 19 14 — " Red Internationalism " and " Red 
Nationalism ".......... 199 

CHAPTER XIX 

THE CONFLICT OF THE TWO CIVILIZATIONS 

The immediate causes of the war — A " preventive " war — The conflict 

between a militarist civilization and a productive one ., . . 202 

PART III 
THE HISTORICAL CAUSES 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 

CHAPTER I 

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE AND THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA 

The coronation of Charlemagne — The Treaty of Verdun (843) — Historic 
law — Lothair's portion — Germany — The Holy Roman Empire — 
Anarchy in Germany — The Electors — The Hapsburg — France and the 
Thirty Years War — The relation of France with Alsace — France the 
Peace-maker — The services rendered by France — The Elector of 
Brandenburg — Character of the Peace of Westphalia — Prussia under- 
mines French influence ......... 207 

CHAPTER II 

FRANCE AND PRUSSIA FROM I735 TO 1814 

France as the ally of Prussia — The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) — 
France allied to Austria during the Seven Years War — The Brunswick 
manifesto in 1792 — The Treaty of Bale in 1795 — The Franco-Prussian 
Agreement — The Treaty of Luneville — The gains of Prussia and 
Austria — The Holy Roman Empire becomes Protestant — The Diet of 
Ratisbon — Napoleon's mistake — The Convention of Potsdam and the 
results of Austerlitz — The Peace of Pressburg — The Confederation of 
the Rhine (July 12th, 1806) — The end of the Holy Roman Empire — 
Napoleon the heir of Charlemagne — The war with Prussia — The Treaty 
of Tilsit — Napoleon's acts — Stein — General Scharnhorst — Prussia's 
offers to France — Yorck and the Prussian forces after the Russian 
campaign — Hardenberg : bribes to France — Prussia's indifference to 
the fate of Germany — The Treaty of Kalisch — The King of Prussia's 
summons to his people — The Treaty of Paris — The Germanic Con- 
federation . . . . . . . . . . .212 

xxix 



Contents 
CHAPTER III 

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 

The programme of the Treaty of Kalisch and the achievements of the 
Congress of Vienna — Talleyrand — The rule of law — Public law — The 
contempt of the Prussians and the Czar of Russia for public law — 
Austria, Talleyrand and Lord Castlereagh — The Treaty of January 3rd, 
18 1 5 — The disastrous mistake of Talleyrand and Lord Castlereagh — 
Acquisitions of Prussia, Austria and Russia — Switzerland — The pro- 
visions of the Congress of Vienna relating to the Germanic Confedera- 
tion — Prussia's discontent — " Only accept the Rhine Province for the 
defence of Germany " — The Holy Alliance — The final decree of the 
Congress of Vienna ......... 222 

CHAPTER IV 

PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA. 1847-1866 

Frederick William's opposition to a written constitution — The Revolution 
of 1848 and German unity — " Prussia transformed into Germany " — 
The Parliament of Frankfort — The elimination of Austria — Offer of 
the Imperial crown to the King of Prussia — The Treaty of the Three 
Kings — The Parliament of Erfurt — The Diet of Frankfort — The Con- 
vention of Olmiitz — Prussia's desire for revenge — Bismarck and the 
prussification of Germany — Ferro et igne — Governing without Parlia- 
ment — " Might is right " — Bismarck and the Polish insurrection — 
The question of the Duchies — Napoleon III., Austria and Prussia — 
Bismarck and Napoleon III. — The war of 1866 — The preliminaries of 
peace at Nikolsburg — The Treaty of Prague — Prussia's gains — The 
question of compensation — M. Benedetti's ignorance — His fears in 1868 227 

CHAPTER V 

THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 

The Federal Constitution — Procedure — The King of Prussia Bundes 
Presidium and Bundes-Feldherr — The same attributions as those of the 
Deutsche Kaiser — The Chancellor — The Bundesrat — The Reichstag — 
Electoral conditions unchanged after 1867 — Treaties of defensive 
alliance with the Southern States — The Zollverein . . . .235 

CHAPTER VI 

THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDATURE 

Astuteness of King William and Bismarck — Beginnings of the Hohen- 
zollern Candidature question in March, 1869 — Prince Leopold's refusal 
— He is compelled to accept — Proceedings at Ems — the Prince of 
Hohenzollern withdraws — M. de Gramont's inconsistent demands — 
The Ems incident — Bismarck's telegram — The opposition of the 
southern States . . . . . . . . . .238 

XXX 



Contents 
CHAPTER VII 

THE CERCAY PAPERS AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE 

The Due de Gramont against Austria and Italy — The Bavarian minister 
Bray — His policy and conversion — Count Beust follows suit — The 
Cercay papers — M. de Ruville's explanation — Bavarian opposition — 
The ceremony at Versailles — The Emperor disagrees with Bismarck — 
The Emperor prefers the title of " Emperor of Germany " to that of 
" German Emperor " — The necessity of dissolving the German Empire 242 

PART IV 

THE HISTORICAL CAUSES OF THE WAR 

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY 

CHAPTER I 

RACES AND NATIONALITIES 
Definition of a race — Lack of agreement — The different elements of ethnic 
groups — The secondary role of somatic characteristics — The race 
question in Austria-Hungary — Historical and linguistic characteristics 249 

CHAPTER II 

AUSTRIA 

The Austrian Marches — The Duchy — The Hapsburgs — The monogram 
A.E.I.O.U. — Austria was never among the Electors of the Empire — A 
Duchy — Austria has no history — The title of " Emperor of Austria " 
dates from 1804 . . . . . . . . . .251 

CHAPTER III 

THE CZECHS 

I. Slavs and Teutons — The Czech civilization — The bishopric of Prague — 

German " peaceful penetration " — Relations with France — The King 
of Bohemia as an imperial Elector — The struggle against German 
influence — John Huss — The Czech language — Prague University — The 
Council of Constance — The resistance of the Hussites — Ferdinand 
of Hapsburg — The Confessio Bohemica — The Lettre de Majeste — 
The defenestration of Prague — The Battle of the White Mountain — 
Reaction in Bohemia. 

II. The awakening of national feeling — The Judgment of Libasa — 

Palacky's letter to the Committee of Fifty — The Congress of Prague — 
The three issues in Austria : Centralism, Dualism and Federalism— 
The Constitution of 1849 — Tne reaction — German policy — The elec- 
toral system — Dualism — The progress of the Czechs — The decay of 
German influence — The Germans and the Czechs — The Wacht am Rhein 
and the Marseillaise . . . . . . . . .254 

xxxi 



Contents 
CHAPTER IV 

THE HUNGARIANS 

Their origin uncertain — They belonged to the Finno-Ugrian family — Their 
choice of Western civilization — St. Stephen— A State independent of 
the Roman and Eastern Empires — Struggles with the Turks — Ferdi- 
nand of Austria elected King of Hungary — The Ottoman invasions 
— Religious persecution — Resistance to German influence — The 
Hungarian aristocracy — Szechenyi — The Magyar language — Fiscal 
privileges — Historic rights and formalities — Revolts by and against 
the Hungarians — Retrogression — Hungarian policy is anti-German 
towards Hungarians, but Prussian towards others — Hungarian ambi- 
tions and their realization to-day ....... 262 

CHAPTER V 

THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 

The Croats — Latin influences — The Serbs and Byzantine influences — 
Historic claims : Koloman II. — Croats v. Magyars — The defeat of 
Kossovo — Serbia — A Turkish pashalik from 1459 to 1804 — The Croats 
escaped Turkish rule — Illyria — Subject provinces or allied kingdoms — 
Croat nationality — The Nagoda of 1868 — Subjection to the Hun- 
garians — The oppression of Croatia — The liberation of Serbia — Bosnia 
and Herzgovina — Antagonisms and aspirations — The Congress of 
Abbazia ........... 267 

CHAPTER VI 

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY 

Joseph II. 's germanizing zeal — The policy of Metternich and Francis II. — 
Divide ut imperes — Constitutional and centralist policy — The Diet of 
Kromeriz — Bach — The Germans of Austria are one with the Germans 
of Germany — The three bonds of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — 
The Emperor — His titles — The army — The bureaucracy — The selection 
of officers — The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — Both 
Germans and Hungarians have striven for its dismemberment — Magyar 
centralism ........... 273 

PART V 
THE CONSEQUENCES 

CHAPTER I 

THE END IN VIEW 
International law — An aspiration rather than a reality — Treaties resulting 
from wars are instruments of extortion — Neither victors nor vanquished 
regard them as final — The sovereignty of the State — The absence of 

xxxii 



Contents 

morality in international dealings — " Might is Right " — The law of 
the strongest — Historical law — The great treaties — The coming treaty- 
will be the resultant of force — Use and misuse of force — The coming 
treaty and acceptance of the inevitable . . . . .281 

CHAPTER II 

WHAT IS MEANT BY NATIONALITY IN POLITICS 

Political anthropology — The Teutonic race — Its rights are the invention of 
the Historical School — The principle of nationality is not a principle of 
law — Is it a traditionalist principle ? — The Turks, Germans and Hun- 
garians are incapable of assimilating the groups they govern — Their 
power of resistance constitutes their nationality — The incompetence 
of their rulers i3 their right to separation — The end of the Hapsburgs, 
Hohenzollerns and the Ottoman Empire . . . . . .286 

CHAPTER III 

THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY 

The Compact of September 6th, 1914 — Neutrals will have no locus standi — 
Only the belligerents can be parties to the treaty — The precedents of 
1 8 14 and 18 15 — The Hohenzollerns and the Imperial Chancellor are 
disqualified — The plenipotentiaries to the Bundesrat — The Reichstag 
possessed the treaty-making power in the Germanic Confederation . 288 

CHAPTER IV 

THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS 

The effect, not the cause — Results in 1806, 1856 and 1870 — Foreign inter- 
ference in contrast to political independence ..... 290 

CHAPTER V 

THE GOAL IS THE REMOVAL OF THE CAUSES OF WAR 

A political task — How to remove the causes of war — We must be satisfied 
with that aim — The maintenance of peace — It is impossible with the 
present constitution of the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy — Prussia to be dismembered at the start of negotiations . 292 

CHAPTER VI 

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 

The two autocracies : the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy — The remodelling of Germany — Commercial unity : the 
Zollverein is permanent — Political unity : the Empire must be dis- 
solved — The annexations of 1866 — Not by agreement — Those annexed 
accepted the inevitable — King George V. of Hanover — The Emperor's 

xxxiii c 



Contents 

an — 7 he powers of the individual States — We must resr.;-. 
;: the mdmdu&l States while destroying I he diploma 
..'.::;.:• Autocracy of the King .... 294 

CHAPTER VII 

THE FACTOR OF PARTICULARISM 

kkms — Dissf :an Empire — 

Ihe Gaeftb— The ' Party of 1 " — The::: :he 
. pte siU gii — The Prossificatian of Germany — The | 

. . — . :he 
Soath and th ^deration of the Rhine — The chances of per- 
se — A Saxon's opinion of Prussian influence — of 

5 it . . . . 1 g . ; 

CHAPTER VIII 

THE DISMEMBERMENT OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

The ooflapsf :-Hungar: - . e mutual h 

:omponent peoples — Annnnal ;;d by natural 

I mpmgs — Vitality - *— teater Serbia — Italy 

and the Adriatic — The Trentino — The German provinces — Girault's 

qc for the reconstruction of a German Ausl -.-nan Empire 

— No counterpoise pass —Doc - and 

1871 . . . . . . . . 500 

CHAPTER IX 

ROUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA 

I. Roumania — The Kingdom of Dacia — Tradition — Turkey and Russia — 

: union of Moldavia and Wallachia settled by the Treaty of Paris 
in 1S56 — Union in 1S59 — A constitutional monarchy in 1S60" — Sym- 
pathy for France in 187] — I - s 1 in 1881. 

II. Transylvania and I m BmmmL 

III. Daco- Roumanian ambitions — The advantage oi having a strong 
buffer State between Russia and the Balkans— The importance of a 
final settlement . . . . . . . . . 5:5 

CHAPTER X 

TURKEY 

Lord Beaconsheld introduces Germany to Eastern politics — Constantinople 
a hot-bed of intrigue — The Anatolian Railway in 1SS9 — The " Sick 
Man " — The Treaty of Paris — The dogma of Turkish integrity — Lord 
Derby and the suicide of the " Sick Man '' — EI .Img theories 

both conventional and false — The Khalifate — The break-up of the 
Turkish Empire — Russia and Constantinople — The Balkans . . 310 

xxxiv 



Contents 
CHAPTER XI 

RUSSIA 

The development of the Slav States as an antidote to Pan-Slavism— 
Russia's power of " assimilation " — The tolerance of Mohammedans — ■ 
The Slav peril — Mazzini's opinion — An Italian alliance with the Slav 
family 313 

CHAPTER XII 

POLAND 

Austria's right to Galicia — The partitions of Poland — The arrangement of 
18 1 5 — The incorporation of Cracow in Austria — Germany's failure to 
assimilate the Poles — The Kaiser's appeal to the Teutonic Knights — 
The proclamation of August 14th, 1914 ...... 315 

CHAPTER XIII 
The German Colonies 317 

CHAPTER XIV 

THE RESTORATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE 

I. The declaration of the Deputies in 1871 — Germany's failure to assimilate 

Alsace-Lorraine — French culture survives — Area and population of the 
annexed provinces — The proportion of German immigrants — The re- 
constitution of the four departments. 

II. Restoration a matter of right — The question of a plebiscite does not 

arise — The plebiscite is a mechanical and simple system, but unsatis- 
factory — Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague — Impossibility of securing 
a genuine referendum . . . . . . . . . 31& 

CHAPTER XV 

THE WAR INDEMNITY 

War is an affair between States, not between individuals — " Strangling " 
the Germans — The policy of pressure and the policy of reconciliation — 
The war indemnity — Herr von Zedlitz's claims — Pecuniary responsi- 
bility — Some crimes against the law of nations ought to entail personal 
responsibility — Securities — The Prussian State railways — The State 
mines — No State will secure material profit from the war . . .321 

CHAPTER XVI 
German Trade and Free Trade . 325 

Conclusion 326 

XXXV 



Contents 
APPENDIX 

THE BULGARIAN QUESTION 

I. Balkan interests and peace — II. The Bulgarians before and after 1878 — 
III. Bulgaria and the Wars of 1912-1913 — IV. The Bulgarians and 
Macedonia — V. Diplomatic illusions — VI. The difficulties of the 
problem ........... 329 

Index 351 



XXXVJ 



PART I 

THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE WAR 



The Causes and Consequences of 
the War 



CHAPTER I 

THE STARTING POINT 

The Sarajevo trial — No connection between the assassination of the Archduke 
and the war. 



O 



N the 28th of October, 19 14, appeared an announcement that 
judgment had been given in the Sarajevo trial. 



The prisoners Danilo Ilio, Veljko Cubrilovic, Nedo Kerovic, Misco Jovanonic 
and Jakov Milovic are sentenced to death by strangulation. 

Mikar Karovic is condemned to imprisonment for life. 

Danilo Princep, Nedjelko Cabrinovitch and Trifko Grabez are sentenced to 
imprisonment for twenty years. 

The announcement was barely noticed. So momentous had been 
the consequences of the assassination of the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand on the 28th of June, that the event itself had almost 
passed into oblivion. Nothing of the trial itself was known. Nine 
persons had been sentenced. 

As the same penalty had not been pronounced in each case, the 
judges must have distinguished between the various degrees of guilt. 
Yet men who knew nothing of that crime have lost their lives by 
thousands and suffered every form of agony and mutilation, women 
and children have known every form of torture and death, thousands 
of houses have been destroyed, and sorrow and mourning have stalked 
through Serbia, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany 
and Austria-Hungary. 

Why have these hordes of victims been sacrificed to the shade of 
the Archduke Francis Ferdinand ? How comes it that an act which 
alone concerned the lives and conscience of its perpetrators, whether 
principals or accessories, has led to a holocaust, the horror of which 
finds no parallel in human history or imagination ? 

3 ** 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

In the June* issue of the Journal des Economistes, when examining 
the risks of war and the burden of armaments, I concluded my 
article thus : 

The statesmen of every country should make it their business to compare the 
importance of the objective causes of the risks of war with the crushing burdens 
of an armed peace. The disparity is patent. There remain the subjective 
causes which are not susceptible of calculation, being the outcome of certain 
psychological conditions to which no standard can be applied. Yet in the 
ordinary affairs of life it is assumed that men will behave as rational beings. 
Is it too much to hope that those who direct the destinies of nations will behave 
likewise ? 

The present war shows that it was indeed too much to hope. The 
Emperors Francis Joseph and William II., and their advisers, Count 
Tisza, Premier of Hungary, Count Berchtold, President of the Austro- 
Hungarian Council of Ministers, Doctor von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
the German Imperial Chancellor, and Herr von Jagow, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, have made the assassination of the Archduke an 
excuse for plunging Europe into the horrors of universal war. 

There is no relation between the cause and the effect. The conse- 
quences are out of all proportion to the motive assigned. The mere 
fact of that disproportion amply justifies us in believing that these 
rulers and statesmen have committed themselves to a course of 
conduct which Teuton psychology can alone explain. 



* 1914. 



CHAPTER II 
THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA AND THE DECLARATIONS OF WAR 

The Austro-Hungarian claims and demands — Reply of the Serbian Government 
— Intentional coincidences — M. Poincare's visit to Russia — The attitude of 
the German Government — Demarches of the ambassadors — Austria, Ger- 
many and Russia — Declaration of war on Russia on the ist of August — 
Declaration of war on France on the 2nd of August — A tissue of 
falsehoods. 

THE authors of this war, realizing the necessity of justifying 
themselves, in face of the responsibility they have assumed, 
to their contemporaries, compatriots and posterity, have tried with 
perverted and childish ingenuity to throw the onus on Russia, Great 
Britain and France. 

Yet it was neither Russia, Great Britain, nor France which deli- 
vered to Serbia the ultimatum of the 23rd of July. 

According to that ultimatum Serbia was held comprehensively 
responsible for the murder of the Archduke. It demanded that the 
Serbian Government should insert a three-paragraph notice on the 
front page of the " Official Journal " to the effect that " the Royal 
Government of Serbia condemn all propaganda directed against 
Austria-Hungary," and pledged itself " to proceed with the utmost 
rigour against all persons guilty of participation in such propaganda." 

The Serbian Government was to pledge itself also : 

(1) To suppress every publication which incites to hatred or contempt of 

the monarchy. 

(2) To suppress immediately the Society known as " Narodna Odbrana." 

(3) To purge public instruction of anything which serves, or might serve, 

to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. 

(4) To dismiss from the Army and administration all officers and functionaries 

guilty of participating in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy. 

(5) To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Imperial 

and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement 
directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy. 

5 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

(6) To institute proceedings against all participants in Serbia in the plot of 

the 28th of June. Delegates appointed by the Imperial and Royal 
Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto. 

(7) To arrest without delay Voislav Tankossitch and one Milan Zigano- 

vitch, an employee in the Serbian state service, whose complicity in the 
Sarajevo crime has been established. 

(8) To prevent the Serbian authorities from co-operating in the illicit traffic 

in arms and explosives across the frontier ; to dismiss and punish 
severely the officials of the frontier service at Shabatz and Loznica 
who were guilty of aiding and abetting the authors of the Sarajevo 
crime by assisting them to cross the frontier. 

(9) To give to the Imperial and Royal Government an explanation of the 

unjustifiable utterances indulged in by high Serbian officials both in 
Serbia and abroad. 

(10) To notify the Imperial and Royal Government immediately on the 

execution of the measures herein set forth. 
The Imperial and Royal Government expects the reply of the Royal Govern- 
ment not later than six o'clock in the evening of Saturday, the 25th of this 
month.* 

There followed a commentary in which the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister affected to set forth the circumstances under which the note 
was delivered. It held up to contrast the hostile attitude of Serbia 
and the long-suffering benevolence of which Austria-Hungary was 
giving yet further proof. It contained the following paragraph : 

"The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this 
step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all 
civilized nations, who could not allow regicide to become a weapon that can 
be used with impunity for the realization of political aims, nor the peace of 
Europe to be in perpetual jeopardy from the machinations emanating from 
Belgrade." 

The five paragraphs which followed recited the various parts played 
by the individuals mentioned in the ultimatum. 

That this ultimatum inspired terror in Serbia is proved by the 
character of the reply, which granted all the demands with the 
following reservations : 

(5) The Royal Government must confess that they do not quite grasp the 
meaning and extent of the Imperial and Royal Government's demand 
that Serbia shall agree to accept the collaboration on her own territory 
of officials of the Royal and Imperial Government ; but they declare 
that they will admit such collaboration as is consistent with the 
principles of international law and criminal procedure, as well as good 
neighbourly relations. 

* See the British White Paper. 

6 



The Ultimatum to Serbia and the Declarations of War 

(6) The Royal Government have no need to assert that they consider it a 
matter of duty to open an inquiry against all persons on Serbian soil 
who, now or hereafter, may be shown to be guilty of complicity in 
the plot of the 15th of June.* As for the participation in this inquiry 
of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for that purpose 
by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot 
accept it, for it would be a violation of the Constitution and the law 
of criminal procedure. However, in specific instances, information 
as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to 
the Austro-Hungarian agents. 

{7} Voi'slav Tankossitch has been arrested, but Milan Ziganovitch had 
escaped and he was a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 
The Serbian Government asked that the presumptive evidence and 
eventual proof of their guilt might be communicated to them in the 
ordinary way. 

All the accused were Austro-Hungarian subjects. The Austro- 
Hungarian Government when drawing up this unprecedented 
diplomatic document knew that Serbia could not accept, without 
fatally compromising her independence, the two paragraphs in respect 
of which she made her reservations. 

This ultimatum to Serbia, requiring an answer within forty-eight 
hours, had been delivered on the 23rd of July, a day on which 
M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, was far from Belgrade. 
At Vienna only Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, knew 
of it.t All the other embassies had found the silence of the Ball- 
platz so profound and reassuring that on the 20th of July the Russian 
Ambassador had left Vienna for a fortnight's holiday. On the 22nd 
and 23rd of July the French Ambassador had two interviews with 
Baron Macchio, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. After 
the first he came away with the impression that the Austro-Hungarian 
Government would take no step to which any Government could 
legitimately object. At the second he was not even told that the 
Note had been presented the same day nor advised of its intended 
publication on the following day. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who saw 
the other Under-Secretary, Count Forgach, on the same day, had 
been more fortunate and learned both the fact of its presentation and 
the character of its contents. The Italian Ambassador, the Duke of 
Avarna, was left entirely in the dark. Not one of the ambassadors 
except the German was told anything by Count Berchtold of the 

* Old Style. 

f See the report of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, No. 161, " Great Britain and the 
European Crisis," the British White Paper. 

7 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

momentous event then preparing. During the forty-eight hours 
which preceded the presentation of the Note he had left for Ischl, 
where he was inaccessible to ambassadors. It is true that as early 
as the 15th of July Sir Maurice had been aware of its existence, but 
his information was derived solely from a private source. It is also 
true that the Neue Freie Presse and other journals were using 
threatening language to Serbia ; but the government organ, the 
Fremdenblatt, was more moderate in tone ; so much so that, as 
Sir Maurice de Bunsen said, " the prevailing opinion among my 
colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to 
involve her in grave European complications."* 

The Note was published on the 24th of July and no one hesitated 
to describe it as an ultimatum. At one moment a rumour gained 
currency that Serbia had accepted it in its entirety. Disappoint- 
ment was general in Vienna, but the same evening it became known 
that the Serbian reply contained reservations and that the Austrian 
Minister, Baron Giesl, had broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia. 
There was a wild outburst of enthusiasm — kept under control, how- 
ever — in Vienna and other Austrian towns. Both the Press and the 
Street demanded immediate war with Serbia as a fitting punishment 
for the Sarajevo crime. 

While the Ballplatz thus kept the French Ambassador in ignorance, 
they knew that the President of the Republic and the President of 
the Council, returning from Russia, could not reach France for four 
or five days. It is hardly a bold conjecture that this coincidence 
was no mere accident. 

At St. Petersburg, on the 24th of July, M. Sazonof, the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, said to Sir George Buchanan, the British 
Ambassador, that Austria would never have embarked on so provo- 
cative and immoral a course without first being assured of the support 
of Germany. 

The German Government denied, and continues to deny, that they 
knew anything about the ultimatum. Yet after the 24th of July 
they declared that " the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment seemed just and reasonable." How did they arrive at that 
conclusion if they had not been acquainted with those demands ? 
They added that " the dispute is one which concerns Austria-Hungary 
and Serbia only. The Imperial Government desire that the conflict 

* See the British White Paper. 



The Ultimatum to Serbia and the Declarations of War 

may be localized. Any intervention by another power may entail 
incalculable consequences." Already, on the day on which the 
ultimatum was launched, they had issued a decree of partial 
mobilization. 

" On the morning of the 25th of July the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine had 
been confined to barracks. On the same day the frontier works had been put 
into a state of war. On the 26th they had issued orders to the railways to 
take preliminary measures for the concentration of troops. On the 27th the 
necessary requisitions had been completed and the covering troops were in 
position."* 

Sir Edward Grey told Count Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador in London, that the Serbian reply was the greatest 
humiliation that he had known any state to suffer, and that he was 
bitterly disappointed to learn that it was regarded as unsatisfactory 
by the Austrian Government. 

If the Austrian Government's sole concern was to guard themselves 
against Serbian aggression, they might have secured, by the way of 
diplomacy, the goodwill of Russia and the other Powers. 

As soon as the Serbian reply was received, the Austrian mobilization 
was completed. 

On the 27th of July, Sir Edward Grey announced in the House of 
Commons that he had suggested a joint demarche at Vienna and 
St. Petersburg of the English, French, German and Italian ministers. 
The suggestion was accepted by France and Russia, but declined 
by Germany. When communicating this suggestion to Count 
Berchtold on the 28th, Sir Maurice de Bunsen was careful to avoid 
the word " mediation," lest Austrian susceptibilities should be hurt. 
The Austrian Minister replied that war would be declared on Serbia 
the same day. In reply to certain observations of Sir Maurice de 
Bunsen, Count Berchtold expressed an opinion that Russia had lost 
any right to intervene from the moment that Austria assured her 
that she aimed at no increase of territory. It seemed to be his view 
that to reduce an independent state to a condition of vassalage was 
less serious than to appropriate a part of it. Evidently the Ballplatz 
considers the whole less than the part. 

All the ambassadors, except the German, did what they could 
to preserve peace. 

The question was whether Count Berchtold, with all his arrogance, 

* See the Memorandum of the 4th of August issued by the French Government. 

9 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

was really prepared to defy Russia or was hoping that Austria- 
Hungary could renew her challenge without greater risk than 
in 1908. 

On the next day, July 29th, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin 
told Sir Edward Goschen that a European war was a remote con- 
tingency, " Russia being unwilling and in no condition to make war." 
On the 28th, in answer to the request of M. Schebeko, the Russian 
Ambassador, Count Berchtold had refused to authorize Count 
Szapary, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to begin 
conversations with M. Sazonof. But two days later, after Russia 
had ordered a partial mobilization against Austria, he gave his consent 
without reserve and in the most friendly terms. Agreement seemed 
well within sight. On the 1st of August Sir Maurice de Bunsen was 
informed that Count Szapary had told M. Sazonof that Austria had 
consented to submit to the arbitration of the powers those points 
in her Note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the independ- 
ence of that State. M. Sazonof had asked that Austria should not 
invade Serbia. On the 1st of August, Count Mensdorff, the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador in London, assured the Foreign Office that 
Austria had never shut the door on a peaceful solution nor broken 
off conversations. The Austrian Ambassador in Paris gave a similar 
assurance. On the other side, M. Schebeko had employed the most 
conciliatory language at Vienna and had told Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
that the tone of Count Berchtold had been no less friendly. The 
general opinion was that Austria was merely seeking some means 
to cover her retreat. 

Unhappily the supreme direction of affairs had already passed 
from the Ballplatz to the Wilhelmstrasse. On the evening of July 29th, 
Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin, had been 
asked to meet the Chancellor, who had just returned from Potsdam. 
The Chancellor's object in this interview was to secure Great Britain's 
neutrality, in return for which he was prepared to guarantee that 
Germany would make no territorial acquisition on the Continent at 
the expense of France. Sir Edward Goschen having questioned him 
as to whether that covered the French colonies, he replied that the 
guarantee could not be extended. He was quite willing to pledge 
Germany to respect the neutrality of Holland but Germany would 
be compelled to pass through Belgium. If Belgium made no resist- 
ance, Germany would, at the conclusion of the war, leave her territory 
intact. 

10 



The Ultimatum to Serbia and the Declarations of War 

While conversations were still in progress at Vienna, Berlin had 
proclaimed a state of war on the 31st of July and instructed Count 
Pourtales, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to hand to the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs an ultimatum comprising a 
declaration that if Russia did not start demobilizing both as regards 
Germany and Austria before midday of Saturday (the next day), 
the German Government would be compelled to issue a decree of 
general mobilization. 

The same day that witnessed this hostile step towards Russia 
witnessed even more hostile acts towards France, acts such as the 
rupture of telephonic, road and railway communications, the seizure 
of French locomotives at the frontier, the placing of machine-guns on 
the railway track, which had been torn up, and the concentration 
of troops along the frontier.* 

On the 1st of August Germany declared war on Russia. On the 
2nd, she violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, delivered an 
ultimatum to Belgium, and crossed the French frontier at three 
points. On the 3rd she declared war on France in the following 
terms : 

" Paris, August 3rd. 
" Monsieur le President, 

" The civil and military authorities have reported 
certain hostile acts committed on German territory by French 
military aviators. 

" Several of these aviators have openly violated the neutrality 
of Belgium by flying over that country. One attempted to 
destroy buildings near Wessel, others have been seen in the 
Eiffel district while another has thrown bombs on the railway 
near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. 

" I have instructions to inform Your Excellency that in view 
of these aggressions, the German Empire considers itself in a 
state of war with France. 

" I have also the honour of informing Your Excellency that 
the German authorities will detain French merchant vessels 
found in German ports but that they shall be released if within 
forty-eight hours a guarantee of reciprocal treatment is forth- 
coming. 

" My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end, it only 
remains for me to ask Your Excellence to furnish me with my 
* See the Memorandum of the French Government. 
II 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

passports and to take the steps necessary to assure my return 
to Germany with the embassy staff, as well as the staffs of the 
Bavarian Legation and the German Consulate at Paris. 

" I beg you to accept, Monsieur le President, the assurance of 
my highest regard. 

" Signed : Schoen." 

The French Government were in a position to state that no French 
aviator had even been in or over Belgium and that similarly no 
French aviator had committed hostile acts either in Bavaria or else- 
where in Germany. The excuses put forward were a fitting climax 
to the series of threats, intrigues and lies. 

Yet the German Government could not put forward similar excuses 
to the Belgians on whom war was declared on the 5th of August, 
two days after their territory had been violated. 

In a dispatch of the 4th of August, the German Minister for Foreign 
Affairs told Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassador in London, to assure 
Sir Edward Grey that Germany would annex no portion of Belgium 
even if the Belgians resisted in arms. " It is obvious that we could 
not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same 
time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. German 
army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium. . . . 
Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being 
for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance." 

On the 3rd of August Italy declared her intention of remaining 
neutral. On the 4th, Great Britain summoned Germany to respect 
the neutrality of Belgium, and receiving no answer, declared war. 
It was not until the 6th of August, the date itself demonstrating 
Austria's eleventh-hour hesitation, that Count Berchtold announced 
that " Russia had begun hostilities against Germany " (that Power 
having declared war on Russia on the 1st of the month), and that, 
therefore, Austria-Hungary was under the necessity of considering 
that a state of war existed between herself and Russia. Yet she did 
not recall her ambassadors from London and Paris. Both Great 
Britain and France were compelled on the 13th of August to intimate 
that they considered that a state of war existed between themselves 
and Austria-Hungary. 

On the 9th of August Montenegro declared war on Austria. On 
the 1 6th Japan delivered an ultimatum to Germany, and on the 
24th declared war. The same day Austria declared war on Belgium. 

12 



CHAPTER III 
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY AND THE SLAVS 

Austria expelled by Prussia — Bismarck, the " Man of Blood and Iron " — 
Andrassy — Discord within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — Russia not 
the author of Pan-Slavism — The Austrian Government and the Slavs — 
The Emperor Nicholas and John Sobieski — The hegemony of the Balkans — 
The Treaty of Berlin — The independence of Serbia — The Germans and 
Magyars numerically inferior to the Slavs — Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia 
— Annexation — The Germans and Magyars versus the Slavs — " The Pig 
War " — The declaration forced on Serbia by Count Aehrenthal — The 
trial of Dr. Fried jung. 

FROM the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) onwards the keynote of 
Prussian policy was the destruction of the Austrian hegemony 
in Germany. In 1834 sne gained for herself economic hegemony by 
the foundation of a customs union — the " Zollverein." From 1859 to 
1863 Austria bent all her efforts to build up a national union with the 
German princes. Prussia resolutely stood out. Bismarck, who came 
into power in 1862, put the matter with brutal frankness : " Austria 
must give up thoughts of Germany and shift her centre of gravity 
to Ofen " (the German name for Buda-Pest). He and King William 
devoted their unflagging energies to building up an army strong 
enough to defeat Austria. When speaking on an Army Bill, 
Bismarck once said in the Prussian Diet : " The unity of Germany 
will never be realized by speeches and votes, but by blood and iron." 
It was, in fact, realized by three wars — one against Denmark in 1864, 
another against Austria in 1866, and a third against France (1870-71). 
After Sadowa Bismarck was anxious not to humiliate Austria. No 
territorial acquisitions were made and the military clique was denied 
its projected triumphal entry into Vienna. The Prussian statesman 
counted on a future alliance with the beaten foe. After the foundation 
of the German Empire in 1871 the alliance was duly effected. Francis 
Joseph cherished no ill-feeling and became virtually the vassal of 
his mighty friend, the Emperor of Germany. The terms of the 

13 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

alliance were drawn up in 1874 by a Hungarian, Count Andrassy, 
who had succeeded Count Beust in September, 1871. 

The two Governments in Vienna and Buda-Pest are habitually in 
conflict with the Slav majority of their subjects. Slav aspirations 
are the nightmare of statesmen in those two capitals ; but instead of 
conciliating the Slavs, they have never ceased to provoke their 
antagonism, both at home and abroad. The result is what might 
have been expected. All Slav peoples, notably those who are subject 
to the domination of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, look for help 
outside. Where else can that be but Russia ? Not Russia, but the 
ruling powers in Austria-Hungary have been the creators of Pan-Slav 
aspirations. 

Another ironical result of this Austrian policy is that His Imperial 
and Royal Apostolic Majesty has for some time found himself in league 
with the infidel Turk, the sworn foe of the Christian peoples in the 
Balkan Peninsula. 

In 18 1 5 Austria opposed the grant of independence to Serbia on 
the ground that such an example could not fail to encourage Slav 
aspirations within her own borders. She likewise opposed the libera- 
tion of Greece because the weakening of Turkey was to Russia's 
interest. Austria's answer to the Russo-Turkish War of 1829 was 
an attempt to form a coalition against the Slav power. In 1849 
Francis Joseph appealed to Russia to subdue Hungary; but in 1854 
he turned against his deliverer, whom the threat of 200,000 men 
compelled to make peace. It is said that shortly after that event 
the Emperor Nicholas II. was looking at a portrait of John Sobieski, 
who forced the Turks to raise the siege of Vienna in 1683. " He and 
I," he remarked, " have been equally stupid, for we both rescued 
Austria and both of us have received her ingratitude as our reward." 

Cast out from Germany, Austro-Hungarian statesmen have had one 
ruling passion — to establish an Austrian hegemony in the Balkans. 
In this passion they have been encouraged by German statesmen, 
fearful lest Austrian glances should again turn northwards. By 
preventing Austria from intervening in the Russo-Turkish War of 
1877, Bismarck thought he had paid off his debt to Russia for her 
neutrality in 1870. Yet the Treaty of San Stefano gave the hegemony 
of the Balkans to Russia. Austria, exiled from the German Confeder- 
ation, saw herself driven forth from the South and South-East also 

At this period the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the closing 
of the Straits to Russia were the cardinal dogmas of British foreign 

14 



The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Slavs 

policy. Bismarck and Lord Beaconsfield were of one mind in robbing 
Russia, at the Congress of Berlin, of much that she had gained by 
the Treaty of San Stefano. 

Article 34 recognized the independence of the Principality of Serbia. 
Article 25 dealt with the subject of compensation in these terms : 

" The provinces of Bosnia and Herzgovina will be occupied and 
administered by Austria-Hungary. As the Austro-Hungarian 
Government have no wish to undertake the administration of the 
Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, which separates Serbia from Montenegro, the 
existing Ottoman administration shall not be disturbed. Nevertheless, 
in order to assure the stability of the new arrangements and to 
guarantee the security of the means of communication, Austria- 
Hungary reserves to herself the right to maintain a garrison and to 
have military and commercial routes throughout that part of the 
ancient vilayet of Bosnia." 

Bismarck seemed to be making Austria a handsome present, but 
in reality he was only adding to her difficulties. For centuries the 
Viennese Government had been trying to germanize its subject Slav, 
Magyar, Roumanian and Latin populations. Since Sadowa and as 
the result of the compromise of 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
had consisted of the Austrian Empire and the crown lands of Hun- 
gary. Yet the Germans and Magyars, the two dominant races, were 
in a numerical minority in 1878, and have always remained so, as 
the lingual census of 1880, not to mention that of 1910, clearly 
establishes.* 

Cis.=Cisleithania. Tr.=Transleithania. B. and H.=Bosnia and Herz- 
govina. (These two provinces were not mentioned in the census of 1880.) 

(In thousands.) (In thousands.) 

1880. Total. 1 9 10. Total. 

Germans (Cis.) 8,008 1 g 9>95o 1 

— (Tr.) 1,882 i 9 ' 9 2.037 12,010 

B. and H 23 J 

Hungarians (Tr.) ^' 2 ° 7 \6 2i7 10,050. 

— (Cis.) 10/ 11 ^10,067 

B. and H 6 ' 

Bohemians > "| 

Moravians I (Cis.) 5,180 | 6,436 

Slovaks J [6,979 ')■ 8 >474 

— (Tr.) 1,799 J 2,031 j 

B. and H 7 J 

Poles 3,238 5,019 

* V. B. Auerbach, Les Races et les Nationalites en A utriche-Hongrie. 
(Paris, F. Mean.) 

15 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

(In thousands.) (In thousands.) 

1880. Total. 1910. Total. 

Ruthenians (Cis.) 2,793 1 

- (Tr.J 345i 3 ' 138 4 '°°° 

Slovenes 1,140 i,349 

Croats and Serbs (Cis.) 563 1 2 88g 783 1 , 722 

— (Tr.) 2,326) ' y 2,939/ 

B. andH 1,882 

Roumanians 2,326 

Latins and Ladins 669 801 

Putting aside the Roumanians, Latins and Ladins, Gypsies, and 
other small groups, we reach the following figures : 

(In thousands.) Percentage of 
1880. 1910. increase. 

Total population 37, 400 51,400 37.8 

Germans 9,900 12,000 20 

Magyars 6,000 10,000 66 

Slavs 17,400 20,877 26 

The increase in the Magyar population is so striking as to excite a 
query whether it is due to the excess of births or perhaps to some 
mode of census-taking which reckons as a Magyar any man speaking 
their language in Transleithania. Notwithstanding this enormous 
increase, the Magyars still form less than 20 per cent, of the total 
population of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Germans 
formed 23.5 per cent, and now form 27 per cent. 

Both Germans and Magyars are numerically inferior to the Slavs, 
who formed 45 per cent, in 1880 and 44 per cent, in 1910. The census 
of this latter year took count of 1,822,000 Croats and Serbs inhabiting 
Bosnia and Herzgovina. 

The Austro-Hungarian Governments complained of having too 
many Slavs, yet in 1879 ^ey added to the number. Such was the 
diplomatic success they owed to Bismarck and they demonstrated 
their gratitude in the next year by forming that alliance with Germany 
which has reduced the Hapsburg Monarchy to the level of a satellite 
of the Hohenzollern Empire. 

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had received the gift of the 
administration of Bosnia and Herzgovina, but effective possession 
had not been made over by the plenipotentiaries of Berlin. The 
inhabitants of the two provinces, who had been the authors in 1875 
of the struggle which drew in Serbia and Montenegro in 1876 and 
finally Russia in April 1877, revolted at the prospect of being handed 
over to the Germans of Vienna. Austria had to send more than two 

16 



The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Slavs 

hundred thousand men to subdue them. This army shot as rebels 
those chiefs and soldiers on whom it could lay hands and left behind 
it the memory of wrongs which time has done little to efface. The 
administration of Baron Joseph von Szlavy led to the insurrection of 
1881-1882. 

The affairs of Bosnia and Herzgovina are managed by the joint 
Minister of Finance. Von Kallay held that position from 1882 
to his death in 1903. It may be admitted at once that his adminis- 
tration and reforms did much for the prosperity of the provinces. 
He established a civil service, harmonized Mohammedan law with 
existing legislation, inaugurated many great public works, and 
reorganized the system of finance and education. But even he failed 
to reconcile the inhabitants of the two provinces to Austrian rule. 

In 1885 Bulgaria violated the Treaty of Berlin by annexing 
Eastern Roumelia with the approval of Germany, Austria and Russia.* 
The other Powers raised no protest. Serbia, hoping to make capital 
out of Bulgaria's difficulties, declared war on her, but was beaten 
and would have been overwhelmed had not Austria intervened. 
By the Convention of Top-Khane, Bulgaria compelled the Sultan to 
recognize Prince Alexander as Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia. 
In reality, the convention set the seal on the union of the two 
countries. 

In 1908 Austria rendered valuable service to Germany at the 
Algeciras Conference and Russia was in the midst of an exhaustive 
process of reorganization after her war with Japan. Consequently 
Austria could count on solid support on one side and feeble opposition 
on the other if she violated the Treaty of Berlin. The Young Turks 
had just taken the reins at Constantinople. Count Aehrenthal and, 
it is said, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand decided on the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzgovina to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
communicated their decision to the world by a Note dated October 5th, 
1908. Austria-Hungary gave up her claims in the Sanjak of Novi- 
Bazar, and gave the following explanation of her conduct : 

" Bosnia and Herzgovina have to-day — thanks to the unflagging labours of 
the Austro-Hungarian Administration — attained a high degree of prosperity 
and culture. The moment seems to have come to crown the work so auspiciously 
begun by granting to these provinces the benefits of constitutional autonomy 
which is fervently desired by the entire population." 

Bosnia and Herzgovina, thus absorbed in the Hapsburg Empire, 

* Infra, Ch. VII. 

17 2 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

have waited in vain for their constitutional autonomy. Austria's 
calculations proved accurate. Russia could not intervene. France 
and Great Britain had too little direct interest in the question to 
take steps which might lead to war without Russian co-operation. 
The ultimatum of July 23rd, 1 914, was only launched by Vienna on 
the assumption — nay, rather the conviction — that Russia would 
stand aside as in 1908. 

On February 29th, 1909, Turkey recognized the annexation. On 
the 6th of April the independence of Bulgaria was recognized. Serbia 
and Montenegro, whose protests had been vigorous and sustained, 
had no option but to submit to destiny. 

The Germans of Cisleithania and the Magyars of Transleithania 
have never been able to assimilate the Slavs. There has never been 
any sentiment other than hatred between the dominant and subject 
races of the Hapsburg Empire. The sole business of the Government 
of a country in which the Slavs predominate numerically is to foment 
antagonism with the Slavs of Russia and the Balkans, as formerly 
they lived on strife with the Turks. To achieve that end they have 
bound up their destinies with those of Germany. But to combat 
Slavdom they have increased the number of their Slav subjects by 
annexing Bosnia and Herzgovina, in defiance of the Treaty of Berlin 
of 1878. This bold stroke of Count Aehrenthal and the acquiescence 
of Europe filled Austria with pride. In reality it was the policy of 
the simpleton. " We don't know what to do with our Slavs. Let 
us have more of them." 

From Potsdam and the Hofburg a vision of oriental splendour 
drew the eyes of the two Emperors and their advisers. The pro- 
fessors never ceased to speak of the Drang nach SudosUn, the " March 
to the South-East," and there were even French writers and statesmen 
who lent reality to these chimeras by puffing the wonderful genius of 
the Kaiser and the perspicacity of the Ballplatz. " Salonica will 
be one day the halfway-house on the highway from Port Said to 
Vienna or Hamburg, the meeting-place of Germany and India. "* 
Politicians, going to economics rather than to probability for their 
arguments, were already connecting up Salonica with Constantinople 
and the Bagdad Railway. To India by rail, forsooth ! 

Unfortunately Serbia lies between Austria and the Aegean Sea, 

* See the Journal des Economistes of November, 191 2 : La Question d' Orient 
et les conflits economiques, p. 190, June, 1914. Les risqucs de guerre et les charges 
mil ita ires, p. 361. 

18 



The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Slavs 

and as if oppression could remove geographical barriers as well as 
destroy the mutual sympathies of Serbs, Croats and the Slavs of 
Bosnia and Herzgovina, Austrian and Hungarian statesmen have 
long carried on a campaign of intimidation. 

The Emperor Francis Joseph accompanied the declaration of war 
on Serbia with a proclamation to his people, in which the enemy was 
roundly abused ; but it is far easier to draw a formidable indictment 
against his Government. 

Doubtless he was right in recalling Austria's services to Serbia in 
1885, when on the point of annihilation by Bulgaria ; but then Serbia 
had rewarded her with docile gratitude up to the death of King Milan 
in 1901. 

King Alexander Obrenovitch tried to liberate his country, but 
was assassinated along with his wife in 1903. The Austrian 
Government based high hopes on the restoration of the House of 
Karageorgevitch but disillusionment was in store. When Serbia 
concluded a customs union with Bulgaria in 1905, Austria-Hungary 
did her best to ruin its prospects by closing her frontiers to Serbian 
cattle and swine. I have told elsewhere how a Frenchman from 
Bordeaux, M. Bigeon, by guaranteeing the purchase of 150,000 pigs 
a year, enabled Serbia to negotiate a loan and thus procure arms. 
The independence of Serbia dates from this " Pig War."* 

The next stage was reached in October, 1905, in a conference at 
Fiume which saw the last of the old dissensions between the Orthodox 
Serbs and the Catholic Croats. 

In 1907 the Austro-Hungarian Government arrested fifty-three 
Southern Slavs on a charge of high treason ; but the Agram trial 
showed that the alleged plot was an elaborate fiction of an agent 
provocateur. In 1909, after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzgovina, 
Count Aehrenthal compelled the Serbian Government to sign a Note, 
of which the following were the principal passages : 

" Serbia recognizes that her rights are not affected by the changes in the 
status of Bosnia ; accordingly she will accept the decisions arrived at by the 
Powers in respect of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. 

" Serbia, in conformity with the advice of the Great Powers, pledges herself 
to abandon her attitude, maintained since October last, of protest and opposition 
to the annexation. She promises, further, to change her policy towards Austria- 
Hungary and henceforth to cultivate good neighbourly relations with that 
Power." 

The humiliation of a people is no more likely to earn their goodwill 
* Journal des Economistes, November, 19 12, p. 184. 

19 2* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

than an affront to an individual. A note of that character could do 
nothing to improve the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary 
and, indeed, the Ballplatz set itself to aggravate them. In December, 
1909, the members of the Serbo-Croat coalition in the Diet of Agram 
prosecuted Dr. Friedjung, who had accused them of high treason, 
and it then appeared that his accusation had been based on a docu- 
ment supplied by the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
which was no more than a forgery of a member of the Austro- 
Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.* 

This policy, so far from provoking dissension between Serbia and 
the Southern Slavs of Austria, drew them together. 

The Emperor Francis Joseph has told us that he has no desire to 
annex Serbia. We can well believe it, for annexation would only 
mean the addition of three millions (five millions if New Serbia were 
included) to the Slavs who already outnumber the Germans and 
Magyars in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Austro-Hun- 
garian Government only wished to " punish " Serbia. For what ? 
The Archduke's murderers were subjects of His Majesty the Emperor 
of Austria and King of Hungary. 

This monarch tells us that Austria only wishes to gain by her arms 
guarantees which will ensure her permanent peace and the cessation 
of internal disorder. How has she set about her task ? By reducing 
Belgrade to ruins and wantonly killing innocent men, women and 
children. This was the necessary if unconvincing justification of the 
ultimatum of July 23rd ; but at bottom it was as irrelevant as the 
pretext put forth by Francis Joseph. Count Berchtold was certain 
that, as in 1908, Russia would not move. He only intended to bluff 
and by taking up a bullying attitude show the world that none dare 
challenge Austria, that Russia was merely an impotent mass, 
imposing only in inaction, and that France and Great Britain were 
too impressed by the menace of the German fleet and army to make 
effective protest. 

But from the moment that Russia took action and France sup- 
ported her Count Berchtold's one thought was of retreat. So well 
was this known to the German Chancellor that at midnight of 
July 31st he instructed Count Pourtales to break down the bridges 
behind him. On the next day Count Berchtold must have learned 
that he had only been a tool in the hands of the Wilhelmstrasse. 

* See Le Manifeste des KuUurkrieger. The story, told by Mr. H. Wickham 
Steed in his Hapsburg Monarchy, is published there. 

20 



CHAPTER IV 

THE GERMAN AUTOCRACY 

The Hohenzollerns — Voltaire's description of Frederick William — Frederick II. 
— Bismarck — The wars of 1866 and 1870 — Political motives for war — The 
Constitution of the German Empire — Germany is not a nation — The 
Bundesrat — The King of Prussia as Emperor — Peace and war are outside 
the province of the Reichstag — Divine Right of the Emperor — His absolutist 
declarations. 

IN 141 7 Frederick of Hohenzollern, Burgrave of Nuremburg, 
bought the Marquisate of Brandenburg from the Emperor 
Sigismund. In 161 8 one of his successors, John Sigismund, bought 
from the Teutonic Knights a small plot of territory beyond the Vistula, 
of which the most remote corner lay on the other side of the Niemen. 
It was called Prussia. Although it formed no part of the Empire, 
Frederick II. obtained the sanction of Sigismund to erect his 
dominions into a kingdom (1701), and betook himself to Konigsberg, 
there to be crowned as Frederick I. 

Voltaire has left us in his Memoirs the following description of his 
successor, Frederick William : 

" He was a true Vandal, who throughout his reign had no thought save to 
amass money and gather about him, with a minimum of expense, the finest 
troops in Europe. No King was ever richer than he, no subjects were ever 
poorer. At a scandalously low price he bought the nobility out of most of their 
estates, and while they squandered half the purchase-money the other half 
returned to the royal coffers as taxation. . . . 

" Turkey is a republic in comparison with the despotism of Frederick William. 
When Frederick William had attended a review he would sometimes take his 
walk in the town. The townsfolk fled at his approach. If he met a woman he 
would ask her why she was wasting her time in the street. ' Go home, hussy,' 
he would say, and as often as not accompany his admonition with a box on the 
ear, a kick in the stomach, or a shower of blows with his cane." 

His son, the future Frederick II., was brought up in the same hard 
school, and at length, tired of his father's treatment, resolved to run 

21 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

away. Frederick William promptly executed his friend and accom- 
plice, Kat, and then condemned his son to the same fate. The young 
Frederick only escaped thanks to the direct intervention of the 
Emperor Charles VI. On succeeding to the throne, Frederick lost 
no time in making war on the daughter of his benefactor, Maria 
Teresa, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, in order to rob her of Silesia. 
He has himself given us a frank exposition of his motives in his 
Memoirs ; " My reasons for making war were my troops, always 
ready for instant action, my well-filled treasury and my mercurial 
temperament. Ambition, interest, and the desire to get myself 
talked about prevailed with me and war was declared." But his 
troops were already in Silesia when Baron von Gotter, his minister 
at Vienna, counselled Maria Teresa to submit with good grace and 
surrender three-quarters of that province to his master the King- 
Elector, in return for which the King of Prussia would lend her three 
million crowns and make her husband Emperor. 

" I take first," Frederick used to say, " and afterwards there is 
no difficulty about finding some pedant to prove my claims." 

Such traditions are by no means extinct. 

The First Minister was a clerk. " The Secretaries of State sent all 
their dispatches to the King's clerk who made an abstract of them. 
The King wrote the answers in a couple of words on the margin. 
Thus was all the government business transacted in an hour. His 
royal father had left such perfect order in the finances and there 
was such an atmosphere of military precision and blind obedience 
that four hundred leagues of country were governed like an abbey." 

Mirabeau, speaking of Prussia at the end of Frederick the Great's 
reign, said : " War is the national industry of Prussia." Bismarck, 
bent on the foundation of a German Empire under Prussian domina- 
tion, used war as an instrument of policy. The war of 1866 eliminated 
Austria from Germany, subdued Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, Saxony, 
Hanover, the two Hesses, Nassau, Baden, Frankfort, increased 
Prussian territory, and led to the Confederation of the North. 
Bismarck has related, in his Reflections and Reminiscences, his motives 
in tampering with the Ems telegram in 1870 so as to provoke war : 

" The German feeling, which in the southern states, lived along with the 
individual and dynastic state feeling, had, up to 1866, silenced its political con- 
science to a certain degree with the fiction of a collective Germany under the 
leadership of Austria, partly from South German preference for the old imperial 
state, partly in the belief of her military superiority to Prussia. After events 

22 



The German Autocracy- 
had shown the incorrectness of that calculation, the very helplessness in which 
the South German states had been left by Austria at the conclusion of peace 
was a motive for . . . the willing conclusion of the offensive and defensive 
alliance with Prussia. ... I felt convinced that the gulf which diverse dynastic 
and family influences and different habits of life had in the course of history 
created between the south and north of the Fatherland could not be more 
effectually bridged over than by a joint national war against the neighbour 
who had been aggressive for many centuries." [France.] (Vol. II., p. 97.) 

Bismarck realized his hopes. It was not as the leader of princes, 
nor yet by the choice of the nation that King William of Prussia 
gained the imperial crown. He assumed it in the Palace of Ver- 
sailles, in the midst of his army, as a corollary to the ruin of France. 
The German Empire is itself a thing of blood and iron, created for 
the advantage of the King of Prussia. Therein lay the measure of 
Bismarck's success. He made him the autocrat of Germany. 

The German Empire is a legal entity of twenty-five members 
and more than sixty-five million subjects. " The individual States, 
not the individual citizens, are the members of the German Empire," 
said Paul Labaud. # The sixty-one plenipotentiaries of these States 
(which include Alsace-Lorraine) form the Federal Council of the 
Empire (Bundesrat). Prussia sends seventeen, Bavaria six, Saxony 
four, Wiirtemberg four, the Grand Duchy of Baden three, Alsace- 
Lorraine three, Mecklenburg-Schwerin two, the Duchy of Brunswick 
two, the other states and the three free cities of Liibeck, Bremen 
and Hamburg one each. Frankfort has no representative, having 
been annexed in 1866. 

The members of the Bundesrat do not vote in accordance with 
their private opinions, but solely on instructions from their con- 
stituents. They are merely the diplomatic charges d'affaires of the 
other States of the Confederation accredited to the King of Prussia. 
Prussia has never had any difficulty in securing a majority. Bribery 
and menace have succeeded when other means have failed. The 
Sovereign participates in the work of the Bundesrat, not as Emperor, 
but as King of Prussia, a constituent State, but he has a casting vote 
because he is the president. 

The legislative authority resides in the Bundesrat and the Reichstag, 
but the Bundesrat takes no part in administration and only sits from 
time to time. 

By Article 1 1 of the Constitution, the King of Prussia is President 

* Le Droit public allemand. 
23 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

of the Federation with the title of German Emperor. He represents 
the Empire in its international dealings, concludes alliances with 
foreign States, and declares war or makes peace in the name of the 
Empire. War can only be declared with the consent of the Federal 
Council unless an attack is made on the land or sea frontiers of the 
Confederation. In any case, the Reichstag has no voice on this 
issue — a feature of the German Constitution which is specially 
significant. The Reichstag represents the whole mass of subjects 
and thus the nation is shut out from any expression of opinion on 
the question of peace or war. This is the affair of the Emperor, 
and, in the second degree, the Bundesrat. It does not concern the 
Reichstag. 

In spite of the restrictive final clause, however, the Emperor enjoys 
absolute authority in all questions of international policy. William II. 
summoned the Bundesrat on the ist of August, the same day that 
war was declared, but he had already prepared the attack on Serbia 
in conjunction with Austria ; he had launched his ultimatum 
against Russia and, if we are to accept a statement in his declaration 
of war on France, he considered that aviators had made an attack 
on German territory. He did not await the approval of the Bundesrat 
to begin hostilities and that approval was not necessary for the 
violation of Belgian neutrality. As he alone directs German foreign 
policy, with him must rest the entire responsibility. With him also, 
as supreme head of the army, must rest the responsibility for its 
methods and conduct of war. Prussian military law is in force 
throughout the whole Empire. 

The King of Prussia is King by right divine. He is Emperor 
because he is King of Prussia ; therefore, he is Emperor by right 
divine. That is the fundamental notion on which the structure of 
William II. 's absolute authority has been reared. " Suprema lex 
Regis voluntas" he wrote in the Golden Book of Munich. " I am 
the sole master in this Empire : there shall be no other," he once 
told the Chamber of the Rhine Province. " There is only one 
law and that my law," he said to the recruits of 1893, and he wrote 
under his portrait, when it was presented to him at the Ministry of 
Public Worship in Berlin, " Sic volo, sic jubeo." He suppressed — 
but the world supplied — the rest of Juvenal's line, " Sit pro ratione 
voluntas P " My wishes are commands, my will a sufficient reason." 

The Emperor has been at great pains to show that the conduct of 
the war has been the affair of himself and his General Staff. In his 

24 



The German Autocracy- 
speech to the First Infantry Regiment of the Guard on the 14th of 
August (published by the Cologne Gazette) he brandished his sword 
and exclaimed : " You are the guarantee that I shall dictate terms 
to my enemies. Up and smite the foe. Let the enemies of Branden- 
burg bite the dust." Now, though Brandenburg includes Berlin, it 
is not Germany. According to the last survey it has an area of 
15,376 square miles, whereas Prussia has an area of 134,622 square 
miles and Germany 208,780. Yet the Emperor spoke of it as the 
pivot of the present war, and he is right, for his actions are those of 
a true heir of the ancient Electors of Brandenburg and the kings 
of the German States who follow him blindly are only his subjects. 



25 



CHAPTER V 
THE KAISER'S GOVERNMENT 

The Constitution of 1871 and the Chancellor — William II. his own Chancellor — 
William II.—" The will of God " — " The instrument of the Most High "— 
Government by force and fraud — Diplomatic illusions — " I mean to be 
loved " — Bismarck on his hereditary pathology. 

THE Constitution of 1871 was the work of Bismarck, who 
fashioned it for his own ends. Under the new regime the 
Imperial Chancellor is the most important person. He presides 
over the Bundesrat and represents it in the Reichstag. He is 
responsible to the Emperor alone. The Secretaries of State are 
merely officials. It is the Chancellor's business to cover the Emperor, 
yet even in the hour of his accession William II. had decided to 
dismiss Bismarck. Caprivi, appointed in his stead, made a frank 
confession of incompetence. " Do not let that trouble you," said 
William II. ; " I intend to be my own Chancellor." And, indeed, 
the great dignitaries who have enjoyed that title have never been 
more than docile subordinates. 

William II. has had four Chancellors, General Caprivi, Prince 
Hohenlohe, Prince von Biilow and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg. 
The latter, " Refer endarius, Assessor, President of the Government, 
First President-Minister, has never seen the world save through 
state papers. He is a perfect type of the royal factotum." # 

There is no cabinet. Each minister has exclusive defined functions 
and is usually a specialist in the affairs of his Department. The 
Chancellor is the only link between the various departments, but 
lest he should be overwhelmed with a mass of details, he has had 
subordinates to sign for him since 1878. The most obvious result is 
that each Department pursues its own affairs without reference to 
any other. There is no unity of direction and anarchy reigns. This 
is amply proved by contradictory decisions which, as every Minister 

* W. Martin : La Crise politique de VAllemagne. (Paris, F. Alcan.) 

26 



The Kaiser's Government 

has his own press bureau, never fail to gain publicity, however great 
the efforts made to conceal them. 

The Ministers are not responsible to the Reichstag, yet this does 
not prevent ministerial crises. M. W. Martin says that since the 
accession of William II. there has been an average of one a year. 
It is true that they only affect individual Departments, but, never- 
theless, German Ministers, exposed as they are to the intrigues of 
the Court, the jealousy of the Chancellor, the opposition of their 
colleagues, faction in the Federal Council, party bitterness and the 
whims of the Emperor, Jiold their office by a tenure even more pre- 
carious than Ministers under a parliamentary constitution. 

It is vain for William II., improving on Louis XIV., to declare 
himself an unfettered autocrat. The days of government by his 
ancestor, old Corporal Schlague, have gone by. He is drawn all ways 
at once by conflicting interests : the industrials of Westphalia and 
the Rhine Province ; the " Junkers," great landed proprietors 
in the eastern provinces, who have always been the mainstay of the 
Prussian monarchy ; the Prussian Diet, the Bundesrat and the 
Reichstag. He is the supreme chief of the army, yet remains the 
sport of the rival intriguers in the Great General Staff. So far from 
making a harmonious policy out of the action of his ministers, he 
is perpetually obliged to accept or decline the conflicting proposals 
they are ever bringing forward. 

Seen in mass, the German Empire presents an appearance truly 
kolossal, to use an expression popular in Berlin. Nevertheless, there 
are many cracks, and the Emperor only keeps it together by holding 
up the double menace of attack by France and Russia. No com- 
petent critic doubts that the Serbian crisis is the outcome of his 
desire to distract public attention from internal difficulties. Here 
one question naturally arises. Was his intention merely to demon- 
strate anew the armed might of Germany or was he draw r n into 
war by the Crown Prince and the war party ? As yet it is 
impossible to say ; but even if it were so, it would not diminish his 
responsibility. 

Most Frenchmen who have visited Berlin have heard Prussians 
talk somewhat after this manner : " Our Emperor is a man after 
the heart of the French who like theatrical coups, pomp, show, 
speeches and parade. But to us Berliners, solid and serious-minded 
as we are, he is too full of surprises to be congenial." 

He is an extraordinary Jack-of-all-trades who decides military and 

27 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

naval questions, designs the statue-groups of the Siegerallee in Berlin, 
paints pictures, composes music and changes his clothes twenty times 
a day. He is always an actor, and never happier than when being 
talked about. Mr. Cloudesley Brereton a few years ago called him 
" a Nero in vanity, but not in cruelty." " Perhaps the latter caveat," 
he adds, " should now be modified."* 

At the opening of the Kiel Canal the Kaiser gave the order that 
the whole fleet should pass through. The senior i\dmiral, who was 
in personal attendance on him that day, had the utmost difficulty 
in convincing him that were his orders carried out not a ship would 
survive the operation. 

The theory of divine right has descended to the Emperor William II. 
from Frederick William. " Our wish is to serve God, and if I reign, 
it is because God has willed it so," was the declaration of his grand- 
father at his coronation in 1861. He took the crown from the altar 
with the words : " The crown comes from God alone. I bear witness 
that I have received it at his hands." 

These ideas have expanded somewhat since the war, witness 
William II. 's proclamation to the army of the East : 

" Remember that you are the chosen race ! The spirit of God has descended 
upon me because I am Emperor of the Germans. 

" I am the instrument of the Most High. 

" I am his sword, his representative on earth. 

" Woe and death to those who oppose my will ! Death to the infidel who 
denies my mission ! Death to the coward ! 

" Let all the enemies of the German nation perish ! 

" God demands their destruction — God, who by my mouth summons you 
to carry out his decrees. "f 

What could be more convenient than to be styled " The instrument 
of the Most High ! " The fortunate nominee may do what he likes 
and throw the responsibility on God ! William II. lusts for the 
applause of the mob, yet no man has a greater scorn of the mob 
than he, for he regards the mob as but the instrument by which his 
inspired desires are accomplished. Occasionally he emerges from 
the clouds of mysticism and expresses himself in true Machiavellian 
fashion, as when he said : " There are many situations in which 
dupes are more necessary than friends." 

* Who is responsible ? Armageddon and After. 
t See the Gazetta Poranny of Warsaw, September 13th, 1914. 

28 



The Kaiser's Government 

His policy is the product of emotional impulse and knavery. It 
is said that if some of his schemes had been realized chaos would 
have reigned in the world. At one moment he contemplated sending 
twenty thousand men to the Transvaal. His telegram to Kruger 
will not soon be forgotten. Yet in a celebrated interview granted to 
the Daily Telegraph correspondent in 1908, he boasted of having given 
Queen Victoria a plan of campaign against the Boers. In 1904 he 
took the initiative in offering a sword of honour to General Stoessel 
as a mark of esteem for his defence of Port Arthur, though that officer 
was about to appear before a court-martial. During the Spanish- 
American War he tried to range Europe in a coalition against the 
United States, the only effect of which was to bring about a recon- 
ciliation between the British and the Americans who had never 
forgotten 18 12. He was the foremost prophet of the Yellow Peril 
and ordered his troops to leave the Chinese with memories of them 
such as the Huns had bequeathed to Europe. He seized the territory 
of Kiao-Chau. He compelled the Japanese to evacuate Port Arthur, 
and then forced Russia into war with Japan on the (for Germany) 
sound principle that this would remove Russian armies to a safe dis- 
tance and weaken France. He cast longing eyes on Turkey, made a 
friend of Abdul-Hamid, and tried to play the double role of protector 
of the Mohammedans and the Holy Places. He schemed for the 
Bagdad railway, and sent an autograph letter to the Sultan begging 
for orders for Krupp's, in which he is personally interested. 

In the Turco-Italian War, not only did German officers train and 
lead Turkish troops against his ally but he sent arms and munitions 
to the Tripolitans and like Austria, supplied the Turks with sub- 
marine mines for the purpose of destroying Italian shipping. His 
visit to Tangier, after the Bremen speech, and the dispatch of the 
Panther to Agadir threw the world into consternation and spread 
universal apprehension of his designs. A caricature in Punch repre- 
sented him with a sword in his hand, his eyes gazing wildly around : 
" I mean to be loved." 

Frederick William IV., who became King of Prussia in 1840, was 
a man of a very singular but ill-balanced temperament. In the 
summer of 1857 he was afflicted with a mental disorder which neces- 
sitated the appointment of his brother as Regent in 1858. Bismarck 
thought that William II. had too strong a resemblance to his great- 
uncle, and once said to the poet Felix Dahn : " If such a thing " 
(the development of similar signs of mental disturbance) " should 

29 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

happen, my successor will have a more difficult task before him 
than I should have had, for the German people would have trusted me"* 
The present war is the work of the Emperor William II., a 
megalomaniac, and a monarch of eighty-four years of age, Francis 
Joseph, who has chosen to mark the conclusion of a life which evokes 
memories of the Atrides by bringing about the most terrible war that 
the world has ever known. I had to learn that it was too much to 
hope that His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary 
and His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia would 
conduct the affairs of their respective nations with as much intelligence 
and judgment as rational human beings display in the ordinary affairs 
of life. 

* It Had to Be, by Sidney Whitman. The Fortnightly Review, September, 
1914, p. 390. 



30 



CHAPTER VI 
POLICE GOVERNMENT AND ESPIONAGE 

Niebuhr on Police Government — The Precetto — The police system in Austria — 
Two Archdukes killed in less than twenty-five years — The assassination 
of Rudolph — Criticism in connection with the assassination of Francis 
Ferdinand and his wife — The administration of justice in Austria — 
Espionage as the foundation of diplomacy and strategy — The Ultimatum, 
the Czar and M. Poincare — German miscalculations in Russia, France and 
Belgium — Great Britain — The Turks — Italy — An accumulation of errors. 

THE German historian Niebuhr says that modern government 
has become a despotism less tolerable than that of the Middle 
Ages because it has assumed two new forms. It is founded, he says, 
on a police system which is now no more than a gigantic network 
of spies, and on a bureaucracy which ruthlessly destroys independence 
of will and action. But which are the Governments thus denounced 
by the all-unconscious Niebuhr ? The answer is Austria and Prussia. 
Austria presents a typical example of police government. Italians 
will never forget the pitch of perfection to which the Austrian 
police system was brought in those parts of Italy subject to Hapsburg 
domination. Its agents were the sbirro and the sgherro, words which 
have no precise equivalent in English, but contain the idea of a spy 
or agent provocateur. Its weapon was the precetto, written or verbal 
orders to some individual commanding him to do, or refrain from 
doing, certain acts. The prohibitions largely predominated. No 
reasons were ever given. If the wretch who received a precetto 
transgressed any of the injunctions therein, he was arrested and 
condemned to a term of imprisonment, secret confinement, or perhaps 
exile. This wonderful system contributed nothing to the maintenance 
of Austrian domination in Italy and its memory is execrated through- 
out the land. In his Hapsburg Monarchy, Mr. Wickham Steed 
states that Austria has always made the police her principal instru- 
ment of government. 

..." The Austrian police remains, at least potentially, much what it was 
a hundred years ago." ..." The stranger is unaware that the porter of his 

31 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

house is a confidant of the police, and that his goings and comings, his manner 
of life, the number and names of his friends and all personal details are care- 
fully communicated by the porter to the police . . . his correspondence is 
being watched, his telephone ' tapped.' . . . 

" Political disturbances and rioting are dealt with as official interests are 
supposed to require. In the autumn of 1905 a Socialist manifestation in favour 
of universal suffrage was suppressed ; blood was shed and arrests were made. 
But within a week the wind in the higher regions had changed, and the Govern- 
ment had veered round in favour of universal suffrage. A huge Socialist demon- 
stration was organized in agreement with the police. . . . 

" But on occasion the police is intractable — whenever its professional vanity 
or the personal ambition of its chiefs is involved."* 

The most striking results of this police system are the deaths by 
assassination within twenty-five years of two Archdukes, heirs to the 
Imperial and Royal crowns of Austria-Hungary. The Archduke 
Rudolph was assassinated in 1889, and to this day his murderers 
have remained undiscovered by the splendid Austrian police. With 
such a glaring exhibition of incompetence before the Austrian Govern- 
ment they had the hardihood to suggest that the Serbian police 
ought to have prevented the Sarajevo crime which was committed on 
Austrian soil ! The charge against that Government gathers weight 
when we consider the motives that have been alleged for the dilatori- 
ness of the Austrian police. In The Secret of an Empress, Countess 
Zainardi Landi tears the veil from the mystery of the Archduke 
Rudolph's death. It appears that he was violently in love with 
Baroness Marie Vetsera and wished to procure a separation from his 
wife, the Archduchess Stephanie, a Belgian princess. He requested 
Pope Leo XIII. to annul his marriage but the letter was sent to the 
Emperor by the papal nuncio Mgr. Galimberti, now a cardinal. After 
a violent scene, in which the Emperor insisted that the Archduke 
should never see Marie Vetsera again, Rudolph withdrew to Mayer- 
ling, and wrote to her not to be uneasy at his absence ; but at the 
same time she had received an order to marry a certain Austrian 
nobleman within twenty-four hours. She went to Mayerling in the 
same carriage which had brought the Archduke's letter. The 
Emperor heard of her departure, and sent Baron Bolfras, a member 
of the military cabinet, with a detachment of soldiers to bring back 
the Baroness, and, in case of intervention, arrest the Archduke himself. 
After some negotiation the Archduke consented to receive Baron 
Bolfras but the soldiers rushed into the house. The Archduke 

* The Hapsburg Monarchy, by Henry Wickham Steed. Austria-Hungary, 
by Geoffrey Drage. 

32 



Police Government and Espionage 

fired his pistol and hit a gamekeeper. The invaders replied in kind, 
and both the Archduke and Marie Vetsera were killed. 

It is not difficult to imagine why the Austrian police have never 
discovered the assassins. How comes it, then, that the all-perfect 
Austrian police were unable to prevent the assassination of another 
heir to the throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife, 
the Duchess of Hohenberg ? On this question of the impotence of 
the Austrian police Mr. Archibald R. Colquhoun goes so far as to say : 

" Those who, like the writer, have been in Sarajevo and know the efficiency 
of the Austrian police, find it almost impossible to credit that the murder, which 
was the result of a second attempt, could have taken place but for deliberate 
negligence on the part of the Austrian authorities to take the usual precau- 
tions. . . . 

" Little pretence was made in Vienna of regretting the Archduke's death, 
still less that of his morganatic wife, whose position was resented by those born 
in the purple. . . ."* 

This opinion is shared by Mr. Cloudesley Brereton in his study, 
Who is Responsible ? Thus the most striking achievement of 
police rule in Austria has been the destruction of the Hapsburgs 
themselves. 

A judiciary which has never attempted to reach the assassins of 
the Archduke Rudolph proves its complicity. The Agram conspiracy 
trial in 1907 further proves to what depths it will descend. I have 
already referred to Mr. Wickham Steed's account of the prosecution of 
Doctor Friedjung in 1909. In the Sarajevo trial, the assassin Princep, 
who killed the Archduke and his wife, and Cabrinovitch, who threw 
the bombs, were condemned to solitary confinement for twenty 
years, but their accomplices were condemned to death. What is the 
meaning of this mystery ? 

A State which enjoys such a police and judicial system has no 
grounds for claiming to oust the jurisdiction of the police and judiciary 
of any other, as was done in the ultimatum of the 23rd of July to 
Serbia. 

In Germany, too, wholesale espionage has been made the founda- 
tion of diplomacy and strategy. The Kaiser has had his network of 
spies embracing the entire surface of the globe. Some clerk or mer- 
chant, whose honest aspect lulls suspicion, makes himself popular 
in a certain neighbourhood and spends his spare time in noting the 
strategic features of the district, selecting sites for gun emplacements, 

* Why the British Empire is at War : North American Review, November, 1914, 
p. 683. 

33 3 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

and collecting information as to the local resources which might be 
available for an invading army. This patriotic spying has been made 
a line art by disciples of German " Kultur," and forms part of the 
official code of ethics according to which all means are justified 
which further the aggrandizement of the Empire. All the information 
so gathered is sorted, classified and pigeon-holed in the offices of the 
General Staff by officials who have had long training in this type of 
work and who boast, without fear of contradiction, that their 
researches are on an unrivalled and unprecedented scale. 

There is, however, one grave defect in this employment of the spy, 
whether of lowly or exalted station. He is less anxious to discover 
truth than information palatable to his superiors and employers, and, 
of course, there is always the personal coefficient of error. Events 
have demonstrated, in falsifying the accumulated results of this 
magnificent Intelligence Department, how great that coefficient is. 
No doubt the General Staff knew that guns could be emplaced at 
such and such a spot, that trenches could be dug somewhere else, 
that Mr. X had a car and so many horses, that Mr. Y would make a 
valuable hostage. But when Mr. X's car and horses have been 
requisitioned, and Mr. Y has been arrested, what then ? Operations 
such as these, like the transactions of a village moneylender, bring 
in little in the way of resources and have to be paid for a hundredfold 
in the hour of defeat. Again, while the Great General Staff dissipated 
their energies in these fruitless and miserable tasks, both they and 
their Government were grossly deceived as to the material and 
moral conditions of their allies and their prospective enemies. 

The arch-spy in every country was the German Ambassador. Thus 
the Wilhelmstrasse, on the strength of Count Pourtales' reports from 
St. Petersburg, came to believe that Austria could do what she 
pleased with Serbia, that Russia, in the throes of strikes, would give 
way again as she had done in 1909, and, in so doing, would lose her 
prestige, not only in the Balkans, but also in France and Great Britain, 
and that accordingly Germany's position would be unchallenged. 
Simultaneously the spies of the General Staff reported that the 
reorganization of the Russian army would not be complete for three 
years, and estimated its offensive powers so low that Berlin regarded 
it as a negligible quantity which could be easily held up by the Austro- 
Hungarian army and a few German reserve corps until the termination 
of a victorious campaign against France released a triumphant horde 
to hurl itself on Russia and annihilate her. 

34 



Police Government and Espionage 

France ! What a game they would play with France ! The 
interview of M. Poincare with the Czar was fixed for July 24th. 
The ultimatum should be dispatched on the 23rd, so that the mystery 
of it might cast a sinister gloom over their meeting. The decision of 
the Austrian Government would be known at the moment M. Poincare 
left Russia. The two allies would be exchanging vows of eternal 
friendship. Germany would bring them to a sense of reality. If 
Russia acted, would France support her ? What ! In a wretched 
squabble over Serbia ! What was Serbia to France ? Jacques 
Bonhomme would soon say it was no affair of his. Panurge would 
add : " I hate fighting, and if I am to fight I must know why." The 
Socialist Congress had just adopted a motion of Jaures advocating 
a general strike in case of war. Socialist opposition might safely be 
counted on. The Ministry was composed of pacifists who had 
opposed the Three Years Law. French finances were in a deplorable 
condition. Her 805 million franc loan was not yet locked up. France 
would abandon Russia and that would be the end of both the Double 
and Triple Entente. She would cease to count among the Powers 
of Europe. They could treat her as they pleased and not a finger 
would be raised in her defence. They could beat her to the dust at 
leisure as Austria would beat Serbia. 

If, on the other hand, she accepted the challenge, they would make 
but a mouthful of her. As she had not dared to add a year to the 
service of the class which was under the colours in October, 19 1 3, 
her army would consist of two classes of young soldiers, many of 
them not more than twenty years of age. They would melt away 
before the onslaught of the German invincibles. What of their 
officers ? The German attaches had seen something of them at the 
South-Western manoeuvres. They were a prey to political dissen- 
sion. There were generals who were happy enough to possess decora- 
tions, badges of rank, and the moral and material advantages they 
conferred, but no desire to take hard knocks for the sake of the 
Republic. Most of them did not believe in war. The Germans, 
with their customary forethought, had spent forty millions more 
than the French and therefore their preparations were infinitely 
more extensive and complete. The French General Staff was wedded 
to the idea that invasion would come by way of Lorraine, between 
Toul and Belfort. The French troops would be massed on that 
frontier while the Germans were passing through Belgium. Except 
Maubeuge, no fortress would bar their path and within a fortnight 

35 3* 



I :\: C:..>:> ?.:*d C: '<:-..: r ::> c : - : War 

. . . 

S 

; " . . ;; — :'.;' : ; ; : 

sir* c carried on: 

... . 

? ::> ; ■ :v.:> 

? :"\\-> luences J 

; her their 

;mgh the question of con- 

did 
r.r: .v.:-: 

not t 
P 

:^ :: - 

oltra-pac 

j 

g 

politics, and 

Laments, 

:hem 
a 
sses 5 remiss 

or indirect, on foe. 

on them for its ms wild not mc 

- - . . 
:o allow their a: 

:uld be an 

■ ; s ^thing mc ms to a 

War, and breakout . . . 1 :.ient 

:"-_e :-.:■•.:■: are .: Britain's energies ;-. : .i:\-^rre.i ::: .-. tv.:^ri\i:i w.ir. 

; v ■ - « Italy. In : ripoli he 

Neither die Wilhdmstrasse nor 
the B th their in 



Police Government and Espionage 

tions towards Serbia. The Kaiser thought that the Italian army 
disorganized and her finance-, in confusion. He had already counted 
her as lost to the Triple Alliance and while he thu .-fully 

renounced tin of a Power with an army estimated at 

1,250,000 men, he provoked the intei Belgian army 

which, with all its defects of training and equipment, hag proved itself 
by its heroi im a foe by no means to be despised. 

By ranging Great Britain among Germany's foes the Kaiser was 
certain to lose the help of Italy. 

The final result of Germ- | the reports they 

so Laboriously accumulated is that the Kaiser was led to plunge 
Germany into war at the worst possible moment for her, by brie 
about a coalition which includes all ' vv-rs of Europe 

with the single- exception of Austria-Hungary. 



37 



CHAPTER VII 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND RUSSIA 

Prussia and Russia after 1772 — Bismarck and Russia in 1877 — The Treaty of 
Berlin — Fears of a Franco-Russian Alliance — The Austro-German Alliance 
— Russian hatred of Germany — Bismarck — Bismarck and Constantinople 
— The Re-Insurance Treaty of 1884 — Bismarck's speech of February 6th, 
1888 — Schemes against Russian credit — The Russian loan in Paris of 
December 10th, 1888 — The accession of William II. — Prince Hohenlohe's 
account of the rupture with Bismarck — The Triple Alliance in 1891 — 
William II. 's scheme — The Franco-Russian Alliance — German diplomacy 
and its results. 

WE must believe that German diplomatists are wonderful men, 
for, in addition to the assiduous self-advertisement of the 
Germans themselves, we have the evidence of innumerable simpletons 
who express a blind belief in Teutonic assertions of their all-round 
superiority. We must also believe that German diplomacy has had 
the benefit of the superior methods which characterize German 
actions. We will now compare these beliefs with the facts. 

In 1 870-1 87 1 Bismarck had created the German Empire, his work 
of " blood and iron," and henceforth devoted his energies to maintain- 
ing it. To preserve it, he followed a contradictory policy. He con- 
cluded an alliance with Austria-Hungary and at the same time 
entered into friendly relations with Russia. In this way he hoped 
Germany would have nothing to fear. 

Since the Seven Years War Prussia and Russia had always been 
on good terms. The schemes for the partition of Poland had been 
a source of discord but their accomplishment had drawn the two 
great brigands together. If Prussia had abandoned Austria and 
Russia after Austerlitz, resistance to Napoleon had reunited them. 
During the Crimean War Prussia had favoured Russia, and in 1870- 
187 1 Russia had adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality against 
France. 

In 1872 Bismarck was successful in persuading the Emperor Francis 

38 



German Diplomacy and Russia 

Joseph to visit Berlin to pay his respects to the Emperor William, 
the victor of Sadowa, and meet the Emperor Alexander II. The 
result was the Alliance of the Three Emperors against France. 

When Russia made war on Turkey in 1877 Bismarck considered 
he had paid off his debt to her by preventing Austria-Hungary from 
intervening. The Russian army reached San Stefano, and the Treaty 
of that name was concluded ; but it appears that its terms were 
inconsistent with an Austro-Russian secret treaty which had been 
signed at St. Petersburg before the war and also with an arrangement 
come to with England at the end of the armistice. In 1878 the 
Congress of Berlin gave to Austria the administration of Bosnia and 
Herzgovina, the two provinces which had initiated the struggle. 
Russia came out of it gravely weakened and Prince Gortschakoff 
left Berlin with a feeling of resentment against Bismarck. During 
his stay he had spoken to a French journalist of the possibility of 
a Franco-Russian alliance. 

Bismarck relates* that at his meeting with Count Andrassy, the 
Austro-Hungarian Minister, at Gastein, on the 27th of August, 1879, 
the latter said : "To a Russo-French alliance the natural counter- 
poise is an Austro-German alliance." Bismarck, however, would 
have nothing more than a purely defensive alliance against a Russian 
attack on either of the contracting parties. The Emperor William 
regarded the agreement as a kind of treason towards the Czar of 
Russia for whom he entertained a warm personal regard. Bismarck 
only overcame his scruples by being " compelled to bring the cabinet 
into play, a method of procedure extremely against my grain. The 
Emperor was not convinced by the arguments of policy, but gave the 
promise to ratify the treaty only because he was averse to ministerial 
changes."! Even so, William I. thought it only loyal to give the 
Czar of Russia private notice of the alliance which had just been 
concluded. 

" The treaty which we concluded with Austria for common defence 
against a Russian attack is ■publici juris. An analogous treaty 
between the two Powers for defence against France has not been 
published."! 

Bismarck was quite aware of the hatred in Russia against all things 

* Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 257. 

t Bismarck : His Reflections and Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 268. 

X Ibid, Vol. II., p. 272. 

39 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

German and that the Czar could not ignore it, however ardent his 
desire to be on good terms with Germany. 

" Scarcely, however, could anti-German rancour acquire in Russia a keener 
edge than it has among the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, the Slovenes of 
the countries comprised within the earlier German Confederation, and the 
Poles in Galicia. In short, if in deciding between the Russian and the Austrian 
Alliance I gave the preference to the latter, it was not that I was in any degree 
blind to the perplexities which made the choice difficult. "* 

Bismarck tried to maintain friendly relations with Russia. He was 
particularly anxious that the German Empire should not be drawn 
into the vortex of Balkan politics, and spared no pains to convince 
Russia of the v " defensive character of German policy." He foresaw 
that Russian ambitions would one day be directed towards Con- 
stantinople, and said that it would be all to Germany's advantage 
if Russia were solidly established at Constantinople and preoccupied 
with the burden of its defence. . . . And againf : " Were I an Austrian 
Minister, I would not prevent the Russians going to Constantinople, 
but I would not begin an understanding with them until they made 
the move forward." Bismarck considered Germany's lack of direct 
interest in the Eastern question a great asset in her policy. 

After absorbing Italy in the Austro-German alliance in 1882 
he tried to bring about another Triple Alliance between Germany, 
Austria and Russia. On the 24th of March, 1884, a treaty was signed 
at Berlin, which was ratified at a meeting of the three Emperors at 
Skiernewice. Bismarck called it the " Re-Insurance Treaty." If 
one of the three contracting Powers made war on a Power not a 
party to the Treaty, the two others would preserve an attitude of 
benevolent neutrality. Bismarck wished to add a clause providing 
that if two of them made war on a fourth, the third would in that 
case also remain neutral ; but Russia had her suspicions that this 
stipulation was aimed at France, and refused to accept it. In case 
of conflict in the Balkans, each Power would pursue its own interests 
and if they clashed the third would decide. A protocol was added 
allowing Austria to annex Bosnia and Herzgovina without regard 
to the other signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. For the rest the 
three Powers declared themselves responsible for its fulfilment or 
non-fulfilment, a stipulation which explains their declaration that 
they would not oppose the absorption of Eastern Roumelia by Bul- 

* Bismarck's Reflections. f Ibid, p. 285. 

40 



German Diplomacy and Russia 

garia and would not permit Turkey to fortify the Balkan countries. 
If Turkey allowed a fourth Power (Great Britain) to enter the 
Dardanelles, the contracting Powers would intervene. 

This Treaty brought no advantage to Russia. Bismarck makes 
no reference to it in his Reflections and Reminiscences, and if it owed 
its existence to him, he failed to maintain it. Bulgaria annexed 
Eastern Roumelia, and to show her independence of Russia Stam- 
bulofT condemned and executed nine Russophile officers. The 
Schnaebele affair showed Russia that Bismarck had not abandoned 
the idea of a second war against France. Alexander III. sent an 
autograph letter to the Emperor William and the Skiernewice Treaty, 
concluded provisionally for three years, was not renewed. 

In practice Bismarck's policy went counter to the principles he 
had enunciated. He was preparing the very Franco-Russian Alliance 
he so much dreaded. In November, 1887, he offered the St. Peters- 
burg cabinet Germany's armed support in case of an Austrian attack 
on Russia, but on the 6th of February, 1888, he destroyed the effect 
of that offer by an inflammatory speech in which he demanded a loan 
of twenty-eight million marks for the purchase of munitions of war. 
" We must carry out the decrees of Providence. . . ." The existing 
misunderstanding with Russia would doubtless vanish ; but 
as the Russian Press " has closed the door on the ancient and 
powerful friend we have always been, we shall not knock there 
again." 

It was Bismarck himself who indicated to France and Russia the 
necessity for combination against Germany. " We can be attacked 
on three sides, while France can only be attacked on the east and 
Russia on the west. We are more exposed to coalitions than any 
other nation. Franco-Russian pressure makes internal unity im- 
perative for us. If we found ourselves at war with Russia, war with 
France would be inevitable." 

In the spring he ordered the Reichsbank to cease taking Russian 
bonds as security. On December 10th, 1888, a Russian loan of 
five hundred million francs was floated in Paris. The ground was 
thus prepared for the Franco-Russian Alliance. 

Bismarck's Russian policy thus ended in a check. 

On the 15th of June, 1888, William II. mounted the throne. His 
first two speeches were made to the Army and Navy and not until 
three days later did he address his people. He dismissed Bismarck 
in March, 1890. According to Prince Hohenlohe's diary, the real 

41 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

cause of the rupture was the conflict between the views of Bismarck 
and the Emperor on the question of making a choice between Austria 
and Russia at the moment when war was threatening between those 
two Powers. It would seem that Bismarck then recognized that the 
subordination of German policy to that of Austria was a mistake. 
These are the entries in the diary : 

" Berlin, March 26th, 1890. 
11 The Emperor thought that Bismarck was contemplating abandoning 
Austria and the Triple Alliance in favour of an understanding with Russia." 



" It becomes increasingly clear that the divergence of opinion between the 
Emperor and Bismarck with regard to Russian aims has been the cause of the 
rupture. Bismarck wanted to let Austria go, but the Emperor insists on the 
maintenance of the Austrian Alliance even at the risk of a war with Russia and 
France. It is a black outlook for the future." 

The Triple Alliance was renewed in 189 1. There were rumours of 
an agreement between William II. and King Leopold that France 
should be attacked through Belgium. It was also said that William II. 
had suggested to England and Turkey an alliance against France. 
Result — the visit of Admiral Gervais and his French squadron to 
Cronstadt at the end of July, 1891. Alexander III. listened bare- 
headed to the strains of the " Marseillaise " and the Russian National 
Anthem. A military and naval convention followed, and the final 
outcome was the alliance of 1895. I was a member of the Ministry 
which sent the fleet to Cronstadt. All thinking men experienced a 
profound sense of relief that the dangerous isolation of France had 
become a thing of the past. 

The Franco-Russian Alliance was responsible for a number of 
illusions cherished by the more simple-minded Frenchmen who 
believed that henceforth the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine was 
assured. Russia had no intention of assisting France in a war of 
revenge. The Franco-Russian Alliance was merely a guarantee of 
security from German aggression. Von Biilow has twitted French- 
men on their disillusionment, but to attribute to all the vain 
imaginings of Deroulede was to assume too much. His jests only 
concealed the chagrin of German statesmen at the maintenance of 
the Alliance. Yet it has owed its continued existence largely to the 
action of Von Biilow and the other Chancellors. Professors, journalists, 
official and otherwise, have never ceased denouncing the Russians as 

42 



German Diplomacy and Russia 

barbarians animated with all a barbarian's hate of lofty German 
civilization and the desire to destroy it.* 

The Germans are never tired of posing as the bulwark of civilization 
against the onslaught of these barbarian hordes. The Russian spectre 
was invoked to support the arguments in favour of increased arma- 
ments in 1912 and 191 3. The forces of the emancipated Balkan 
nations would immobilize a part of the Austro-Hungarian army 
destined for action against Russia. The German contingents must 
therefore be increased. The Chancellor enunciated this policy in his 
speech of the 7th of May, 191 3, and the policy itself may be expressed 
in terms such as these : " Russia will never make war to satisfy 
French passion for revenge. We must therefore force her into war. 
In so doing we shall bring about the very contingency we ought to 
prevent. The one aim of our policy should have been to avoid 
finding ourselves beset both by France and Russia, yet for more than 
thirty years we have pursued a policy which could only bring those 
two Powers together." 

In recent years the aims of this German policy have become 
increasingly evident and German diplomacy touched its high-watei 
mark when, on August 1st, 1914, it found itself compelled to take 
the initiative by declaring war on Russia. 



* If I were Emperor, a pamphlet published in 191 2, which had an immense 
sale throughout Germany. 



43 



CHAPTER VIII 
GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND GREAT BRITAIN 

The policy of Great Britain — The Balance of Power and naval supremacy — 
Bismarck and Great Britain — The Franco-Egyptian crisis — The colonial 
policy of France — The French Protectionists — " Grasping the Trident " — 
" Our future is on the sea " — Naval policy and world-power — Opposition 
in the Reichstag — The Navy League — Anglophobia — Treitschke — Kiao- 
Chau — Turkey — The Mohammedans — Polynesia — Africa — The telegram 
to Kriiger — Von Billow's confessions — Central and South America — 
Holland and Belgium — The blockade of Russia — Megalomania — Picrochole 
— " Great Britain will not move " — Popular illusions about English 
Germanophiles — Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Guildhall on the ist of 
July, 191 1 — Rage against England. 

IN his speech of December 2nd, 19 14, the Chancellor, Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, reminded his audience that British 
foreign policy had two aims : naval supremacy and the European 
balance of power. 

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries command of the sea 
meant the monopoly of ocean commerce ; but the repeal of the 
Navigation Act in 1849 proved that Great Britain no longer intended 
to put forward that claim. She was content to possess, as a conse- 
quence of her Free Trade policy, between fifty and sixty per cent, 
of the world's carrying trade. 

Since the Armada at least, the English have feared nothing more 
than the hegemony of one state in Europe lest they themselves 
should be subjected to it. At the end of the seventeenth century they 
waged war on Louis XIV., who wished to restore the exiled Stuarts 
and dominate the Continent. At the beginning of the eighteenth 
century they again took up arms against him because he was 
attempting to secure the Spanish throne for his grandson, Philip V., 
while preserving all his rights as heir to the French throne. They 
fought against Napoleon, who tried to master Europe and break 
down their power. 

The Prussians had the benefit of this policy in the Seven Years 

44 



German Diplomacy and Great Britain 

War. It is true that when Napoleon gave them Hanover their 
acceptance was followed by a declaration of war from England in 
March, 1806. England supported Prussia in 1813 and 1814; but 
at the Congress of Vienna Prussia displayed such greed that she came 
into collision with the Czar Alexander of Russia and Lord Castle- 
reagh, the representative of Great Britain. She was obliged to give 
up Saxony, which she intended to annex, and an alliance against her 
was formed between France, Austria and England.* 

In 1864 Great Britain was weak enough to allow Prussia and 
Austria to annex the Danish Duchies. She also allowed Bismarck 
to create the Confederation of the North, and subdue South Germany 
in 1866. She raised no objection to the creation of the German 
Empire in 1871. Bismarck took some pains to soothe British 
susceptibilities as to the policy of the German Empire. He repre- 
sented Germany as the model of prudence, thoroughly content with 
her lot, entirely preoccupied with her own internal development 
and consequently in no position to menace Great Britain either at 
sea or on the Continent. At the same time, he was encouraging 
France in her colonial enterprises and inciting her to pursue an 
Egyptian policy which would lead to friction with Great Britain. 
He was eminently successful, and the French protectionists lent him 
their aid by exasperating public feeling in England. 

It was not very difficult for a grandson of Queen Victoria to be 
friendly to Great Britain, but only on the terms that he did not indulge 
in a policy " exceeding the limits of Bismarck's." William II. 
" meant to give Germany a preponderating voice in the world." 
At another time he said that " Germany must wield the 
trident." 

Prince von Bulowf boasted of having carried out that policy, and 
in justification tells a story of Bismarck to the effect that although 
Friedrichsruh was not far from Hamburg the old statesman had not 
visited that city for a long time. Some years after his retirement, 
at the age of eighty, he accepted an invitation from Herr Ballin, 
Managing Director of the Hamburg-American Line, to visit Hamburg, 
and was amazed at the size and magnificence of the liners. " Yes, 
this is a new age — a new world ! " he exclaimed. It was singularly 
bold of Prince Bulow to read into these words Bismarck's conversion 
to the naval and world policy of the Kaiser and his renunciation of 

* V. Debidour : Histoive Diplomatique de I'Europe, Vol. I., p. 36. 
f Imperial Germany, p. 102. 

45 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

the course he had recommended and followed since 187 1. The words 
were uttered on a liner, not on a Dreadnought. 

The Kaiser, with his forceful personality, his well-known views 
and his naval programme, presented for Great Britain a twofold 
danger, of which one aspect was a continental policy which menaced 
British security and rested on a claim to intervene in the affairs of 
everyone else, and the other, Germany's lust for conquest which 
affected the whole world. The Pan-German movement dates from 
just before 1893 and owed its inception to the Kaiser, Admiral von 
Tirpitz and Von Bieberstein. It was based on an interpretation of 
Article 4 of the Constitution of the German Empire : 

" Imperial supervision and legislation shall be extended to the following 
objects . . . and also to colonization and emigration into foreign countries." 

The Reichstag had no ambition for a great navy. On the 28th of 
March a budget cutting down the number of new ships demanded 
by the Government was passed on the third reading. On the 28th of 
June Biilow became Chancellor of the Empire. On the 27th of 
November Admiral von Tirpitz, as head of the Admiralty, brought 
forward a building programme of seven battleships, two armoured 
and seven light cruisers, to be completed by 1904. Speaking in the 
name of the Bundesrat, he said : " Without prejudice to the rights 
of the Reichstag or making any demand for the imposition of new 
taxation, the Allied Governments have made it the basis of their 
naval policy to create within a limited period a national fleet strong 
enough to give effective protection to the maritime interests of the 
Empire." Prince Biilow has said, not without a certain naive frank- 
ness : " We thought this increase of our naval power might arouse 
a certain uneasiness and resentment in Great Britain." If such 
was his anticipation, it was not likely to be falsified by the appearance 
of the " Deutsche Flotte Verein," the German Navy League, which 
Admiral von Tirpitz founded in May 1898. He popularized it by 
methods borrowed from the Salvation Army. German naval officers 
took part in processions in which a great blare of trumpets, trombones 
and drums strove to rouse the landlubbers to a proper conception of 
the ideal enshrined in the Kaiser's famous phrase : " Our future lies 
on the sea." 

The preamble of the Navy Bill of 1900 said that " Germany must 
possess a fleet so strong that the greatest naval Power in the world 
would run the risk, even in c^se of victory, of losing command of the 



German Diplomacy and Great Britain 



was represented as in the throes of starvation and even short of steel 
with which to rebuild her fleet. German professors and journalists 
made no secret of their hostility to Great Britain. The most famous 
of them, Treitschke, said : 

" We have squared our account with Austria-Hungary, France and 
Russia. The last account with Great Britain will be the longest and 
most difficult of all." 

But he did not hesitate to describe it as a necessity. In January, 
1900, Professor Hans Delbriick wrote in the North American Review : 

" As her (Great Britain's) great naval power cannot be overwhelmed by a 
single State, the best remedy would be an alliance against her of all her rivals 
together, especially of Russia, France and Germany." 

Twelve years later Eisenhart wrote in his book, Germany in the 
Twentieth Century : 

" We consider a great war with England inevitable." 

University professors, schoolmasters and journalists have assiduously 
taught that the English are too selfish and cowardly, except in the 
field of sport, to defend their country. The mention of the British 
army invariably suggested the analogy of the mercenaries of Carthage 
and Cato's dictum, " Delenda Carthago.'''' " Carthage must be 
destroyed." 

They went on to demonstrate how easy this would be. They said : 
" The British Empire is not a reality but a sham."* The population 
of the colonies is not large enough to give Great Britain adequate 
support. The ties between them and the mother-country are so 
loose that they have no interests in common. Great Britain cannot 
guarantee their protection. Why, then, should they prejudice their 
security by fighting for her ? General Bernhardi counted on the 
breaking away of Canada and on the probable loss of India. 

The Germans are always explaining that the British Government 
has not the stability of the German autocracy since it is in the hands 
of Ministries, often disunited, and also subject to parliamentary 
control. In such circumstances how could the diplomacy of Downing 

* Professor Cramb : Germany and England. Dr. Charles Sarolea : The 
Anglo-German Problem. 

47 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Street compare with that of the Wilhelmstrasse ? Nevertheless, the 
British Empire extends over the surface of the entire globe, while 
Germany's sole asset is her European territory of a paltry 540,000 
square kilometres.* Britain, then, is the foe which must be, and 
can so easily be, destroyed. These fine imaginings were duly 
translated into acts. 

It is the habit of German politicians to regard every German emigrant 
to a foreign country as a loss to Germany. However, it is not prac- 
ticable to forbid emigrants to go to the United States and compel 
them to settle in German East Africa. So other outlets had to be 
found. 

They first suggested the partition of China, and, by way of a start, 
took possession in the autumn of 1897 of a large slice of territory 
round Kiao-Chau Bay and forced the Treaty of Shantung on China. 
But as China was over-populated already it was hardly suitable as 
an outlet for the German surplus population. 

In 1889 the Kaiser obtained from Turkey the concession of the 
Anatolian Railway. In 1898, shortly after the first Navy Bill, he 
landed in Palestine, assigned to himself the protection of the Holy 
Places which the Pope had refused him, proceeded to Constantinople 
to offer his friendship to Abdul-Hamid and on his way thither made 
a famous speech at Damascus, in which he said : 

" The three hundred million Mohammedans who live scattered over 
the surface of the globe may rest assured that the German Emperor 
will at all times be their friend." 

This direct appeal to the Mohammedans of India, Egypt, Tunis 
and Algeria could not be lost on Great Britain. Then, to put his 
profession of friendship into practice, the Kaiser inaugurated the 
Bagdad Railway scheme. 

He has tried to lay hands on the territory of nearly every foreign 
State, small and great. At the end of the Spanish-American War, 
in 1899, he acquired the Caroline and Marianne Islands, and openly 
boasted of having " secured a point cfappui in Polynesia." But what 
was his purpose if not to agitate Australia ? In Africa the Germans 
have steadily aimed at joining up their south-western and eastern 
colonies by the acquisition of Rhodesia. They hoped the Boers 
would undertake the groundwork of this task. Negotiations took 
* Approximately 208780 square miles. 

48 



German Diplomacy and Great Britain 

place and the Germans agreed to supply them with arms. These 
negotiations led directly to the eventful telegram to Kriiger in 1896, 
which encouraged the Boers to declare war on Great Britain on the 
10th of October, 1899. The Germans were intensely disappointed 
when the British demonstrated their ability to transport an army 
from Europe to the Cape and from the Cape to the Transvaal and 
to bear with comparative ease the cost of the war. The violence and 
vulgarity (which did not even spare Queen Victoria) of the German 
Press exceeded that of any other country, nor was the impression on 
English public opinion modified by the Kaiser's refusal to receive 
Kriiger. The British were not deceived. They knew that Von 
Billow's only reason for maintaining neutrality was the weakness of 
the German fleet and the difficulty of obtaining French support for 
a war of aggression against them. The British Government was 
quite aware of Germany's share in the responsibility for the Trans- 
vaal War. 

The formation of the South African Union out of the various 
peoples of South Africa, and the fact that the Boers played the 
dominating role in it, carried Germany a stage further in the path 
of disillusionment. Von der Goltz said : " We must resist the 
English supremacy." 

About 1880 the Germans entertained ideas of colonization in 
Central and South America. Venezuela was the first object of their 
attentions. They made her loans, bought mines and embarked on 
commercial enterprises. The next step was to dispatch a warship 
to the principal port and claim a share in the government of the 
country.* These proceedings immediately alarmed the United 
States which invoked the Monroe Doctrine and prohibited all inter- 
ference in the internal affairs of Venezuela. This was the deathblow 
to German hopes of colonial expansion in the Gulf of Mexico and 
Germany had perforce to accept British and American supremacy 
at sea. 

To-day, thanks to their rate of emigration into Brazil, they are 
thinking of establishing a German state in the State of San-Paolo. 

Rotterdam and Antwerp are the ports of the Rhine and the Nether- 
lands are the obvious base for an invasion of Great Britain. Holland 
and Belgium are only independent because Great Britain and France 
have prevented Germany from seizing them. Then, says Germany, 

* Pan-Germanism, by Roland G. Usher, Professor of History at Washington 
University, St. Louis, p. 119. 

49 4 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

they must be taken, the Belgian Congo with Belgium and the Dutch 
Indies with Holland. Denmark is the key to the Baltic, destined to 
become a German lake. Denmark, too, must be taken, and then when 
the outlets of Russia are blocked at the Bosphorus on the south 
and the Sound and Great Belt on the north, she will have no other 
open port in Europe save Archangel. 

Germany has pushed Austria into adventures in the east and 
south-east, but in reality Austria has only followed in her wake, 
and it is Germany which has directed Austrian policy for her own 
ends. German and Austrian statesmen, their imagination fired by 
memories of classic times, have ever dreamed of controlling the great 
highways by which the Romans, the Barbarians and the Crusaders 
passed from the Danube valley to Constantinople, and the Turks from 
Constantinople to the Danube valley. Imagination plays a far 
greater part in these flights of fancy than an exact appreciation of 
the benefits to be derived from their realization. Salonica, as a 
commercial port, is almost valueless to Austria and Germany.* Its 
sole use would be for military purposes. Then follows the dream of 
the Bagdad railway, of the germanization of Turkey and Persia, and 
afterwards India. As Italy is established in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, 
Germany would take Egypt, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco. Victorious 
Germany would found a world-embracing confederation, embracing 
Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, Turkey, Egypt, Persia and 
India, with the Kaiser as indubitably its head as he is head of the 
German Empire. The simple gospel of the Pan-Germans is this : 
" If the English can govern India we can do so too." Yet they 
have never succeeded even in governing the Duchy of Posen and 
Alsace-Lorraine ! 

When, in the sixteenth century, an illustrious Frenchman named 
Rabelais described the wonderful feats of Picrochole, he was uncon- 
sciously making himself the historian of German policy. 

The Germans are for ever telling us that Great Britain has acquired 
nearly all her possessions by force and that this gives them the right 
to expel her from them by force. Yet they have not the slightest 
intention of restoring Australia to the aborigines, New Zealand to 
the Maoris, Canada to the Iroquois, and India to her Rajahs or the 
Great Mogul. Their idea is simply to take Great Britain's place. 
Nor must it be forgotten that this ambition a la Picrochole is not 
entertained solely by irresponsible journalists, but has received official 
* See the Journal des Economistes, November, 191 2. 
50 



German Diplomacy and Great Britain 

sanction, as repeated attempts to realize it sufficiently prove. Bis- 
marck's successors have laboured under the delusion that Great 
Britain need never be considered. As Prince von Billow frankly 
says in his book : 

" Germany is now too strong to be attacked by sea, so Great Britain 
will not move." 

That phrase ignores at least one result of Von Billow's policy, the 
Anglo-French entente of 1904. Maximilian Harden, the journalist 
who claims to represent the Bismarckian tradition, has more than 
once reproached the German Government for " diminishing by their 
attitude of menace the causes of friction between Great Britain and 
France in North Africa." The German Government have done more. 
They have bound the two countries in a close-knit alliance. The 
German Ambassador, Count Wolff Metternich zur Gracht, told the 
Kaiser : " You and the Crown Prince hold England spellbound. 
You may do what you like and England will not move. Her War 
Minister is Mr. Haldane, who said ' Germany is my spiritual home.' 
Mr. Lloyd George is enchanted with his visit to Germany and full 
of admiration for our social policy." 

Fortified by these assurances, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr 
von Kiderlen Wachter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the 
Panther to Agadir on the 1st of July, 191 1. On the 21st of July, 
speaking at the Lord Mayor's annual dinner to the bankers and 
merchants, Mr. Lloyd George reminded his audience that 

" Great Britain would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. . . . But if 
a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by 
the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries 
of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests 
were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, then 
I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable 
for a great country like ours to endure. National honour is no party question. 
The security of our great international trade is no party question ; the peace 
of the world is much more likely to be secured if all nations realize fairly what 
the conditions must be." 

Coming from a friend these words were all the more significant. 
They were followed by a declaration of Mr. Asquith in the House of 
Commons which met with universal assent, expressed by Mr. Balfour 
in the name of the Unionists, and by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald on 

51 4* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

behalf of the Labour Party. The effect was such that the German 
Press immediately dropped its provocative tone and expressed itself 
a3 thoroughly satisfied and ready for an understanding. 

Germany doubled her armaments and to lull British suspicions 
gave out false reports of the acceleration of her naval construction. 
Her military experts devised plans for the invasion of Great Britain 
and openly congratulated themselves that the days of Nelson's 
strategy had gone by when the defence of the Channel was left to 
the winds of Heaven. 

German diplomacy, with all its method, with all its skill and with 
all its unrivalled armoury, of which espionage is the principal weapon, 
has produced a situation in which Great Britain, France and Russia 
find themselves united in a common cause, a situation the reverse 
of that of 1900 when Hans Delbruck dreamed of a coalition of Ger- 
many, Russia and France against Great Britain. When the decisive 
moment came Germany put forward a ridiculous casus belli against 
Russia after refusing Sir Edward Grey's suggestion of a conference. 
She carefully cleared away the last doubts as to her intention to 
provoke war, then violated the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, 
and gave Great Britain the magnificent role of defending the sanctity 
of treaties which she herself described as so many " scraps of paper." 
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and his compatriots have ceased to 
speak of Germany defending Europe against Slav barbarism. Their 
rage is now directed against the English whom they are pleased to 
call their near relations. They have taken endless pains to prove 
that the violation of Belgian neutrality was only a pretext for the 
English, yet they themselves presented Sir Edward Grey with a 
motive for war which appealed irresistibly to all. Could Great 
Britain have remained neutral without that motive ? For myself 
I think not. She could not have kept out in face of so evident and 
persistent a menace to her security as the patent designs of the 
German Empire. But how can a sample of German diplomacy 
which made British intervention inevitable be regarded as a proof 
of its method, wisdom and superiority ? Diplomacy which has 
arrayed Great Britain, Russia and France in war against its country 
has brought it into dire peril, and the more the Chancellor 
emphasizes the effect of British intervention, the greater is the 
indictment against himself and Prince von Billow, unless, indeed, 
they were merely the mouthpiece of William II. 



52 



CHAPTER IX 
GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 

Bismarck's policy after Sadowa — Not extended to France — The peril of 1875 — 
Its true character — Colonial policy and Anglophobia in France — Alsace- 
Lorraine — Boulangerism — Bismarck and preventive wars — Opposition in 
the Reichstag — The Schnaebele affair — The Raon-1'Etape affair — The 
isolation of Alsace — The Emperor William II. — A policy of threats and 
favours — The visit of the Empress Frederick — Retaliation on Alsace — 
The ambitions of William II. — The Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. 

WE have seen by what methods of bluff and bluster the directors 
of German policy have succeeded since 1871 in drawing 
together Russia and Great Britain into alliance with France in 
opposition to the Triple Alliance. The same methods were equally 
characteristic of Germany's attitude towards France. In his Reflec- 
tions and Reminiscences, Bismarck reveals that he always allo'wed 
for the contingency of which Germany stood in so much dread and 
we have seen the means by which he attempted to reconcile contra- 
dictory policies. There was always, however, one fatal bar to his 
success. Germany would make no promise not to attack France. 
Bismarck tells us* how he opposed the King and the military clique 
after Sadowa when they demanded territorial acquisitions and a 
triumphal entry into Vienna. He made it his business " to avoid 
leaving behind in her (Austria) any unnecessary bitterness of feeling 
or desire for revenge." He says : 

" In positions such as ours was then, it is a political maxim after a victory 
not to inquire how much you can squeeze out of an opponent, but only to 
consider what is politically necessary." 

Nevertheless, he betrayed this principle after the victory over 
France. He declared for " the frontier of language." Von Moltke 
demanded Metz and Belfort. Thiers replied : " If you want both, 
there is no chance of signing peace to-day." Bismarck says : " I 
was distinctly apprehensive of foreign intervention at that moment." 
* Reflections and Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 41. 

53 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Von Moltke abandoned Belfort and kept Metz. No sooner had the 
indemnity been paid and the last German troops left French soil 
than France was again threatened in 1875. The French had just 
established their fourth battalions. Von Moltke and the war party 
demanded a preventive war on the ground that it would be both 
agreeable and useful, would reduce France to impotence and give 
them a new sheaf of laurels with little effort. Bismarck has accused 
Prince Gortschakoff of having invented this story in order to rouse 
the Czar of Russia to intervene. " Story " or not, Queen Victoria 
was not slow in intervening also. On the 13th of August, 1875, 
Bismarck wrote to the German Emperor : " I do not know whether 
your Majesty would consider it feasible to take Queen Victoria at her 
word when she assures your Majesty that she would find it easy to prove 
that her fears were not exaggerated."* Bismarck goes on to speculate 
as to her sources of information. As a matter of fact, he knew them 
then and that they were quite otherwise than he hypocritically con- 
jectured. In April, Herr von Radowitz, a very popular figure in the 
Court of Berlin, had seen Count de Gontaut-Biron, the French Am- 
bassador, at a ball, and warned him that French military reorganiza- 
tion might lead to war. Blowitz, in the confidence of the Due de 
Decazes — then Minister for Foreign Affairs — wrote to The Times, 
saying that Germany intended to " bleed France white," to exact an 
indemnity of ten milliards (£400,000,000), payable within twenty 
years, and to keep an army of occupation in the eastern departments 
until that sum was paid. Mr. Delane, the well-known editor of 
The Times, only published this piece of news after having verified 
it. Now the German Ambassador in London, Herr von Munster, 
and the British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord Odo Russell, had both 
announced it. The German Press denied it, but Radowitz, who had 
made the original remark to de Gontaut-Biron, continued to remain 
high in Bismarck's favour. One day, when Bismarck attributed 
this story to Stock Exchange speculators, Lord Odo Russell replied : 
" Will you censure your four ambassadors who have misled us and 
the other Powers ? " Bismarck gave no answer. He says in his 
Reflections and Reminiscences (Vol. II., p. 189) : 

" So far was I from entertaining any such idea at the time, or afterwards, 
that I would rather have resigned than lent a hand in picking a quarrel which 
could have had no other motive than preventing France from recovering her 
breath and her strength." 

* Bismarck's Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 191. 

54 



German Diplomacy and France 

Nevertheless, his letter of the 13th of August to the Emperor con- 
tained the following observation : 

" But, on the other hand, it is not advantageous to give our enemy (France) 
the assurance that we shall in any case await his attack " (Vol. II., p. 192). 

It is highly probable that Von Moltke and the war party, who were 
so often the object of Bismarck's complaints, really had the intentions 
divulged by Radowitz to Count de Gontaut-Biron. However that 
may be, Radowitz's indiscretion proved doubly useful to Bismarck. 
He confounded the war party and at the same time intimidated 
France by revealing his hope that peaceful means would dissuade her 
from pursuing her military reorganization. The result was the reverse 
of what he wished. Great Britain and Russia both intervened and 
their rulers intimated to the Emperor William their distrust of the 
aggressive tone of German policy. 

I have recounted,* briefly and without exaggeration, the deplorable 
consequences of the policy into which Bismarck led France at the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878. He successfully directed French passions 
against Great Britain and induced his dupes to squander their strength 
in Africa and the Far East, and generally to subordinate French foreign 
policy to the necessities of Germany. The question of colonial policy 
was the determining issue of the French elections of 1885. According 
to the ministerial declaration of November 16th, " The extension of 
our colonial enterprises imposes an unjustifiable burden upon us ; " 
and when M. de Freycinet became President of the Council, he 
declared on the 7th of January, 1886, that " Universal Suffrage 
means that France shall pursue a policy of peace and honour, and 
shall make her weight felt on the Continent. There must be no 
more of these oversea adventures." 

Unfortunately M. de Freycinet showed lack of statesmanship by 
allowing General Boulanger to be thrust upon him as Minister for 
War. The new Ambassador in Berlin, M. Herbette, hastened to 
assure the Emperor William I. at his first audience on the 23rd of 
October, 1885, " that the political aims of the French Government 
were peace, industry and stability." William I. could hardly reply 
that he hoped they would fail and had perforce to rest content with 
this assurance ; but a month later, on the 25th of November, a Bill 
was brought forward to increase the German army by ten per cent, 
on its peace footing, and even more on its war footing. To overcome 

* Journal des Economistes, May 15th, 1914, pp. 195-201. 
55 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

the opposition of the Reichstag Von Moltke was imported, in the 
hope that his immense prestige would influence the assembly, and 
he declared that 

" An understanding with France has been spoken of. But as long as public 
opinion in France demands the restoration of two essentially German provinces, 
such an understanding is impossible." 

In France the " League of Patriots " did its best to furnish argu- 
ments to Von Moltke and the big-army party. Its noisy and 
irresponsible agitation found a fitting mouthpiece in General Boulanger 
and the attitude of the German Press gave it a handle. 

Speaking on the nth of January, 1887, Bismarck said : " We are 
at the moment in possession of the subject of dispute — Alsace. We 
are not therefore fighting to obtain it." He declared himself hostile 
to the idea of a preventive war. " I never believe in making war 
merely because sooner or later war is inevitable." He recited 
the appalling consequences to Germany of a French victory, if war 
broke out ; but if Germany should triumph, " we should try to reduce 
France to such a condition that she would be unable to attack us for 
thirty years." With all this persuasion, however, the Reichstag 
voted the law for three years only and was immediately dissolved. 
Francophobia was made the issue in the ensuing electoral campaign 
and the Chancellor roused public feeling to fever-heat by the broad- 
cast distribution of pamphlets and posters showing French soldiers 
invading Germany and carrying away the women and cattle. The 
Press announced that seventy-two thousand reservists would be 
called up for the 7th of February. On the nth of March the new 
Reichstag passed the Seven Years Law by 227 votes to 31. There 
were 34 abstentions. 

The agitation died down, but five weeks later, on the 10th of April, 
a French police commissioner named Schnaebele was arrested on 
the frontier and taken to Metz. This man was arrested on a 
warrant emanating from the tribunal of Metz, ordering him to be 
seized as soon as he set foot on German soil. The charge preferred 
was that of high treason committed in France. He had been 
denounced by a man named Klein, himself accused of the same 
crime. Schnaebele had been lured on to the German side of the 
frontier by his German colleague who pretended that a frontier-post 
had fallen down. While on the German side and waiting for his 
colleague he was set upon by some other men and though in the 

56 



German Diplomacy and France 

course of the struggle that followed he got back on to French soil, 
he was none the less arrested. 

Explanations lasted until the 27th of April. The German Govern- 
ment would not admit any violation of the frontier, but could not 
help recognizing that a trap had been set, and on the 29th gave orders 
for Schnaebele's release.* The French Government thus vindicated 
their rights in the particular instance, but the German Government 
preferred a claim to charge Frenchmen with high treason for acts 
committed on French soil. The Times pointed out that according to 
this theory all Frenchmen might be charged with treason by Germany 
and likewise all Germans by France. A charge of treason brought by 
one country against another is ridiculous. While the incident was 
under discussion Bismarck uttered these words in the Prussian 
Chamber : 

"It is impossible to establish permanent friendly relations with so quarrel- 
some a race as the French, who have attacked us times without number in the 
past." 

Under the circumstances, this declaration was an additional proof 
that Bismarck shared the common German defect of want of tact. 
His acts and speeches were far more dangerous than the freaks of 
Paul Deroulede and the antics of the circus general named Boulanger 
who left the Ministry on the 30th of May. The incident closed 
officially on the note of " Peace with Honour." 

On the 24th of September, 1887, there was a new frontier incident 
at Raon-1'Etape. A soldier named Kauffmann, lent to the Forestry 
Department, shot a Frenchman, M. Brignon, and wounded another, 
M. de Wangen, who were shooting with three friends near the frontier. 
The German Government granted an indemnity of fifty thousand 
marks to M. Brignon's widow but no proceedings whatsoever were 
taken against Kauffmann. On the contrary, he was rewarded by 
his officers for " the noble achievement of having killed a Frenchman." 

As Bismarck said, the German Empire was " in possession of the 
subject of dispute." Yet no progress was made towards assimilating 
the new provinces. The people of Alsace-Lorraine were stung to 
fury by the measures taken by their first Statthalter, Herr von 
Manteuffel, and his successor, Prince Hohenlohe. The machinery of 
law was set in motion to repress expressions of opinion. French 

* See L'Allemagne et la France en Europe (1885-1894), by Pierre Albin 
(Paris, Felix Alcan), p. 82. 

57 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

newspapers were not allowed in the two provinces. A close watch 
was kept on girls' schools to discourage the teaching of French, and 
no Frenchman was allowed to visit Alsace without a special permit 
from the authorities. 

The North German Gazette explained these measures of repression 
by saying that " the chief obstacle to the assimilation of Alsace was 
the continuation of social and economic relations with France." 
Accordingly, those relations had to be restricted if they could not be 
altogether suppressed. The French Government even had to make 
an arrangement with Switzerland by which trains which had formerly 
passed through Mulhausen were allowed to travel on Swiss territory. 

Thus it came about that after nineteen years Bismarck was 
declaring that France must definitely resign herself to the loss of 
Alsace and Lorraine, and at the same time admitting that the 
" germanization " of those two provinces had made no progress. 
German tyranny there was itself, in fact, the heaviest indictment of 
the territorial arrangements of 1871. Bismarck was also unwittingly 
admitting that the German Empire was a thing so delicate and fragile 
that its existence could only be maintained by an armed force which 
he was pleased to call defensive. Yet he could not have created that 
armed force without the aggressive arguments he advanced at one 
time against France, at another against Russia. When he retired he 
left the inevitable Franco-Russian Alliance as a legacy to William II. 

However, Bismarck stood for a certain guarantee of peace which 
vanished when William II. became his own Chancellor. At the 
Labour Conference which was to have been held at Berne, but which 
he managed to get transferred to Berlin in 1890, he showed himself 
very friendly to Jules Simon and the other French delegates. But 
no one was deceived by that manoeuvre. On the 6th of May, at the 
opening of the Reichstag, he brought forward a Bill to increase the 
field artillery by seventy batteries and the establishment by eighteen 
thousand men. The two new army corps were brought up to strength 
by the addition of their special arms. Caprivi, the new Chancellor, 
justified the measure by Bismarck's old argument — the rapproche- 
ment between Russia and France. 

Bismarck's ambition was that Germany should always be so 
powerful as to inspire terror in all other nations. In 1871 the Army 
establishment was fixed for three years at 401,059 men ; that is to 
say, one per cent, of the total population, in conformity with 
Article 60 of the Constitution. In 1874, however, the General Staff 

58 



German Diplomacy and France 

had the three years extended to seven, and in 1881 the establishment 
was fixed for another seven years, to the 31st of March, 1888, at 
427,274 men. 

These Seven Years Laws fixed the Army establishment for a 
definite period, avoided the necessity of frequent reference to the 
Reichstag, and gave the Chancellor a free hand with his foreign 
policy. Further, these laws were only binding on the Reichstag. 
The Chancellor could ask the Reichstag to modify them if he thought 
fit, and on the 25th of November, 1886, though the seven years' period 
did not expire until 1888, he demanded an additional 41,135 men. 

A year later the Chancellor again violated the Seven Years Law. 
The service of the six classes of trained men whose time in the 
landwehr would normally have expired in their thirty-third year was 
extended to their thirty-ninth. Every fit man between seventeen 
and forty-five who had not done service either in the Army or Navy 
was to be incorporated in the landsturm. 

On the 6th of May, 1890, as we have seen, the Seven Years Law 
of 1887 was revised. The establishment was increased by eighteen 
thousand men ; seventy batteries were added to the artillery, and 
so on. It will be noticed that the Seven Years Laws were never 
revised in favour of the diminution of armaments, but always in the 
direction of increase. 

The Freycinet Ministry (1 890-1 892), in which M. Ribot was Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, put an end, at least for the moment, to the anti- 
English policy of France by concluding the Agreement of the 5th of 
August, 1890.* At the same time Russia and France were drawing 
ever closer together. 

An incident in 1891 showed the uncertainty of the relations between 
France and Germany. William II. projected an exhibition of paint- 
ings at Berlin and commissioned Detaille, the most national of French 
painters, to secure the support of French artists, as the Government 
did not wish to take any part. Detaille was successful. The Empress 
Frederick suddenly resolved to pay a visit to Paris. She went to 
Versailles and crossed the Park of Saint-Cloud. Her movements 
became the subject of great clamour among the Boulangists. 
Detaille received the Empress on her first visit, but two days later, 
Under pressure from Deroulede, he withdrew his co-operation. His 
defection was followed by that of the other artists he had secured. 
The Empress had to leave France without any public reception. 
* I was a member of that Ministry. 

59 



The Causes and Consequences of the W 

. : ■ ■ P ass i 

hress 

Latter 

j 
M. R fid the 

;:u. The Ge m in Govei ome 

i 

but the ill-will b 

with the atmc 
i 
It is 

die 1st 

[n July a French 
August 
: . on tbu- 
interest in the 

on d with the 

other to j thai common 

.•"v Eu ro- 
On die 14th of Se William II 

E rfurt in which he the Corsica] . p s art who 

j humiliation on the P rinces 
but on the 1 6th oi S ished t: 

in Alsace-Lou line ' May, 1892, the R< 

BID emp 

denee 
jot communes 
.forth to be in ere / 

Mulhauser sters must 

wary. 
A: the end of : Army Bill increased 

:.i;> officers, 11.000 non-conr.v -;.ooo men » 

and the 800,000 marks (app oxima ; 0.000). 

Bisrr the mouth of Cap 

Of course, the on of immedi . but '* the French 

can.] 



German Diplomacy and France 

love war for the glory it brings," and the Chancel:- ! of them 

eady to hurl themscV He wound up with a 

to the I rapprochement^ the result 

by German diplomacy, to th^ir utter amazement and confusion. 

Id 1893 the Emperor William went to celebr; 
Seda: battlefields oi Lorraine. He made a triumphal entry 

into MetZ at the head of 25,000 men and in te banquet 

told the Lorrainers, " Germans you are, and Germans you shall 
remain." 

After variou 3 negotiations, not free from difficulty, the I: 
:«n Alliance was signed in March, 1894. Thus was lost to 
Germany that European hegemony to which Bismarck had never 
ceased to aspire, and which William II., vith greater emphasis, if 
authority, has ever demanded as her due. 



*« 



CHAPTER X 
GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 

ALGECIRAS 

Bismarck a reluctant advocate of colonial policy — Opposition in the Reichstag 
— New Guinea— Angra Pequena and Great Britain — Togoland and the 
Cameroons — The Berlin Conference of 1885 — Subsidies for German ship- 
ping — Caprivi's opposition to colonial expansion — The Anglo-French 
Agreement of April 12 th, 1904 — The Franco-Spanish Agreement — The 
resignation of Von Biilow — The Emperor William's rage — Herr von 
Kiihlmann and M. Saint-Rene Taillandier — William II. 's visit to Tangier — 
Germany's insolent demands — " We stand behind Morocco with our full 
strength " — The Algeciras Conference — German manoeuvres are checked — 
Von Biilow and the " isolation " of Germany — German diplomacy as seen 
by the Frankfort Gazette. 

WE have already noticed certain deviations in Bismarck's policy 
even during his long dictatorship. There remains another, 
his excursions into the realm of colonial expansion. 

Bismarck found it profitable to offer colonies to France but many 
Germans found it intolerable that France should be allowed to add 
to her territory while Germany remained confined within her old 
frontiers. Bismarck feared friction with Great Britain and the 
Liberals, on whose support he depended, opposed colonial adventures. 
However, in 1879, after the collapse of the important house of Godefroy, 
which had a large connection in the South Seas, he asked the Reichstag 
for a State guarantee for a company which was to take over its 
plantations in Samoa. The Reichstag refused. 

A company was formed and began operations in the north of New 
Guinea. The Deutscher Kolonial Verein began to work up public 
opinion in favour of colonial policy. Bismarck yielded. In 1883, 
when a Bremen merchant named Liideritz suggested to him the estab- 
lishment of a trading-station at Angra Pequena, he informed Great 
Britain. As that Power raised no kind of objection and even ignored 
the intimation, Bismarck declared the whole coast and hinterland 

62 



German Diplomacy and France 

between the Portuguese possessions and the Orange River (with the 
exception of Walfisch Bay) a German Protectorate. Further north, 
Dr. Nachtigal, stealing a march on both the French and English, 
occupied Togoland and the Cameroons. In 1884 and 1885 a German 
Protectorate was established on the east coast of Africa. Simul- 
taneously German colonies were established in New Guinea and in 
the archipelago of New Britain. The Caroline Islands would have 
shared the same fate had it not been for the award of Pope Leo XIII., 
who was called in to arbitrate between Germany and Spain. Bismarck 
announced that he meant to delegate responsibility for the colonies 
to the traders. The new territories were considered merely as pro- 
tectorates, not incorporated in the Empire ; but in 1888 an Arab 
rising compelled the German Government to undertake the defence 
and administration of East Africa and all the German colonies were 
put under the direction of a department of the Foreign Office. At 
the Berlin Conference of 1885 Bismarck obtained recognition for the 
German possessions in East and West Africa, and a year later for 
the South African possession also. 

In 1 881, as part of the programme, Bismarck demanded a subsidy 
for German shipping ; but the project was opposed by Bamberger 
and the Liberals and it was not until 1885 that he obtained subsidies 
for Pacific steamship lines. Then others followed. 

On the other hand, in 1892 Caprivi opposed the colonial movement, 
and to those who said " Why not take the French colonies ? " he 
replied, " We have quite enough of our own " (November 23rd, 1892). 
This retort, however, far from soothing the German " colonials," 
only served to irritate them. France occupied Tunis, Indo-China, 
Madagascar, the Sudan, the Congo, and had by no means forgotten 
Alsace-Lorraine. It was not fair. 

The Fashoda incident did not lead to war between France and 
Great Britain. At the time of the South African War Von Biilow was 
given to understand that he could not drag France into a war against 
England. At the end of March, 1904, he was informed that an agree- 
ment was about to be concluded between Great Britain and France. 

This entente bore the date of April 8th, 1904. On the 12th of April 
Biilow, who had known of it a fortnight before, told the Reichstag 
that " from the point of view of German interests it contains nothing 
objectionable ; from the point of view of Morocco, German commercial 
interests have everything to gain from the establishment of peace 
and order in that country." 

63 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

On the 6th o! October, 19043 ■ Franco-Spanish treaty was con- 
cluded by which Spain adhered to the Tench Agreement. 
The WOhefanstrasst s informed the same day and the German 
Chancellor's attitude remained unchanged. His complacence, 
ever, was uTusory. On the :4th oi April, 19^4, the Emperor William 
had rancorously complained oi the warm reception which Italy 
M. Loubet in the previous year. 

'• Think mew the unity o! the G 

nation; think of Worth fg I trust that the results 

6 our eyes will be . . . to hnd us united, if 
ever we are called on to take our part in w c 

On the 50th of May the German Colonial Assembly . 

D in the following terms : 

'• La .\ny modification 01 the ... the German Empire must 

receive compensation sufficient to counterbalance the i . French p 

and cones] inoe ol her economic intei - - the country, 

her need of naval bases and the requirements of her expanding population."' 

At that time Russia was war with Japan and 

cc could look for no material ass 1 in that quarter. Further, 

as deputies and journalists were urging incessantly that dis- 

prevailed in the French army and navy. 

On February nth, 1905, the German Minister at I Herr von 

Kuhlr to the French Minister. If. Saint-Rene Taillandier : 

" We have noticed that you systematically treat . ftt. I 

am formally instructed to tell you that the Imperial Government will ignore 
ents that may have been concluded wit CO and will 

maintain complete '. ::on.*' 

1 Biilow told the French Ambassador that he knew nothing of 
the words "attributed'' to his charge ..' A month later 

William II. announced his pending visit to Tangier. In the Reichstag 
Biilow declared : 

•• I consider that the duty of the German Government is to see that in future 
our economic interests in Matt not injured. - ' 

The Frankfort Gazette considered that that formula implied die 
M maintenance of the territorial integrity oi Morocco." Immediately 
afterwards the voice of menace made itself heard in the Mum 

• The reply of the threatened German interests 

64 



German Diplomacy and France 

will be made through the gateway of Metz." Another journal tried 
a flight of wit by adding that " English warships could hardly be 
fitted with wheels so as to take part in a continental war." 

After delivering a speech at Bremen, William II., on March 23rd, 
embarked on the liner Hamburg which was escorted by the cruiser 
Friedrich Karl. He stopped at Lisbon from where he is said to have 
telegraphed to Bulow that he would not go to Tangier. Biilow seems 
to have replied that as his voyage had been deliberately planned and 
begun it could not be broken off. The Emperor accordingly pro- 
ceeded. When he reached Tangier harbour, he sent his aides-de-camp 
on shore at once but delayed his own landing for nearly four hours. 
He was received by Mouley-Abd-El-Malek, and said to him : " I 
consider the Sultan an absolutely free Sovereign, and it is with 
him that I wish to confer as to the best means of safeguarding 
German interests in Morocco with all our strength." 

The German Government published a " White Book," setting forth 
reasons for the voyage and the Emperor's declaration. It began with 
certain quotations from the Press in justification of the step. Now, 
with the exception of an extract from the Temps, all of them were 
subsequent to Biilow's speech announcing the Kaiser's voyage. The 
" White Book " put them forward as " provocation," yet in fact 
they were that unusual species of provocation which follows, not 
precedes, the decision and the act ! The whole German case was 
based on the assertion that M. Saint-Rene Taillandier had addressed 
the Sultan as the mouthpiece of Europe, but his subsequent dispatches 
revealed what he actually had said : 

" I reminded the Sultan that he was under an obligation to safeguard by any 
and every means the French and European interests which were in such 
serious jeopardy." 

The German consul at Fez, in face of this simple and positive 
declaration, made at the moment by a man who appreciated the signi- 
ficance of his words, could only bring forward a version which he had 
more or less wrung from the Sultan. 

There followed an impertinent German attack on the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, M. Delcasse, who was compelled to hand in his 
resignation on the 8th of June, 1905.* 

M. Rouvier, President of the Council, took over his portfolio — 
and also his difficulties. The Wilhelmstrasse called for a conference, 
which they induced the Sultan to demand. Prince Radolin, the 

* See Victor Berard : L' Affaire Marocaine. (Paris.) 

65 5 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

German Ambassador in Paris, said at the Quai d'Orsay : u We stand 
by a conference, and if there is no conference, then by the status quo. 
You must realize that we are behind Morocco with our whole strength." 

Germany hoped to secure through the conference the establishment 
of international police, army, and financial administration in Morocco, 
in which she would have a controlling voice. Yon Biilow took to 
threats. He said to the French Ambassador, M. Bihourd : u This 
difficult, this very difficult question, must not be allowed to drag on. 
It is not wise to linger on the edge of a precipice." At last, on the 
8th of July, M. Rouvier accepted the idea of a conference with the 
reserve that " the Imperial Government should pursue no objective 
contrary to the interests of France or the rights conferred by existing 
treaties and arrangements." 

During the negotiations Count Tattenbach made the most strenuous 
efforts to secure a concession for the harbour works at Tangier and 
other Moroccan ports, an order for ships, a loan, and a contract for 
the material and installation of a cable between Tangier and the 
Atlantic coast. All this was denied at first in Berlin but in Sep- 
tember Von Biilow came to the end of his evasions and quietly said 
to the French Ambassador : " In your place I should secure a similar 
concession." 

In a word, " I am guilty ; be guilty too, and we shall be quits." 

The Conference met at Algeciras on the 1 6th of January, 1906. 
The Russo-Japanese War had ended in the previous August so Russia 
was free. Great Britain and Spain were in agreement with France. 
The German Emperor offered the policing of all the Moroccan ports,* 
both to Italy and Spain, and took to threats when, on March 3rd, 
M. Revoil having demanded a discussion of the police question and 
Herr Radowitz opposing, ten votes were given in favour of it and 
only three votes against, the latter being those of Germany, Austria- 
Hungary and Morocco. Germany, in no wise abashed, telegraphed 
to St. Petersburg and Washington that all the Powers had deserted 
France. In the night of March I3th-I4th the English Government 
replied by a circular telegram, asserting their complete agreement 
with France. On the 19th a similar assurance was given by the 
Russian Government. 

On the 20th of March Herr von Tschirschky, Secretary of State, 
said to M. Bihourd : 

(i The difficulties are at an end, since we conform to your wishes." 
* Tardieu : La Conference d' Algisiras, (Paris, F. Alcan.) 

66 



German Diplomacy and France 

In his book, Imperial Germany, Prince Bulow professes himself 
satisfied with the result, which he records in these words : 

" Nevertheless, we succeeded in preserving the sovereignty of the Sultan, 
and in securing international control of the police organization and the Moroccan 
National Bank, thus ensuring the open door for German economic interests 
as well as for those of all other countries." (P. 82.) 

M. Delcasse had left the Quai d'Orsay. The Tangier voyage was 
over. The Algeciras Conference had finished its labours. Never- 
theless, Bulow, speaking on the 15th of November, 1906, sounded 
a note of petulance and menace : 

" A policy which aimed at encircling Germany, at forming a ring of Powers 
to isolate and paralyse us, would be very dangerous for the peace of Europe. 
Such a ring is impossible without the exertion of a certain pressure. Pressure 
creates counter-pressure. Pressure and counter-pressure can easily produce 
explosions." 

Yet when Germany formed the Triple Alliance, when in 1884 she 
added to that another Triple Alliance embracing Austria and Russia, 
and when she urged France into conflict with Great Britain — what 
was all that but an attempt to isolate France ? Germany's idea of 
what was legitimate was everything that increased her strength 
against France, but everything that increased French resistance to 
her aggression she denounced as provocation on the part of France. 

When she held M. Delcasse responsible for the policy of so-called 
" isolation " of Germany, she paid him the greatest possible com- 
pliment, for she thereby admitted the superiority of French diplo- 
macy to her own. The German charge was that M. Delcasse wanted 
to isolate Germany by the Anglo-French Agreement, the Franco- 
Italian Agreement, and the Franco-Spanish Agreement, super- 
imposed on the Franco-Russian Alliance. The mighty Power which 
aspired to the hegemony of Europe thus behaved like a lost child, 
crying, " I won't be left alone ! I'm frightened ! " 

To complete the picture, Germany threatened to hurl her army 
at the Powers which " ringed her round." 

About the end of 1906 the Frankfort Gazette gave the following 
resume of the achievements of German diplomacy : 

" German diplomacy has become unpopular throughout the world. First, 
the telegram to Kriiger ; then declamations against the Yellow Peril and 
America ; then pan-Islam agitation in Africa. One blunder after another . . . 
what has it all led to ? We left the Boers to shift for themselves. The Japanese 
have beaten the Russians. The Sultan of Morocco has had to accept the 
Franco-Spanish police. . . ." 

67 5* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

That is a German's considered judgment of German diplomacy- 
diplomacy which has always been inspired by the Kaiser himself or 
the Chancellor, and never been hampered by Parliamentary institu- 
tions. Yet French writers and politicians are still to be found who 
wax enthusiastic over the autocratic regime of Germany, the con- 
sistency of her policy and the mechanical precision of her methods, 
and not even a patent success such as that of Algeciras can shake 
their assertion that France was beaten. 



68 



CHAPTER XI 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND FRANCE 

AGADIR 

The affair of the deserters — The interview with the Kaiser recorded by the 
Daily Telegraph — Germany's threatening attitude — The agreement of 
February 9th, 1909 — The annexation of Bosnia and Herzgovina — Germany 
" in shining armour " — The Agadir coup — Herr von Kiderlen Wachter's 
declarations to Herr Class, President of the Pan-Germanic League — Ger- 
many's object — Uncertainty — Morocco and the Congo — " Our place in 
the sun " — German indifference to the Algeciras Convention — The arrange- 
ment of November 4th, 191 1 — " Diplomatic ethics " — The five threats to 
France — Billow's confession — The motives for Germany's ill-will — The 
routes through Alsace and Lorraine. 

THE Algeciras Conference made little improvement in the internal 
condition of Morocco. In March, 1907, Dr. Mauchamp was 
murdered at Marakeck. In July some European workmen employed 
at the port of Casablanca were killed. Moulai Hand, brother of the 
Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, organized a rebellion which was supported by 
the Germans who had abandoned their former protege. 

Six deserters from the Foreign Legion, three of them Germans 
and the others Swiss and Austrians, had been granted safe-conducts 
by the German Consulate. On the 25th of September, 1908, the 
French prevented them from embarking and there was something 
in the nature of a " scene," in which the Chancellor of the German 
Consulate took part. Baron von Schoen, then Secretary of State, 
suggested arbitration. France agreed. Baron von Schoen imme- 
diately demanded that France should first apologize for the encroach- 
ment of her agents on the prerogatives of the German Consulate, 
Germany expressing her regret for the grant of safe-conducts to Swiss 
and Austrians who had obviously no right to them. 

On October 28th the Daily Telegraph published a famous account 
of an interview with the Kaiser, in which he avowed his friendship for 
Great Britain but declared that it was not shared by the German 

69 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

nation. The publication of this interview caused the greatest excite- 
ment in Germany, and both the Emperor and the Chancellor were 
severely criticized. 

Was Biilow trying to distract public attention from the affair of 
the deserters ? However that may be, he began to adopt a threatening 
attitude towards France. Prince Radolin said as much to M. Clemen- 
ceau and talked of leaving Paris. 

The situation became so grave that the Army Corps of the East 
were confined to barracks and the decision was taken to recall the 
class dismissed in September. At last the German Emperor con- 
sented not to go to war for such a trivial affair in which he was hope- 
lessly in the wrong, and on November ioth he agreed to arbitration 
without a preamble. On the 15th of November, Prince Biilow, in 
the Reichstag, professed his friendship for France. This display of 
good feeling was followed by the agreement of February 9th, 1909, 
whereby Germany, recognizing the special political interests of France 
in Morocco, undertook not to stand in her way. France guaranteed 
Germany .-economic equality as she had already done in the case of 
England, Spain and Italy. In May, 1909, a Moroccan Public 
Works Association was formed, comprising all the great commercial 
houses which had tendered for public works in Morocco in the 
previous six years. 

In March, 19 10, following on friendly negotiations, France and 
Germany decided on a Moroccan loan to pay off the European 
creditors whose claims had been examined in 1909 by an international 
commission sitting at Casablanca. x4t the moment Franco-German 
relations seemed to be on the most excellent footing.* 

In Imperial Germany Prince Biilow speaks of the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzgovina as Germany's revenge for the Moroccan 
affair and the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg told M. Isvolsky, 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Germany, " in shining 
armour," stood beside Austria. 

The real attempt at revenge on the part of the German Empire 
was the Agadir coup. 

On July 1st, 191 1, Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, 
handed to M. de Selves, who had only been three days at the Quai 
d'Orsay, the following note : 

" Various German commercial houses which carry on business in southern 
Morocco, and particularly in Agadir and its neighbourhood, are alarmed at 

* Tardieu : La France et les Alliances (1910J. (Paris, F. Alcan.) 

70 



German Diplomacy and France 

the unrest among certain tribes. These houses have asked the Imperial Govern- 
ment to undertake the protection of the persons and property of their repre- 
sentatives. In answer to this request the Government have decided to send 
a warship to the port of Agadir, so that in case of necessity assistance and 
protection may be given to German subjects and proteges and the important 
German interests in that region. As soon as tranquillity and order are restored 
in Morocco, the vessel charged with this mission of protection will leave the 
port of Agadir." 

In the version which appeared in the North German Gazette a more 
ominous note was heard. The protection of German subjects was 
only a pretext. The Panther was sent to Agadir, not to intimidate 
Moroccan tribes, but to intimidate France and deprive her of the 
benefits of the Algeciras Convention. 

The moment was well chosen. Saturday being the first day of 
the English week-end, Sir Edward Grey was not at Downing Street. 
Also, it was the eve of the departure of the President of the Republic 
and the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Netherlands. Lastly, 
the Emperor William II. was just about to start on his annual cruise 
to the Norwegian fjords in order to create the alibi which was to 
do such good service at the end of July, 1914. 

With the clumsy bad faith which is characteristic of the German 
Government they attempted to deny their intentions in this theatrical 
proceeding, but the Fortnightly Review* has published the evidence 
given on January 9th, 191 2, in court by the editor of the Rheinisch 
Westfalische Zeitung in an action brought by him against the Grenz- 
boten. It has only appeared in the former journal and the Tagliche 
Rundschau, but has never been contradicted by the persons mentioned : 

" Herr Class, the President of the Pan-Germanic League, is prepared to state 
upon oath before this Court that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Herr von Kiderlen Wachter, writing to him from Kissingen, requested Herr 
Class to meet him at the Hotel Pfalzer Hof in Mannheim. During the interview, 
which occupied several hours, Herr von Kiderlen- Wachter stated : ' The Pan- 
Germanic demand for the possession of Morocco is absolutely justified. You 
can absolutely rely upon it that the Government will stick to Morocco. M. 
Cambon is wriggling before me like a worm. The German Government is in a 
splendid position. You can rely on me, and you will be very pleased with our 
Morocco policy. I am as good a Pan-German as you are.' On the 1st of July 
Herr Class called at the German Foreign Office, and failing to find Herr von 
Kiderlen Wachter, was received by Herr Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary. 
Herr Zimmermann told him : ' You come at an historic hour. To-day the 
Panther appears before Agadir, and at this moment (twelve o'clock mid-day) 

* No. XCL, New Series, 462. 
71 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

the Foreign Cabinets are being informed of its mission. The German Govern- 
ment has sent two agents provocateurs to Agadir, and these have done their duty 
very well. German firms have been induced to make complaints and to call 
upon the Government in Berlin for protection. It is the Government's intention 
to seize the district, and it will not give it up again. The German people require 
absolutely a settlement colony. Please prevent, wherever in the Press you 
have influence, the raising of claims for compensation elsewhere. Possibly 
France will offer us the Congo. However, the German Government does not 
want compensation elsewhere but a part of Morocco.' "* 

There is the objective, stated unequivocally. The French Ministers 
were thoroughly perturbed by this act of aggression. Should they 
send a warship in reply to the dispatch of the Panther ? M. Delcasse, 
then at the Admiralty, was opposed to that course, and finally it w r as 
decided that France should follow the lead of Great Britain. While 
M. de Selves was in the Netherlands, M. Caillaux, President of the 
Council, had temporarily taken his place at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. He had a conversation with Herr von Gwynner, President 
of the Deutsche Bank, and member of the Prussian Upper House. 
But the Panther, a small gunboat about 210 feet in length, was 
replaced by the cruiser Berlin, about 340 feet long and carrying a 
crew of 273 men and 13 officers. France was retreating, Germany 
advancing. 

What did she really want ? 

" A final solution of the Moroccan question," said the official Press. 
But by what means r To this question various answers were returned. 

Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, supported by Mr. Balfour, 
Leader of the Opposition, and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, Chairman of 
the Independent Labour Party, made an emphatic declaration that 
the British Government would take all necessary steps to protect 
British interests and fulfil the engagements contained in the treaty 
with France. Count Osten Sacken, the Russian Ambassador, made 
a friendly inquiry as to the views of the German Government. 

M. de Selves, having returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
asked Baron von Schoen what Germany wanted. Baron von Schoen 
replied that " he had no information on the matter." M. Paul 
Cambon was accordingly instructed to press the Wilhelmstrasse for 
the answer which their Ambassador in Paris professed to be unable 
to give. On July 8th, Baron von Schoen, speaking purely in a 
private capacity, said that " he thought the Congo might become 

* Quoted by J. Ellis Barker in his article, " Anglo-German Differences and 
Sir Edward Grey," Fortnightly Review, March 1st, 191 2. 

72 



German Diplomacy and France 

the subject of some understanding." Next day Herr von Kiderlen 
Wachter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, said as much officially. 

It has been rightly said that Germany was pursuing a policy of 
extortion. She was demanding the Congo from France in exchange 
for Morocco, as if Morocco belonged to Germany. 

The negotiations followed a strangely erratic course. On July 15th 
Herr von Kiderlen Wachter demanded the whole of Gaboon and all 
the French Congo situated between the Atlantic and the river Sanga. 
The French Government replied that " they could not entertain any 
proposals on that basis." On the 23rd, Herr von Kiderlen Wachter 
offered to compensate France with the Bee de Canard and Togoland ; 
but at the same time he reserved the right to open the question of 
special guarantees in favour of German trade and industry in Morocco. 

The firmness of Great Britain made the Wilhelmstrasse draw back. 
Germany gave up all claims to territorial compensation in Morocco, 
but she demanded a favoured nation treatment in that country 
and the maintenance of the system of " proteges," which the French 
Government particularly wished to abolish. On the 1st of August 
Herr von Kiderlen Wachter demanded compensation in the Congo : 
(i.) Access to the sea between Libreville and Spanish Guinea in such 
a way that the German possession should surround that colony ; 
(ii.) access to the river Congo. In return France was to have a free 
hand in Morocco. 

Access to the river Congo meant cutting French Equatorial Africa 
in two. 

On the 4th of August Herr von Kiderlen Wachter demanded more 
than half of Gaboon and the middle Congo. France was to surrender 
to Germany her right of pre-emption on Spanish Guinea, and to come 
to some arrangement with Germany in anticipation of the disap- 
pearance of the Belgian Congo. On the 9th he maintained all these 
demands, and withdrew the offer of Togoland. On the 14th and 17th 
there were further demands. The conversations were interrupted by 
the absence of the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the 
Chancellor ; but the German Press put their requirements still higher. 
At a banquet given by the Hamburg Senate the Kaiser repeated once 
again : " You may rest assured that no one will deny us our place 
in the sun." Both he and his audience took his words to mean that 
if Germany coveted territory already in the possession of France, the 
French would have to give place. 

On September 7th, when conversations were resumed, the whole 

73 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

question was at large. In Morocco Germany reserved to herself 
the right to treat directly with the Sultan and refused even France 
the right to suggest reforms to him. Two zones were created, one 
south and the other north of the Oued Tensift. The Germans were 
to be guaranteed thirty per cent, of the public works in the first and 
seventy per cent, in the second. 

A similar guarantee was to be given in respect of the iron ores. 

Germany was calmly proposing to tear up the Algeciras Treaty, but 
she was forced to give way. On September 23rd an agreement 
seemed to have been reached, but on the 27th Herr von Kiderlen 
Wachter substituted new claims in Morocco for those he had had 
to abandon. Again on October nth the matter seemed to have 
been concluded but discussion revived over the question of the bi- 
section of French Equatorial Africa. Herr von Kiderlen Wachter 
consented to accept in substitution two strips of territory which 
would connect the Cameroons with the river Congo. On October 25th 
the parties were at one ; but on the 26th Herr von Kiderlen Wachter 
raised the question of the French right of pre-emption on the Belgian 
Congo, a right which was impliedly recognized in the Berlin conven- 
tion of 1885, and formally acknowledged by the Franco-Belgian 
arrangement of December 23rd, 1908. At length a formula was 
found, and on the 4th of November the convention was signed. 

The first Article gave France full liberty of action in Morocco. 
This was the result for which Germany had threatened Europe with 
a general conflagration ! It was true that she had obtained com- 
pensation, but only by means which had inspired fresh distrust of 
the " diplomatic ethics " of the Wilhelmstrasse. Herr von Kiderlen 
Wachter's manoeuvres during the four months, now giving, now 
withdrawing, and introducing fresh unexpected demands, were those 
of an unskilful horse-dealer. The Germans admitted the check, but 
consoled themselves with the thought that the Moroccan question 
was not settled, but merely postponed.* 

Since 1871 Germany's relations with France have been marked by 
five distinct threats on the part of the former Power : the crisis of 1875, 
the Schnaebele affair, the voyage to Tangier, the affair of the Casa- 
blanca deserters, and the Agadir coup. But these were only the 
patent threats. To them we must add latent threats, provocative 
conduct, the alternately contemptuous, patronizing and aggressive 

* Georges Blondel : Deutsche Kultur, in Le Monde Economique, December 19th, 
1914, p. 1355. 

74 



German Diplomacy and France 

attitude of Germany, the speeches of the Kaiser, the Chancellors, the 
Foreign and War Ministers, and last but not least, the incessant 
growth of German armaments, in justification of which they put 
forward, in terms more or less explicit and provocative, the irre- 
concilability of " the hereditary foe." This description is known to 
be totally false. 

Prince Biilow, in his book Imperial Germany, has revealed the 
motives of Germany's attitude towards France : 

" No nation has ever recovered so quickly as the French from the effects of 
national disasters. None have ever so easily regained their elasticity, their 
self-confidence and their energy after grievous disappointments and apparently 
crushing defeats." (P. 72.) 

Thus we see that the resurrection of France after the downfall is 
the cause of Germany's ill-will, disappointment and alarm. The 
enemy she thought dead is alive and has upset all her calculations. 

Bismarck's idea was to get rid of France by urging her into a 
policy of colonial expansion. France took the hint and succeeded 
better than Germany, thereby creating a new cause of hatred and 
jealousy. 

Above all Prince Biilow reproaches France with a failure to realize 
the imperious political necessities of Germany. Through Alsace and 
Lorraine lie the routes from Paris to Frankfort, Leipzig, Dresden, 
Bale, Munich, the Danube valley and Vienna. 

" In France there is no comprehension of the fact that what seems to them the 
brutal severity of the conqueror was really a matter of necessity to us Germans." 

Why ? Because the possession of Alsace and Lorraine is a military 
asset in a German attack on France. But then the possession of those 
provinces must also be a national necessity for France. This has 
never occurred to Prince Biilow who never sees beyond the interests 
of Germany. He is at a loss to understand how other nations are 
also concerned for their own interests and security. 

German diplomatists have never been able to enter into the feelings 
and aspirations of other nations. Hence their failures. 



75 



CHAPTER XII 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND ITALY 

Italy left in the lurch by Prussia in 1866 — Germany, Tunis and Italy — The 
Prussian legation at the Vatican — Affronts to Italy — The Triple Alliance 
of May 20th, 1882 — Its renewal in 1902 — Austria and the Italians — Albania 
— Italy and Tripoli — The Kaiser provides the Turks with submarine mines — 
Italy replaced by Turkey in the Triple Alliance — Signor Giolitti's Note 
to Austria on the Serbian question — Prince Biilow and Italy. 

GERMANY'S diplomatic treatment of her Allies is on a par with 
her treatment of France, Russia and Great Britain. 

In 1866 Italy had an opportunity of testing the value of her rela- 
tions with Prussia. On July 22nd Prussia concluded an armistice 
with Austria without consulting the Italians who were accordingly 
compelled to evacuate the Trentino, which had been almost completely 
occupied by Garibaldi and his volunteers. They were faced with the 
concentrated might of Austria which Prussia's action thus set free 
to turn against them, and had no option but to withdraw and be 
content with Venetia which Napoleon III. gave them. 

After 1 87 1 Italy became alarmed at the movement in France to 
restore the temporal power of the Papacy. Besides, Germany's 
superiority had been proved. Italy and Germany began to draw 
together. 

Bismarck forged the weapon of the Austro-German Treaty of 1879 
for use as much against Italy as against France, for Italy had never 
forgotten Austrian oppression and the Irredentists would not be 
silenced. 

France embarked on her expedition to Tunis in 1 88 1, and its imme- 
diate result was a loud chorus of protest in Italy, the Italian Govern- 
ment even going so far as to appeal to Berlin. Bismarck's answer 
was that France's action had been contemplated and approved since 
the Treaty of Berlin, and made no secret of the fact that far from 
dissuading her he had given her every encouragement. 

The Italians bore him no grudge. The Cairoli Ministry fell and his 

76 



German Diplomacy and Italy 

successor, Depretis, accepted the Austrian Emperor's invitation to 
King Humbert to pay him a visit in Vienna. The visit took place 
on October 27th, 1881, but was never returned by the Austro-Hun- 
garian Sovereign. Bismarck wanted more than that, and according 
to his wont, set out to win the friendship of Italy by bullying her. 
Without condescending to inform the Italian Government, he restored 
the Prussian Legation to the Vatican, which had been withdrawn in 
1874. The King of Italy's visit to Vienna was not even referred to 
in the imperial message to the Reichstag on November 17th, 1881, 
and on November 29th Bismarck spoke of Italy as a country of revolu- 
tions and the semi-official Press opened a campaign in favour of an 
international guarantee for the Holy See. 

The consequences were very different from what Bismarck expected. 
At the reception of the deputies on New Year's Day, King Humbert 
declared that " Italy meant to be mistress in her own household," 
and the Italian Ambassador in Berlin was instructed accordingly. 
While Italy refused to recognize the Treaty of Bardo, which gave 
France a protectorate in Tunis, Bismarck ordered the German 
Consul at Tunis to acknowledge the decrees of the French Govern- 
ment. 

Austria wanted Italy to renounce all claims to the Trentino and 
Trieste. No Italian Ministry dare pledge itself to do so, but at length 
the Treaty of the Triple Alliance was signed on May 20th, 1882. 
Its existence was only divulged a year later. 

Bismarck has told us that as a matter of fact he had given nothing 
to Italy, and he affected to minimize the value of the Treaty for 
Germany. " All I wanted," he used to say, " was that a corporal 
with an Italian flag should threaten the West rather than the 
East." 

The Italian politicians who brought Italy into the Triple Alliance 
obtained the paradoxical result that Catholic Austria became a 
guarantor of the Italian occupation of Rome. The Emperor Francis 
Joseph, who makes an annual gift of a million crowns to the Pope, 
became the head gaoler of the prisoner of the Vatican on whose 
behalf no French statesman since 1877 has ever thought of expelling 
the King of Italy from the Quirinal. 

Bismarck, who hated the radicalism of Depretis and Mancini, 
treated them both with lofty disdain. When he had concluded the 
Treaty of Skiernewice between the three Emperors, he began to 
attach less importance to the Triple Alliance. In 1885 Mancini 

77 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

announced in the Chamber of Deputies that the Treaty of 1882 ".left 
Italy freedom of action, especially in respect of interests it could in 
no case protect." These words meant that Italy's Mediterranean 
interests were not within its scope. When it was renewed, however, 
it seems that certain improvements were introduced. 

Crispi, a blind admirer of Bismarck, was devoted to the Triple 
Alliance. In 1887 he effected a rupture of commercial relations 
with France, a step attended by disastrous consequences to both 
countries. In 1888 and 1889 there was an exchange of royal visits 
in Rome and Berlin. 

In June, 1902, the Triple Alliance was renewed for a period of 
twelve years but it had not succeeded in creating good relations between 
Austria and Italy. Austria carried on a policy of petty persecution 
of Italians in the Trentino, Istria and Dalmatia. The establishment 
of an Italian University for her Italian subjects was vetoed. When 
the suggestion was made that an Italian Faculty of Law should be 
created at the University of Innsbruck there was a riot of the towns- 
folk and students against the Italians in October, 1902. In 1903 
and 1904 there were fresh acts of violence which extended into Croatia. 
Besides, Austrian policy in the Balkans, and especially with regard 
to Albania, clashed directly with Italian interests. In 1903, follow- 
ing on the Miirsteg programme, Italy obtained the nomination of 
General Giorgis as commander of the international gendarmerie in 
Macedonia, and for Italian officers the supervision of the Albanian 
district of Monastir. But these concessions she owed solely to Great 
Britain, France and Russia. 

When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzgovina in 1908 
the Italians denounced the step as an act of brigandage. At first 
they cherished the illusion that they would receive something 
by way of compensation, but Austria-Hungary had made no pro- 
mises, had no intention of giving compensation, and, in fact, gave 
none. 

In 191 2, Italy, after having assured herself of French and 
British neutrality, set out to conquer Tripoli, and informed Berlin 
and Vienna of her intentions. To all outward appearance her scheme 
met with no opposition. However, she had to renounce any idea 
of military operations against Turkey in the Adriatic, Asia Minor, 
and at Constantinople itself. The Kaiser immediately tried to carry 
out his repeated professions of friendship for Turkey in a manner 
which could only injure Italy. The means which he employed are 

78 



German Diplomacy and Italy 

described thus by M. Pichon, ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the 
Petit Journal of October 17th, 19 14 : 

" I publish to-day the circumstances in which Germany supplied Turkey 
with submarine mines for the purpose of destroying Italian shipping. Austria 
delivered the first consignment, but the mines were discovered to be defective, 
and Germany offered to replace them. A German naval officer was sent to 
Constantinople to place them in the Bosphorus and this was done. 

" I have shown how another Army officer was sent to Benghazi to take part 
in the operations against the Italian forces. He was a Bavarian, and is still 
on service in the East. The German embassy in Constantinople, then directed 
by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, employed as its chief agents in these 
affairs the correspondent in Turkey of a great German newspaper, M. W . . ., 
and the deputy of Benghazi, C . . . These facts were more or less suspected 
in Rome, and it was not entirely of his own free will that Baron Marschall left 
Constantinople. ' If you could only hold on four months longer ! ' he said 
to the Turks when representing to them Italy's inability to continue the cam- 
paign after that period. 

" His successor, Von Wangenheim, continued to render the Turkish Govern- 
ment similar services, to the prejudice of the ally of his own country." 

This curious (German and Austrian) conception of the duties of an 
ally would hardly have met with Machiavelli's approval, for States 
which behave in that way only earn the suspicion and hatred of 
those on whom they ought to be able to count. Germany and 
Austria replaced Italy in the Triple Alliance by Turkey, but they 
did not even condescend to forewarn the Italians. 

The Balkan Wars only embittered the relations between Italy and 
Austria-Hungary. On December 6th, 1914, Signor Giolitti made 
the following revelation : 

" On the 9th of August, 191 3, the Marquis di San Giuliano, then 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, received a telegram, in which Austria 
communicated to Italy and Germany her intention to take action 
against Serbia. Austria claimed that her action was defensive only, 
and that therefore the casus fcederis arose." 

To this Signor Giolitti replied : 

" If Austria takes action against Serbia, it is evident that the casus foederis 
will not arise. She will be acting purely in her own interests. She will not be 
defending herself because no one is thinking of attacking her. Vienna must 
be informed of this in the most positive and formal manner." 

These revelations prove that Austria-Hungary's action against 
Serbia was premeditated. The assassinations at Sarajevo could 

79 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

hardly furnish a pretext in 191 3, so Austria dispensed with one. 
All these facts were known to Germany in 19 14, so Germany 
was quite able to estimate what value could be attached to the 
motives put forward by Austria for her ultimatum of the 23rd of 
July. It is but an additional piece of evidence that, finding 
the moment propitious for war, she would do nothing to prevent it. 

I say nothing of the disputes between Austria and Italy over 
Albania. The salient fact is that the Wilhelmstrasse, having seen 
Italy's attitude in 191 3, knew that she would not be drawn into war 
by any Austro-Hungarian aggression against Serbia. Accordingly, 
the policy of the German Government achieved the remarkable 
result that they lost the benefit of their alliance with Italy at the 
very moment when they were faced with a coalition of Russia, France, 
Great Britain, Belgium and Serbia, and when they could only count 
on the assistance of Austria-Hungary. 

Both Vienna and Berlin kept Italy entirely in the dark as to the 
ultimatum of the 23rd of July, and she declared her neutrality on 
the first day. In his pride the Kaiser seems to have been more or 
less indifferent to this declaration. Italy ! a negligible factor. 
Italian help was not needed to crush France. When the German plan 
failed, however, they set themselves to win over Italy. Fervent 
appeals were made to the Clericals of the Kolnischer Volkszeitung, 
and then to the Socialists who sent Herr Siidekum to plead their 
cause with the Italian Socialists. Some newspapers have even 
asserted that certain of the Italian Socialist groups received bribes 
from the German Socialists. In that case Herr Siidekum could 
speak with authority. Nevertheless, his mission was an utter failure. 

The Germans published an edition of the Berliner Tageblatt in Italian. 
They flooded Italy with letters, pamphlets, extracts from the papers 
and the concoctions of the Wolff Bureau. Still the Italian Govern- 
ment refused to emerge from its " sacred egoism." Finally the 
Germans sent Prince Biilow to Rome. Bismarck relates, with his 
usual affectation of indifference in speaking of his colleagues, ho^ 
Prince Billow's father came to visit Italy. On October 6th, 1879, 
he spoke of him in these words to Busch : 

" The Emperor gradually wears us all out. My nature is such that I have 
been able to hold out for seventeen years ; but Biilow, for example, who onb 
took my place for a few months, has thereby contracted a disease of the spins 
cord and will die of it. The blame must lie at our Gracious Majesty's door. 
Biilow is to be sent to Italy.* 

* See Bismarck's Memoirs, by Maurice Busch. 
80 



German Diplomacy and Italy 

His son, Prince Biilow, was sent to Rome to make a supreme effort. 
The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Baron Macchio, left Italy at 
the moment of his arrival to avoid having to express any opinion on 
the proposals he was bringing, for Prince Biilow was offering Italy 
the Trentino. 

Germany has always been ready to give away other people's 
property. 



81 



CHAPTER XIII 
THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND AUSTRIA- HUNGARY 

Beust, Francis Joseph and Andrassy — Reasons for the Treaty of 1879 — The 
self-abasement of the Austrian Emperor — The subordination of Austria- 
Hungary to Germany — Dismemberment the inevitable consequence. 

BISMARCK has told us how he devoted himself to the struggle 
against Austria after 1852. He used to complain that " she 
treated Prussia so abominably that one fine day we were compelled 
to give her solid proof that we could get along without her. In 1866 
we took advantage of the first opportunity, and showed Austria 
the door."* 

Showing no ill-will, Bismarck next set himself to bring about a 
reconciliation with Austria, but Beust enjoyed the reputation of 
never having forgotten Sadowa. Francis Joseph did not take his 
defeat too much to heart. He congratulated the Emperor of Ger- 
many on his victory over France. In 1872 he went to Berlin to pay 
his personal homage. He informed Beust that he intended to sacrifice 
him in favour of Andrassy who, representing the interests of Hun- 
gary, owed Prussia the deepest gratitude for having by her victory 
forced Austria to the compromise of 1867 which inaugurated the 
Dual System. 

The following is Bismarck's estimate of his Treaty of Alliance 
with Austria in 1879 '• 

" We had to prevent an understanding between the Dual Monarchy and 
France, and that object we thereby achieved without imposing on ourselves any 
obligation to defend the Trentino, Trieste or Bosnia against the Italians, 
Turks or Southern Slavs. 

Bismarck reckoned that he was securing the support of the Germans 
of Austria as well as the Hungarians. According to his ideas, the 
Emperor of Austria preserved only the trappings of authority. In 

* Busch's Bismarck. 
82 



The German Empire and Austria-Hungary 

favour of that view it could be said that Francis Joseph had recognized 
the autonomy of Hungary and, as regards foreign policy, submissively 
followed Bismarck's lead. The Chancellor peacefully consummated 
the work of 1866. To crown it he even urged an " indissoluble con- 
stitutional alliance ; " but Andrassy replied that he could not go 
so far for fear of difficulties with the Reichsrath. 

The Gazette de Lausanne of December 17th, 19 14, published the 
wailings of an Austrian diplomatist over Austro-German relations. 
So far from denying that Germany wanted the war, he asserts that 
she only sought a casus belli. But this had to be of such a character 
that Austria-Hungary could not draw back. 

" From that point of view the Serbian affair could not be bettered. Berlin 
incited our diplomacy to extreme measures, and the moment it appeared that, 
after all, a compromise might be reached, launched her ultimatum to Russia. 
We were thus forced into war, 

" Our country is the only one which has not, up to the present, published the 
diplomatic documents relating to the period immediately before the war. We 
could not do so without exposing Germany." 

Germany borrowed Austrian heavy artillery for the reduction of 
the Belgian fortresses and on August 28th Austria found herself 
obliged to declare war on the Belgians, to punish them for the crime 
of being fired on by the guns Austria had lent to her ally. 

The German General Staff has also assumed control of the Austrian 
army and employed it to defend German soil against the Russians : 

" Austria-Hungary has been sacrificed : she has endured the horrors of 
invasion in order that the people of Germany may not suffer too much alarm 
and inconvenience." 

The Kaiser has not merely had a free hand in conducting the 
foreign policy of the German Empire. He has been equally free to 
direct Austro-Hungarian policy, and, of course, the interests of his 
ally have ever been subordinate to his own necessities. 

The Austrian diplomatist sums up the present situation very 
lucidly : 

" Ever since October 7th, 1879, the Ballplatz has followed the tracks which 
Berlin marked out. The tragedy of Sadowa and the memory of the Holy 
Roman Empire have been forgotten in order that we might fix our eyes on the 
East which Germany dangled before us as fair prey. Yet she has always 
prevented us from seizing it. All we did was to rouse Russia, threaten the 

83 6* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

interests of the Mediterranean Powers and enable the German Chancellors to 
create that atmosphere of European unrest which alone induced the Reichstag 
to vote the enormous credits required for the maintenance and augmentation 
of the army and fleet on which the greatness of the German Empire depends. 
" To preserve the advantages of the Treaty of Frankfort and extend her 
power in the world, Germany has made tools of her Allies and has brought 
down the hatred of all Europe on our heads." 

The war broke out. If Germany were successful, she would reap 
all the fruits of victory. The Austrian diplomatist omits to mention 
that the German Empire acts as a magnet to the Germans of Austria ; 
that a German victory would transfer the centre of gravity in Austria 
from Vienna to Budapest and might even lead to the absorption of 
the German provinces of Austria in the German Empire. But he 
foresees defeat and foretells that Germany will use all her endeavours 
to saddle Austria with " the larger share of the cost of the policy of 
adventure into which Germany has plunged." He predicts dismem- 
berment which may well be even more thorough than he anticipates. 
He is living on illusions, however, when he suggests that Austria, by 
concluding a separate peace, " may recover her hegemony over the 
Germanic peoples of Central Europe and restore the Germanic Empire 
at the expense of militarist and aggressive Prussia, to the manifest 
advantage of Europe and Humanity." 

It is too late. Austria " has weakly and blindly followed in the 
path of her hereditary enemy." She is bound hand and foot to 
Berlin. 



8 4 



CHAPTER XIV 
THE NEW TRIPLE ALLIANCE 

Bismarck and the Eastern Question — William II. and Turkey — Accusation of 
wholesale bribery made by the Foreign Office — The lenience of the British 
and French Ambassadors towards the Turks — Enver Pasha — How the 
alliance was made — The Jehad — Allah and the " Old God of Konigsberg " 
— " The Sick Man " — Von Billow's mistake. 

BISMARCK once said : " Germany has the advantage that her 
policy is free from direct interests in the East."* However, 
William II. has done his best to lose it. He was quite willing to 
allow the Turkish Government to manage their own domestic affairs, 
but he meant to direct Turkish foreign policy against their old friends 
and protectors, Great Britain and France, while pretending to further 
the interests of Bulgaria and Roumania, interests palpably at variance 
with those of Turkey. He succeeded in gaining the friendship of 
Turkey, but only aroused the suspicions of Russia, Great Britain and 
France. So where was the advantage ? 

The Turkish army was reorganized by the celebrated Baron von 
der Goltz and in 191 2 all the General Staffs of Europe, on the 
authority of its organizer, promised it victory. Nevertheless, in the 
Balkan War it fell to pieces at the first shock. However, Germany's 
military prestige survived. The Turkish Government put General 
Liman von Sanders at the head of their military forces and Von der 
Goltz went back to take up his old post. 

On August 10th, 1914, the Turkish Government sheltered the 
warships Goben and Breslau, then purchased them fictitiously, and 
in spite of their promises to the Allies, kept the officers and the crews. 
German officers went to Constantinople in large numbers. In its 
communique the Foreign Office stated emphatically that German 
influence was being exercised by means of wholesale bribery. 

Yet the Ambassadors of Great Britain and France made every 
possible allowance for the Turkish Government. They told the 
* Reflections and Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 288. 

85 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Turks that they were committing acts which, for any other Power, 
would be regarded as a violation of neutrality, but that France and 
England would pass them over in their desire that Turkey should 
remain neutral, and not complicate the situation by adding to future 
problems that of the dismemberment of Turkey. 

Meanwhile, Enver Pasha, the Minister for War who was fanatically 
pro-German, and his German advisers were preparing an attack on 
Egypt via Akaba, Gaza and the Suez Canal. Sheikh Aiz Shawisl 
was distributing in Syria, and probably in India, a pamphlet exhorting 
all Mohammedans to rise against Great Britain. 

On the other hand, the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, the Finance 
Minister, and a majority of the other ministers were in favour of 
maintaining neutrality. 

The Bourse Gazette, on the authority of one who is described as an 
official high in the diplomatic world, gives the following account of 
the circumstances in which Turkey was finally drawn into the 
war. 

In October the Turkish Government were faced with the necessity 
of paying the salaries of their numerous officials, which were already 
several months in arrear. Being short of funds, they turned to their 
only available source — Germany. They decided to send to Berlin 
Fethi Bey, who was particularly popular in German Government 
circles. Fethi Bey went, was warmly received by Herr von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg, and had an audience of William II. The Emperor 
agreed to advance Turkey the sum of 150,000 Turkish pounds 
(^136,000), but on the sole condition that Turkey should immediately 
attack England and Russia (" Sie miissen aber sofort gegen England 
unci Russland marschiren J ' "). Fethi Bey then declared that Turkey 
would give military support to Germany when a particularly favour- 
able moment presented itself, but that the actual occasion was 
unsuitable. Now the very day — October 27th — that Fethi Bey 
left Berlin, the German Admiral, Souchon Pasha, ordered the German 
ships which had passed into the Black Sea to bombard the Russian 
coast. Informed solely by the Press messages, the Turkish Ministers, 
in their stupefaction, went to the German Ambassador, Baron von 
Wangenheim, and demanded an explanation. The Ambassador 
replied : " Fethi Bey has made a formal promise to Berlin that 
Turkey shall enter the war, and when a promise is made to our 
Emperor it has to be kept." Enver Bey, Germany's tool, was 
followed by Talaat Bey, and carried the day. 

86 



The New Triple Alliance 

If the Kaiser really gained the assistance of Turkey with his £i 36,000, 
it was the most usurious loan on record and he has all the glory of 
having greatly improved on Shylock. ♦ 

Heiri Bey, the Sheik-ul-Islam at Constantinople, announced the 
Jehad, the Holy War on all infidels, who must certainly include 
His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, Apostolic King 
of Hungary. Yet the Catholics of Austria-Hungary, Bavaria and 
the Rhine Provinces, and the Lutherans of Prussia waxed delirious 
over these words of Heiri Bey : 

" Nothing, not even the wars of Islam in the days of the Crusades, can 
compare with the scale of the present Holy movement. Centuries have passed , 
but faith has not weakened in Musulman hearts, and, when sounds the 
clarion-call to the Holy War, all good Mohammedans, the women no less than 
the men, will do their duty. Hundreds of thousands of pilgrims, knowing the 
fetva, go from Mecca to Medina, to the sacred hills. Like microbes {sic) they 
will enter the bodies of the enemy Empires." 

The Kaiser has unquestionably bought the protection of Allah 
remarkably cheaply, but how can he reconcile the stirring up of a 
Mohammedan " Holy War " with his famous declaration of his 
divine mission ? 

" Remember that you (Germans) are the chosen race ! The spirit of God has 
descended upon me because I am Emperor of the Germans. I am his instru- 
ment, his sword, his shield. Woe to the unbelievers ! " 

Does he think that the Mohammedans have been converted to the 
" Old God " he incarnates ? Does he think that the seventy million 
Mohammedans of India and the other millions of Russian Turkestan, 
Arabia, Egypt, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco are likely to enter into a 
Holy War at the bidding of the giaour who at Damascus in 1898 
promised them his protection and in 1914 petitioned for theirs ? 
The Shiites of Persia are not more obedient to the Sheik-ul-Islam 
than are Protestants to the Pope. The Jehad summoned the Moham- 
medans of Lybia to throw the Italians into the sea. If the Italians 
refused to be thrown, they would be drawn into the war ; so German 
Imperial diplomacy led to the result that Italy was driven into the 
arms of the Triple Entente and her place in the Triple Alliance taken 
by Turkey. 

In 1853 the Czar Nicholas I., in a conversation with Sir George 
Hamilton Seymour, said : " We have a sick man on our hands." 

87 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

In 1914 the Sick Man's health was no better but the Kaiser had 
to go to him for help. 

On April 14th, 1904, Von Biilow, who was then Imperial Chan- 
cellor, said : " If we keep our sword sharp we shall never have to 
fear isolation. Germany is too strong for her alliance to be despised." 
Yet she has been reduced to bringing in Turkey in order to re- 
constitute the Triple Alliance ! 



88 



CHAPTER XV 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND THE SMALL STATES 

Luxemburg — Gladstone and Belgium — William II. 's hopes — Herr von Jagow 
and the British Ambassador — Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's tirade — 
Germany covets Antwerp and the Netherlands — The Emden failure — 
The Annexation programme — Professor Lasson — Intimidation of small 
states. 

I DO not remember the Luxemburg affair of 1867. It was but 
the preliminary to the war with France which Bismarck had 
resolved to bring about at his own moment while making France 
seem the aggressor. 

The neutral status of Luxemburg is not questioned by Germany. 
General Tulff von Tschepe und Weidenbach, in a proclamation to 
Luxemburg, dated August 2nd, but prepared long before, declared, 
with that effrontery in lying which is characteristic of German 
methods, that 

" France, having violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, has begun hostilities 
— as has been demonstrated beyond doubt — on the territory of Luxemburg 
against the German forces. Faced with this emergency, His Majesty has 
ordered the German troops — in first line to the 8th Corps — to enter Luxemburg." 

The pretext was false, but Germany, for whom the route through 
Luxemburg was a military necessity, calmly violated its neutrality 
in spite of vehement protest on the part of the Grand Duchess. 

Gladstone was open to criticism on the score of grave weaknesses 
in his foreign policy but he never wavered in his attitude towards the 
independence of Belgium. In August, 1870, he made separate agree- 
ments with Prussia and France, whereby, if either of the two Powers 
violated the neutrality of Belgium, England guaranteed to join the 
other. In 1875, when Queen Victoria intervened to prevent a second 
German attack on France, Gladstone sent a commission to devise 
joint measures of defence. 

The Kaiser laid himself out to reassure the Belgians. In October, 

89 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

191 1, he had a conversation with the Belgian General Heimburger 
and M. Delvapx de FenfTe, Governor of the Province of Liege, who 
had come to greet him in the name of the King of the Belgians. He 
said to M. de Fenffe : 

" You are Governor of a province with which we have always 
lived as good neighbours. You have recently passed, I think " (it 
was just after the Agadir incident) " through a time of great anxiety. 
Believe me, that anxiety was needless." 

At the luncheon which followed, replying to the toast of General 
Heimburger, he said : 

" You are right to have confidence in us." 

On August 3rd, 1 9 14, Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium. 
Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, stated quite frankly to the 
British Ambassador their reasons for doing so. 

" They had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as 
to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some 
decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, 
as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in 
view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got 
through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss 
of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their 
troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German 
asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops." * 

During the afternoon the British Ambassador informed Herr von 
Jagow that, unless the German Government stopped their advance 
and gave an assurance by midnight that they would proceed no further 
with their violation of the Belgian frontier, Great Britain would take 
all steps to enforce the observance of the treaty which Germany had 
signed. 

Herr von Jagow replied that the safety of the Empire made it 
absolutely necessary that the German troops should pass through 
Belgium. The British Ambassador replied that he would have to 
demand his passports and went to see the Chancellor, Dr. von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, who treated him to a harangue which lasted 
not less than twenty minutes : 

" Just for a word — ' neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often 
been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make 

* See the British White Paper. 
90 



German Diplomacy and the Small States 

war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. 
All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible 
step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his 
accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had 
done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while he was 
fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for 
all the terrible events that might happen." 

Sir Edward Goschen replied that 

" In the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that 
for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance 
through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to 
understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of ' life and death ' for the 
honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do 
her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked." 

" But at what price will that compact have been kept ? Has the British 
Government thought of that ? " 

Sir Edward Goschen replied that " fear of consequences could 
hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements." 
During this interview the Chancellor was so excited that Sir Edward 
Goschen thought it wiser to refrain from increasing further his 
agitation. 

This harangue of the Chancellor will for ever remain a scene of 
epic comedy. It demonstrated his utter contempt for the engage- 
ments taken by his own Government, and from his own mouth we 
learn that no reliance can be placed on their present and future 
plighted word. The pathetic phrases in which he spoke of his dis- 
illusionment revealed his mental simplicity. He complained that 
Great Britain was stabbing Germany in the back. But was not 
Germany stabbing Belgium in the back ? There were volumes of 
irony in the perversion by which he tried to represent Great Britain 
as a cunning apache because she faced the Chancellor with a " scrap 
of paper " to which the seal of Prussia was attached. 

The violation of Belgium was put forward as a strategical necessity, 
but it was none the less a realization of political ambitions. Ger- 
many's frontage on the North Sea consists of a strip of coast-line 
seventy-five miles long as the crow flies, from Emden to Cuxhaven, 
the outpost of Hamburg. Germany is a land Power, but on her 
north-western frontier lies a maritime Power far excellence — Holland. 
Now Holland's maritime prosperity is largely based on the industrial 
prosperity of Westphalia and the Rhine Province, and these regions 

9* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

have as their outlet only two ports, Rotterdam and Antwerp, both in 
foreign countries. 

In 1883, to avoid this dependence on foreign ports, Herr Wind- 
horst, the leader of the Catholic Centre, agitated for the construction 
of a canal from Dortmund to Ems in the hope of diverting a part 
of the traffic in coal and other Westphalian products to Emden. 
William II. was struck by the idea and the canal was opened in 
August, 1899. A volume of trade to the figure of 1,500,000 tons* 
had been anticipated but in 1905 it had not yet reached 700,000 tons, 
though the tolls had been reduced. The canal was carried to the 
port of Emden at a cost of twenty million marks.t The basin has 
a depth of about thirty-six feet. The Emperor ordered certain 
steamship lines to make useless calls there. The dredging apparatus 
has for long taken up more space than the ships. When I visited it 
I only saw two vessels which had brought iron ore from Sweden. 

However, to ensure that the canal route should be used and not the 
Rhine, the Dortmund-Ems canal was not connected with the Rhine, 
a precaution which availed nothing, and finally the canal from Dort- 
mund to the Rhine was included in the last programme. In spite 
of all these efforts, traffic continued to avoid the canal, with its 
twenty-seven locks, and use the Rhine. Between Carlsruhe and 
its mouth, a distance of 621 kilometres (388 miles), there is only a 
difference of 100 metres (328 feet) in level — that is, 16 centimetres 
a kilometre. The river is nowhere less than 200 metres (218 yards) 
wide. Its depth at Cologne is about eleven feet. The freight 
between Ruhrort and Rotterdam is not more than one centime per 
metric ton. 

French public opinion has often been entertained by schemes 
for partitioning Austria in favour of Germany, which was thus to 
secure Trieste. In sober truth, the German Emperor's dream has 
been to incorporate the Netherlands in the German Empire and seize 
Antwerp. It must never be forgotten that if Antwerp is in Belgium, 
both banks of the Scheldt not more than twelve miles below that 
city are in Dutch territory. 

There was no mystery about Germany's ambition to swallow up 
Holland. Great Britain is the natural guardian of the Netherlands. 
The South African Boers were of Dutch origin and during the 
Transvaal War Dutch opinion for the most part was hostile to Great 

* One metric ton = 2,204 lbs. f ^983,000 approximately. 

92 



German Diplomacy and the Small States 

Britain. I say " for the most part " advisedly, because it was not 
unanimous as the following incident proves. 

After a banquet given during the Exhibition in 1900, one of my 
friends said to me : 

" The Dutch delegates wish to be presented to you to thank you 
for the reception you gave them in 1899, and also to congratulate you 
on your attitude on the South African question." 

My friend was extremely surprised and I not less so. The Dutch 
gentlemen said to me : 

" The permanent menace to us comes from one quarter — Germany. 
Anything that weakens our relations with Great Britain is a danger 
for us. We have blamed our Government for dispatching a Govern- 
ment ship to bring back Kriiger." 

The opinions of these distinguished men, some of them in official 
positions, were soon reinforced from Germany itself. In 1901 and 1902 
Herren Stubmann, von Hale and Huton published several pamphlets 
inviting Holland to become incorporated in the German Empire. 
They did not go beyond persuasion, and suggested a Zollverein for 
a start. If Holland entered it she would have all Central Europe 
for her market. Two Dutch newspapers, the Haagsche C our ant and 
the Avond Post, took up the idea, as well as that of a postal 
union. At length the Dutch and Belgians accepted a form of 
union which appears in the Almanack de Gotha under the name of 
the Union d? Administration de Chemins de Fer Allemands. This 
joint system is composed of the railways of Germany and Holland and 
part of those of Belgium. 

The Dutch were not enthusiastic over their wooing by Germany. 
Holland is a Free-Trade country and could only lose by entering the 
German tariff system. They find dumping very profitable. The 
German syndicates sell sheet-iron cheaper abroad than to their own 
people. The Dutch use it for the manufacture of boilers, which they 
re-sell in Germany, and barges for navigation on the Rhine. 

Persuasive methods having failed, the German Press took to 
threats and all the Pan-Germans exclaimed that the Dutch had no 
right to deny themselves the honour done them in being counted as 
Germans. They went further. On September 30th, Professor Lasson 
wrote : 

" Holland is incapable of protecting herself. This little Kingdom pursues her 
tranquil existence at our expense, living on the memories of past glories and 
accumulated wealth. Holland is only an appendage to Germany. Her life 

93 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

is smoothly-flowing, a life in dressing-gown and slippers, which demands little 
reflection or exertion. 

" We Germans have little respect and sympathy for the Holland of to-day. 
We can thank God that, except for their dependence upon us, the Dutch are 
not our friends." 

In September, 1906, dwelling on this danger in the Nineteenth 
Century and After, I terminated my article thus {translated) : 

" The basis of the entente cordiale between France and Great 
Britain is the necessity of preserving the independence of Holland 
and Belgium. The maintenance of the status of those two countries 
is a common interest of France and Great Britain — indeed, of all 
civilized nations — except one." 

The German occupation of Antwerp brings the whole question to 
the fore. The Kaiser hopes that by holding Antwerp he will be in 
a position, when peace terms come to be discussed, to invoke the 
formula, " Beati possidentes." But he is deceiving himself. Great 
Britain and France will never allow Germany to remain there. Imme- 
diately after the fall of Antwerp The 'Times voiced British public 
opinion in an article which gave Holland great credit for her correct 
attitude but pointed out that she would find her situation extremely 
difficult, if not intolerable, if Germany permanently controlled the 
Scheldt and thus turned the Dutch defences. If Antwerp became 
a second Wilhelmshafen and the focus of German militarism in the 
North Sea, the Dutch possession of the mouth of the Scheldt would 
be absolutely useless. The Times added that a few days previously 
a German paper had asked whether they (the English) would fight 
on for twenty years ? They would fight for twenty years and more 
if necessary because they could never lay down their arms until the 
last of the Prussian bandits had been driven from Belgium. 

Herr Zimmermann, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
has not, however, concealed from the Dutch that their fate aftei 
the war is to be absorbed into the German Empire. But it is not 
only Belgium and Holland that are threatened. Switzerland, Den- 
mark, Norway and Sweden are no better off. 

Herr Spahn, a professor at Strasburg University, contemplating the 
results of the war, says : 

" The conditions of Swiss national life will unite even more closely than in the 
past the destinies of Switzerland and Germany." 

94 



German Diplomacy and the Small States 

Herr Oncken, professor of Universal History at Heidelberg, has 
put forward the following definition in a recent pamphlet : 

" A neutral State, a little parasitic organism which waxes fat by living on the 
divisions of the great." 

Another writer says :* 

" The small States have lost their right to exist, for no State can make good 
its right to independence unless it can assert it by force of arms. In word no 
less than in deed the German Empire has shown itself to be the common enemy 
of all nations." 

* If I were Emperov. 



95 



CHAPTER XVI 
GERMAN DIPLOMACY. ITS METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 

The letter to The Times and the Wolff telegram — Herr von Bethmann-Holl- 
weg's contradictory arguments — The aggressive and defensive aspects of 
the Triple Alliance — Threats to England — Fatuity — Germany confesses she 
created the Triple Entente — Great Britain guilty of not accepting German 
hegemony of Europe — German attempts to break up the Entente — Herr 
von Bethmann-Hollweg unable to save appearances — The responsibility 
for the war — Against Belgium — Against Japan — Violation of the Hague 
Convention of 1907 — Germany's arguments, false both in law and fact — 
" Touching a hair of a German " — A confession of German psychology — 
German political incapacity — Billow's admission — Hypocritical and over- 
bearing diplomacy. 

THE foregoing recital of facts has adumbrated the results which 
German diplomacy was destined to achieve. The following 
incident, which occurred after the declaration of war, affords an 
example of its artless methods. 

The Tunes received a letter from a highly-placed person saying 
that the Kaiser's religious convictions made him averse to war, but 
that Russia had driven him to it. The Times did not publish it. In 
consequence of an error in transmission The Times received, the 
same evening, a telegram meant for the representative of the Wolff 
Bureau in London. It said : " The Times will publish to-morrow 
an article on the situation. Telegraph it word for word. — Wolff, 
Berlin." 

Speaking on December 2nd, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg revealed 
the disconcerting sang-froid with which Germany puts forward con- 
tradictory explanations. He began by contrasting " the aggressive 
character of the Triple Entente with the purely defensive character 
of the Triple Alliance." To give that assertion even the colour of 
truth, it is necessary to forget Germany's five well-marked acts of 
aggression against France, the behaviour of Austria in the Balkans, 
the Kaiser's speeches, the Crown Prince's indiscretions and declara- 

96 



German Diplomacy. Its Methods and Achievements 

tions, the provocative utterances of various Chancellors and War 
Ministers, the clamours of the Pan-German, Naval and Colonial 
Leagues, the official writings of Von der Goltz and Bernhardi, not 
to mention the frantic outbursts of megalomaniac fury which have 
proceeded from German professors of history, from Treitschke to 
Lamprecht. 

Then he went on to blame Great Britain for wishing to maintain 
the balance of power, and asserting " as elementary dogma that the 
role of arbiter mundi was her inalienable right." Forgetting that 
he had just announced the " purely defensive " character of the 
Triple Alliance, he added : 

" I have never believed that England could be brought to abandon that 
attitude by methods of persuasion, but I thought it possible that the growing 
power of Germany and the increasing risk of war would lead England to realize 
that that principle could not be maintained, and that it was better to abandon 
it in favour of a peaceful compromise with Germany. However, that dogma 
has always paralysed our attempts at an understanding." 

So Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, like his predecessor, Prince Billow, 
could only think of one way of treating England — the way of threats. 
The more violent the threats, the sooner would England come to 
heel ! This German statesman was quite incapable of the following 
simple reasoning : 

" By yielding to threats England will admit that she is afraid of us. 
If she once admits that, she will see herself compelled to give way 
under further pressure from us. Now though we have a very poor 
opinion of British statesmen, we must not think them incapable of 
foreseeing that situation and consequently our pressure, so far from 
bringing them to submission, will drive them to increase their fleet 
and look for allies among other nations." 

A statesman of average intelligence would have considered all 
possibilities in the case of any nation ; but in the case of Great 
Britain the German Chancellor scorned reflection, though anyone 
with even a nodding acquaintance with British psychology knows 
that the Anglo-Saxon is trained from his youth up to resent pressure 
and never to yield to threats. 

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg boasted of having made Great Britain 
retreat at Agadir and notwithstanding Mr. Lloyd George's speech at 
the Guildhall we may admit that he was right. But he added that 
England was always trying to establish closer relations with France 

97 7 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

tass Herr von Bethmarm-K. 

the results . - & He » - ■ • - i 

t, let hi 

. 

3 . 

! te 
5 concessions 

! 

I 

reals Mrs * 

In a 

tecaus* 

" T-- 

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ss >s v < . t is the < 



: 

* S - - ■ ■ ? . i E 

I with 

3 

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9» 



German Diplomacy. Its Methods and Achievements 
But who was it that broke the peace I Hei lethraann-Hol 

.v.i . OOt even clev le. 

The diplomatic documents published by the different be! 

leave no room for doubt that the G r the 

nature of the ultimatum to en if they did not collaborate 

in it. When M. Sazonof knew its contents on July 24th he a 
that the tirne-lirnit of forty-eight hours should be ert 

ot exactly a provocative requt 
the Austro-Hungarian Am . . carne to inform 

that the ultimatum had been delivered. H. 
followed by that of Baroi] I who said at or.se : 

in entire agreement with Austria. If her demand. 
will take military measures. Germany hopes that 00 one will inter- 
vene in this question. It is to the intei 
localize the conflict by leaving it to the parties concerns 

What the German Government called " localizing the conflict :: 
the delivery of this highly provocative declaration, which was likely 
to lead to war. 

The next day Baron von Schoen returned to the Quai d :f 
explain that " these words conveyed no threat ; " but he made 
them worse by adding that " Germany appr- andpoint, 

and can only allow herself to be guided by her duties as an ally." 

On July 3 1 st. M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for F01 
Affairs, and Count Szapary, furnished with plenary by Count 

Berchtold, had arrived at an agreement which Serbia accepted. I 
have already shown* how the Kaiser, to prevent that solution, had 
instructed Count Pourtales to hand in an ultimatum to Russia at 
midnight on July 31st. In fact, Germany declared 
o'clock in the evening of August 1st. 

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, has 
revealed that Count Berchtold, alarmed at the consec .:' his 

ultimatum, was still negotiating on the 1st of August. If. Schebeko, 
the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, has told us that the Austrian 
Cabinet were so horrified and angry that they nearly left the K 
to face Russia alone. We have heard of violent scenes bev 
Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, and Count Berchtold, 
in which the former broke out in unmeasured abuse. 

These facts were perfectly well known to Herr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg who none the less had the audacity to say that " England 

* Chapter II. 

99 7* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

and Russia bear before God and Humanity the responsibility for 
the catastrophe which has fallen on Europe and the world." 

In 1867 Bismarck raised the Luxemburg question with a view to 
isolating France in Europe, but he meant to declare war on her at 
the moment of his own choosing and make her seem the aggressor. 

The Kaiser and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg made war on Russia 
and France at their own selected moment, but lest the opportunity 
should slip, they assumed the part of the aggressor. They were 
under the impression that when they had produced a situation, 
they could change its character. 

Those whose sole intellectual and moral criterion is success are 
accustomed to distort facts, and were prepared to accept Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg's reasoning if it had been justified by victory. 

The Chancellor is always forgetting his own statements. When 
he was explaining the violation of Belgian neutrality for the first 
time, he said : " Necessity knows no law. ..." A treaty which 
guarantees the neutrality of a country is only a " scrap of paper." 
But when he came to address the Reichstag on December 2nd, he 
indulged in a tirade against Belgium, as if blissfully unconscious of 
his previous admission. " As for Belgium's guilt ... it has been 
proved by a document we found in Brussels." What was in that 
document ? Even on German showing, it was a scheme for the 
defence of Belgium, devised in concert with Great Britain. But 
defence in what circumstances ? In case of the violation of Belgian 
neutrality. Said the Chancellor : " From the moment that Belgium 
rendered assistance to France and England by resisting the German 
invasion, she was no longer neutral." He did not venture to speak 
of Luxemburg. Luxemburg did not count. But to accuse the 
Belgian Government of being guilty because they wished their 
neutrality to be respected is to introduce a new notion into Inter- 
national Law which sheds much light on German political ethics. 

The Chancellor likewise accused Japan of violating the neutrality 
of China by seizing Kiao-Chau, and, turning severely to Great 
Britain, he said : " Did this violation of neutral territory provoke 
their intervention ? " It would have been very easy for Great 
Britain to reply : " When Germany first established herself at 
Kiao-Chau, was she respecting Chinese neutrality ? " As Kiao- 
Chau had become a German possession, Japan was acting against 
Germany, not against China. 

During the war itself Germany's conduct has been one long violation 

100 



German Diplomacy* Its Methods and Achievements 

of the Hague Convention of 1907. Germany's argument in her 
defence has been twofold. 

(1) In law. — The 9th Convention of the Hague of 1907 is only binding on a 
belligerent if all the belligerents are signatories to it. 

(2) In fact. — Three of the belligerents in the present war have not signed 
the 9th Convention, namely, Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey. 

The German argument is false under both heads. 

First, the final Article stipulates that denunciation — or abstention 
— by one of the Powers only affects that Power. The Convention 
remains binding on the other contracting parties (Convention IX. 
of 1907, Article 12). 

Secondly, the 9th Convention of the Hague was signed on 
October 18th, 1909, by Serbia, represented by MM. S. Grouitch, M. G. 
Milovanovitch, M. G. Militchevitch — by Montenegro, represented 
by MM. Nelidow and Martens N. Tcharykow — by Turkey, represented 
by H. H. Turkan Pasha — without reserve.* 

When Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg tries to put forward legal 
arguments, he only shows his contempt for all law. In his speech 
of December 2nd, after bewailing the conflict " thrust " upon them, 
he uttered a paraphrase of the famous civis Romanus sum, but 
applying it as only a German could : 

" The world must learn that no one can touch a hair of a German with 
impunity." (Vociferous applause.) 

The Pan-German League, All Deutscher Verein, the official organ 
of German aspirations, has announced that by virtue of a higher 
law emanating from the " Old God of Konigsberg," every Prussian, 
and in the second degree, every German, can freely break the heads 
of all who refuse to give up to them any particular object they happen 
to covet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has announced " Germany's 
intention to make her force and capacity prevail in the world." 

Prince Biilow affords a striking illustration of German ignorance 
of psychology. In his book, Imperial Germany, he states that after 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzgovina Russia dared not intervene 
and that France and Great Britain would not. He immediately 
jumped to the conclusion that they yielded before German prestige. 

* Edouard Clunet in Le Temps, December 28th, 1914. 
101 



The Causes and Consequences d the War 

truth was much more simple. Ru>si.-. qo condition 

:";:•:.;■.•:, ..ua Furace and Great Britain were 

The Germans concluded I bat Russia having yielded in 1909. 
would yield ag [ 9Hi : -- i: ^ **■ •- pl ace 

■ in 1014; that England, not having 

td in 1900, wc [914 — even dated 

the neutrality 0: Belgium, the Germans jined that because 

bout §e bia, raid refuse to 

.ith Austria-Hungary. It 

direct interests in Sei 

but : . Austria-Hungary 

ar.d v : , RttSSI a not 

ge to Its help the er .-.gum be able to count on Russia if 

same situation . thai il they did not 
e theii s ty with Russia no one ■ auk! trust them 

td they would rind th< ess and despised 

to : . - old take the 

first :hem pret 

. i d to himself: " 1: is bound to come 

soone: m later/ 3 fid timsc I in bis country's 

. s s 

^ : ; ms 6 same ig 

the methods " Holy War.* 1 

nedans oJ the Sudan replied that Turkey's wax 
;: .-;.-...-. sible purpose was to support 

.-.uu Austria-Hungary which no more profess faith 

1 did Grt ce.* 

Ev* 

ig • 
s book t passage 

Doctoi Akhc 

' YV 

j 

S 

isses 3 .'•.-.-. • -. .-. 1 ....'. point so 
•Seel -9th, 191^ . nani- 

-OUT.'' 

EOi 



German Diplomacy* Its Methods and Achievements 

Prince Bulow repeats approvingly : " We are not a political 
people." 

He has himself furnished the best proof of the truth of his 
statement, for during his period of office the character of German 
diplomacy underwent no change. It was simultaneously hypocritical 
and provocative, but the provocation unmasked the hypocrisy and 
no one was deceived. 

The results of its methods were to unite against the German Empire 
the three greatest Powers of Europe and two small ones, Serbia and 
Belgium, the heroism of which has been of vital importance to the 
Allied plan of campaign. Germany lost one of her allies, Italy, and 
at the critical moment her other ally, whom she had made her 
cat's-paw, nearly drew back on seeing the abyss that yawned before 
her feet. If she had set out to league against her all the enlightened 
peoples of the earth she could not have been more successful. 

German diplomacy shares the responsibility for the violations of 
the Hague Convention with the German Army, whose behaviour 
has been such that merely by attempting to justify it Germany has 
put herself outside the pale of civilized races. 

I offer these achievements of German diplomacy for consideration 
to those of my compatriots who, with craven perversion, have 
grovelled before Germany since 1870, displaying their patriotism 
by declarations of the perfection of everything German and the 
futility of everything French. 



103 



PART II 

THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE WAR 



CHAPTER I 

PRODUCTIVE versus MILITARIST CIVILIZATION* 

Their different characters — Germany's methods of expansion — Werre — 
Treitschke's theories of the holiness and divinity of war — War versus Law 
— War is an instrument of constraint ; commerce, of freedom — Some 
apologists of war — A test for the professors — War always ends with peace. 

AUGUSTE COMTE, Herbert Spencer and G. de Molinari have 
drawn comparisons between a militarist civilization and 
a productive civilization, and their conclusions can be summarized 
thus : 

" Capture is the sole mode of acquisition known in the animal world, and to 
Man in his pre-commercial phase. The idea of exchange, which presupposes 
goodwill on the part of the contracting parties, is peculiar to Man, and to him 
only when his evolution is far advanced." 

The Germans presented the most extreme form of a militarist 
civilization. Tacitus tells us that they held it shameful to win by 
the sweat of their brow what they might have obtained by force. 
Pigrum et iners videtur suadore acquirere quod possis sanguine parare 
{Germ., 14). Such ideas are by no means extinct among their 
descendants. 

I find in the Encyclopedia Britannica, under the heading War : 
(Old English) Werre, (French) Guerre, of Teutonic origin. 

German professors have attempted to endow war with all sorts of 
virtues. Treitschke speaks of its " holiness " and its " divinity " 
because " it is the most powerful force that goes to the making of 
nations." Herbert Spencer says that war is the origin of govern- 
ment. A human aggregation which finds itself under the necessity 
of defending itself or attacking another selects a chief distinguished 
for his warlike qualities. This chief inspires confidence and exacts 

* The Journal des Economistes, January 15th, 1904 — my communication to 
the SocUU d'Economie Politique : " The Influence of the Economic Ideas of 
Herbert Spencer ; " The Theory of Evolution, Ultima Verba, by Molinari ; Le 
Commerce et les Commerfants, Book II., Chapter II., by Yves Guyot. 

107 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

obedience. From this process springs the military type with its 
reliance on the governing power. Along such lines of evolution we 
reach the regime of statute, regulating the actions of men. 

War is an instrument of constraint ; exchange, being the resultant 
of discussion, individual initiative and agreement between the parties, 
is an instrument of freedom. 

Treitschke, contrasting the two civilizations, says : 

" The majesty of War appears in the effacement of paltry individualism 
before the conception of the all-embracing State." 

General Bernhardi and others have developed that idea : 

" The Ethos of Prussian policy, preserved inviolable through the ages, is 
War — war not merely as a means to territorial expansion and the realization of 
political ambitions, but as a moral discipline, or rather as a kind of spiritual 
inspiration." 

Baron von Strengel, returning from the Hague Conference, wrote a 
book in which he denounced peace as a national peril and prayed 
that " the love of peace might be torn from the soul of the nation." 
Mirabeau said that " war was the national industry of Prussia," and 
Hans Delbnick has added : " It is our national religion and life." 
An Austrian professor, Herr Ludwig Gumplowitz, has revived the 
old Latin doctrine : " A foreigner is an enemy." Heinrich Rettich 
considers that " war between States is a human necessity," a necessity 
which is " none other than the tendency to increase one's possessions at 
the expense of strangers." If this principle applies to groups it 
must equally apply to individuals, and when the professor who 
expresses these views wants some coffee he should seize it instead of 
buying it from the grocer who has himself bought it from the importer. 

This plan has not infrequently been tried by various individuals, 
but the professors, by a singular lapse of logic, call them thieves, 
and remind them that there is a Penal Code which makes that method 
of " increasing their possessions " both dangerous and unpleasant. 

It is idle for the descendants of the Germans, so well described by 
Tacitus, to speak of making war for war's sake, because war always 
ends in peace and the periods of peace have been much longer than 
the periods of war. Besides, the Germans are not merely a race of 
warriors. They claim to take the first place in agriculture, industry 
and commerce. The real origin of the present war is the absence 
in Germany of equilibrium between productive civilization and 
militarist civilization. 

108 



CHAPTER II 

THE POPULATION OF GERMANY 

"The rights of over-populated countries" — Emigration has almost ceased in 
Germany — The populations of Belgium and Germany compared — The area 
at their disposal — The Torrid Zone — An argument for the Neo-Malthusians 
— The Slavs — The absurdity of the extermination theory. 

IT must be remembered that the area of Germany (540,800 square 
kilometres = 208,780 square miles) is only 4,400 square kilometres 
more than that of France (536,400 square kilometres = 207,100 square 
miles). In 1871 the population of Germany was 41,059,000; in 
1900, 56,367,000 ; in 1910, 65,000,000 ; and according to the 
calculation for 191 3, 66,835,000. 

Germany is over-populated. Then she has a right to additional 
territory ! Such is the basis of her claims — claims endorsed by many 
non-Germans, who, parrot-like, take up the cry. 

Yet the Germans themselves are not finding existence so onerous 
that they must seek better conditions elsewhere. Quite otherwise. 
The volume of emigration has steadily diminished. In 1885 the 
emigrants numbered 171,000. In 1892 the number fell to 116,000, 
in 1898 to 23,000, and from 1908 to 1912 the annual average has not 
exceeded this last figure. If the Germans themselves do not find 
that there are too many of them in Germany, why talk of Germany's 
surplus population entitling her to additional space ? 

The Pan-Germans reply : " It is true that Germany is capable 
of supporting a population of 68 millions, but she will be unable to 
support one of 80 or 90 millions." Now a German population of 
90 millions would mean 166 to the square kilometre. But Belgium, 
with an area of 29,455 square kilometres, had a population of 
7,658,000 in 191 3 ; that is, 260 to the square kilometre, or 56 per cent, 
more than Germany. If the German argument is sound and they 
have the right to take territory from other nations, how much 
weightier is it in the case of Belgium ! It gives the Belgians a claim 
to a slice of Germany. On the same scale the population of Germany 
would be, not 6y millions, but 140 millions ; so there is still a margin. 

109 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Belgium has no need of conquests to support her population. The 
Belgians do not even emigrate to the Congo, where there are only 
5,500 whites. 

The earth is not yet over-populated. The United States, Canada, 
Argentina and Brazil still have huge areas which are only sparsely 
populated. 

The German colonies are for the most part situated in the Torrid 
Zone, to which the European, especially the North European, seldom 
becomes acclimatized. The white population of the German colonies, 
including Kiao-Chau, was only 27,800 in 1912. These colonies have 
no more furnished an outlet for the German population than has 
the Congo for Belgium. 

The Germans had better hopes of Morocco, but there, too, their 
calculations went wrong. 

The German argument that their over-population justifies the 
invasion and conquest of other countries would be a formidable weapon 
in the hands of every German householder whose family approaches 
unwieldy proportions. He could say with justice that a man with a 
large number of children has a right to help himself to the property of 
a man with a smaller number. But before putting his theory into 
practice he would have to secure the reform of the Penal Code, which 
punishes thieves without regard to their family burdens. 

The adherents of this peculiarly German theory also supply the 
Malthusians with an overwhelming retort : " Instead of exercising 
self-restraint you multiply with no regard for consequences and then 
seize territory from other peoples under the pretext that your short- 
sightedness gives you the right. To shift your responsibilities on 
to their shoulders, you use your surplus population to overwhelm 
them with your outflanking strategy and mass tactics. They resist ; 
and your surplusage of men vanishes in the gaps created by your own 
theories of war. It would have been better to deny yourselves the births 
and education of the poor beings you sacrifice on your battlefields. " 

If mere numbers betoken rights, the Slavs, with their population 
increasing faster than that of Germany, have an even greater claim 
to accessions of territory. Between 1846 and 1855 Russia in Europe 
had a population of 65 millions. On January 1st, 1910, the population 
of European Russia, including Poland and Finland, was estimated at 
137 millions. If Asiatic Russia is added, the total amounts to about 
170 millions. Thus the increase in population of Russia in Europe 
is nearly double that of Germany. 

no 



The Population of Germany 

In 191 2 and 191 3 the Chancellor put forward the Slav peril as the 
principal justification for the increase of the German army, and the 
Slav peril is unquestionably the Kaiser's motive for selecting 19 14 
as the best date for the war. 

Does he think that the 170 million inhabitants of the Russian 
Empire can be exterminated ? Suppose he thinks he can kill two 
millions of them, though Russian military history does not encourage 
the belief that Russians allow themselves to be slaughtered like sheep. 
If he loses only half as many in the process, the relative situation 
remains unchanged, in view of Russia's numerical superiority. But 
if he loses the same number, the loss is double. He knows quite well 
Russia cannot be conquered and that an army which pentrates into 
the heart of Russia is an army lost. Then what is his real aim ? 
Does he want to colonize Russia with Germans ? In spite of his 
appeal to the Teutonic Knights, his coercion laws and the expenditure 
of millions, he has failed to clear the Poles from the Duchy of Posen. 

It is as impossible for the Germans to exterminate the Slavs as 
for the Slavs to exterminate the Germans. All this talk of extermi- 
nation is a relic of atavism, a return to the primitive ideas of men who 
lived at least two thousand years ago. The Teutons could not even en- 
tirely exterminate the thinly-scattered alien populations of that period. 

The modern Germans make themselves ridiculous when they com- 
pare themselves to the races of classical antiquity which were over- 
whelmed by the barbarian invasions. There is nothing more absurd 
than the efforts of Goethe and Nietzsche to transform the Teutons 
into Greeks. Mephistopheles and Zarathustra came from our 
Northern mists. Aristophanes never met them on the Agora. We 
have still to wait for the sculptor who is to adorn the Tiergarten 
with a modern German's idea of the Apollo Belvedere, a spiked 
helmet on his head, a pipe between his teeth, drinking his beer and 
staring manfully at a heavy-footed Callypigian Venus. 

This self-comparison with Greece, absurd enough to excite our pity, 
proves that a nation's civilizing influence does not depend upon its 
numbers. Men will be reading Aristotle and Plato long after they 
have forgotten the names of the ninety-three signatories to the 
Manifeste des Kulturkrieger* (" Manifesto of the Intellectuals "). 

* See the Journal des kconomistes, August and September, 19 14, and April, 
191 5. Letters from Luigi Brentano, Yves Guyot, D. Bellet and G. Blondel. 
This correspondence has appeared in a brochure, under the title : Le Manifeste 
des Kulturkrieger. (Published by Felix Alcan, Paris.) 

Ill 



CHAPTER III 

THE THEORY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY 

Economic science a cam eral Science — The Historical School — National Economy 
— The Congress of Eisenach — Adolph Wagner and Schmoller — Reaction 
against the disciples of Adam Smith — A summary of the economic doctrine 
— Frederick List — His conclusions. 

IN Germany economic science has always been regarded as a cameral 
science. (The word " cameral " comes from " Kammer" the 
Chamber, which in the Middle Ages in most German States adminis- 
tered the Crown lands and looked after the revenue.) In 1727 
Frederick William I. founded at Halle and Frankfort chairs of 
economics and cameral science. Economics was only a department 
of government and the exchequer. It has not lost that character. 

The German historical school of jurisprudence, with Savigny at 
its head, proposed to set up traditionalism in opposition to the 
French Revolution and the critical school of Kant. 

The economists who founded the historical school have more or less 
followed Savigny. The German historico-ethical school might just 
as well call itself the school of economic atavism. Its ideal is a 
return to the ancestral type. Von Thiinen, List and Roscher are 
nationals. Roscher says that there are several political economies, 
as if there could be several national arithmetics. They became 
" Academic Socialists " when Roscher, a professor at Leipzig Univer- 
sity, who in 1843 had enunciated the programme of the Historico- 
Ethical School, Grundriss zu Vorlesungen ilber die Staatswirthschaft, 
founded the " Society of Social Policy," which held its first congress at 
Eisenach on October 6th, 1872. There were present Professors Schon- 
berg of Tubingen University, Adolph Wa"grler of Berlin University, 
Luigi Brentano, then at Breslau University and now at Munich, 
Hildebrand of Jena, Knies of Heidelberg, and others. Schmoller, 
who has since become rector of Berlin University, gave the inaugural 
address, in which he declared that " the physiological conditions of 

112 



The Theory of National Economy 

the various social classes ought to be the basis of our reforming 
activities. He was not asking for the suppression of industrial 
liberty, nor the capitalist class ; but he could not, merely out of 
respect for abstract principles, allow so-called freedom of contract to 
lead to the economic exploitation of the working classes." 

For the rest, there were divisions in the camp. Herr Wagner poked 
fun at the " Ethico-historico-psychologico-statistico-inductive School, 
the members of which fortify themselves in their narrow ideas and 
form a clique." The nerveless fatalism of the " paleographical 
economists " he dubbed " historical quietism," and spoke jocularly 
of " this science of archives." Herr Schmoller, on the other hand, 
called him a metaphysician. 

The Germans are right in speaking of their historical method as 
being peculiarly their own. Herr Schmoller described it thus at the 
close of his inaugural address as Rector of Berlin University in 1897 : 
" All the great idealistic conceptions, humanity, Christianity, the 
development of law during thousands of years, the moral duties of 
the State, especially as they have been understood in Germany and 
Prussia, lead us along that pathway of reform to which the imperial 
messages of 1880 and 1890 beckoned us. German science has done 
nothing more than to attempt to lay a solid foundation for those old 
ethico-religious and juridico-political precepts." 

Thus Herr Schmoller assigns to German economic science the task of 
justifying the past and present of the German Empire and the political 
ideals of the German Government, truly the task of a maid-of-all-work. 

" Modern economic theory," he says, " has reached a historical 
and ethical conception of the State and Society utterly unlike that 
which was formulated by rationalism and materialism. It is no 
longer a simple theory of commerce and exchange. It has once more 
become a great political and moral science which has restored man 
to his rightful place as its true subject-matter, not goods and capital." 

Herr Schmoller, with all the authority given him by his rectorate, 
carefully notes that " a pure disciple of Adam Smith cannot be a 
useful teacher," and that, consequently, he would have to adapt 
his science to the necessities of the Government's social policy or 
" relinquish his chair."* 

Economic Science must be " national." The Catheder Socialisten, 

* This passage, disputed by Herr Luigi Brentano, is to be found at p. 323 
of Schmoller 's Politique Sociale et Economie Politique. French translation 
reviewed by the author. 

113 8 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

the " Academic " Socialists, are always clamouring for greater inter- 
ference by the State in economic affairs, " to invigorate public spirit," 
says Herr Held, forgetful that the stronger the State, the weaker is 
public spirit. Herr Wagner goes so far as to say that the individual 
citizen has no right to his own comings and goings, to change his 
residence from one place to another, or to marry without permission. 
Following Mario and Schoffle, he would allow the State to fix the 
number of families and the number of children to each. He forgets 
to tell us how the State would ensure obedience to the last regulation. 
The tenets of this school may be summarized thus : 

(i) Man is not a mere egoist. He is gregarious by nature (Gemeinsinn), and 
has the instinct of obedience to duty, his country and God. 

(2) There are no universal and unchanging factors in. human nature. Men 

differ from each other according to their stages of civilization. 

(3) Every question must be examined in its relation to a given country, and 

with the help of statistics and history. This is the " historical and 
realistic method." 

(4) The State takes precedence of the family, and the family of the individual. 

(5) A private person has only such rights as the laws give him. 

(6) The function of Political Economy is to examine the condition of the 

various social classes and maintain equilibrium between them. 

(7) The Government has the right and duty to regulate competition within 

the State ; a fortiori, competition with other countries. 

(8) It is untrue that all interests, even legitimate interests, can be made to har- 

monize. Egoism spurs men to robbery and evil conduct, and to set up 
their own private interests in opposition to the general good. The 
State, the highest instrument of Law, and in the name of national 
interests, must suppress or restrain them. 

(9) The State must protect and foster every form of economic activity which 

furthers its purposes, and discourage all others. 

(10) The State should replace private foresight by public foresight. 

(11) Rights of property have assumed very various forms. They are not 

absolute nor always identical. 

(12) Economic problems are not self-contained. They are intimately 

bound up with psychology, religion, morals, law, national habits and 
, history. 

(13) Political Economy is a " cameral " science. The State is its subject, 

and the social question is a moral question.* 

Frederick William and Frederick II. organized the economic system 
of Prussia on the military model. The " National Economists," 
" Historico-Ethicals " and " Catheder Socialisten " bear the stamp 
of their origin. They are committed to the inconsistency of wishing 

* See Yves Guyot : La Science fcconomique, 4th edition, 191 1, p. 351. 

114 



The Theory of National Economy 

to maintain in an industrial civilization that all-pervading domination 
of the Government which characterizes a militarist civilization. 

The man who was cited as the authority in favour of the protec- 
tionist changes of 1879 was Frederick List. List was born in 1789 
at Reutlingen in Wiirtemberg. He spent his youth attacking the 
nobility and bureaucracy and threw himself into the movement 
which, after 1 8 15, aimed at removing the customs barriers which 
separated the small States of Germany. After ten months of hard 
labour in prison, his reward for a too enthusiastic advocacy of this 
cause, he was compelled to leave Europe for the United States. There 
he attacked Adam Smith's system of " cosmopolitan economy " 
and enunciated his theory of national economy. Although he con- 
tinued to devote himself to questions immediately concerning Ger- 
many, he was unable to return to his native land until 1834. In 
1 841 he published his National System of Political Economy and com- 
mitted suicide in 1846. I give here the principal points of his work : 

(1) There should be no duties on imported foodstuffs. 

(2) In international trade the exchange is between nations, not between 

individuals. 

(3) Nations should maintain a protective system until they are in a position 

to compete with England. 

(4) It should be the Government's business to foster the increase of pro- 

ducing capacity for all commodities the production of which is 
favoured by natural resources. 

(5) A nation should be self-supporting, except in respect of certain raw 

materials like cotton. 

(6) All the States of Germany should enter a single customs union. 

(7) Holland is as much a part of Germany as Normandy is of France. 

(8) What is called " the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe" has 

been nothing but the effort of the weaker to prevent the stronger 
from realizing his purposes. 

(9) Germany, with the countries " which belong to her," Holland, Belgium 

and Switzerland, can make herself a commercial and political Power. 

(10) The nations, Germany, Holland and Belgium, whose naval power is 

inferior to that of England should amalgamate to form a united naval 
Power instead of remaining at the mercy of English supremacy. 

(11) It is to the interest of all that England's industrial predominance should 

lose those avenues of access (Holland, Belgium and the Hanseatic 
towns) by which England has hitherto maintained her ascendancy in 
the Continental markets. 

(12) It is of ten times greater importance to secure and maintain the home 

market than to seek wealth abroad. 

(13) No commercial privilege should be granted in Asia exclusively to one 

European nation. Neither of the two routes to the Red Sea and the 
Persian Gulf must be in the sole possession of England. 

115 8* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

(14) If any nation is qualified for the establishment of a national industrial 

power, that nation is Germany. 

(15) We maintain that the existence, independence and future of the German 

nation depend on a German system of national protection. 

We will now see in what manner and with what modifications those 
who appealed to List put his theories into practice. 



116 



CHAPTER IV 

THE ZOLLVEREIN AND THE TARIFF OF 1879 

The Zollverein — Bismarck's inconsistent policy — How his protectionist policy 
encouraged Socialism — The rural and industrial populations — Germany's 
nerve-centre lies west of Berlin — The importance of the Rhine Province 
and Westphalia. 

UNDER the Continental System Napoleon prohibited maritime 
trade, but insisted on free trade between all nations under 
the total or partial domination of France. Their population was 
estimated to be seventy-two millions. 

After the Congress of Vienna in 18 15 Germany found herself cut up 
into a number of small States, each of which insisted on its own 
customs and currency as the sign manual of its independence. No 
doubt it was very glorious, but it was extremely inconvenient for the 
populations distributed among them. In Prussia, which was a medley 
of States having little or no connection with each other, there were 
no less than sixty different tariffs covering 2,800 articles. At one 
point of her long frontier a particular article was duty-free ; at 
another, duty was payable on it. 

Baron Heinrich von Biilow, Minister of Commerce, and Karl George 
Mxasen, the Finance Minister, decided to impose no import duties 
on raw materials but to impose a ten per cent, duty on manufactured 
articles and a twenty per cent, duty on colonial products. These 
duties were specific and not ad valorem. Prussia's neighbours, the 
small States, jealous though they were of their economic freedom, 
gradually entered the customs union. The first recruit was Schwarz- 
burg-Sondershausen in 18 19, and others followed. In 1828 Wiirtem- 
berg and Bavaria formed a customs union. Towards the end of that 
year a commercial union of central Germany was formed between 
Hanover, the Saxon duchies, Brunswick, Nassau and the free cities 
of Frankfort and Bremen, in opposition to the development of the 
Prussian system. On May 29th, 1829, however, Prussia signed a 

117 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

commercial treaty with the southern commercial union, and on 
March 22nd, 1833, tne central and northern unions were amalgamated. 
On January 1st, 1834, the larger part of Germany had a single 
customs frontier, and by January 1st, 1854, tne Prussian system 
had, in spite of Austrian opposition, absorbed the whole of Germany 
except Hamburg, which only accepted it in 1888. The development 
of railways had convinced the most resolute opponents that a Zoll- 
verein was inevitable. 

The German tariff, after the commercial treaty of 1862, was com- 
paratively liberal. Bismarck established the protectionist tariff of 
1879 in the interests of the industrials of the Rhine Province and 
Westphalia. At the same time that he was introducing repressive 
legislation against the Socialists, these import duties were fostering 
industry and thus swelling their ranks. To this masterpiece of logic 
he added the inauguration of an Imperial insurance scheme, a sooth- 
ing poultice of bureaucratic Socialism which he thought would 
dissolve the Socialist party, but which only strengthened it. It 
contributed largely towards the exodus of the rural population into 
the industrial centres. 

In 1 87 1 the rural population living in communities of less than 
2,000 inhabitants was 64 per cent, and the urban population 36 per 
cent. In 1895 the two populations were numerically equal. In 1907 
the entire agricultural population numbered 17,243,000, out of a total 
of 61,720,000, or 279.5 per 1,000, instead of 349 per 1,000. The 
industrial population, excluding those employed in mines, numbered 
23,404,000, or 375 per 1,000, instead of 355. The mining population 
numbered 2,982,000, or 48.3 per 1,000, instead of 35.7. Commerce 
and the transport industries accounted for 8,278,000, or 134 per 
1,000, instead of 115.2. 

Berlin is nearly midway between the eastern and western frontiers 
of Prussia. Her nerve-centres lie to the west. Except for the great 
industrial province of Silesia, all the industrial forces of Germany 
have a tendency to congregate in the west. The movement of the 
population of Prussia demonstrates the truth of this observation. 
Except for Breslau, which has 515,000 inhabitants, all the towns with 
more than 250,000 inhabitants lie to the west of Berlin, which, accord- 
ing to the census of 1910, had a population of 2,071,000. Cologne has 
517,000 inhabitants; Frankfurt-am-Main, 415,000; Diisseldorf, 
359,000 ; Charlottenburg, 306,000 ; Hanover, 302,000 ; Essen, 
295,000 ; Magdeburg, 280,000. For the rest of Germany, Dresden, 

118 



\ 



The Zollverein and the Tariff of 1879 

with 552,000 inhabitants, is on the same degree of longitude as Berlin ; 
but Leipzig, with 626,000 inhabitants, Munich with 608,000, and 
Hamburg with 987,000 lie to the west. 

At the Diisseldorf Exhibition of 1909, a great chart near the 
entrance demonstrated the importance of the Rhine Province and 
Westphalia to the Prussian Monarchy. 

Percentage. 

Area 52,820 kilometres (approx. 20,374 1 5 

square miles) 

Population 9,955,000 29 

Volume of trade 97,545,000 tons (metric)* 45 

Coal products 72,187,000 ,, 71 

Mining products 2,977,000 ,, 66 

Iron products 4,706,000 ,, 81 

Steel products 3,647,090 ,„ 86 

The proportion has steadily risen. 

Bismarck always designed his protectionist policy to keep on good 
terms with the manufacturers of the Rhine Province and Westphalia, 
and so that at the time he was attempting to proscribe Socialism 
he could say : " I give work to the working classes." 

* A metric ton=2,204'6 lbs. 



119 



CHAPTER V 

ACTIVE PROTECTION AND THE AGRARIAN INTEREST 

The demands of the Agrarians— The tariffs of 1SS5 and 1S87— Bismarck's 
mistake — Action against Russia — Caprivi's concessions — Anger of the 
agrarians — Their appeal to the Kaiser — Agrarian v. Industrial policy — 
Prince Hohenlohe and the great estates — Coalition between the great 
landowners and the great manufacturers — The low standard of living of 
the working-class — The import of grain — The " Import Certificates " — 
Agricultural " Dumping " — The export of rye to Russia — The advantages 
of import certificates — Bounties on spirits — Agricultural syndicates and 
the great landowners. 

IN his 1879 tariff Bismarck had imposed a duty of one mark* per 
100 kilogrammest on imported wheat, rye and oats, and 50 pfennigs 
on barley. These were small duties which List would none the less 
have opposed. 

But this duty, so far from satisfying the great landowners 
of the East, only roused their anger and fired their ambitions. 
Thev considered their interests had been sacrificed to those of the 
industrials of the West. Had they not a far stronger claim to pro- 
tection ? Were they not the pillars and props of the Crown ? Were 
not East Prussia, West Prussia, Brandenburg and Pomerania the 
ancient possessions of the Prussian Monarchy, while the Western 
provinces had only been acquired by war or diplomatic pressure ? 
Was not Bismarck himself by birth a great landed proprietor ? 
Bismarck lent a sympathetic ear and immediately after the Treaty of 
Skiernewice, forgetting that he had just been striving to establish an 
entente between Germany and Russia, he secured the acceptance of 
the law of May 24th, 1885, which raised the duties on wheat and rye 
to 3 marks per 100 kilogrammes, on barley and oats to I mark 50 pf. 
By the law of December 21st, 1887, these duties were again raised 
to 5 marks for wheat, 4 marks for oats and 2 marks 25 pf. for barley. 

This policy pleased the agrarians, and also annoyed Russia, 

* One mark=n|d. ; 50 pfennigs=6d. 
f One kilogramme=» 2-204 1ds - avoirdupois. 

120 



Active Protection and the Agrarian Interest 

Bismarck being apparently under the singular impression that he could 
ingratiate himself with that country by his hostile economic practices. 
This tariff war was not without effect on the relations between Russia 
and France. Yet Bismarck recognized the importance of keeping on 
good terms with Russia ! 

When Caprivi was Chancellor he cared less for the friendship of 
Russia than for the goodwill of the United States and Great Britain. 
All this time, while the import duties checked the imports of Russian 
wheat into Germany, Russia was answering them with duties on 
manufactured articles. Both countries suffered heavily. Caprivi 
had to consent to a reduction of the duty on wheat and rye from 5 
marks to 3 marks 50 pf., on oats from 4 marks to 2 marks 80 pf. 
This scale, lower than that of 1887, was still higher than that of 1885. 
The agrarians were all the more exasperated with the " con- 
temptible " Chancellor, because he " owned not a foot of ground nor 
a blade of grass." They appealed to a man of their own class, a great 
landed proprietor like themselves, the Kaiser ! He heard their cause, 
expressed his sympathies and one fine day, after a violent scene, 
brusquely dismissed the Chancellor as a reward for his great services 
to the Empire in concluding commercial treaties with Russia, 
Roumania, Austria-Hungary, and other countries. Caprivi was 
replaced by Count Biilow, a great landowner whose agrarian sym- 
pathies were well known. Thus did the Agrarian Bund (League) 
triumph. 

In his speeches at Essen and Breslau in 1902 William II. revealed his 
violent aversion to the Socialists. He wanted to pursue an agrarian 
policy in preference to the industrial policy which fostered Socialism. 
In the session of January 23rd, 1905, Count Posadowsky, Minister of 
the Interior, expounded this policy. He contrasted the restless 
" neurasthenia " of German public and political life with German 
agriculture, which he called " the sheet-anchor of the ship of State." 
He wanted to maintain the agricultural element as a permanent 
counterpoise to the floating population of the towns, " which gave 
the Reichstag the largest Radical majority in the world." 

However, Prince Hohenlohe confessed in the Reichstag that an 
owner of twelve hectares,* so far from being in a position to sell corn, 
had to buy it. Small holders represent j6 per cent, of all the agricul- 
tural proprietors of Germany, so he was admitting that fifteen million 
peasants had no interest in the tariff duties. 

* One hectarea«nearly z\ acres. 
121 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The corn duties were only imposed in the interests of the great 
landowners. A small holder produces ten tons of rye and sells one. 
If he profits by the duty of 5 marks per 100 kilogrammes, it is only 
to the extent of 50 marks, which, spread over 100 metric quintals*, 
gives him 50 pfennigs a quintal. The large scale grower who produces 
1,000 quintals can sell at least 900. His profit from the protective 
tariff amounts to 4,500 marks (£221), which gives him 4 marks 50 pf. 
per quintal. 

But this argument had no bearing because the great landowners 
had been clever enough to negotiate with the great industrials and 
arrive at an understanding profitable to both. The working classes 
would pay a little more for their bread and pork, but a rise in wages 
does not necessarily follow an increase in the cost of living. The 
only thing that mattered was to maintain the protective system, and 
in 1905 the Reichstag, by 228 votes to 81, raised the duty on wheat 
to 5 marks $o pf., the duty on rye and oats to 5 marks, and the duty 
on barley to 4 marks. The duty on flour was raised from 7 marks 
30 pf. to 10 marks 20 pf. ; that on pigs, from 3 marks 30 pf. to 9 
marks ; that on sheep from 1 mark 70 pf. to S marks, and on fresh 
and frozen meat from 15 marks to 35 marks. 

The census of 1907 shows that the imposition of duties on foodstuffs 
has not won back the nation to agriculture. At the same time they 
have been a heavy burden on the working classes. Mr. Andrew D. 
White, formerly United States Ambassador in Germany, said in 
1905 :t 

• ' There is much distress among the poorer classes. The food consumed by 
many is not only unappetizing but abominable. In a number of industrial 
centres human beings herd like animals. The condition of the peasants in 
Prussia, Silesia and Thuringia is terrible. Horrible misery is hidden behind the 
flimsy fabric of politico-humanitarian institutions which deceive the superficial 
inquiries from other lands. These institutions are but the pitiless travesty of 
State providence, and are already crumbling to their doom." 

Yet notwithstanding all these privations, Germany is not a self- 
supporting country, and is compelled to import a certain quantity of 
corn. 

In 1894 tne agrarians invented an exceedingly ingenious method 
of using the import duties on cereals as an export bounty, a method 

* One metric quintals* 100 kiIogrammes=«220 lbs. avoirdupois. 

I Germany's Aim in Foreign Politics, "North American Review," April, 

1905. P- 56i. 

122 



Active Protection and the Agrarian Interest 

known as the system of " Import Certificates " (Einfuhrscheine). 
Any exporter of grain or flour has the right to a certificate which 
authorizes him to import, free of duty, a quantity not only of cereals, 
but of things such as coffee and oil, equivalent in value to the amount 
specified in the certificate.* If the world's market price of rye is no 
marks and the German market price 150 marks, an exporter will 
export his rye at no marks and receive an import certificate of 50 
marks, which he sells on the Bourse. He thus receives 160 marks, 
showing a bonus of 10 marks on the German market price. 

This is a kind of agricultural dumping, with the aggravating circum- 
stance that it originated in a law. Thanks to the system, Germany, 
formerly an importer of rye, has become an exporter : 

Five year average. Imports. 

1891-1895 646,800 

1906-1910 453,600 

1910 389,500 

1911 614,100 

The average annual value of Russian rye imported into Germany 
from 1891 to 1895 was £2,400,000; from 1896 to 1900, £3,270,000. 
In 1909 it fell to £1,755,000 and in 1910 to £1,945,000. 

The rye growers of Germany are to be found mainly in the Eastern 
provinces. Instead of selling their harvests in the west of Germany, 
they find it more profitable, thanks to the import certificates, to export 
them to Northern Europe, especially Poland, Russia and Finland. 
The Germans have established mills in Russia just within the frontier. 
They send their rye there, availing themselves of the import certifi- 
cates. The flour is sold in Russia and the bran re-exported into Ger- 
many. If the market piice of rye were not higher in Germany, the 
export bounty would amount to 31.35 per cent, of the value of the 
the rye. 

The following table shows the increase of the German export of rye 
into Russia : 

Tons. Value in £. 

1891-1895 7,700 £48,000 



Exports. 


Difference 


(In metric tons.) 




17,400 


- 629,400 


506,500 


+ 52,800 


820,000 


+ 430,500 


768,500 


+ 158,400 



1901-1905 
1906-1910 
1911 . .. . 



* The Journal des ticonomistes 



16,100 £81,000 

111,000 £750,000 

146,700 £1,050,000 



April 15th, 19 14, p. 68. Le Traite de Com- 
merce Russo-Allemand et I'Allemagne exportatrice de cirSales, by Max Hoch- 
schiller. 

123 



r cent age 


. Germany. 


Percentage. 


98 


300 


i-7 


25-7 


38,000 


46.2 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The increase in the export of German rye into Finland has advanced 
from 1,832 tons in the period 1 885-1889 to 26,437 tons in the period 
1905-1909, while the import from Russia advanced from 14,400 tons 
to 34,000, and instead of constituting 88 per cent., as in the first period, 
only formed 56 per cent, in the second. 

The diminution, as regards imports of flour, is even more striking : 

Russia. 

1885-1889 17,300 

1905-1909 21,200 

The flour which the Germans export to Finland comes from the 
wheat they import from Russia. 

Germany has also driven Russian grain and flour out of Sweden 
and Norway. 

The German agrarians claim that this system is perfect and are 
for ever clamouring for higher duties on wheat. We can easily see 
why. In 19 10 Germany exported 820,000 metric tons of rye, in 
respect of which there were import certificates for £2,010,000. The 
same year she only imported 389,500 tons, on which the import 
duties amounted to £963,700. The figure for the value of import 
certificates not paired with import duties was thus £2,010,000 — 
£963,750 — £1,046,250. Such was the clear profit, not to mention 
the profit resulting from the difference between the world's market 
price and the German market price. 

The Russo-German Treaty was due to expire in 1917. The 
Russians disliked intensely the aggressive protectionist system so 
beloved of the Germans. One would not be far wrong in saying 
that one of the motives for the declaration of war on Russia could be 
expressed in the words : " As soon as we have beaten Russia we can 
compel her to accept the terms of any commercial treaty we choose 
to dictate." 

With a view to favouring agriculture and especially the great 
potato-distillers, a scheme was started in 1887, in the Bismarckian 
era, to graduate the duty of 70 marks a hectolitre* in such a way 
as to return 20 marks a hectolitre to certain classes of producers 
of spirits for specified quantities. The quantity of spirits which paid 
duty at 50 marks was less than the consumption, which was thus 
obliged to pay as if the duty of 70 marks had been imposed on the 
total production. In this way the distillers made an extra- profit 

* A hectolitressioo litres=22 imperial gallons. 
124 



Active Protection and the Agrarian Interest 

of 20 marks per hectolitre on all the spirits they distilled and sold. 
In other words, it was a present of £2,000,000 per annum as com- 
pensation for the drop in the consumption. In 1909 the duty was 
raised from 70 to 125 marks a hectolitre — the rate being only 105 
marks up to the amount of 226.4 million litres. This preserved the 
Liebesgabe of £2,250,000 to £2,350,000 ; but the consumption having 
fallen off, the profit realized was not more than £2,000,000 in the last 
years. Between 1887 and 1910 some of the big distilleries made six 
or seven million marks out of the difference of 20 marks. 

The production and sale of spirits in Germany are controlled by 
the Central fiir Spiritus V erwertung, which includes almost every 
producer. Legislation has been passed which embodies the syndi- 
cate's wishes. There are fines for overproduction and bounties on 
denaturation. German spirits pay 125 marks a hectolitre, while im- 
ported spirits would pay a duty of 225 marks if they could get into 
the country. 

Import duties and export bounties are both favourable to the policy 
of the syndicates. M. A. Souchon has studied that policy in his 
book, Les Cartels de V Agriculture en Allemagne* He comes to 
the conclusion that " les cartels sont £ autant plus facile s a etablir que 
le sol est moins morcele." (The fewer the subdivisions of land — i.e., 
a few large estates instead of many small ones — the easier it is to 
form syndicates.) Thus they work in favour of the great landowner. 
Their success has been most striking in Pomerania. The Central 
fiir Spiritus V erwertung has its supporters among the great land- 
owners of the east. 

The Sugar Syndicate was killed by the Brussels Conference in 1902. 
M. Souchon says that " the Central fiir Spiritus V erwertung would 
have been equally unable to survive such an ordeal. " 

The Agricultural Syndicates have roused the suspicions and anger 
of the consumers. Not without reason in the case of the Sugar 
Syndicate, adds M. Souchon. t 

The syndicates, however, are not always successful in maintaining 
prices at a high level because the hope of even further rises stimulates 
supply. 

The entire economic organization of Germany is concerned with 

* 1903. A Colin. 

| See Yves Guyot : " La Question des Sucres en 1901; " " L'Industrie du Sucre 
sur le Continent." Journal de la SociiU de Statistique, Nov. 1902. 

125 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

production only. Demand and the purchasing power of the con- 
sumer are not considered. If the consumer cannot keep up it is his 
own fault. 

Thus Germany's idea is to throw her surplus production to the 
foreigner, and if the foreigner is rude enough to receive it without 
enthusiasm he must be prepared to meet the Kaiser's anger. 



126 



-ji 



CHAPTER VI 
THE GERMAN SYNDICATES AND DUMPING 

The Syndicates are monopolies of sales, not of production — They date from, the 
Tariff Law of 1879 — The syndicates and the chemical industry — Herr 
Liefmann on the disappearance of economic individualism — Cost price 
and market price — The fight against the customer — The consumer exists 
for the producer — The Potash Syndicate — Waste — The limitation of pro- 
duction — The Rhenish- Westphalian Syndicate imports coal — Over-produc- 
tion — The consumer's revenge — The disappearance of the small-scale 
producer — The combines — A fictitious method of keeping up prices only 
prolongs crises — The impossibility of controlling prices — The Prussian 
Industrial State and the syndicates — " Dumping " — How it favours the 
foreigner — Rotterdam — Export bounties for finished products — An unex- 
pected result — German and English sheet-iron — List's theory of national 
economy means a present to the foreigner — Attacks on foreign industries — 
The Nobel Dynamite Trust Company, Limited — The European Petroleum 
Combine and the Deutsche Bank — Industry and the Banks — Financiers 
and the syndicates — Some conclusions. 

HERR ROBERT LIEFMANN* has defined a syndicate as a 
voluntary association of producers in the same line of industry 
who, while preserving their own independence, agree to act together 
with a view to acquiring a monopoly in the market. The words 
" preserving their own independence " are not strictly accurate, for 
the members of a syndicate are bound by a limit of production which 
they may not exceed, and cannot dispose of their own products 
entirely as they please. But this description has the merit of being 
frank, and admits that the object of a syndicate is to acquire a selling 
monopoly and to impose its own price on the consumer. Every 
member can consult his own convenience as to his method of pro- 
duction, and therein lies the difference between a syndicate and a 

* Cartels et Trusts, by Robert Liefmann, Professor at the University of 
Freiburg in Breisgau, 1909. French translation, 1914. Trusts, Cartels et 
Syndicats, by Arthur Raffalovich, 2nd edition, 1909. See also the Marche" 
Financier, which M. Raffalovich publishes annually and which contains a record 
of all the events in connection with syndicates in the last twenty-five years. 

127 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

trust. In almost every case a syndicate is only an instrument for 
the monopoly of sales. 

Some German syndicates were founded prior to 1870, but the great 
crash in the middle of that year led to their development. They still 
remained, however, isolated phenomena, and the real era of syndicates 
begins with the protective tariff of 1879. 

Herr Liefmann says that the protectionist reaction was not a 
reason so much as an opportunity for the growth of syndicates. 
This may be true in general, but Liefmann admits that in 1879, 
the tariff having increased the cost of raw materials in the soap and 
dynamite industries, the producers were compelled to restore the 
balance between the sale price and the increased cost price by means 
of general agreements. The greatest development of syndicates 
occurred in the periods of marked industrial expansion, such as 1888 
to 1890, 1895 to 1900, and from 1904 to 1907. They were, therefore, 
not intended to maintain prices but to raise them. 

According to the investigations made by the Imperial Department 
of the Interior in 1903, the syndicates numbered 335. There were 
132 in the brick industry, 62 in the iron industry, 19 in the coal 
industry, 46 in the chemical industry, 27 in the industries connected 
with stone and earthenware, 17 in the industries engaged in supply- 
ing food. They represented 15 groups of industries, including the 
textile industries, in which there were 27. 

But syndication is not always feasible. It is only really suitable 
for those industries the products of which present a character 
of simplicity and uniformity. Hence the appearance of sub- 
syndicates, especially in the chemical industry, which are only con- 
cerned with the production of one substance. An example is the 
Bismuth Syndicate. Of the 500 existing syndicates, a certain number 
represent " syndicated " concerns which have disappeared and been 
replaced by others. 

The Germans have gone on from national syndicates to inter- 
national syndicates, of which more than half belong to the chemical 
industry ; the others concern rails, steel tubing, and other metallur- 
gical products. The field of action of these syndicates is mainly 
confined to Austria and Belgium. 

Herr Liefmann greets the advent of syndicates with the most 
unfeigned enthusiasm. They have destroyed economic individualism. 
Adam Smith had stated that in a free market competition tended to 
keep the selling price very near to the cost price. The producers being 

128 



The German Syndicates and Dumping 

rivals, the consumers were the tertius gaudens. The syndicate has 
changed the fight for the consumer into a fight against him. It is 
the old militarist notion that the individual does not count. It 
is no longer the producer's object to satisfy the consumer's (that is, 
the whole world's) needs as expeditiously as possible. He is to be 
the consumer's master, and the consumer's raison d'etre is to be the 
source of his profits. Under tht r egime of competition the profits 
are the measure of the consumer's satisfaction, and he is more neces- 
sary to the producer than the producer to him. But under the 
regime of syndication the profits are the result of successful exploita- 
tion of the consumer. The syndicate regime attempts to make the 
consumer put himself entirely at its service, and one of its methods 
is to make him buy exclusively from the syndicates. 

This ambition is by no means always realized. The syndicates 
force up prices with the inevitable result of raising up against them- 
selves rival concerns, some of which are formed with the sole object 
of compelling the syndicates to buy them out. These things have 
happened in every industry, notably the potash industry (Kaliin- 
dustrie). The new firms care naught for demand, and seem to labour 
under the delusion that the mere production of potash implies profits. 
This error is the revenge on the syndicates of the theory of economic 
liberty. The syndicates have encouraged the industrials to give no 
thought for the consumer but to produce for production's sake. In 
1879 a syndicate was formed which comprised the two largest pro- 
ducers of potash — the Prussian State, the State of Anhalt — and two 
private firms. In 1905 there were no less than three hundred boring 
undertakings. The Kalisyndikat spent millions of marks on making 
borings in the vicinity of rival borings merely to compel competitors 
to sell their ground. In 1909 there were fifty-two members of the 
syndicate. Thirty new workings were in course of construction. 
The figure of participation of the three oldest concerns fell to 2.8. 

In the summer of 1909 some of the large firms resumed their freedom 
of action and concluded several large contracts with the United 
States. The syndicate found itself broken up. This was an unex- 
pected occurrence, and the Imperial Government reconstituted the 
syndicate by enacting that all the workings should be included in it. 
The State works and those in which it was interested were to have 
no limit of production, but all others were to be restricted in their 
output for six years. This arrangement was calculated to keep new 
concerns out of the field, but the calculation proved vain. In 1910 

129 9 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

there were sixty-nine concerns. The estimate for 191 5 was two hundred 
and seventy-five. It has been said that between 1901 and 1914 the 
potash industry has been responsible for a waste of £60,000,000.* 
The root principle of the syndicate is the limitation of production by 
;:iing a certain output to each member. They are all liable 
to the fate which overtook the Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate when, 
owing to its difficulties in increasing output and opening new mines 
in 1906, it was obliged to purchase immense supplies of coal in 
England, as it could not meet the demand. Six months later it had 
a heavy surplus on its hands. To prevent the mines being closed 
down and the employees turned off, it was obliged to accumulate 
stocks and to sell abroad at dumping prices. 

The syndicates claim to be able to regulate the conditions of 
industry, but they have patently failed, in spite of all their efforts 
to make demand suit their own convenience. From time to time 
the consumer takes his revenge and demonstrates that he does not 
exist for the producer but the producer for him. 

But the syndicates have certainly resulted in the extinction of 
the small-scale producer to the advantage of the large-scale producer. 

At the same time they have raised up against themselves what are 
known as " Combines." For example, the great foundries begin to 
work mines and themselves undertake the production of everything 
thev need, so as not to be dependent upon the syndicates for their 
materials. The Cassel firm of Hendschel and Solm, which makes 
locomotives, has acquired blast furnaces and a coal mine. Many 
blast furnaces and steel works are now known as Hiittenzechen (mine- 
foundries). On the other hand, the great mining concern of Gelsen- 
kirchen has taken over two large metallurgical works, the Hachencr 
Huttenverein Rote Erie and the Scbalker Gruben- und Hii;: 
which were already a combine. 

During a crisis the task of the syndicates is to prevent prices 
from falling in sympathy with the demand, or at least to the same 
extent. They keep up prices on paper without regard to the diminu- 
tion of demand. At first the producer is delighted. The prices 
remain at the old figure, but the demand leaves them severely alone. 
They are pure window-dressing, and, being fictitious, only prolong the 
crisis. If they were lowered they would stimulate demand, and 
therefore the creation of new concerns by those who have available 
capital and want to take advantage of the prevailing cheapness 
* Raffalovich : Le Marchi I . 1912-1913, p. St. 

130 



The German Syndicates and Dumping 

to benefit as soon as the crisis was over. These fictitious prices 
delay such a solution. Herr Liefmann says that the loudest com- 
plaint of syndicates and their high prices are heard in times of 
industrial depression. 

But even a syndicate cannot resist the competition of rivals, which, 
under no necessity to prop up feebler members and producing cheaply, 
demonstrate to the consumer the advantage of an open market. 

On June 4th, 1908, the Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate was com- 
pelled to begin limiting the output of coke. The diminution finally 
reached forty per cent, of the original output. In March the output 
of coal had similarly to be restricted. 

Syndicates cannot maintain stability of prices and sometimes they 
are the cause of their fluctuations. 

The dissolution of several syndicates on January 1st, 1909, was 
followed by a very sharp struggle. In August, 1909, the great mixed 
works reduced to 46-48 marks the price of Thomas steel, which 
stood at 75-76 marks at the beginning of 1908. In 1909, after 
the dissolution of the Silesian cement groups, there was a violent 
conflict in Central Germany between them and the outsiders. 
The Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate lowered the selling price from 
400 marks to 265.* On January 22nd, 191 3, they raised the price 
of coal from 27 pfennigs to one mark for coke, and that of briquettes 
to one mark. They explained the rise by saying that owing to new 
conditions in the metallurgical industry, wages and working expenses 
in the coal industry had increased. On October 14th they announced 
a further rise in prices for 1913-1914. There was a general outcry 
that the syndicate was acting in defiance of public interest and 
was solely prompted by considerations of profits and dividends for 
shareholders. 

The Prussian Treasury grew nervous and repudiated their arrange- 
ment with the syndicate. 

The Prussian State was in a quandary. Their cost of production 
was higher than that of private firms. They wanted high prices, 
but feared the revolt of the consumers. Of course they wanted their 
works to earn profits. The Treasury was not a member of the 
syndicate, but they had empowered the syndicate to sell all the 
output which Prussia and the Empire could not take. 

The Frankfort Gazette denounced this arrangement as a surrender 
on the part of the Prussian State. 

* Raffalovich, 19 12. 

131 9* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The renewal of the Steel Syndicate (Stahlzverksverband) for a period 
of five years took place in 191 2, and the agreement was only signed at 
three o'clock in the morning of the 1st of May. Three new works 
producing Thomas steel claimed their share in the " A " products 
(half-wrought, railway material and wrought iron). The Deutsch- 
Luxemburg claimed a monopoly in the girders of the Grey 
system, of which it had the patent. An allotment was made to 
twenty-five members. " B " products (bar iron, wire rods, sheet 
iron, tubes, cast and forged iron) had to be left out of the syndicate's 
programme. The concerns employed in the manufacture of Martin 
steel pay for their raw material at the rates fixed for " A " products 
and try to obtain it from concerns outside the syndicate. The mixed 
works, on the other hand, have been supported by the syndicate. 

The coal which the mines took for their foundries contributed 
nothing towards the common expenses and formed no part of their 
quota. These concerns have had to pay a larger share of the joint 
expenses, but they limit the market for the ordinary mines as they 
provide their own consumers. 

There was also some difficulty over the renewal of the Coal Syndi- 
cate. A notice of the nth of January announced that it would be 
dissolved that year. 

One of the greatest weapons of the syndicates is the practice of 
" dumping," that is, selling to the foreigner at a lower price than to 
their own nationals. Rotterdam owes much of its industrial pro- 
sperity to this practice of dumping. The Rotterdam works import 
their sheet-iron cheaply, and work it up into boilers and lighters, 
which they export to Germany. 

The German Wire Nail Makers' Association (Drahstiftverband) lost 
£43,750 on its foreign sales in the second half-year of 1900, but made 
a total profit of £57,000, thanks to its home trade. 

The Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate has been charged with selling 
fifteen per cent, cheaper abroad than in Germany, and reference has 
been made to its sales to the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee Railway, f.o.b. 
Rotterdam at eight shillings a metric ton, equivalent to six shillings 
at the pit-head. It thus appears that the syndicates favour foreign 
industries at the expense of German industries which need iron, steel 
and other finished and half-finished products. 

To soothe the agitation of the manufacturers who use their 
products the syndicates give them export bounties {Ausfuhrver- 
giitungen). They pay them an indemnity for the quantity of syndicate 

132 



The German Syndicates and Dumping 

products they employ for their exported goods. Since 1902 the 
Coke and Coal Syndicate and the Steel Syndicate have maintained a 
central office at Diisseldorf which has laid down uniform regulations 
for the granting of these export bounties. When the bounties were 
granted to all manufacturers, the syndicates merely raised up rivals 
to themselves in foreign markets. To-day the bounties are given to 
the syndicates only ; but it is the foreigner who profits by them as 
against the sellers of unfinished products. Yet they themselves 
supply them ! 

From the 15th of December, 1909, to the end of March, 1910, the 
Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate gave a bonus of one and a half 
marks per ton of the Syndicate's coal employed in the manufacture 
of finished products for export. After that date the premium was 
reduced to one mark, and the concession could be withdrawn at any 
time on eight days' notice. The arrangement was terminated at the 
end of 191 1. 

Shipbuilding material is exempt from duty in Germany. Herr 
Reumer, a National Liberal, whom Herr Singer has called the Cartel 
King, addressing a commission of inquiry in 1903, said : 

" Our sheet-iron industry must enter into competition with England for the 
delivery of materials for German construction. But we cannot, get orders 
without quoting lower prices for our products than those of the English pro- 
ducts, that is, unless sacrifices are made. It is the syndicate which makes 
these sacrifices."* 

The great system of national economy has produced the ironical result 
that instead of " protecting the national industries" the syndicate gives 
work to the foreign workman. List's economic policy makes German 
industry serve the interests of the foreigner and gives him presents. 

But at the same time the German system of export bounties is 
intended to annihilate the industries of other nations. 

Herr Liefmann also mentions concerns which are not engaged in 
economic activities, but whose sole function is to control other con- 
cerns by virtue of a governing interest in their shares. 

" Some of these concerns aim at establishing a monopoly : they desire to 
concentrate the entire organization and management of some particular 
industry in their own hands by acquiring a controlling interest. The oldest of 
this species of concern is the Nobel Dynamite Trust Company, Limited, which 
was, it is true, originally an English company, formed in London in 1886 as an 
English ' trust,' but which is none the less substantially a German concern,! 

* Quoted in Trusts et Cartels, by Raffalovich, p. 314. 

f See also the Journal des Economistes, August, 1914, p. 253. 

133 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

there being only one branch, a dynamite factory . in England. This company 
owns the shares of all its branches, though to the outside world these offshoots 
look like independent concerns with their own dividends. In reality, however, 
the dividends are held for the trust and all the branches are under common 
management." 

The first controlling company, formed in 1901, was the Rice Trade 
Association, which comprises all the German rice mills. The most 
important is the European Petroleum Combine, which has finally 
acquired an imperial monopoly, exercised by a private company 
under State control and accountable for its profits to the State. 

" It has been said/' M. Raffalovich remarks,* " that the Deutsche 
Bank, which has great interests in oil and which had made an un- 
profitable agreement with the Standard Oil Company and wanted 
to get rid of it, urged on the formation of the combine. Others have 
spoken of its keen competition with another financial group (the 
D is co n to Gesellsch aft) . ? ' 

The great electrical concerns of the Allgemeine Elektrizit'dts-Gesell- 
schaft and Siemens und Halske are connected up by amalgamation or 
participation with a host of concerns occupied in any and every 
branch of the electrical industry. The large companies have their 
offshoots whose exclusive function is to acquire a controlling interest 
by purchasing the shares of local electricity works. 

In Germany, most of the industries, so far from leading the banks, 
are led by them. German professors call this situation the reign of 
capital. The expansion of industry does not correspond to any 
increase of demand but to the amount of capital which the banks 
have at their disposal seeking investment in any branch of industry 
which offers a prospect of profit. In the inquiry on syndicates under- 
taken by the Society of Social Policy {Verein fitr Sozial-politik), 
Professor Wagner called attention to this change in the character of 
German industry. Control and management tend to pass from the 
hands of the technical expert to those of the financier pure and simple, 
and the financier is always favourable to the formation of syndicates, 
because he sees in the syndicates some guarantee of industrial stability 
and security for his capital. Herr Liefmann frankly confesses : 

" The prevention of competition between those engaged in the same profes- 
sion or industry has been in no way conducive to economic peace ; but a struggle, 
far keener than the ordinary right for customers, has now broken out in many 
industries, a fight against customers, especially those engaged in working up 
raw material, and the retailers." 

* Le Mcuche Financier, 1912-13, p. Si. 

134 



The German Syndicates and Dumping 

In short, the syndicates are a monopolistic organization of the 
large-scale producers directed against the manufacturers, who are 
dependent upon them for their material, and all the consumers. The 
manufacturers, who must have an unending supply of raw material, 
are sacrificed to the small group of industrial magnates who purposely 
withhold that supply. Their employees are sacrificed with them. 
Thus the industrial organization of Germany is oligarchical. The 
great magnates of the Rhine districts are favoured like the Junkers 
of the East. 

The syndicates cannot keep prices steady and not infrequently 
contribute to their fluctuation. 

By their policy of " dumping " they raise up foreign competition 
abroad against their own nationals, while their policy of aggressive 
protection against foreigners helps to injure foreign industries. 

They set out to replace economic competition between producers, 
a benefit to the consumer, by the establishment of monopolies to the 
detriment of the consumer. 

Thus, whilst in a free market sale price always tends to approximate 
to cost price, they try to maintain sale price at any figure they please 
by treating the consumer as of no account. 



135 



CHAPTER VII 

COAL-MINING. THE METALLURGICAL AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES IN 

GERMANY 

Comparative figures of coal production — The reserves of coal — The production 
and consumption of iron — Some comparative figures — Exports — Realiza- 
tion of stocks — Pig iron and steel as raw material — The chemical industry 
— The distribution of coal among the various industries. 

SYNDICATES have not brought economic peace, as Herr Robert 
Liefmann frankly confesses. 
Nevertheless, the Germans are never tired of chanting the industrial 
expansion of Germany, forgetful, doubtless of set purpose, that the 
development of the United States has been even more remarkable, 
and that other nations have also made progress, the United Kingdom* 
among them. 

These are the figures for coal-mining (not including lignite) in the 
three countries : 

1901-1905. 1906-1910. 1911. 1912. 
(In millions of tons [English].) 

Germany 113. 1 142 .5 156 172 

United Kingdom 229 261.7 271.8 260.4 

United States 302.9 405.8 443-2 477-2 

Germany's increase of production is thus 52 per cent., but that of 
the United States is 58 per cent. The actual increase is 59 million 
tons for Germany and 175 million tons for the United States. 

In 191 2 there was a falling-off in the coal production of the United 
Kingdom owing to the coal strike ; but in spite of that the British 
output exceeded that of Germany by 88 million tons. In 191 3 the 
British output went up to 287,400,000 tons, and that of Germany 
191,500,000 tons, so that the difference was 96 million tons. 

* Le Marchi Financier (Annual), by A. Raffalovich. Statistisches Jahrbuch 
fiir das Deutsche Reich (Berlin). The Diplomatic and Consular Reports and 
the British Blue Books. 

136 



Coal-Mining. Metallurgical and Chemical Industries 

The figures of imports and exports of coal for the three countries 
in 191 1 and 191 2 are as follows : 

191 1 1912 Excess of 

( A ^ 1 * ^ Exports in 

Imports. Exports. Imports. Exports. 191 2. 
(Million tons.) 

Germany 11. 9 36.6 11. 3 42.6 31.3 

United Kingdom — 87 — 85.8 85.8 

United States 1.3 25.6 1.8 26.8 25 

The consumption of coal has been : 



1901-1906. 1906-1910. 1911. 1912. 

(In million tons.) 

Germany 99.7 126.5 131. 3 140.7 

United Kingdom 166 178.2 184.8 174-8 

United States 295.5 394- 2 4 2 5-6 459-5 

Per head of population (in tons). 

Germany 1.69 2 2 2.12 

United Kingdom 3.93 4.04 4.08 3.83 

United States 3.67 4.43 4-54 4-82 

Thus the consumption per head of population in Germany falls 
considerably short of that in Great Britain and the United 
States. 

The value per ton at the pit-head for Germany and Great Britain 
has been : 



United Kingdom 
Germany 



1901-1905. 


1906-1910. 


1911. 


1912. 


s. d. 


s. d. 


s. d. 


s. d. 


7 10* 


8 3f 


8 1! 


9 of 


, 8 9+ 


10 o|- 


9 11 


10 6\ 



Nasse, having said that the coal reserves of Great Britain would 
not be exhausted for six hundred and sixty-eight years, has not been 
deemed worthy of attention by the Germans. Thomson, however, 
gives them a limit of one hundred and fifty years, and Forster Brown's 
estimate is only sixty years. This last figure is all the more satis- 
factory to the Germans, because their own reserves will not be ex- 
hausted before a thousand years in the Ruhr district, eight hundred 
and seventy years in Saxony and five hundred and seventy-five years 

137 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

in Upper Silesia. These are the calculations of the same Nasse who 
is regarded this time as an authority on the question. 

Thus Great Britain will run short of coal long before Germany, 
and fall into a position of inferiority. All Germany must do is to 
trust to time. Unfortunately Germany is impatient. 

In another estimate I find the following figures, which are not in 
entire agreement with those given above for 191 1 and 191 2. They 
illustrate the progress made in the production of coal and iron ore in 
Germany. These are the relevant figures* : 



Mixing Output. 
Coal. Value. 

(Millions of tons [metric].) 

1892 71.4 £25,800,000 

1900 109 . 3 £4.7,400,000 

1905 121. 3 £51,500,000 

1910 152.8 £74,800,000 

1911 160.7 £77,100,000 

1912 174-9 — 

1913 191. 5 — 



Iron ore. 


Value. 


(Millions 


of tons [metric].) 


11. 5 


£2,020,000 


18.9 


£3,810,000 


23-4 


£4,020,000 


28.7 


£5,250,000 


20.9 


£5,675,000 


26.2 


£5,679.000 



The production, imports and exports (including, since 1907, those 
of coal and briquettes, expressed as coal), and the consumption of 
coal, show the following figures : 







Percentage 




Percentage 




Percentage 


Home 


Percentage 




Pro- 


-f or - on 


Imports 


+ or - on 


Exports. 


+ or — on 


con- 


+ or - on 




duction. 


previous 




previous 




previous 


sump- 


previous 






year. 




year. 




year. 


tion. 


year. 










In millions of tons [metric].) 






1904.. 


.120.8 


+ 3-5 


7-3 


+ 7-3 


18 


+ 3-5 


110. I 


+ 3-7 


1905.. 


.121.3 


+ -4 


9-4 


4-28.8 


18. I 


+ I 


112. 5 


+ 2.2 


1906.. 


.137.1 


+ 13 


9.2 


+ 1.7 


19.5 


+ 7.69 


126.8 


4-12.6 


1907.. 


.143.2 


+ 4-4 


14.5 




25-7 




132 




1908 .. 


.147.7 


+ 3.1 


12.5 


-14. 1 


26.7 


+ 4 


133-4 


4- 1 


1909.. 


.148.8 


+ -7 


I3-I 


+ 5-3 


28.8 


+ 7-7 


133. I 


— .2 


1910.. 


.152.8 


+ 2.7 


12. 1 


- 8 


30-9 


+ 7-3 


134 


+ .6 


1911 . . 


.160.7 


+ 5-2 


11. 8 


— 2 


35 


+ 13-2 


137.4 


+ 2.5 


1912 . . 


.177 


+ 10. 1 


11. 2 


- 4.9 


40.6 


+ 15-8 


147.7 


+ 7.4 


1913-. 


.191.5 


+ 8.1 


11. 3 


+ 1.2 


44.9 


+ 10.6 


157.9 


+ 6.9 



Between 1904 and 191 3 the output of coal increased by 57 per cent, 
and the consumption by 46 per cent. 

* For the purpose of this table 1 mark=n|d. 

138 



Coal-Mining. Metallurgical and Chemical Industries 

The output and consumption of iron in the Zollverein have increased 
as follows : 



Output of 

pig iron. 

(Millions of 

metric tons.)* 

1866-1869 1.2 

1879 2.2 

1890 4.6 

1900 8.5 

1901 7.8 

1902 8.5 

1903 10 

1904 10. 1 

1907 13 

1908 11 .8 

1912 17.9 





Consumption 


of 






iron expressed 




Per head. 


as pig iron. 




Per head. 


(Kilo- 


(Millions of 




(Kilo- 


grammes.) 


metric tons. 


)8 


rammes.) 


32.7 


1 .2 




33 


50.5 


1-5 




35-1 


97.1 


3-9 




81.7 


I5I-4 


7-4 




131. 1 


138 


5-1 




89.4 


147 


4.4 




76 


171. 4 


5-7 




97-9 


169.2 


6. 7 




112. 2 


209.8 


9 




145-12 


187.6 


7.3 




115.97 


268.52 


10.3 




155-54 



Thus the increase of output is far more marked than that of con 
sumption. 

I now give the figures for the output of pig-iron in Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States during the period 1908- 
I9l2t : 



Germany. 



1908 11 .8 

1909 12.6 

1910 14.8 

1911 15 .6 

1912 17 .9 

1913 19-3 



United United The world 

Kingdom. States. output. 
(In millions of tons [metric].) 

9.2 16.2 48.8 

9.7 26.2 60.6 

10.5 27.7 66.4 

— 24 65 

9-7 30.2 75 



Since 1903 Germany has taken the second place among the 
countries producing pig-iron. In 191 2 her proportion of the world's 
output rose to 23 per cent. 



* 1 metric ton=a2,204 lbs. ; 1 kilogramme=»2i lbs. 
t Circulaire du Comite des HouilUres, No. 4,856, December 22nd, 191 3. 

139 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Below are the figures for the iron exports from the Zollverein : 

Pig-iron Wrought Addition of 33 £ per Totals 

of iron and cent, to the figures in 

all kinds. steel. the preceding column to 

arrive at the quantities 
expressed as pig-iron. 
(In thousand tons [metric].) 

1866-1869 62.6 94.4 3i-4 188.6 

1879 433-1 625.4 208.5 1,267 

1890 181. 8 864.1 288 1,334 

1900 190-5 T .589 5 2 9-7 2,309 

1901 303-8 2,250.1 750 3,304 

1902 516.9 3, on. 6 1,003.8 4.53 2 -9 

1903 5 2 7-8 3.202 1,067.3 4,797 

1904 316.2 2,721 907 3.944-3 

1907 385-7 3.529 1. 176 5.092 

190S 421.5 3>7 11 1,237-2 5.370 

1910 934 4.369 1,456.4 6,759 

1911 1,003.6 4,890 1,630 7,523 

1912 1,217.9 5,391 1,797 8,406 

According to a work of Doctor Gluckauf, the following table shows 
the changes in the relation between the exports of iron from the 
Zollverein and the total output of pig-iron : 

Percentage. Percentage. 

1868-1869 15-59 1904 39- 12 

1879 56.9 1907 40.72 

1890 34-59 1908 39-03 

1900 27.1 1910 45.7 

1901 4J-93 l 9 11 48.29 

1902 53 ; i4 x 9i2 47-°4 

1903 39.04 

The 1902 figures show that the exports are sometimes the realization 
of stocks. In the period 1910-1912 the amount exported was nearly 
half the total output. 

Now, as Sir Hugh Bell has shown in a remarkable study, pig-iron 
and steel are raw materials. Mere output is less important than to 
make full use of them for machinery, tubes, shipbuilding and other 



* The Iron and Steel Industry in Great Britain, by Sir Hugh Bell, Journal des 
Economistes, January, 191 1. 

140 



Coal-Mining* Metallurgical and Chemical Industries 

After coal-mining and the metallurgical industry comes the German 
chemical industry. There are two enormous chemical works. Bayer 
at Leverkusen and the Badische Anilin unci Soda Fabrik, which was 
founded in 1865 to exploit the properties of fuscine, discovered in 
i860 by Verguin, a chemist of Lyons, but which the French did not 
know how to turn to commercial uses. 

Germany cannot complain that foreigners refuse her exports. 
About 1820 the French Government adopted red trousers for the 
infantry in order to encourage the madder industry. Then that 
colour was replaced by alizarine, which is made by the Badische 
Anilin Fabrik, and the War Department has permitted no change 
since. 

Out of a total production of sixteen million pounds' worth 
of dye-stuffs by the great works, export accounts for three- 
quarters. 

One of the five leading dye companies, the Aktien Ge 's ells ch aft filr 
Anilin Fabrikation of Berlin, has taken up on an immense scale the 
manufacture of cinematograph films. This firm bought from two 
chemists of Paris, MM. Clement and Riviere, a process for replacing 
nitro-cellulose or celluloid by acetate of cellulose, which is less 
inflammable. The invention had not been taken up in France, but 
now the municipal regulations make the substitution compulsory 
for cinematograph work. 

The spinning and weaving industries are in a backward 
condition. 

Germany claims to have a monopoly in the manufacture of 
musical instruments, her exports being of the annual value of 
£4,000,000. 

She also has an export trade in toys and trinkets. 

M. V. Cambon says* : 

" German industry owes its triumphs to causes other than perfection of 
workmanship. The dominant factors in its favour are cheapness, the close 
attention paid to the customer's craving for variety and novelty, and especially 
unparalleled and ubiquitous advertisement." 

The distribution in 1910 and 191 1 of the coal output of the 
Rhenish-Westphalian Syndicate among the various classes of 

* Les Dernters Progres de I'Allemagne, by V. Cambon (1914) (published by P. 
Roger), p. 196. 

141 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

consumers will throw light on the relative importance of the 
different industries.* 

Coke and briquettes expressed as coal. 

1910. 19c t. 

Tons Per- Tons. Per- 

(Metric), centage. centage. 

1. Coal-mining and production of coke 

and briquettes 4,722,249 7.48 4,860,173 7.09 

2. Metal mines and the preparation of 

ores 305,692 .46 282,285 .41 

3. Salt mines and works 277,472 .42 333.474 «49 

4. Metallurgical works of every kind "] 

except siderurgical j 

5. Siderurgical works (production of 

iron and steel, rolling-mills, 

foundries) } 27,931,992 42.45 28,249,869 41.22 

6. Metal working (except iron and j 

steel) 

7. Iron and steel working 

8. Machinery J 

9. Electrical industries 958,995 1.46 1,070,744 1.56 

10. Stone and earthenware industries 

(bricks, earthenware and pottery) 2,835,517 4.31 3.233,271 4.72 

11. Glass industry 482,589 .7^ 521,098 .76 

12. Chemical industry 1,979-358 3.01 2,022,015 2.95 

13. Gas-works 2,141,370 3.26 2,274,514 3.32 

14. Textile clothing and cleaning indus- 

tries 2,012,116 3.06 2,000,325 2.92 

15. The paper industry and polygraphic 

business 684,130 1.04 901,499 1.32 

16. Leather, rubber, etc., industries.... 242,814 .37 249,456 .36 

17. The wood industry and carved work 97.395 .15 91,548 .13 

18. Beet-sugar industry, sugar refineries 

and the making of syrup 405,091 .61 375, 911 .55 

19. Brewing and distilling 701,697 1.07 734,690 1.07 

20. Industries producing other foodstuffs 654,629 1,00 646,512 .94 

2 1 . Works pruducing materials for water- 

supplies, baths and wash-houses . . 307,166 .47 319,748 .47 

22. Commercial and domestic heating.. 8,693,514 13.22 8,789,934 12.83 
2^. Railway and tramway construction 

and working 6,996,767 10.64 7,926,096 11.57 

24. Inland navigation, coasting traffic, 

deep-sea fisheries, harbour and 

pilotage services 2,772,867 4.21 2,924,345 4.27 

25. Navy 579,863 .88 718,609 1.05 

Totals 65,783,280 100 68,526,115 100 

* Circulaive du Comite des Houilleres, No. 4,644, January 21st, 191 3. 

142 



CHAPTER VIII 
ANGLO-GERMAN TRADE 

The syndicates are the great export-machines — British and German trade from 
1904 to 191 3 — Anglo-German trade — The German figures — The difference 
between f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices — The British figures — The discrepancies — 
German exports always higher — Special lines of trading — Class I., food- 
stuffs — Class II., raw materials — Class III., manufactured articles — 
Class IV., miscellaneous — Totals — British re-exports — British exports 
into Germany and the German tariff. 

HERR FRITZ DIEPENHORS remarked in a recent article,* 
in which he lauded Germany's economic superiority over 
Great Britain : 

" Germany's conquest of foreign markets must certainly be ascribed mainly 
to the syndicates. It is due to open or secret export bounties that the members 
of the syndicates were able, especially in periods of depression, to maintain 
themselves as serious competitors in foreign markets. With that assistance 
prices are kept at a level which barely covers the lowest cost of production." 

He correctly states the conditions precedent to the establishment 
of syndicates, " a rigidly protectionist system as regards customs and 
tariffs, low freights and the existence of products of the soil in which 
a monopoly may be established." 

" The Englishman, who regards Free Trade as a sine qua non, is compelled 
to resist to the best of his ability all such attempts at combination as are per- 
mitted in Germany. The syndicate imposes on its members a certain renun- 
ciation of independence, a thing contrary to English tradition. He (the English- 
man) refuses to submit to the subordination of individuality which follows 
monopolistic organization, forgetting that such an organization is only an 
abstraction for capitalistic organizations." 

So the English, with their Free-Trade system, are shut out from 
the blessings of a regime of syndicates, a grave cause of weakness to 
them, in Herr Diepenhors' view. He goes on to make an enthusiastic 
comparison between the economic development of Germany and that 

* La Concurrence Anglo- Allemande {Revue Economique Internationale, May 
15th, 1914). 

143 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

of Great Britain, in which the superiority of the former is clearly 
demonstrated. 

The following tables show the movements of British and German 
trade from 1904 : 

British Trade. 
Imports* retained in the Exports. Total. 

United Kingdom. 

(Million £.) 

1904 480.7 300.7 781.4 

1912 632.9 487.2 1,120.1 

1913 659.1 525.2 1,184.3 

Between 1904 and 1913 the increase was actually £403,000,000, 
or 51.8 per cent. 

German Trade. 
Imports. Exports. Total. 

(Million marks.) 

1904 6,821 5,315 12,136 

I9 J 2 10,691 8,956 19,647 

1913 10,770 10,098 20,868 

Between 1904 and 191 3 the increase of German trade was 
£428,000,000 (8,700,000,000 marks), or 69 per cent. Thus British 
trade still stands at a higher figure, but the difference is not great, 
particularly in 191 3. 

We will now examine the figures for trade between the United 
Kingdom and Germany. 

Below are the figures from the German customs returns : 

Imports from the Exports to the 

United Kingdom. United Kingdom. 

In million marks. 

1901 552.7 906.7 

1902 557-3 958.2 

1903 594 982.2 

1910 766.6 1,102 

1911 808.8 1,139-7 

1912 842.6 1,161.1 

1913 876.1 1,438.2 

British exports into Germany have thus increased by 54 per cent, 
between 1901 and 1912, and in 191 3 the advance was 58 per cent. 
In the first period German exports to the United Kingdom 
increased by 28 per cent., but in 191 3 the advance was 58 per cent. 
Up to 191 2, therefore, as these German figures show, the increase of 

* Less re-exports. 
144 



Anglo-German Trade 

German exports to the United Kingdom was much less than that 
of British exports to Germany. 

The export figures are calculated at f.o.b. prices — that is to say, 
" free on board," while the import figures are calculated at c.i.f. 
prices — i.e., " cost, insurance, freight." 

Consequently, the German customs authorities arrive at a figure 
for exports to Great Britain lower than that estimated by the British 
customs themselves and, conversely, a higher figure for imports 
from Great Britain. I now give a table from the British customs 
returns. It covers imports retained for consumption in the United 

Kingdom : 

German exports to the British exports 

United Kingdom. to Germany. 

1901 £32,207,000 £23,573,000 

1902 £33.633,000 £22,850,000 

1903 • • • ^34-533.000 £23,550,000 

1910 £58,105,000 £37,020,000 

1911 £61,277,000 £39,283,000 

1912 £65,841,000 £40,362,000 

1913 £76,183,000 £40,677,000 

According to these figures German exports to England have 
advanced, as compared with 1901, by 105 per cent, in 1912 and 137 
per cent, in 191 3. British exports to Germany have advanced, in 
1912 by 70 per cent, and in 1913 by 72 per cent. The discrepancies, 
which are obvious, are due to (1) the difference between f.o.b. prices 
and c.i.f. prices ; (2) the carelessness displayed by the customs 
officials in calculating the value of goods leaving the country. One 
fact, however, is clear. In 1901 and 1902, as in 191 2 and 191 3, 
Germany sold more to England than she bought from England. 

On an analysis of German exports to the United Kingdom and 
British exports to Germany, based on the British figures, we find 
the following results for the years 1909-19 13 : 

Class I. — Articles of food and drink, and tobacco. 

Imports from Retained for home Exports to 

Germany. consumption. Germany. 

(Million £.) (Million £.) 

Total. 

1909 l 3 l2 -9 2 -9 

1910 11 .7 11 .6 3 

1911 13-2 13 3-9 

1912 11 10.9 4 

1913 l6 -4 J 6.3 4 

145 10 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Of these figures, in 1913 £102,000 represented tobacco. Refined 
sugar accounted for £6,161,000 and unrefined sugar for £4,733,000, 
or a total of £10,894,000, equivalent to 66 per cent, of the total. 

In the figure of British exports herrings accounted for £2,818,000, 
or 70 per cent, of the total. 

Class II. — Rcnv materials. 

(Million £.) 

1909 4.8 4.6 6.6 

1910 5.9 5-8 7 

1911 5.1 4.9 6.8 

1912 6 .6 6.3 7.2 

1913 7.1 6.8 8.4 

Of the £8,400,000 exports into Germany, £5,346,000, or 63 per cent., 
represented coal. English coal has even made its way to Frankfort, 
to fight the Syndicate on its own ground. 

Class III. — Manufactured articles. 

(Million £.) 

1909 39-4 36.5 21.9 

1910 43.6 40.1 26 

191 1 46.4 42.6 27.6 

1912 51 .7 56.1 28 

1913 56.1 52.3 27 

The imports from Germany are very miscellaneous. Chemical 
products of all kinds account for a smaller proportion than might 
be expected. In 191 3 they were valued at £1,135,000, of which 
£1,098,000 worth were retained for consumption in the British Isles. 
To this must be added £156,700 for saltpetre, £441,400 for potash, and 
£102,000 for soda. 

The dyes extracted from coal which Germany sent to England in 
191 3 were valued at £1,730, 00, of which £1,717,000 worth was for 
British consumption. Electrical machinery and parts accounted 
for £721^000, £699,000 being the value of that retained for home 
consumption. £1,546,000 represented machinery of all kinds, of 
which machinery to the value of £1,468,000 remained in the country. 

The outstanding German export was steel : ingots, billets, tinplates. 
For this heading the figure is £3,055,000, all consumed at home. 
Iron and steel of other kinds, £4,177,000 ; retained for home consump- 
tion, £4, 1 36,000. Of musical instruments, pianos account for £700,000, 

146 



Anglo-German Trade 

£671,000 retained. Other instruments £45,600, £40,000 retained. 
Parts £156,000, £144,000 retained. Total, £901,600. 

Silk and silk-wares account for £1,758,000, of which £1,665,000 
represents the amount retained. Ribbons £493,000, £455,000 
retained. 

In spite of the tariff, the British exported to Germany in 1913 
cotton thread to the value of £5,141,000, cotton stuffs to the value 
of £1,800,000, and other kinds of cotton goods to the value of 
£633,000. 

British exports to Germany of combed wool, woollens, cloth, etc., 
amounted to £8,147,000. 

Class IV. — Miscellaneous. 

Postal packages and other articles. 

1909 £521,000 £518,000 £794.500 

1910 £560,000 £556,000 £945.300 

1911 £567.500 £565,000 £958,300 

1912 £694,100 £692,000 £1,059,700 

1913 £700,500 £699,000 £1,255,900 

General Total. 
(In million £.) 

1909 57.8 54.6 32.2 

1910 61 .8 58.1 37 

1911 65.3 61.2 39.3 

1912 70 65.8 40.4 

1913 80.4 76.2 40.7 

England continues to send Germany goods she gets from abroad 
or her colonies 

Foodstuffs. Raw materials. Manufactured Total General 

articles. including total, 
miscellaneous 
articles. 
(In million £.) 

1909 1.8 10.7 2.3 14.9 47.2 

1910 1.8 13 3 17-9 54-9 

19" : -9 13 3-i J 8.i 57-4 

1912 2.2 14 2.9 19.2 59.6 

1913 2 -5 H. 1 3-2 19-8 60.5 

Among the exports of raw materials for 191 3 appears the figure 
of £4,100,000 for wool, some of which came from Australia and New 
Zealand. This is a great source of annoyance to Germany. 

147 10* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The Germans show typical ingratitude when they complain of 
their commercial relations with the United Kingdom, which is amongst 
their best customers and sources of supply. 

A Diplomatic and Consular Report gives an analysis of British 
exports to Germany. The German customs tariff is divided into 946 
groups, subdivided into 2,009 headings. In 191 2 British exports 
into Germany to the value of £41,300,000 fell under 1,400 headings. 
The British Report* classifies the German tariff in four categories : 

" (1) Under customs rates which have not been altered by any 
bargaining by third parties (autonomous rates) ; (2) or under customs 
rates reduced as the result of commercial treaties with third parties 
(treaty rates). If they are imported free of duty, the immunity may 
(3) be due to the fact that the autonomous tariff provides no customs 
duties ; (4) or due to the fact that whatever duty rates had existed 
were abolished as the result of negotiations with third parties. 

" Both (1) and (3) represent autonomous rates ; both (2) and (4) 
represent treaty rates." 

If the value of British exports into Germany in 191 2 be distributed 
among these four categories, we find : 

Groups. Articles. Value. Per cent. 

of total value. 
(Millions of marks.) 

1 680 324 38.43 

II 370 155 18.39 

III. 290 344 40.81 

IV 60 20 2.37 

Total 1,400 843 100 

It therefore appears that British exports in groups (1) and (3) 
represent £32,700,000, or 79.24 per cent. ; those in groups (2) and (4) 
represent £8,600,000, or 20.76 per cent. Therefore four-fifths of 
British exports to Germany come under the autonomous rates ; 
40.8 per cent, enter free in the third group, which declares certain 
articles enumerated therein duty-free, namely, cotton, wool, coal, 
oil-cake, bran, old paper, crude metals and ships. 

The 680 articles in the first group, representing a value of £16,000,000, 
or 38.43 per cent, of the total, pay duty. But what duty ? The 
duty which Germany has thought sufficient to protect herself : 

* Annual Series : Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No. 5,404, 1914, 
Germany. 

148 



Anglo-German Trade 

autonomous duties. How can Germany, then, complain that Great 
Britain compelled her to lower her tariffs, when she imposed these 
tariffs to suit her own convenience and not as the result of a bargain ? 

It is plain that Anglo-German trade rivalry has not been due to 
any reduction of tariffs extorted from Germany since she has made 
no such reductions even to third parties. She has fixed them at the 
figure that suited her. 

It is true that while Hamburg received from the Rhenish-West- 
phalian Syndicate 3,718,000 tons of coal, no less than 21,949,000 
tons were received from the United Kingdom. It is certainly a 
humiliation for the mines of the Ruhr, but in itself that is hardly a 
sufficient ground for national hatred against Great Britain. 



149 



CHAPTER IX 
MARITIME RIVALRY 

Palmerston and the German navy — Ships without ports — " Kolossal " — The 
great German steamship lines — The British and German fleets — Naval 
construction — The share of the German mercantile marine in maritime 
traffic — " Tramps " disregarded by the Germans — Prestige as a motive 
for maritime enterprise — Export bounties and subsidies — Charges against 
Great Britain — The German Empire and the " Freedom of the Seas." 

ALTHOUGH Germany cannot compete with Lancashire for her 
cotton-thread, or her spinning and weaving machinery, those 
industries are not responsible for the morbid jealousy which animates 
her statesmen and many of her industrials. The true cause is the 
British mercantile marine. 

They have never forgiven Palmerston for his remark in 1861 that 
the Germans could plough the soil, fly in the clouds and build 
castles in the air, but would never learn to venture on the seas. 

They repeat that sally so often and in such a way that we might 
almost think that they launched the hnperator and V aterlancl merely 
in reply to it. 

The hnperator is 689 feet long, has a beam of 98 feet and draws 
36 feet of water. Her tonnage is 55,000 and her horse-power 65,000. 
The Vaterland's dimensions are : Tonnage, 60,000 ; length over all, 
905 feet ; draught, 63 feet ; horse-power, 70,000. 

In their hurry to produce something really " Kolossal " to over- 
shadow the Olympic, the Germans built these ships before there 
were ports to receive them. The Elbe is not deep enough and the 
existing depth is sometimes affected to the extent of three feet by 
the wind. The Imperator was put into service before Cuxhaven'was 
ready for her, so that she had to moor outside. But the English had 
no ship as big and that was the main thing ! 

Germany has two steamship companies which have larger fleets 
than any other in the world. At the beginning of 19 13 the Hamburg- 
Amerika Line possessed tonnage to the figure of 1,307,000. The 

150 



Maritime Rivalry 

North German Lloyd had a fleet of 821,000 tons. Of the great English 
companies, the Ellerman Line had only 563,000 tons, the British India 
Steam Company 553,000, the Peninsular and Oriental 539,000. No 
other had as much as 500,000. True, there are more of them.* But 
how has Great Britain injured the German companies ? 

The rift in the lute was that in 191 3 Great Britain had a fleet of 
12,602 steamers representing 11,273,000 tons, and 8,336 sailing ships, 
with a tonnage of 846,000, a total of 20,938 vessels and 12,119,000 
tons. On January 1st, 1914, Germany had only 2,170 steamers, 
with a tonnage of 2,832,000, and, sailing ships included, 4,935 vessels, 
with a total tonnage of 3,320,000. 

According to Lloyd's the world's shipbuilding for 19 14 amounted 
to 2,852,000 tons, or only 48,000 tons less than in 1913. Of that 
figure the share of the United Kingdom was 59 per cent., of which 
a tonnage of 1,288,600 was kept. If only ships of more than 3,000 
tons are reckoned the share of the United Kingdom was 64 per cent. 
Before the commencement of hostilities Germany had launched 
387,200 tons, or 78,000 tons less than in 1913. 

The Germans, however, have encouraged shipbuilding by remitting 
all duties on the materials employed in that industry. 

As regards the movements of traffic in German ports, foreign 
shipping represents 62,265,000 tons and German shipping 29,000,000. 
In view of the fact that many German lines are subsidized, that foreign 
preponderance of 45 per cent, proves that German shipping does not 
meet the transport necessities of the country. This it is which 
Germans cannot forgive Great Britain. 

The Germans care little about " tramps." These wayward vessels 
which pass from one port to another, calling wherever there is a cargo 
to be picked up, are a shock to their maritime notions. In Great 
Britain, on the other hand, they form 60 per cent, of the mercantile 
marine. In 1909, it appeared from inquiries made by The Economist, 
that out of the 160 shipping companies interrogated, 73 possessed 
tramps only, of a tonnage of 2,500,000, and small private shipowners 
had tramps to the tonnage of 2,700,000. 

The Germans prefer to concentrate on their great lines. 
There is much that is purely artificial about their maritime activity. 
Their direct service between Hamburg and the Persian Gulf corresponds 
to no commercial necessity. Its aim is a political one. 

* Georges Michon : Les Grandes Compagnies Auglaises de Navigation, 191 3 
(published by A. Rousseau). 

151 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Many of the lines to Chile, Colombia, the Republic of San Domingo, 
Siam, Morocco, the Philippines, Venezuela, Bolivia and Uruguay 
have been established mainly to display the German flag. The 
German object is prestige. Unfortunately prestige is expensive and 
cannot be turned to profit. 

All consignments of less than 5,000 kilos and most consignments 
above are sent to the ports at special export rates. In 1900, for the 
Levant and East Africa the rates were fixed from every German town 
to the place of destination. These rates were at once export bounties 
and subsidies to the lines employed in the carriage of the goods. 
Every bill of lading contains a clause nullifying any special 
contract. 

In spite of such efforts Great Britain retains her superiority. But 
in what way does she injure German shipping ? When German ships 
enter British ports they receive the same treatment as British ships. 
What have they to complain of ? 

A jealous person never needs real reasons for inflaming his passion. 
He resorts to the fanciful. Such persons are the Germans. They 
allege that Great Britain can close the Channel to them and so they 
have been anxious to seize Calais. Then they say that Great Britain 
has made the seas her preserve, but they cannot produce a scrap of 
evidence to show that she has hindered the development of their own 
shipping in any way whatever. That development is itself an 
unanswerable refutation of the charge. Besides, one of their proudest 
boasts is that they have torn down Great Britain from her pre- 
eminent position because the expansion of their own shipping has been 
more rapid than hers. Looking at percentages, they are doubtless 
right. But, if so, why the Navy League and its inflammatory propa- 
ganda against Great Britain ? " In the name of the Freedom of the 
Seas ! " reply the professors, performing, as in the days of Frederick II., 
their function of justifying the actions of their rulers. 

Has British naval supremacy impeded the growth of Norwegian 
shipping ? Do the Dutch fear that it will cut them off from their 
colonies in the East Indies ? 

The day on which maritime supremacy passes to Germany will 
see the end of Holland as an independent country, and Norwegian 
shipping will feel itself no longer safe. 

The German Empire cares no more for the " freedom of the seas " 
than for the freedom of the land. Her policy aims at world power, 
and as it is unrealizable so long as Great Britain bestows on her fleet 

152 



Maritime Rivalry 

the attention it deserves, the Germans have concentrated against 
her all their ruinous and futile efforts. 

The war broke out and Grand Admiral von Tirpitz has not dared 
to bring out his Dreadnoughts from their shelters behind Heligoland 
or in the Kiel Canal. His famous raid, to avenge the failure of 
Zeppelin attacks on open towns was not a success, and he is now 
driven to submarine attacks on merchant vessels. 

On February 4th, 191 5, Von Pohl, the Naval Chief of Staff, issued 
a notice to neutrals announcing that from February 18th the German 
Navy would destroy all hostile merchant ships. Why that date ? 
The new procedure had already been employed when German sub- 
marines were sent to torpedo ships off Havre and in St. George's 
Channel. The Germans had not hesitated to torpedo the Amiral 
Ganteaume, a vessel belonging to the Chargeurs Reunis, which was 
transporting Belgian refugees from Calais to Havre. They had also 
attempted to torpedo in the Channel a hospital ship, the Asturias. 
The new departure was the threat to sink neutral ships which might 
be found in the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, the 
Channel included. It was a logical extension of German methods of 
warfare, which already included bomb-dropping from aircraft, incen- 
diarism, and the wholesale shooting of old men, women and children. 
It can only be described as an exhibition of impotent rage. 

The Kaiser does not " grasp the trident " and Germany's future 
does not " lie on the water." 



*53 



CHAPTER X 
FRANCO-GERMAN TRADE 

Article ii of the Treaty of Frankfort — The trade of France with her chief 
customers and sources of supply — French and German statistics — The 
chief imports of France — Coal, machinery, grain — French exports of raw 
materials — Foodstuffs and chemical products — The skin and fur trade — 
Seed for sowing — The textile industries — Jewellery — Toys — Motor-cars — 
Interruption of the normal expansion of Franco-German trade. 

ARTICLE 1 1 of the Treaty of Frankfort bound " France and 
Germany to the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing 
of the most-favoured nation." The article limited this condition 
to six nations, England, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Austria and 
Russia. Germany has extended the most-favoured-nation clause to 
more than forty nations, including the Republic of San Marino and 
the Hawaiian Islands. 

French protectionists were extremely indignant over these exten- 
sions, but I confess I have never been able to understand their 
attitude. 

I will now take the figures of French trade for four years with the 
principal nations which supply and take her products, and endeavour 
to show Germany's share of the total. I am selecting the year 1903, , 
because it is ten years before 191 2, 1913 because the statistics for 
that year have just been published, and 1907 because there were 
some exceptional features in that year. 

First I give a table showing French imports from her principal 
sources of supply : 

1903. 1907. 1912. 1913. 

The United Kingdom ... .£22,000,000 £35,000,000 £41,500,000 £43,900,000 

Germany £17,600,000 £25,200,000 £39,560,000 £42,400,000 

The United States £21,400,000 £26,600,000 £35,200,000 £35,400,000 

Belgium £12,900,000 £16,900,000 £21,400,000 £22,000,000 

Russia £11,900,000 £10,700,000 £17,100,000 £18,140,000 

The British Indies £9,700,000 £14,250,000 £14,100,000 £15,370,000 

154 



v Franco-German Trade 

At the same periods French exports to her principal customers 
were : 

1903. 1907. 1912. 1913. 

The United Kingdom ....£47,210,000 £54,260,000 £54,040,000 £56,740,000 

Belgium £25,000,000 £34,100,000 £45,220,000 £43,920,000 

Germany £20,320,000 £25,700,000 £32,580,000 £34,340,000 

The United States £10,060,000 £15,700,000 £17,140,000 £16,760,000 

Switzerland £9,540,000 £13,980,000 £16,140,000 £16,080,000 

Italy £6,900,000 £13,980,000 £11,980,000 £12,120,000 



Thus French imports from Germany have increased by 140 per cent., 
while French exports to Germany have increased by 68 per cent. 
But British exports to France have advanced 99 per cent., while 
French exports to the United Kingdom have only advanced 14 
per cent. 

If we compare the figures of the French Customs with the figures 
of the German Customs, we arrive at the following figures for Franco- 
German trade at the four dates selected : 



1903. 1907. 1912. 1913 

(Million marks.) 

Imports from France . . 306.2 453-6 55^.2 584 

Exports into France . . 253.2 449-1 689.4 790 



According to these German figures, French exports to Germany 
between 1903 and 191 3 advanced 90 per cent, instead of 60 per cent., 
and French imports from Germany 212 per cent. If we convert the 
marks into francs (1 mark=i franc 23 centimes) we find that the 
figure for German exports to France reached 847 million francs in 
1912 and 972 million francs in 191 3. 

I have already given the two reasons why the figures of the 
importing country are always higher than the figures of the exporting 
country : (1) Exports do not interest the customs authorities, who 
are mainly concerned as revenue officials and do not search the 
luggage of the traveller on his departure ; (2) The customs authorities 
accept the value declared without verifying it, and this declared 
value is the price /.<?.£., while the value of imports is the 
price c.i.f. 

What classes of imports have contributed most to the increase 

155 



1907. lgn. 


1912. 


I9I3- 


(Million francs.) 






67.2 61.7 


60.5 


57-7 


32.7 57 


59-7 


51.6 


10.2 13 . 1 


13.5 


15 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

shown in these figures ? According to the French customs 

returns : 

1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
(Million francs.) 

Coal 40.2 83.9 1 1 8. 3 1 50 .3 165 

Machinery and parts 32.9 76.7 ^3 l -9 J 3 2 -9 132 

Cereals (grain and flour) ..2 — 52.1 25.7 87 

Between 1903 and 191 3 the increase in the imports of coal, 
machinery and cereals amounted to 311 million francs (£12,320,000), 
out of a total increase of 625 millions (£24,750,000), or 49 per cent. 

Of these three headings of imports two were destined for industrial 
uses and the third for food. 

France has sent the following raw materials to Germany : 

1903. 

Wool and woollen waste . . . .65 .6 
Cotton and cotton waste . . ..23.5 
Copper 4.4 

As regards raw material, if Germany in 191 3 sent France six million 
tons of coal to the value of £6,540,000, France sent Germany in the 
same period four million tons of ores, the value of which, however, 
was only £1,350,000. 

Except in the case of ores, most of the raw material exported from 
France comes originally from other countries. These exports are due 
to arbitrage between different prices. They may represent the 
realization of stocks, or perhaps sales at a profit ; but, whatever they 
are, the steady rise of the figures under this head shows that the 
French exporters find the trade profitable. 

French imports of foodstuffs are concerned mainly with corn and 
potatoes, destined for animal as well as human consumption. French 
exports of foodstuffs are quite different, being articles of diet which 
are not indispensable, but the taste for which has grown with the 
increasing wealth of Germany. 

1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 

(Million francs.) 

Table fruits 3.5 10.4 20.9 15 21 

Wines 24.9 29.5 20,5 33.2 19. 1 

Detailed analysis of Franco-German trade returns reveal many 

156 



Franco- German Trade 

cases in which articles belonging to the same industrial categories 
appear both as exports and imports. 

The chemical industry is the most prosperous in Germany which 
sends France her chemical products but at the same time receives 
chemical products from France. 

Chemical Products. 
French imports from French exports into 
Germany. Germany. 

(Million francs.) 

1903 24.3 10 

1907 34-7 11. 7 

1911 53.5 3i-7 

1912 61 .2 35 

1913 86.7 39.9 

Thus from 1903 to 191 3 the increase for Germany has been 260 per 
cent, and for France 300 per cent. In spite of their potash mines and 
their wonderful chemical works, Germany has no monopoly of chemical 
products, since she imports some from France. It will be seen that 
of the total quantity of chemical products passing between France 
and Germany in 191 3, France sold Germany 31 per cent, and Germany 
sold France 69 per cent. 

Germany sends France prepared dyes to the value of 6,300,000 
francs. The value of the French export of dyes to Germany is 
1,600,000 francs. 

The next table shows the movements of the skin and fur trade : 



Undressed skins 
and furs. 



Imports. Exports. 

1903 14.2 46.8 

1907 12.4 43-4 

1912 21.5 60.4 

1913 2 3.6 75-5 



Dressed skins. 

Imports. Exports. 
(Million francs.) 
13.2 11. 3 

13.4 11. 3 

21.4 22.5 

20 22 



Skins and furs pre- 
pared and worked up 
into finished goods. 



10.4 

15-5 

46.5 
45-6 



Imports. Exports. 



5-5 
12.5 

32.5 
32.4 



Seeds for sowing are a national product. Of course the French are 
always being told of Germany's superior methods of agriculture. 
The beet growers have said that they could not do without German 
beet seeds even in war time. Nevertheless, the German demand for 

T-57 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

French seeds is even greater, as they pay more for them than the 
French do for German seeds. 

1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
(Million francs.) 

French imports from Germany 2.4 4.9 j .7 7 7.6 

French exports into Germany .. 1 1 .5 9.4 22.9 13.3 17 

The imports of certain classes of manufactured goods show no 
advance, or a very slight one. Textile wares for example : 

1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 191 3. 
(Million francs.) 

Thread 4.2 3.6 5 4.8 4.2 

Linen, hempen goods 9 1.5 2.3 2.2 2.3 

Cotton goods 20.5 31. 1 28.1 28.2 26.2 

Woollens 12.5 11. 6 8.6 8.8 8.8 

Silk and floss silk 13.8 16.9 12.6 13.4 12.8 

Thus the imports of German textile products have remained 
stationary. 

The next table shows French exports to Germany : 

1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 

Thread 10. 1 

Cotton goods 5.2 

Woollens 8.2 

Silk and floss silk 19.2 

During the three years 1911-1913 the average annual value of the 
French import of thread was £178,000, and that of the export, £752,000. 
The Germans send France more cottons and woollens than they 
receive from her. 

At first sight the figures relating to silk seem to show that the 
average annual value of the French import of German silk in the 
years 1911-1913 was £534,000, while that of the French export was 
only £396,000. But to this last figure must be added the value of 
silk goods sent by post : 





(Million francs. 


) 




22.9 


17 


18.5 


23.6 


12 .7 


9.8 


12.3 


10.5 


6.1 


5-3 


5.6 


7.2 


9.7 


10.6 


10 


9.8 



1903. 


1907. 


1911. 1912. 
(Million francs.) 


1913. 


18.4 


19. 1 


21. 1 22.8 


23.8 


(£729,000) 


(£757,000) 


(^835,500) (£903,000) 
158 


(£942,500) 



Franco-German Traoe 

If we take the average of the three last years, while Germany sold 
France annually silks to the value of £515,000, France sold Germany 
£1,310,000 worth ; that is, 154 per cent. more. 

In certain categories the movements of exports and imports can 
be appreciated at a glance : 

1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
(Million francs.) 
Imitation jewellery imported from 

Germany 3.2 6.2 36.5 39.5 7,7-7 

Gold and silver wares and jewellery 

exported by France 5.6 7.4 8.8 9.3 -j ,.\ 

Toys, fans and trinkets are exchanged, but^itjis plain that the 
articles which these terms connote are not the same in all cases : 

1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
(Million francs.) 

Imported from Germany .. 11. 7 12.2 15.7 18.3 19.7 

Exported into Germany 9.5 16.4 19.3 16 18.9 

To within the last two years French exports in these lines were 
larger than the German. 

The figures for carriage-work and motor-cars are as follows : 

1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 191 7 . 
(Million francs.) 

Imported from Germany 3 10.2 5.8 4 7 

Exported into Germany 6.5 14.5 14.4 16.9 22 

The French supremacy is unquestionable. 

Only in the categories of earthenware, glass and glassware is there 
an increase of imports without reciprocity : 

1903. 1907. 1911. 1912. 1913. 
(Million francs.) 

Imported from Germany 17.4 29.4 42.1 44.5 37-4 

Exported into Germany 3.4 4.2 4.6 5 4.8 

A detailed analysis of Franco-German exports and imports reveals 
one striking fact. 

In 191 3 Germany exported to France : 

Among foodstuffs, cereals 87 million francs. 

Among raw materials, coal 165 ,, 

Among manufactured articles, machinery and parts 132 ,, ,, 

159 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

If the 165 million francs for coal be deducted from the total value 
of the German exports to France, the figure remaining is 904 million 
francs (£35,800,000). The difference in value between the German 
imports to France and the French exports to Germany is thus 
reduced to 37 million francs (£1,4.65,000). 

The French imports from Germany of corn and flour can only be 
explained on the assumption that France needed them, and the 
French corn-growers cannot complain that this import has ruined 
prices because prices have been very high. 

The other great import has been that of machinery and parts. 
Who bought these ? Plainly the French manufacturers who needed 
them for their business. This machinery has therefore contributed 
to the economic development of France. 

France has no corn to send to Germany. Nor has she any coal. 
After all, even if France imports machinery of German manufacture 
there is a demand for French machinery in Germany, as is proved 
by the eight or nine million francs' worth which the Germans buy 
annually. 

The richer Germany became, the better customer she was for 
France, in spite of the tariff. Similarly France's custom was growing 
ever more valuable to Germany. In plain fact the two countries 
were excellent customers for each other, and had there been no such 
phenomenon as " economic imperialism " to interrupt the course 
of their commercial relations, their trade must have expanded 
normally, to their mutual great advantage. 



160 



CHAPTER XI 
HOSTILE ECONOMIC PRACTICES 

What is a commercially " closed " State — Fichte, Oldenburg and Wagner — 
The Chancellor's protectionist views — Their effect on the elections — The 
1909 tariff — Additions to the number of articles — Article 103 — Discrimina- 
tion — No exchange of cattle between France and Germany — Threats and 
recriminations — Article 15 of the Law of 1892 — Germany's reply — 
Sparkling wines and brandies — Analyses — The Comity du Commerce 
Fran^ais avec V Allemagne — German railway rates — Export fever in Ger- 
many — The Press agitation of 19 13 — Commercial jealousy, economic 
ignorance, hypocritical and unfair practices. 

TRADE between France and Germany has increased steadily, 
in spite of the Protectionists in the two countries who have 
done their best to drive them into economic war. 

The idea of a commercially " closed " State, a Geschlossener 
Handelsstaat, must be ascribed to Fichte. In 1897 it was revived 
by Oldenburg and received the support of the celebrated Professor 
Adolph Wagner, who desired Germany to be self-supporting. Dietzel 
answered him with Free Trade arguments. Oldenburg cried out in 
terror : " If the corn-producing countries, such as the United States 
and Russia, become industrialized, they will no longer take our 
manufactures and we shall then die of hunger." 

Adolph Wagner, in a book called Germany, an Industrial and 
Agricultural State, says : 

" We must seek to retard the large increase of our population."* 

The duties on corn were raised. It might have been hoped that 
dearer food would produce the result desired by Adolph Wagner. 
It produced no such result. The population continued to increase, 
and if the rate of increase has slackened considerably of late years, 
the change has been most noticeable in the wealthiest parts of 
Germany. 

* Discussion du Huitieme Congres £vangelique, 1897.- 

l6l II 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The theoretical question has been abandoned by the two great 
Protectionist groups in Germany,* the landowners and farmers on 
one side and the big manufacturers on the other. Although the manu- 
facturers are National Liberals and politically hostile to the Agrarians, 
they are all in agreement as to the necessity of maintaining the pro- 
tectionist system. However, their interests are not identical. The 
Catholic Centre looks for support both to the working classes and 
the landed proprietors of the Rhine Province. In Silesia the great 
landed proprietors have also large mining interests and wield immense 
influence. 

In September, 191 1, the Prussian railways reduced by one-half 
their rates for the carriage of feeding stuffs for cattle. The potato 
harvest was so poor that the Prussian Government permitted the 
substitution of maize in the distillation of spirits. 

Various Chambers of Commerce and other bodies demanded the 
temporary abolition of the duties on maize (which stood at three 
marks a quintal) and also on the poorer qualities of barley, as well 
as the suspension of all restrictions on the import of meat and 
cattle. 

To this demand the Chancellor replied in the Reichstag that any 
abolition or reduction of duties would injure the agricultural interest. 
Temporary abolition would be all the more dangerous, as it might 
end by becoming final. 

However, the orators of the Centre and the National Liberals, 
while professing their adherence to a protectionist policy, demanded 
the reduction or temporary suspension of the duties on maize and 
barley, the admission of frozen meat from the Argentine Republic, 
and revision of the system of import certificates for corn. The 
Chancellor showed himself more protectionist than the Protectionists. 
The Deutsche Export Revue, the organ of the Bund des Industriellen, 
declared that his attitude would cause deep dissatisfaction in com- 
mercial and industrial circles. 

It is certainly probable that the Chancellor's attitude had some- 
thing to do with the success of a hundred and ten Socialists in the 
elections of 1912. 

The German tariff of 1909 covered no less than 941 articles. The 

Prussian bureaucracy which drew it up wanted to evade some of 

the effects of the most-favoured-nation clause. They went to work by 

increasing the number of the headings of the tariff in such a way 

* Luigi Brentano : The Free Trade Congress at Antwerp (1910). 

162 



Hostile Economic Practices 

that certain French specialities exported into Germany were not 
included in the commercial treaties which had been concluded. 

French Protectionists waxed extremely wrath over Article 103, 
dealing with cattle with heavy bay or brown markings, pasturing 
normally 300 metres (984 feet) above sea-level, but spending one 
month of the year in pastures at an altitude of 800 metres (2,600 feet). 
Whatever the origin, cattle for fattening paid the same duty of 9 
marks per 100 kilos (220 lbs.), while other cattle paid the full duty 
of 20 marks. 

It is plain that this distinction had been made to favour a certain 
Swiss breed, perhaps with the object of introducing the species into 
Germany. In any case, French, Austrian, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, 
Danish and other cattle, not answering to these descriptions, could 
not take advantage of the reduced duty. 

It was a case of discrimination. From the French point of view, 
what was the result ? Was France so rich in flocks and herds that 
she might have invaded Germany with them ? 

Was it possible to reply to this discrimination by putting duties 
on cattle of German origin ? Germany does not export cattle. 
Could France retaliate on German coal, raw material ? The metallur- 
gists, strongly protectionist, would have objected. In the French 
tariff of 1910 the duties on machinery and parts were raised, but this 
affected the imports of that class from England and Belgium as well 
as from Germany. The increase might profit some of the manu- 
facturers, but it hit all who needed machinery. 

These cases of discrimination made an excellent springboard for 
M. Klotz, about to start on his campaign which led to the revision 
of 19 10. Both he and his friends kept repeating that twelve per cent, 
of French exports had been harmfully affected by German discrimina- 
tion and that only six per cent, had benefited. 

In any case, the expansion of Franco-German trade was not 
arrested, and, in fact, the exports of France exceeded her imports. 

M. Klotz made inflammatory speeches which seemed directed 
towards Germany ; but at the same time he said : 

" The object of the revision is not a systematic raising of our minimum tariff, 
but a systematic raising of our general tariff." 

In his speeches M. Klotz indicated Germany and her discrimination. 
But in virtue of Article 1 1 of the Treaty of Frankfort, France could 
not apply her general tariff to Germany. 

163 11* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The Germans knew quite well what they were about, but mutual 
recriminations do not pave the way for good relations. However, 
Franco-German trade continued to increase. 

But the matter did not stop at words. Article 15 of the French 
Tariff Law of Jan. nth, 1892, ran as follows : 

" All foreign goods, whether in a natural state or manufactured, bearing 
either on themselves or on their packings, cases, wrappings or labels any manu- 
facturer's or trade mark, name, sign or legend of any kind, suggesting that 
they have been made in France or are of French origin, may not be imported, 
bonded, or carried by rail, and all trade in them is strictly prohibited. 

"This regulation also applies to manufactured or unmanufactured foreign 
goods coming from a district or locality with the same name as any French 
district or locality which do not bear, in addition to the name of the district 
or locality, the name of the country of origin and the word ' Imported ' in 
legible and distinct characters." 

The apparent object of this innovation was to prevent confusion 
between the foreign and French origin of any particular article. 
But of late the law has been applied in such a way that all imports 
from abroad into France must show a mark of origin. 

The new law compelled a German firm which had been selling 
optical instruments in France for more than sixty years to add to 
its trade-mark (" X. Jena ") the words " Imported from Germany." 
The customs authorities were kind enough to dispense with the 
redundant words.* 

However, we must not pass over in silence the rare example of 
moderation they displayed in not insisting that every piece of coal 
exported from England, Belgium and Germany into France should 
be stamped. 

As a reply to these hostile practices, it was suggested in Germany 
that Article 15 should be met by a regulation that not only all goods 
imported into Germany, but even goods in transit, should be 
stamped with the name of country of the origin, if necessary in 
indelible characters. 

When the Germans revised their tariff in 1910 the duties on spark- 
ling wines were raised from 130 marks to 180 marks, and on 
brandies from 300 to 350 marks. 

The German Customs regulations laid down that every consign- 
ment of wine should be analysed on entering the country at the 

* Maurice Ajam : Le Conftit Economique Franco- Allemand : Journal des 
Economistes, November, 191 3. 

164 



Hostile Economic Practices 

expense of the consignor. The French exporters made little objection 
so long as the German Customs officials contented themselves with 
one analysis per consignment. But on September 1st, 1910, the 
German authorities decided that only those wines could be con- 
sidered " homogeneous " which were of the same district, vintage and 
price. Therefore a separate analysis was necessary for each variety 
in a consignment 

The German law permits blending up to forty-nine per cent., but 
this admissible blending was hardly likely to improve the quality of 
French clarets. 

At the suggestion of M. Lucien Coquet a few years ago, a number 
of Frenchmen founded the " Comite du Commerce Francais avec 
FAllemagne." Its presidents have been M. Pierre Baudin, M. Rene 
Millet, and since June, 191 3, M. Maurice Ajam. It is known simply 
as the Comite Franco-AUemand. Its aim has been " to promote 
good trade relations between France and Germany." In the summer 
of 191 3 M. Maurice Ajam went to Germany to study the trade question, 
and on his return kindly published his conclusions in the Journal des 
Economistes for November, 1913, under the title, " Le Conflit 
Economique Franco-Allemand." He also published further details 
of his investigation in a book called Le Probleme Economique Franco- 
AllemandT* 

The majority of the members of this society were French and 
German exporters. I can speak freely on this topic, because, although 
I was invited, I never joined this body. The Protectionists who 
always want to sell without buying can hardly find fault with those 
Frenchmen who try to win a larger market for French goods in Ger- 
many. But were not the Germans enjoying the French market ? 
The Protectionists have the same complaint to make as regards 
England and Belgium ; yet in spite of their efforts they have not yet 
found a means of preventing goods from being exchanged for other 
goods. 

Tariffs, however, are not the only weapon in their armoury. In 
Germany the Protectionists make use of the railway rates, scaled low 
for exports and high for imports. Thus the consumer is hit twice. 
The export of home products is facilitated and the price of foreign 
products is kept high. 

" Always sell and never buy " is the first commandment of Pro- 
tectionists in every country. The policy of the syndicates is only 
* Published by Perrin. 

165 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

a logical application of it. But those who are for ever seeking a 
" remedy for crises " want to go one better. 

In the second half of 19 13 there was marked industrial depression. 

The Press immediately found the remedy — exporting. In the 
name of Germany's economic mission in the world and in the name 
of Weltzvirtschaft, a chorus of obloquy was raised against Great Britain 
which had her colonies, and America which had a whole continent ; 
while Germany, the new-comer, had no commercial " preserves." 
Then followed exhortation to Germany to take her share of Africa 
and secure a monopoly in Asiatic Turkey, South America and China. 

" Within forty-eight hours of each other two scientific institutions 
were inaugurated early in 1 9 14, both specially devised to teach 
the science " (? or art) " of international trading, viz., the Institut 
fiir Seeverkehr unci Weltzvirtschaft, inaugurated at the University of 
Kiel, February 20th, 19 14, as a branch of the Kaiser Wilhelm Stiftung, 
serving scientific purposes, and the Weltzvirtschaftliche Ge sells ch aft, 
constituted at Berlin, February 22nd, composed of scientists and 
pursuing only theoretical ends (lectures and papers on the world's 
economic development)."* 

Commercial jealousy, economic ignorance, unfair and hypocritical 
practices — these have been in all countries the offspring of Protection. 

* Annual Series of Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No. 5,404, 1914, 
Germany. 



I6G 



CHAPTER XII 
THE OPEN DOOR 
The Open Door — The Journal de Geneve and Algeria — German trade in Algeria. 

IT is easy to understand the ill-feeling in France and Germany 
caused by the tariff war between the two countries, but Germany 
had certainly no ground for complaint with regard to Great Britain's 
treatment of her. 

At the end of 1903 Mr. Balfour had certainly talked of Retaliation, 
but he had seemed half-hearted. Mr. Chamberlain took up the 
question of " Tariff Reform," but could not convince the English of 
the desirability of a change. 

Germans are very envious of Great Britain's predominance in the 
carrying trade. 

In a series of articles on " Germany and England " in The Statist 
for 191 2 Sir George Paish put the following question : 

" When does the commerce of a nation become its commerce ? The world's 
wheat shipments are made in the vessel of any country available for the purpose 
at the moment. The vessel is the property of one person or of a group of persons 
of one nationality, and the cargo belongs to another or to several others of a 
different nationality. Not until the wheat is in the English Channel is it known 
whether or not the vessel will discharge its cargo in Liverpool, or in Hamburg, or 
in Rotterdam, or in Antwerp, or at a French port. And even when its destination is 
decided upon the wheat is still the property of those who caused the wheat to be 
shipped, who may be citizens of any country. A portion of the commodities 
needed by England is brought in foreign vessels ; a large portion of the commo- 
dities needed by Germany arrives in the vessels of other countries. Thus a vessel 
may be owned by one country, its cargo by another, and its underwriting be 
performed by a third. It is possible for a country to enjoy a great overseas 
commerce and to own neither ships nor goods at sea." 

But Germany wanted to be self-supporting, and could not forgive 
British ships for bringing her cheaper goods than she could produce 
herself. 

Lastly, Germany could not deny that Great Britain pursued the 

167 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

policy of the " Open Door." At the time of the Agadir crisis the 
Cologne Gazette said : 

" Experience shows that in Algeria, Tunis, Indo-China, Madagascar, and 
everywhere else, France has bolted and barred the door against the trade of 
all other nations." 

France certainly does not favour the " open door " system, and yet 
the logic of events has triumphed over the force of Protection. Here 
is a reply from the Journal de Geneve to this charge against France : 

" The numerous Swiss who have taken up their residence in Algeria and 
Tunis and gained — certainly many of them — positions of influence and import- 
ance, are unanimous in their opinion that French rule there means a warm 
welcome, tolerance and security for foreigners. Foreigners are treated exactly 
like Frenchmen. No obstacle is thrown in the way of their purchasing land. 
They may establish their businesses and engage in trade without let or hindrance. 
They are subject to no taxation from which Frenchmen are exempt. ' I have 
lived ten years in Tunis,' said a Swiss friend of ours the other day. ' I have 
worked and developed my property there without paying a sou towards the 
revenue.' 

" France has so effectively ' bolted and barred the door,' to use the language 
of the Kolnische, that while 105,000 Italians now reside in Tunis, there are only 
38,000 Frenchmen there. The Italians fare as well as if they were in Italy. 
They have their own schools, doctors, lawyers and clubs. Consequently they 
are now thoroughly reconciled to the French protectorate, and have forgotten 
their original suspicions and resentment. They are able to say that they could 
not have been given more scope if it had been their own country which had 
borne the burden, faced the dangers, and surmounted the difficulties of occupying 
Tunis and restoring order in that country. 

" In Algeria there are more than 400,000 Europeans, mainly Spanish and 
Italians, not to mention many Swiss. 
" What about trade ? 

" Let us take the Statistical Year Book of the German Empire for 1910. It 
shows that German exports to Algeria advanced from 500,000 marks in 1902 
to 3,600,000 marks in 19 10. Between 1901 and 19 10 they increased from 
600,000 marks to 1,300,000 in Tunis and from 2,400,000 marks to 4,500,000 
marks in West Africa. 

" The same Year Book, marking the expansion of the national trade in 
triumphant percentages, places the increase of German exports for eight years 
at 575 per cent, for Algeria, 127 per cent, for Tunis, 86 per cent, for West Africa, 
360 per cent, for French Indo-China, 183 per cent, for Guiana and Martinique 
and 253 per cent, for French possessions in Oceania." 

These figures demonstrate the absurdity and futility of the " closed 
door " policy. 

Germany's plan was to force open the doors of others with her 
cannon while she kept her own closed. 

168 



CHAPTER XIII 
COLONIAL AMBITIONS AND ILLUSIONS 

German Colonial Policy — " Land hunger " — Settlement colonies in Africa — 
Massacre of the natives — No outlets for the German population — Theories 
and facts — Kiao-Chau — German interests in Morocco — Navigation for 
prestige — Economic pretexts to cover political aims — " Extending the 
frontiers." 

GERMAN protectionists, like those of every other country, have 
two objects before them in addition to the restriction of trade 
between their own and other nations : 

(i) That Germany should be self-supporting. 

(2) That Germany should increase the outlets for her trade by 
acquiring consumers who would be her own property. 

The second object is the basis of her colonial policy which Bismarck 
could not resist, though his support was half-hearted. In 1884 he 
took over Angra Pequena from a Bremen merchant, Liideritz, who 
had obtained it from a Namaquois chief. 

Herr F. Koike, the editor of the Koloniale Zeitschrift, gives a table 
for 191 1 showing the following figures for German trade with English, 
French, Dutch and Belgian colonies. 

Imports into Germany. Exports from Germany. 
(Million francs.) 
i,342.5 352.5 

The idea of Germany's buying three times as much from the colonies 
of foreign Powers as she sold them enraged the pundits of National 
Economy. A greater spur to their indignation was the knowledge 
that out of 55,500,000 square miles, the area of the habitable globe, 
the English possessed 13,123,712, Russia 8,400,000, France 
4,330,000, while Germany had to rest content with only 
1,343,020. Hence the new passion which they denominate Landgier, 
" Land Hunger." Their cardinal dogma is that a great Power should 
possess, in every quarter of the globe, territories corresponding to 
its population and its capacity to expand. 

169 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

They meant their African colonies to be settlement colonies. Ger- 
man savants would not condescend to remember that white men hardly 
ever become acclimatized to countries in the Torrid Zone with 
25 isothermal degrees.* 

The Germans massacred the Herreros and other native peoples, 
and were then surprised to discover that black labour was indis- 
pensable to the development of their colonies. But if Doctor Dern- 
burg, the first Secretary for the Colonies, despised the blacks, he had 
not a much better opinion of whites. His ideal was a colony without 
inhabitants to be exploited by banks. Unfortunately even the banks 
had their doubts. His successor, Solf, reverted to the idea of settle- 
ment colonies, but Pomeranians and Mecklenburgers are afraid of fever 
and dysentery and display a marked preference for North America. 

In 191 3 there were 28,800 whites in the German colonies. As the 
excess of births over deaths in Germany is 800,000, it could not be 
said that the colonies provided an outlet for that over-population of 
the Mother Country which Herr Adolph Wagner and other professors 
feared so much. Indeed, of that 28,800, officials and missionaries 
accounted for 12,000. 

Herr Bonn, Professor of Munich University and Director of the 
Academy of Commerce, delivered in 191 1, on a special occasion, a 
lecture on German colonial policy with special reference to Africa. 
He drew a vivid contrast between theories and the facts. It had 
been said that the German colonies in Africa could supply all the 
cotton required for home consumption. Now in 1909-1910 that 
consumption was 1,664,000 bales ; that is, 377 million kilogrammes. 
To supply the home market it would have been necessary to cultivate 
two million hectares and dispose of the labour of two or three million 
people. Doctor Bonn estimated the number of blacks available 
at fourteen millions, counting men, women and children. 

In 19 1 2 the total trade of the German colonies was : 

Imports. Exports. Total. 

(Million francs.) 
322 251 573 

If Kiao-Chau be excluded 

143 101 244 

the figures are 

179 150 329 

Thus Kiao-Chau accounts for two-fifths of the total. 

* See Yves Guyot : Lettres sur la Politique Coloniale, pp« 47, 55. 

170 



Colonial Ambitions and Illusions 

For several years the Kaiser's ambitions were turned from Turkey 
to China. Germans believed that in view of the future partition of 
China Kiao-Chau was one of the tit-bits. Belgium, the United States 
and Great Britain had all obtained railways but no territorial con- 
cessions. In November, 1897, two German missionaries were 
murdered. As it happened there was a small German squadron, 
under the command of Admiral Diedrichs, present at the time. On 
November 14th detachments were landed from these ships which 
took possession of the territory around Kiao-Chau Bay and hoisted 
the German flag on the neighbouring hills. Almost at once a pro- 
clamation was issued assuring the Chinese that the Germans enter- 
tained nothing but friendly feelings for them, but would retain 
possession of the territory in question with a view to obtaining satis- 
faction for the murders. Pekin summoned the Germans to depart, 
but, so far from complying, they demanded the concession of a railway 
line and some mines in the province of Shantung. China was in no 
condition to resist and the German Government duly obtained a 
lease for ninety-nine years of 193 square miles of the province of 
Shantung, the bay of Kiao-Chau and a sphere of influence of 2,750 
square miles. The compact was signed on March 6th, 1898. The 
second paragraph of the first article ran thus : " His Majesty the 
Emperor of China, desiring that the German troops should take 
possession of the territory hereinafter delimited . . ." But that was 
not the end of this study in irony. The province of Shantung was 
abandoned to the Germans. In return the Germans gave an under- 
taking that they had no ulterior designs with regard to China, and, in 
particular, " would make no attempt to seize illegally any part of 
that province." In return for the mining concession, the German 
Government added that " they were not inspired by any ill-feeling 
towards China, but only wished to increase the trade and improve the 
relations between the two countries." 

When demanding a credit of five millions for the development of 
the new acquisition Prince Biilow said : 

"The Chinese authorities will have the proofs of German power ever before 
them and will understand that any injury to the German people will not be 
disregarded. We have secured a strategic and political position at Kiao-Chau 
which will give us a decisive influence on the development of events in the 
Far East." 

The Germans immediately set to work to fortify their new posses- 
sion. It has been said that they emplaced five hundred Krupp guns 

171 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

of the^latest model. The development of the trade of the port was 
duly boomed, but obviously much of its increased activity was due 
to the shipping employed for the fortification and railway construction. 
In 1904 the railway from Tsing Tao to Tsinan-Fu, 256 miles in length, 
was opened. It feeds the most fertile and thickly-populated dis- 
tricts, hitherto destitute of means of communication, and connects 
with the main line in China from Nankin to Pekin. 

To this railway is due the commercial activity of the port of Kiao- 
Chau, the trade of which advanced, as the customs returns show, 
from 59,482 Huakim taels in 1900 to 1,670,000 in 191 2. 

The expansion of the navy, which has proved a costly luxury to the 
German Empire, dates from this occupation of Kiao-Chau. 

To-day the Japanese have deprived the Germans for ever of their 
possession. Kiao-Chau was the only colony which was a striking 
commercial success, and that because it provided the Chinese with 
railway facilities ; but it was the Chinese, not the Germans, who 
made its prosperity. In German eyes its value was mainly 
strategic* 

When the Germans spoke of their interests in Morocco, it might 
have been thought that they did a flourishing trade in that part of 
Africa. As a matter of fact, the entire trade of Germany with 
Morocco in 1909 was 11,300,000 marks, her total trade in that year 
being 17,000,000,000 marks. In other words, the Moroccan portion 
was not even one per cent., being six-tenths per cent, of the whole. 
British trade with Morocco was worth £2,204,000, French £2,195,000, 
German £564,147. To threaten the peace of the world for " interests " 
of such dimensions proves that the Kaiser and his advisers have no 
sense of proportion. 

The Germans had another plan, a highly artificial one, for swelling 
the importance of their Moroccan " interests." The figures for the 
tonnage of ships entering the port of Tangier illustrate its operation. 

German. English. 

Laden. In ballast. Laden. In ballast. 

1907 40.540 104,517 195.245 81,835 

1908 25,375 147.176 191,606 25,387 

1909 42,896 135,670 193.230 34.636 

* " Tsingtau and its Significance : with Some Impressions from a Recent 
Visit," by William Blane, The Nineteenth Century and After, December, 1914. 
" Tsing-tao et la Ruine de la Culture Allemande en Extreme-Orient," par 
D. Bellet. Revue des Deux Mondes, March 1st, 191 5. 

172 



Colonial Ambitions and Illusions 

While the proportion of English ships in ballast is about one-eighth 
of their total, German ships in ballast represent four-fifths of their 
total. These German ships call for the purpose of displaying the 
German flag. The British Consul has pointed out that the German 
services to the coast of Morocco would be discontinued were it not for 
the Government subsidies they receive. 

In 1901 there were 16,500 Europeans in Morocco, of which total 
Germans, Austrians and Swiss combined amounted to 153, or 1 per 
cent. ! 

The official communique said that the Panther was sent to protect 
the lives of Germans and German proteges ; but the village of Agadir, 
with its three or four hundred inhabitants, did not contain a single 
German. 

It is plain that the Kaiser's chief interest in Morocco was its 
strategic importance. The Panther was sent to Agadir, where there 
was not a German to protect, and not to Mogador, because Agadir 
could easily become an important port and the Germans wanted it 
for a naval base. " This country," they said, " stands at the corner 
of Africa, and such a position in the continent is a factor of the highest 
strategic importance." 

The geographer Ratzel enunciated the principle of accumulating 
territory in these words : " The development of a world-empire means 
that in one region after another the conquering power extends its 
political frontiers." The Kaiser, once established in Morocco, would 
have attempted to put that principle into practice as he had done 
when scheming to join up German South-West Africa with German 
East Africa. « 

The motives of German colonial policy must always be sought in 
considerations of strategy and politics rather than in economic 
ambitions. 



173 



CHAPTER XIV 
THE BAGDAD RAILWAY 

Frederick Barbarossa and William II. — German friendship for Abdul Hamid — 
The Konia-Bagdad railway — Financial arrangements — The French 
Government's part — A check in England — The Franco-German Agreement 
of February 15th, 1914 — Horns-Bagdad — Diplomatic mysteries — German 
trade in Turkey. 

IN 1 1 89 Frederick Barbarossa entered Constantinople. In 1889 
William II. celebrated the seven-hundredth /anniversary of that 
event by paying a state visit to the same city. Although the Crusades 
were a resounding failure, William II. felt the spirit of the Crusader 
within him, even at the moment of offering his friendship to the Sultan 
Abdul Hamid and his protection to the Moslem world. His visit was 
rewarded by the concession of a railway in Anatolia as far as 
Konia. 

The year 1898 was marked by the Armenian massacres. Sultan 
Abdul Hamid became an object of execration the world over. This 
was the moment for the Kaiser to distinguish himself. He sent the 
Sultan his portrait and in a high-sounding state speech assured him 
of his eternal friendship. " Eternal " was a strong word. True, 
the friendship had had a beginning. But there was also to be an 
ending. 

In October, 1898, he visited Constantinople again. In 1899 an 
irad of the Sultan decreed the extension of the railway from Konia 
to Bagdad. 

At this time, however, the Kaiser was haunted by his Chinese 
dreams, although the study of the railway problem, always disguised 
as archaeological or other research, had never ceased. In 1900, an 
engineer of the Deutsche Bank published a book in which he projected 
a scheme for connecting European and Asiatic Turkey by a bridge over 
the Bosphorus. 

However, Russia had obtained from the Sultan a promise that 

174 



The Bagdad Railway 

railways in Armenia should only be constructed by the Turks them- 
selves, or by Russians. Great Britain was busy with the Transvaal 
War. The memory of Fashoda still embittered her relations with 
France. German scholars consoled their countrymen for their dis- 
appointments in Africa and China with visions of the agricultural 
resurrection of Mesopotamia and the fine field it offered for German 
colonization. 

The Kaiser obtained a second irad, dated February 18th, 1902. 
The estimate amounted to 800 millions ; but in spite of the guarantees 
given by the Turkish Government, German financiers knew that the 
money could not be raised in their own market. 

It may be admitted at once that both the French Government and 
financiers made mistakes. An agreement was concluded between the 
German Anatolian Railway Company and the French Smyrna- 
Cassaba Company that Germany should raise 40 per cent, of the 
capital required and France another 40 per cent., the remaining 20 per 
cent, being found by the Powers having financial interests in Turkey. 
Germany, however, was not equal to raising her 40 per cent, and 
magnanimously invited Russian co-operation. Count Witte replied 
by an official communique in the Russian Financial Messenger, advising 
Russians to keep their capital for national enterprises of more imme- 
diate interest. 

Germany, so far from encountering opposition on the part of the 
French Government, received their support. M. Victor Berard says* 
that M. Delcasse had used his visit with President Loubet to St. 
Petersburg (May, 1902) to speak favourably of the Bagdad railway 
scheme ; that he prosecuted the idea during the whole of 1902 and 
at the beginning of 1903, and ended by convincing Count Lamsdorf 
that as the Germans were determined to build the railway in any 
event, it would serve Russian interests better to be with them rather 
than against them, or at least to allow France to enter a combination 
which could thus not be used as a weapon against Russia. There 
was an interview between the Emperor William and the Czar Nicholas 
at Revel (August, 1902), and at length Russia consented. 

William II. tried to interest England in the scheme during his visit 
to that country in 1902. In 1903 the suggested proportions were 
revised. Germany was to find 30 per cent., France 30 per cent., 
England 30 per cent., and the remainder was to be raised at large. 
In return the English were to consent to an increase in the Ottoman 
* La France et Guillaume II., 1907. 
175 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

tariffs, the adoption of the Bagdad route for the carriage of the 
Indian mails and the creation of a terminus on the Persian Gulf. 
Mr. Balfour declared that he did not wish the route to be under the 
sole control of a Franco-German company. Lord Lansdowne had 
expressed approval of the scheme. However, Mr. Balfour soon came 
to see that the control of the system would be exclusively German, 
and on April 23rd, 1903, Great Britain finally refused to take any part. 
The old arrangement was restored. France was to find 40 per cent., 
Germany 40 per cent., and the remainder was to be placed in Switzer- 
land and Belgium. 

The greater Germany's difficulties, the greedier she became. The 
original agreement had provided that the Director should be a German, 
and the President a Frenchman. Berlin now claimed that both 
offices should be filled by Germans. The reply was simple. Bagdad 
Railway shares were not allowed to be quoted on the French market 
(October, 1903). In revenge the Kaiser made his famous voyage 
to Tangier in 1905. 

The Germans constructed the 125-mile stretch between Konia and 
Boulgourdou over a level plain ; but when they reached the Taurus 
sector, artificial works, such as tunnels and bridges, involved an 
enormous outlay. They obtained a further guarantee of four per 
cent, per kilometre for a special loan of 98 million francs. The 
Deutsche Bank returned to France and offered this four per cent, 
guarantee as a bait in the fond hope that it would secure French 
assistance. 

Russia, in return for her complacence towards the Bagdad railway 
scheme, obtained recognition for her special interests in Armenia 
and Northern Persia. Simultaneously she came to an arrangement 
with Great Britain defining her zone of influence in Persia, and an 
Anglo-Russian agreement of August 31st, 1907, fixed the relations 
of the two Powers with Afghanistan, which is now connected by 
railway with the Trans-Caspian at Merv. 

In 1908 there was a fresh Turco-German arrangement by which 
the surplus of the customs revenue was guaranteed to the grantee 
company. At the end of 191 3 negotiations between MM. Porsot and 
Scrgent, representing France, and Herren Gwynner and Helferich, 
representing Germany, assisted by M. Cambon and Herr Zimmermann, 
resulted in the conclusion of an agreement on February 15th, 1914, 
whereby France abandoned her interest in the Bagdad Railway, 
and Germany recognized her exclusive right to undertake the public 

176 



The Bagdad Railway 

works, construct and manage the railways and control the ports of 
Syria and North and North-east Anatolia. 

The Germans — Turkey's good friends — thus arranged for her dis- 
memberment without so much as consulting her. On the other hand, 
the three French lines, including the Smyrna-Afiunkara-hissar line 
and the Soma-Panderma line, were isolated, and could not give 
France influence in any way comparable to that enjoyed by Germany 
through the management and control of the great Bagdad route. 

But Bagdad is five hundred miles from the Persian Gulf. Ger- 
many had still to deal with the maritime supremacy of Great Britain, 
and her ambitious scheme had not opened a new route to India. 
On the 15th of June, 1914, six weeks before the declaration of war, 
Great Britain had come to an arrangement delimiting her sphere of 
influence beyond Bagdad, and when Turkey declared war on the 
Allies, her first act was to land an Anglo-Indian force and secure 
Basrah. 

The Anglo-French project of a railway from Horns to Bagdad 
connected with a terminus at the Syrian port of Tripoli was mooted 
as a counterblast to the German Bagdad line. It would be shorter 
than its German rival and require none of the great artificial works 
which distinguish the Taurus sector. It would touch the Euphrates 
at Deir, serve Mesopotamia, and be the most direct route by the 
Mediterranean for the mail services. The idea was more than eighty 
years old. Without doubt the Germans would rage against a rival. 
But although the rival lines would meet at Bagdad, throughout the 
greater part of their length they would be at too great a distance 
from each other to allow of serious competition. Sir William Willcox, 
who was deputed by the Ministry of Public Works in Constantinople 
to study the question of Mesopotamian development, reported in 1909 
that this railway would provide the necessary stimulus to local trade. 
He estimated the cost of construction of a narrow gauge railway at 
69,000 francs a kilometre. In 1910, M. Bernard Marimone, backed by 
a powerful group of English and French financiers, brought forward 
another scheme for a railway passing through Palmyra, Deir and 
Anah. At the time certain diplomatic intrigues were taking place 
which have been revealed by Mr. Francis Aldridge in an article called 
" A Bungle in Entente Diplomacy."* The reasons for the hostility 
displayed by certain French diplomatists is not easy to understand. 
However, the scheme fell through, to the great joy of the Germans. 
* Fortnightly Review, August, 19 14. 

177 12 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

We must take care that future Anglo-French negotiations with regard 
to Eastern affairs are not marred by similar misunderstandings. 

If we were to accept the statements of some journalists and politi- 
cians, German trade has acquired in the Ottoman Empire the same 
predominance which her diplomacy already enjoys. A glance at the 
statistics dispels that legend which many Frenchmen have indus- 
triously spread abroad with the purpose of rousing French manufac- 
turers, financiers, and even the Government. 

The figures for the fiscal year ending March 13th, for 1906, 1909, 
1910 and 191 1 are as follows (1 piastres. 23 franc = approximately 
2jd.) : 

Imports (million piastres). 
Exporting Country. 1906. 1909. 1910. 191 1. 

Great Britain 1.099 94 1 882 8 4 8 

Austria-Hungary 651 407 628 765 

France 267 397 318 393 

Germany 132 194 221 387 

Exports. 

1906. 1909. 1910. 1911. 

Great Britain 633 314 55 8 537 

Austria-Hungary 213 248 174 219 

France 381 363 365 440 

Germany 123 115 112 131 

Total Trade of the Turkish Empire. 

Imports 3,137 3,143 3.338 4.256 

Exports 1,967 1,844 1,820 2,208 

Thus German trade with Turkey is much less than that of Great 
Britain, although German exports to Turkey have advanced and 
approach those of France. No doubt part of that advance is repre- 
sented by material for the Bagdad railway and also war material 
of all kinds. 

In this case, as in most others, there is something fictitious about 
the figures of German trade. 

Germany has also sent colonists to Turkey but only in small 
numbers. They have been entirely without influence, and in all 
probability strongly dislike Oriental government. German ambitions 
in that quarter have also resulted in failure. On the other hand, 
the Kaiser's influence at Constantinople has been supreme. His bold 
ambassadors have robbed the English and French ambassadors of 
their old prestige. The latter, indeed, put no obstacles in their way. 
Obsessed by the idea that the Turks would be triumphant in 191 2, 

178 



The Bagdad Railway 

they were so hypnotized by German ambition that they accepted 
with calm resignation all its consequences. If Turkey had been 
victorious in the war of 19 12 Austria-Hungary would have crushed 
Serbia and extended her influence to Salonica. The Emperor of 
Germany would have stretched out a friendly hand to the Sultan, 
and tacitly informed Bulgaria, Roumania and Greece that they must 
regard him as their natural protector. 

Berlin, Vienna, Constantinople, Bagdad ! From the terrace at 
Potsdam the Kaiser saw himself at last in a position to strike at 
England in India and Egypt and his dreams a la Picrochole bore 
him into the Infinite. 

In 1916 the Allies are at Salonica, Russia holds Erzrum and 
continues to destroy the German armies. The English threaten 
Bagdad. What a fall ! 



179 12 s 



CHAPTER XV 

ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND IMPERIALISM 

A contradiction — Pacific declarations of industrials and financiers — Their argu- 
ments — They were self-evident — " The economic organization of Germany- 
was fashioned for peace " — Exchange is the affair of individuals, policy 
of Governments — The Kaiser as commercial busybody — The Sultan as his 
customer — The Professors of Economics stray from their subject — Economic 
Imperialism — Military interests — Herr Thyssen's Anglophobia — French iron 
mines owned by Germans — Raw material — Germany's large imports from 
Russia and Great Britain — Great Britain her best customer — Economic 
considerations abandoned — " Prestige " — The War Party — Harden's ex- 
hortations — A summary — The real end and its attainment by appeal to 
the passions. 

I HAVE already shown the aggressive character of Germany's 
" Economic Imperialism. " Yet it must be granted that the 
extension of her economic interests implied in itself a certain force 
working for peace. 

Several French writers have reported conversations with German 
financiers and industrials who displayed natural pride in the immense 
progress made by Germany and, in particular, cited the growth of 
German capital. A banker said : "In a country like ours, where 
industry is in the hands of finance, finance is necessarily peace-loving."* 
" We want peace above everything else, because we are business 
men," said the manager of the Dresdner Bank. A Prussian official, 
high in the imperial service, gave M. Bourdon an extremely eloquent 
and lucid description of the historical development of Germany and 
added : " We are still in process of expansion. It is vital for us that 
this process should not be arrested or even impeded. Peace is a 
necessity for us. It is always a prime necessity for a nation which 
is accumulating wealth, just as war and pillage are necessities for 
the needy conqueror. Victory would give us nothing we do not 
possess already. Defeat would spell utter ruin."f 

* Georges Bourdon : L'Enigme Allemande, p. 386* 
f Georges Bourdon, ibid., p. 176. 

180 



Economic Interests and Imperialism 

Doctor Rathenau, director of the great electricity combine, declared 
openly, that, " In Germany the people want peace." 

In 1913, M. Maurice Ajam, representing the Comite du Commerce 
Frangais avec VAllemagne, of which he was president, visited Germany 
to sound the opinions of the great German industrials. Some of them 
spoke to him of the Slav peril : 

" The only chance of war between France and Germany lies in a sudden 
onslaught on Austria by Russia. In that case we should stand by Austria 
even if the whole world were to totter under the shock. But in no case would 
the first attack come from us."* 

As regards the economic aspect of the question, they added : 

" We regard other countries, particularly France, only as so many markets. 
A nation so essentially industrial and commercial as ours cannot pursue an 
aggressive policy." 

Returning to the Slav peril, they remarked that " a war would not 
remove it." 

M. Maurice Ajam was so impressed by the general tone of these 
conversations that he said : 

" Peace ! I can say that all Germans, those in the business world without 
exception, are devoted to the cause of European peace." 

If M. Ajam was wrong, his mistake has cost him dearly for he has 
lost a son in the war. It must be remembered also that the German 
manufacturers and merchants gave reasons for their pacifist inclina- 
tions. Germany's industry, commerce and wealth were in process of 
expansion. Even the policy of the syndicates and the practice of 
" dumping," both hostile to competing industries, were profitable to 
the foreign consumer for whose benefit they were intended. It is 
easy to say now that the Germans who used those words were hypo- 
crites. Their arguments are as true and applicable to-day as they 
were in 191 3, and M. Maurice Ajam's conclusion is as appropriate 
now as then. 

Arthur Raffalovich, whose knowledge of Germany is profound, 
wrote : " The economic organization of Germany is fashioned for 
peace." 

While exchange is the province of the individual members of the 
various national communities, politics concern their governments and 

* Le ProbUme ficonomique Franco- Allemand, 1914, by Maurice Ajam. 

181 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

rulers. Now all state action implies limitation of individual liberty, 
and between nations that limitation is called war. 

The Kaiser has always played the part of showman of the 
German industrial and commercial world. It is quite likely that 
some Germans gave him credit for having speeded up the triumphal 
car of German industry and believed that he could open up new 
markets with the point of his sword. It is probably true with regard 
to Krupp's, for whom he acted as commercial traveller. He wrote to 
the Sultan with his own hand to recommend their guns and thanked 
him personally for the orders he placed. At the end of 1905, when 
all the European Powers sent their squadrons to Crete to make a demon- 
stration against Turkey, Germany alone was unrepresented. In return 
William II. obtained an order worth two and a half million Turkish 
pounds (approximately £2,400,000).* 

William II. could hardly hope for a similar success with his uncle, 
Edward VII. Yet when he went to Sandringham in 1909 he took 
with him a stock of little appliances for lighting, cooking, heating 
and hairdressing, Lampen, Koch appar ate, Frisierapparate, and gave 
demonstrations in person in the hope of introducing those products 
of German industry on the English market. 

To this low level had the exponent of National Economy descended 
in his attempt to put it into practice. He could not enunciate broad 
principles such as strike the imagination and evoke sympathy. Men 
do not go to universities to learn the intricacies of buying and selling. 
Conscious of their shortcomings, German Professors, instead of con- 
centrating on their economic researches turn to political speculation. 
They take refuge in history and hold up to the admiration of their 
pupils those manifestations of force which masquerade as victories 
or defeats. They give lessons in Economic Imperialism. 

It was to the interest of all the generals and officers and their 
aristocratic families, the non-commissioned officers and their rela- 
tions, to feed the flame of their countrymen's warlike passions, for 
war was their raison d'etre. The Emperor and the Chancellor provided 
them with the appropriate war-cries, which they were not slow to 
take up : " The Slav Peril " on one side, the " Hereditary Foe " on 
the other, and last but not least, " Perfidious Albion," denounced 
by the naval officers who figured in the processions of the Navy 
League as if she had closed the Straits of Dover to the vessels of the 
Hamburg-American Line or the North German Lloyd. 

* Victor Berard : La France ei Guillaume II., p. 179* 
182 



Economic Interests and Imperialism 

I give the justification of the war put forward by Herr Thyssen, the 
mining magnate, who was the first to work the iron mines of Perrieres, 
Soumont and Dielette in Normandy : 

" Every far-seeing Englishman must have known that Germany would not 
for ever submit to England's pressure. 

" The policy England pursued made the war inevitable, and it must continue 
till the egoism and arrogance of England are broken down and Germany's 
position in the world is recognized." 

But how had England injured Herr Thyssen ? She had not pre- 
vented him from exploiting the mineral wealth of Normandy. He 
could not even complain of English competition. 

Germany threatened the world's peace on the pretext of her 
interests in the iron mines of Morocco. No one has ever refused to 
sell ores to her. German metallurgists have found scope for their 
energies even in the Meurthe-et-Moselle basin. They have a share 
in seven mining concessions, with a total area of 5,165 hectares 
(approximately 12,757^ acres) : Valleroy, Jarny et Sancy, Murville, 
Moutiers, Conflans and Serrouville. The grant of a share of Serrou- 
ville was made in exchange for the grant of a share in a German coal- 
field. In exchange for the grant of a share in the Valleroy conces- 
sion, the Longwy Steel Company obtained from the Rochling a share 
in the Carl Alexander mines at Baesweiler. The Senelle-Maubeuge 
Mining Company formed the Jarny Mining Company, in which three 
German metallurgical works participate — the Phcenia Aktien Gesell- 
schaftfur Bergbau und Hiittenbetrieb of Horde, the Hasper Eisen und 
Stahlwerk of Hasper, and the Hosch Eisen und Stahlwerk of Dort- 
mund. The Senelle-Maubeuge Company also formed a company 
with the Lorraine blast furnace company, Aumetz-Friede, to work the 
Murville mines. The Moutiers mine is worked by an association 
formed in 1900, consisting of two French groups, two Belgian groups 
and a German group. Out of two hundred shares in the Conflans 
concession, one hundred belong to MM. Vieillon and Migeon, seventy 
to the Dislinger Werke of Detlingen (Germany), ten to a Belgian 
company. The Gehenkirken own nearly 2,000 hectares (approximately 
4,940 acres) in the Lorraine mining area, including the concessions of 
Saint-Pierremont, Sexey, Haute-Lay, Saint-Jean, Sainte-Barbe, 
Crusnes and Villerupt. 

Herr Thyssen has himself acquired in the Meurthe-et-Moselle 
basin the concessions of Batilly, Bouligny and Jouaville, which 
feed his Hagendingen works near the Moselle. 

183 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The Germans control eighteen concessions, covering more than 
10,000 hectares (24,700 acres), a seventh of the whole, in the Eastern 
mining area, and ten concessions, covering 7,300 hectares in 
Normandy.* 

If the Germans intend Germany to be self-supporting, even with 
regard to all raw materials, they will have to annex Louisiana and 
other southern states of the United States in order to get their cotton, 
and the Argentine Republic and Australia to get their wool. 

Out of 717.000 kilos of refined gold, 410,500 kilos come from the 
British Empire ! That is to say, £57,500,000 out of £98,000,000. 
Yet no one has prevented the Germans from buying shares in the 
Transvaal mines, and before the war they had no difficulty in buying 
gold in London. 

Great Britain does not refuse to sell gold to Germany. In 191 3, 
though Russia sold to the Germans to the value of £70,000,000, Great 
Britain came next, having sold to them to the value of £43,000,000, 
and bought from them to the value of £70,500,000. The British are 
their best customers. Austria-Hungary, in spite of her central 
position, bought less — £54.100,000. Turkey, notwithstanding the 
Kaiser's utmost efforts and the increasing activities of German com- 
mercial agents, only bought from Germany to the value of less than 
£4,900,000, and even that figure included building and other material 
for the Bagdad railway, and probably some consignments from 
Krupp's for the army. 

Did Germany's economic interests require her to make war on the 
two countries from which she drew the bulk of her imports, one of 
which was also her best customer ? 

In the article on Anglo-German commerce, to which I have already 
referred, Herr Diepenhors, after reciting all the arguments that his 
economic Anglophobia could suggest, doubtless recognized that they 
vitiated his own case, so he came to the conclusion that in the 
opinion of many people the Anglo-German problem could only be 
solved by an appeal to force and took on himself to declare that : 

' It is the province of the politician, not the economist, to determine in what 
manner the two nations will best arrive at an understanding." 

Economic competition was not enough for this German. He 

declared openly that it had been superseded by political competition. 

To hasten the day of Germany's economic supremacy. 

* L'Allemagne en France : EnquHes Economiques, par Louis Bruneau. 

184 



Economic Interests and Imperialism 

Apparently, notwithstanding the statistics of German industry and 
trade, he had no confidence in their future. He did not regard the 
unfettered operation of the law of supply and demand as enough. 
He favoured an appeal to force which would crush competition alto- 
gether and leave Germany without a rival. 

It was not the objective interest of gain which prompted the 
Germans to supersede the economist by the warrior. It was the 
insidious passion for prestige ! 

This passion was exploited by the War Party, known as the 
Bernhardi-Keim-Reventlow Trinity, with Maximilian Harden's 
journal, Die Zukunft, as their organ and the Crown Prince for their 
mouthpiece. Harden wailed that " the German bourgeois was too 
engrossed in business, work and money-making. Few of them ever 
think of war, or rather they have let peace become a necessity."* 
He hoped to rouse them from that unmanly torpor by exhortations 
such as these : 

" Industrialism is stifling Germany. Was she not promised that she should 
be the mistress of the seas and that not an inch of the earth's surface should be 
divided up without her securing the best portion ? Has there been any dividing 
up since ? No, not even in Africa or the Gulf of Bothnia. Instead of the 
triumphs promised, Germany has witnessed the commission of one error after 
another. The Pax Britannica, not the Pax Germanica, rules the world. What 
has the Agadir coup brought us ? We have gained some useless marshes in the 
Congo, while Chauvinism and the old military spirit have revived in France. 

" Gold is forged with iron, but not iron with gold. To believe otherwise is 
mortal sin against the holy spirit of the nation. Hear, good people, what the 
foreigner will say : Forty-three years after Sedan the wealthy Empire of Ger- 
many is compelled to make a levy on property to defend its sixty-eight million 
subjects against forty million Frenchmen, because it can no longer pick a single 
blade of grass from the paths it has tracked out. Is the spirit of the true 
Prussian, who always knew to what goal his work bore him, then dead ?f 

Herr Freymann, the author of a book If I were Emperor, which 
had an enormous sale in Germany, wrote : 

" No war I Such is the cry of our capitalists. It would ruin us I " 

On this question he comes to a decision without hesitation : 

" Trade will suffer heavily but will find new outlets. Far more serious will 
be the damage to industry. To have any conception of what that damage 

* Bourdon : L'fcnigme Allemande, p. 330. 

I See "Maximilian Harden, Guillaume II. et le Kronprinz," Le Carres pan dant, 
February 10, 19 15, by M. Andre. 

135 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

may be, it is only necessary to think of the ravages caused by a crisis of a few 
months. But even this has its good side. We have before us an accumulation 
of evidence to show that our export policy is making us dependent on the 
foreigner. Thanks to that, our leaders of industry will overcome their hesitation 
to limit their activities to supplying the requirements of the home market." 

This advocate of war did not favour the commercial expansion of 
Germany. According to him Germany must go to war to gain the 
right not to sell abroad and to compel her manufacturers to limit their 
output. 

We may summarize our conclusions thus : 

Germany's aggressive policy clashes with her economic interests. 

Many German industrials and financiers are aware of this. 

Economic Imperialism cannot be justified on economic grounds. 

It has brought Germany into antagonism with her two chief sources 
of supply — Russia and Great Britain, the latter being also her best 
customer. 

The objective basis of Jingoistic appeals and exhortations was the 
interest of the military and its allied aristocratic caste. These 
appeals could only be addressed to subjective passions. 



186 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE PROFITS OF WAR. THE WAR INDEMNITY OF 1871 

Maximilian Harden — •The bandit view of war — The indemnity of ^200,000,000 — 
The cost to Germany of the war of 1870 — How much recovered through 
the indemnity ? — How the indemnity was paid — Gold movements in 
Germany — Loss on the sale of silver — How the indemnity was used — The 
Vienna crisis — Bismarck's view of the effects of the indemnity — Mr. Norman 
Angell's hypothesis — The effect of the indemnity on prices and wages — 
The indemnity cost Germany dearly. 

HARDEN added an objective argument to the rhetorical outburst 
previously quoted. He said that " the most profitable 
achievement of the Germans in the nineteenth century was the war 
of 1870." He thus depicted his countrymen as a band of highway- 
men counting their five milliards* of war indemnity. 

He remembered that the last instalment was paid on September 5th, 
1873, though it was not due until March 2nd, 1874. This fact con- 
vinced the Germans that they had been too modest in their demands. 
Their mistake prompted them to threaten France in 1875. If they 
renewed the contest they meant to " bleed France white." Before 
the present war German writers spoke freely of exacting an indemnity 
of thirty milliards from France. It would give them the double 
satisfaction of enriching Germany and ruining the nation which had 
survived all its defeats at their hands. These brigand instincts are 
largely responsible for the present conflict. The actual cost of that 
conflict as well as the outlay on military preparation in 191 2 and 
1903 would be recovered by robbing the vanquished. Thus the 
German taxpayers would be reimbursed. True, several tens of 
thousands of them would lose their lives in that profitable affair, but 
that was nothing. 

jjfDid the effects of the war indemnity of 1 87 1 justify the Germans 
in entertaining such extravagant hopes ? 

* A milliard = a thousand million francs. 
187 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The German Government received £200,000,000, but they did not 
distribute the money among the population. 

Sir Robert Giffen* estimates the cost of the war of 1 870-1 871 to 
Germany thus : 

Direct losses £66,000,000 

Indirect losses £50,000,000 

Total £1 16,000,000 

The capital represented by the human lives lost is not included. 
Sir Robert Giffen estimated it at £30,000,000 — a very low figure. Even 
excluding this item, the war indemnity only exceeded the actual loss 
to Germany by about £80,000,000. 

It has been said that the indemnity conferred a tangible advantage 
on Germany by enabling her to adopt a gold standard. Doubtless 
that is partly true, but it is ridiculous to pretend that the money 
flowed over Germany in one great golden wave. I give the final 

figures of the indemnity : 

Francs. 

Principal 5,000,000,000 

Interest 302,123,000 

Cost of discount and conversion of foreign bills 

at the expense of the French Government.. 13,635,000 

Total 5,315,758,000 

The German Government made an allowance of £13,000,000 as the 
value of that part of the Chemin de fer de l'Est, which they took over 
in the annexed provinces. 

The amount of French gold and silver sent in payment to Germany 
was only 512,294,933 francs. The remaining 4,353,365,519 francs 
was paid in German coin and notes and commercial bills. Of that 
total, bills represented 4,248,326,374 francs and fell into two classes : 

Francs. 

German " liberative " bills 2,799,514,184 

Bills other than German bills, including Marks- 
banco, Hamburg money of account 1,448,812,190 

These are the figures given by M. L6on Say in his report of 1874. 

While the instalments were being paid off the exchanges were in 
favour of Germany ; but as soon as the whole had been liquidated 
* Essays in Finance. "The Cost of the Franco-German War." 

188 



The Profits of War. The War Indemnity of 1871 

gold began to leave Germany. Between July, 1874, anc * tne begin- 
ning of 1875 gold to the value of £25,000,000 went out of Germany. 
The Bank of Prussia was compelled to raise its discount rate to six 
per cent., and began to pay in silver thalers, which had " provision- 
ally " kept their liberative power, instead of in gold. 

The single gold standard was adopted on the 9th of July, 1873. 
A large part of the indemnity had been paid in silver. The German 
Government lost 15 per cent., or £4,800,000, on its sales of silver, 
which amounted to £32,000,000. 

Of the 5,315 million francs of the indemnity, the German Empire 
kept 2,050 millions and divided the rest between the different States. 
The Confederation of the North received about 2,800 millions and 
the other States the remainder. Details are lacking as to how these 
amounts were spent, but it is supposed that they were devoted to 
making good the damage resulting from the war or military purposes. 

The Empire only spent about 56 million francs for civil purposes, 
25,500,000 francs towards buildings for the Reichstag, and the 
remainder on the Alsace-Lorraine railways and the Luxemburg line. 
A thousand millions was put at the uncontrolled disposal of the 
Chancellor. While the funds were waiting to be appropriated, part 
to the construction and repair of fortresses, they were lent at interest 
to the banks and the pension fund for soldiers. 

The Confederation of the North paid off £13,000,000 borrowed for 
the war. The sum of £6,000,000 was deposited in the fortress of 
Spandau as a war chest. In March, 1915, England received several 
quite new one-pound pieces, the dates of which showed that they 
must have been part of it. 

The Government used the indemnity to pay their debts for war 
material, as well as to renew and increase their stocks. Much of it 
was devoted to fortress construction. It therefore promoted activity 
in certain industries, but only for the benefit of enterprises which, 
so far from being productive, involved an ever-increasing outlay. 

Professor Adolph Wagner, examining the uses to which the war 
indemnity was put, has expressed regret that it was not devoted to 
great works of public utility. 

In the " Black May " of 1873 there was a severe financial crisis in 
Austria, which extended to Germany and the whole world. It was 
due to the wholesale absorption of capital for war purposes, in rail- 
way construction in the United States, which had doubled its mileage 
in seven years, Russia, whose mileage of 11,875 miles had been the 

189 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

work of the years since 1868, and in Austria, where the mileage had 
increased by 4,000. The loans of Brazil, La Plata, Chile and Peru, 
not to mention those of Honduras, Paraguay, San Domingo and 
Costa Rica, had also contributed. 

The crisis resulted, as crises always result, from the destruction of 
capital or the conversion of circulating into fixed capital.* The war 
indemnity did not save Germany from its effects. It has even been 
said that it was one of the causes of the financial depression in that 
country. This is an exaggeration^ All that can be said is that it 
did not prevent it. 

When Bismarck introduced his protective legislation on March 2nd, 
1879, ne compared the relative positions of France and Germany, 
and declared that the war indemnity of 187 1 had not enriched 
Germany. 

On November 29th, two years later, he said : 

" About 1877, for the first time, I was struck with the general and increasing 
distress in Germany, as compared with France. I have witnessed a diminution 
of the general well-being." 

He was not merely speechifying. Busch, his biographer, expressed 
a similar opinion in private conversation : t 

" In the long run the [French] milliards were no blessing, at least not for 
our manufacturers, as they led to over-production. It was merely the bankers 
who benefited, and of these only the big ones." 

In " The Great Illusion " Norman Angell takes a hypothetical case, 
and postulates that Germany extracts an indemnity of £1,000,000,000 
from Great Britain. If these millions are paid in real wealth — 
that is, products and goods directly or indirectly useful for exist- 
ence — they mean a wholesale invasion of imports which would be 
anathema to Protectionists. But Mr. Angell also postulates that 
this indemnity would entail a rise in prices. Now if it meant an 
increase of imports, that in itself ought to lower prices. It could 
only raise prices if it stimulated demand and commercial activity. 

Mr. Horace Handley O'Farrell, in his study, " The Franco-German 
War Indemnity and its Economic Results," has taken two tables 

* Yves Guyot : La Science fcconomique. Journal des ficonomistes, August, 
I9I3- 

f Sir Robert. Giffen : Essays in Finance. " The Liquidations of 1 873-1 876." 
I Bismarck; Vol. III., p. i6i« 

190 



The Profits of Wai\ The War Indemnity of 1871 

from the " First Fiscal Blue-book " (Cd. 1,761). To arrive at the 
figures for real wages, he has divided the figures for nominal wages by 
the index number for prices. 

The figures for German wages are those of Krupp's. 



Prices and Wages in Germany. 



Prices and Wages in France. 





Prices 

(1900= 

1 00}. 


Nominal 


Real 

Wages 

0. 


Prices 


Nominal 


Real 


Year. 


(Money) 
Wages 


(1900= 
100). 


(Money) Wages 
(1900=100). 


Wages 
0. 




(1900=100]. 












Not 














Not 


1870 


in 


64 


.581 


available. 


Not available. 


available. 


1871 


117 


63 


.540 


104 


74 


.712 


1872 


130 


7i 


•545 


in 


74-5 


.672 


1873 


135 


78 


.576 


no 


75 


.682 


1874 


124 


81 


•653 


IOI 


75 


•743 


1875 


116 


81 


.695 


102 


75 


•735 


1876 


"3 


7^ 


.672 


100 


76.5 


.765 


1877 


113. 5 


70 


.616 


102 


78.5 


.785 


1878 


104 


67 


.654 


89 


79 


.870 


1879 


94-5 


63 


.666 


86 


79 


.920 


1880 


105. 5 


67 


.635 


80 


84 


1.050 



These figures show that there was a marked rise in prices in Germany 
in 1872 and 1873, followed by a fall which brought them below the 
figure of 1870. Wages only rose afterwards, in accordance with an 
almost universal rule, and then fell likewise ; but as prices were below 
the level of 1 870, there was an actual rise in real wages. 

In France a rise was also observable in 1872 and 1873, but it was 
not so marked as in Germany. The rise in nominal wages was not 
great, but in view of the fall in prices the rise in real wages in France 
was actually 47 per cent, as compared with 187 1, while in Germany it 
was only 17 per cent. 

There is no doubt that Krupp's benefited greatly from the war 
indemnity. They had been paid in full for the war material they 
had supplied and received large orders for the new material to 
replace that consumed in the war. Their workpeople were therefore 
in a position to derive advantage from the indemnity, yet the fact 
remains that, in respect of wage advances, they were a long way 
behind the French workpeople. 

In all cases of robbery the loss to the victim exceeds the gain to 
the robber. Robbery is an occupation that has its risks. The 
damages of war are not merely to be reckoned in terms of human life. 

19T 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

It involves costly preparation and ruinous expense. Sir Robert 
Giffen calculated that the real figure of the indemnity received by 
Germany was not more than £80,000,000. 

The indemnity is not a tenth part of the sum Germany has spent 
on armaments since she pocketed it and up to the outbreak of the 
present war. And Germany has forced France, Russia and England 
to arm. She has driven them to a coalition against her. To-day the 
£80,000,000 net that she received has vanished under the mountain 
of millions she has spent since August, 19 14, to which will be added 
the indemnity that she in her turn will have to pay. 

Germans who are still capable of reflection will leave to Harden the 
inspiration that " the most profitable achievement of the Germans 
in the nineteenth century was the war of 1870." 



192 



CHAPTER XVII 
THE BURDEN OF ARMAMENTS 

The Seven- Year and Five-Year Bills — The Reichstag's opposition — The Laws 
of March 27th, 191 1 ; June 14th, 191 2 and July 3rd, 191 3 — The Slav Peril 
and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech on April 7th, 191 3 — An ever- 
expanding budget — The accumulation of debt between 1900 and 1909 — 
The subscriptions to the loans of March, 191 3 — The levy on property — Its 
character — Miscalculations — Incitements to waste — The naval and military 
expenditure of the German Empire imposed a similar burden on other 
countries. 

WE have seen the Seven- Years Law in operation under the Bis- 
marck regime, and that the ever-increasing expenditure on 
the army met with opposition in the Reichstag. 

The Army Bill of November 25 th, 1886, was opposed by the Centre, 
led by Windhorst ; the Liberals, led by Richter ; and the Socialists, 
led by Grillenberger. On the 14th of January, 1887, the Reichstag 
adopted an amendment of Stauffenberg, reducing the period of its 
operation to three years. Bismarck immediately read a message 
from the Emperor dissolving the chamber. In the ensuing elections 
the Bill was approved by 227 votes to 31, with 84 abstentions. When 
the Chancellor, Caprivi, introduced a Bill for the period 1893-1899, 
increasing the army effectives to 492,068, the commission engaged on 
its examination threw it out on January 12th, 1893. On the 6th of 
May Caprivi had to dissolve the Reichstag, but on July 15th the Bill 
was duly passed by 201 votes to 185. 

In each case the opposition of the Reichstag was not ratified by 
the country. 

We have also seen that while the Seven-Years Law pledged the 
Reichstag to a certain minimum of military expenditure, it did not 
bind the Chancellor. This was equally true of the Five-Years Law 
of March 27th, 191 1. It was followed by the Law of the 14th of June, 
191 2, which added 29,000 men on a peace footing to the 10,000 men 
added in the preceding year, and increased the first estimates by the 
sum of £43,000,000, spread over the financial years 1912-1917. 

193 x 3 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Next came the Law of July 3rd, 191 3, which was the con- 
sequence of the Balkan Wars. We have seen that the Germans of 
Central Europe are outnumbered by the Slavs. From the 65 millions 
which form the population of Germany itself, three million Poles in 
the Duchy of Posen must be deducted, not to mention a million 
foreigners. If the twelve million Germans in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire be added, we have a maximum of 74 million Germans. Now 
Russia in Europe alone has a population of 132 millions, and its rate 
of increase is higher than that of Germany. If we deduct from the 
Austro-Hungarian population (less the German element) ten million 
Magyars and three million Roumanians, there remain more than 
twenty-five million Slavs in the Dual Monarchy. 

When Germany compares herself with France she boasts of her 
numbers, but when she compares herself with Russia the thought 
of numbers is a nightmare. 

Addressing the Reichstag on April 7th, 191 3, Herr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg declared that though Germany wanted to be prepared for 
war, all her desires centred on peace. Peace would be assured were 
it not for evilly-disposed neighbours. But what of Germany's neigh- 
bours ? The Chancellor announced that Germany's relations with 
Russia were cordial and expressed his belief that a race-war was 
improbable. He stated that Germany was on good terms with Great 
Britain. What of France ? He indulged in a tirade against French 
Chauvinists. But if the French Chauvinists had not ceased their 
idle clamour they were neither as ambitious nor as vociferous as the 
Pan-Germans. Every year Germany trained 280,000 recruits, and 
put 60,000 men on one side. In his speech, the Chancellor, Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, put the following question : " Ought we to pay 
for the luxury of denying ourselves thousands of trained men when 
we might have all these thousands of soldiers ? " 

The Army Bill* of 1913 proposed to add 4,000 officers, 15,000 non- 
commissioned officers, 117,000 men and 27,000 horses to the peace 
establishment. It fixed the number of units in the different armies 
at 669 battalions, instead of 651 ; 550 squadrons of cavalry, instead 
of 516 ; 633 batteries of field artillery (no increase) ; 55 battalions of 
foot artillery, instead of 48 ; 44 battalions of pioneers, instead of 33 ; 
31 battalions of communication troops, instead of 18 ; 28 train 
battalions, instead of 25. The new establishment set up by this Bill 

* La Vie Militaire en France et a VEtr anger, 2 e Annee, 1912-1913, p. 222 etc. 
(F. Mean). 

194 



The Burden of Armaments 

was 36,000 officers, 110,000 non-commissioned officers, instead of 
95,000 ; 661,000 men, instead of 544,000. To these we must add 
6,000 superior and 4,000 inferior clerks, whose services are performed 
by soldiers in France, and 18,000 one-year volunteers, instead of 
14,000. These figures give a total of 835,000, and with the additional 
incorporations the establishment was expected to reach 870,000 by 
the beginning of spring. All the provisions of the Bill were to have 
been put into operation by the 1st of October, 1915 ; but as regards 
the three principal armies, the changes had been effected by the 1st of 
October, 1913. 

All these ever-elastic bills, Seven-Year and Five-Year, illustrated 
the common defect of financial estimates. At the time they were 
passed each of them contemplated a certain definite figure for the 
expenditure they involved ; but when they expired, it was discovered 
that most of that expenditure was continuing. 

In 1872 the estimated Imperial expenditure was £22,100,000*, of 
which £13,200,000 was for the army and £1,200,000 for the navy. 
In 1912-1913 the expenditure on the army and navy amounted to 
£65,450,000. If the Soldiers' Pension Fund and the loan raised for 
national defence are added, the total was about £76,400,000. 

The expenditure of the Empire and the federated States for 191 2- 
191 3, according to Herr Wermuth, the Finance Minister, was 
£422,000,000, or £255,000,000, if self-balancing items are deducted. 
At the end of 1870 the imperial debt amounted to £24,000,000. 
In 1880 it was £61,000,000. 

In 1912 Herr Wermuth stated that between 1900 and 1909 the 
Empire had had to borrow no less than £132,000,000. 

"Fourteen per cent, of the total," he said, " had been allocated to productive 
expenditure, such as the post office and the railways ; the remaining 86 per cent, 
represents the balance, more or less disguised, of the ordinary and extraordinary 
expenditure ; 60 per cent, went to the army and navy, more than 14 per cent, to 
the expeditions in Eastern Asia and South-West Africa. A small part was devoted 
to the construction and widening of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal, and the adminis- 
tration of the Protectorates. It cannot be doubted that the rest represented 
loans to cover the annual deficits." 

He added : 

" To be meeting the cost of armaments during a long period of peace by means 
of loans that are never reduced, is merely to shift the responsibility for assuring 
the safety of the nation on to the shoulders of the next generation, and in that 
way imposes a double burden on that generation." 

* Calculated on the basis of 20 marks=^i9 7. 

195 13* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

In the first week of March, 191 3, the Germans were called upon to 
subscribe to two loans, one of £7,350,000 of Government stock of 
the Empire and Prussia, the second of £20,000,000 of Prussian four 
per cent, exchequer bills, issued at ninety-nine and repayable in five 
years. 

The Government stock was over-subscribed to the amount of 
40 per cent., the total reaching £10,000,000 ; but the subscription of 
Treasury bills only produced half the sum required, though all the 
great banks had prophesied a success. As a matter of fact, the 
number of individual subscribers to both loans was very small. 

The expenditure involved in the two Army and Navy Bills of 191 1 
and 191 2, and still to be covered, was in addition to the £27,500,000, 
which were to be spread over four years. In addition, there were 
deficits. The yield of the duty on spirits had been estimated at 
£1,800,000. The figure had been only £900,000. The surplus of the 
customs revenue had been estimated at £2,250,000, but the surplus 
realized had been only £1,400,000. 

Such was the financial situation in 191 3 when the military measures 
of that year demanded an additional expenditure of £50,000,000. 
This demand was met by the imposition of a levy on capital, the 
proceeds of which were to be devoted exclusively to the one object. 
The Socialists were delighted. " It is a bold step in the direction of 
Socialism," they cried. Militarist megalomania was itself forging the 
key which would open the strong boxes of capitalism to the Social 
Revolution ! But their delight was tempered with scepticism. The 
new military system involved an additional annual expenditure of 
twelve to fourteen million pounds. What measure of taxation would 
be needed to produce that sum ? For while the levy on capital would 
be a temporary expedient, other impositions would be permanent. 

The announcement of the levy was followed by immediate financial 
depression, and the discount rate went up to five per cent. The 
Frankfort Gazette said : " Behind an affectation of approval we see 
hesitation and head-shakings." It confessed that there was a 
suspicion that the mere threat of the levy had led to the export of 
capital, with its two attendant dangers — diminution of the available 
capital and depletion of the stock of gold. 

German taxpayers are like the taxpayers of all other countries 
in resenting additions to their financial burdens. 

The levy on capital was not an imperial imposition. The Con- 
federate States contributed a fixed proportion of one mark per head 

196 



The Burden of Armaments 

of population. It was raised to two marks, but was then not levied 
per head of population, but on assessed capital. These States had 
to raise the additional sum by means of a tax on capital, death duties, 
and other expedients of the same kind. The choice was left to their 
respective Diets. 

When Herr Lucke, a National Liberal deputy, advocated death 
duties, the Chancellor opposed the suggestion vigorously on the 
ground that it would be likely to produce serious friction with the 
States. 

The new law embodied a fiscal amnesty for all who voluntarily 
rectified previous false declarations of capital and property. This 
clause, however, brought in no great windfall, for false declarations 
continued. The yield of the levy had been estimated at £74,000,000, 
which it was hoped would render the third year's contribution 
unnecessary. The yield was only £49,000,000. Berlin and its 
suburbs had been expected to produce £10,000,000. It only pro- 
duced £7,100,000. The capital of Frankfort had been assessed at 
£162,000,000, which would have produced £2,250,000. Frankfort 
only furnished £1,750,000. 

For the fiscal year 1914-1915 the Budget of the German Empire 
was made out as follows : 

Total receipts, £430,895,000, in which Post Office and Telegraphs 
figured for £41,050,000, railways for £8,100,000, miscellaneous receipts 
for £41,000,000, and extraordinary receipts, the proceeds of the loan, 
for £264,400,000. 

The ordinary recurring expenditure was £130,850,000, the non- 
recurring was £36,125,000. The extraordinary expenditure was 
£264,350,000. The total was thus £431,200,000. 

Recurring Non-recurring Extraordinary- 
Expenditure. Expenditure. Expenditure. 
(Million pounds.) 

Ordinary Army Estimates 42.68 16.6 — 

Ordinary Navy Estimates 1 1 .05 1 1 . 5 1 .45 

Extraordinary War Estimate — — 26 1 

(Million pounds.) 

Imperial Interest-bearing Debt 235 

Non Interest-bearing : 

Exchequer Bonds 8 

Paper Money 6 

— H 

Total 249 

197 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

A Berlin note of the nth of July, 1914, announced that there would 
be additional taxation in the autumn for naval purposes. 

Professors Delbnick and Ballod justified the ever-increasing 
expenditure with these words of List : 

" Nations whose destinies call to the sea mock at the parsimony of those who 
cling to the land." 

Unfortunately every increase in the naval and military expenditure 
of Germany was followed by a corresponding increase in that of 
France, Great Britain and Russia. Germany, breathless but unwilling 
to fall out, was doomed to exhaustion in such a contest. She could 
only end it by bringing about a catastrophe. 



198 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE FACTOR OF SOCIALISM 

The spread of Socialism — Its influence at the polls — Agrarians and Socialists — 
The protection of foodstuffs — The failure of the Insurance Scheme — The 
fall in wages in 1914 — " Red Internationalism " and " Red Nationalism." 

THE attitude of the Socialist Party must always be reckoned 
among the factors which urged the Kaiser to make his 
" preventive " war in 1914. 

Of the 397 members of the Reichstag, the number of Socialist 
deputies returned at each election since 1898 was : 

1898. 1903. 1907. 1912. 

56 82 43 no 

The Socialist party has replaced the Centre, which was formerly 
the most influential bloc in the Reichstag. Further, the number of 
deputies does not reflect the voting power of Socialism in the country. 
The elections are based on the census returns of 1867, so that many 
an industrial district only elects one Socialist member, although its 
increased population would entitle it to several. The number of 
votes cast for Socialists was 4,239,000, 991,000 more than in 1907. 
Added to the other opposition votes, the total reached 7,524,000, 
whereas the Government only polled 4,664,000 votes. 

There are also 221 Socialists in the Diets of the different States. 
Bavaria has thirty. They form the majority in Schwartzburg 
Rudolstadt, though the Diet has been twice dissolved. The Socialist 
party had eighty-five daily papers, including the Vorw'drts. 

In 1914 they had a " Red Week," in which the membership of the 
party was increased by 132,200 and brought up to 1,115,000. 

The Emperor has more than once hurled maledictions against the 
Socialists. Such were the results. Socialist propaganda made head- 
way even in the army. Rosa Luxemburg opened a campaign to 
denounce the ill-treatment of the men and was duly prosecuted. She 
asked leave to call 925 witnesses. The Government was alarmed 
and dropped the charge. 

199 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The Government's agrarian policy furnished the Socialists with a 
whole armoury of arguments. In 191 1 they pointed to the ruling 
prices of wheat (per metric ton) : 

Shillings. 

Berlin 207 

New York 150 

Liverpool 163 

Paris 202 

In the debates which took place at the end of November the 
Ministers declared that the public must decrease their consumption 
of meat, but that the new regulations touched the middle as well as 
the working class. Herr von Schorlemer-Lieser, the Prussian Minister 
of Agriculture, said : " Those affected are not merely the workmen, 
but the small clerks, artisans and traders ; " and he added, by way of 
consolation : " Horse-meat is becoming more and more popular." 
Herr Delbriick, the Minister of the Interior, admitted that " the 
Tariff policy aimed at raising prices." Of course it was awkward 
for meat-eaters, but they must reconcile themselves to the change. 
This protectionist legislation was passed by a majority of 174, but 
there was a minority of 140 in favour of the abolition of all duties 
on food. 

We must remember with what enthusiasm William II., in 1890, 
summoned to Berlin the Conference for the International Protection of 
Labour, which was originally to have been held at Berne. The failure 
of State Socialism, as inaugurated by Germany, has been exposed by 
a Professor of Berlin University,* Herr Ludwig Bernhard, who bases 
his conclusions on the evidence of several other professors, and one 
of the highest officials in the Imperial Insurance Bureau, Herr 
Friedensburg. He says that the wonderful system of State insur- 
ance has been responsible for the chronic condition of Rentenhysterie 
and malingering. Compulsory assistance has demoralized those it 
was meant to benefit. He also shows that the regulation of labour 
had introduced an element of oppressive control which threatened 
to destroy the spirit of enterprise. 

The first half of 191 3 had been a period of good times for the working 
classes. In the second half there was a fall in wages which continued 

* See the Journal des kconomistes, July, 1902. La Faillite de la Politique 
Sociale Allemande, par A. Raffalovich. L' Industrie et les Industriels, by Yves 
Guyot, Book IV., Ch. IX. (1914). 

200 



The Factor of Socialism 

during the first three months of 1914, as the following figures 
show :* 

Average Earnings of a Workman of the Ruhr Basin. 



st Quarter of 1st Quarter of 


Quarterly earnings, 


Quarterly earnings, 


1913. 1914. 


I9I3- 


1914. 


M. Pf. (per day.) M. Pf. 


M. 


M. 


5 44 5 3i 


429 


405 



The Kaiser and several of his Ministers have regarded the war as a 
means of shelving these difficult problems and transforming the 
Socialist party from the Opposition into the national party, bound 
to the Kaiser, the supreme chief of the army and the personification 
of the German Empire. He adopted the idea of Herr Fendrich, 
formerly deputy of the Diet of Baden, who proposed to substitute 
" red nationalism " for " red internationalism." 

* Comiti des Houillires, N. 4,983, June 25, 1914. 



201 



CHAPTER XIX 
THE CONFLICT OF THE TWO CIVILIZATIONS 

The im the wai — A '" preventiv; mi — The conflict between 

a militarist civiiir.. one. 

FROM the for I facta v, e can draw the following 

conclusions. 

The Kaiser and the forward party wanted to settle internal diffi- 
culties h :.z a great crisis. The idea reminds one of the g 

hich always Eorms a 
of re\ S --.-.lists, and which Karl Marx and Engels pro- 

.: hand. A great i ;/. to oblivion 

the revelations of the exti y morals of the Emperor's 

favo.. cince von Eulenburg, Count von Sanders and others. 

It would conceal t rchy in which the German Govern- 

ment was flc. It would reconstitute the army, the weak- 

which had been exposed in Franz Adam Be;. i's book. 

" Jena or Sedan. 91 It would restore its . which had been 

such as the _ '. b era i ic lent.* 
An article in the C 1014. announced 

that by ioi~ Russ Id have completed the reorganization of her 

army, coi Me Balti I the Gulf of 

FinLv zstituted her corps :. .-. and built a system of 

strategic railways in Poland. Further, the Russo-German com- 
• would fall to be renewed in 191 ~. By crushing Russ: a 
beforehand Germany would be able to impose what conditions she 
pleased. 

It woula be accessary to overthrow France so completely that she 

would never again stand in the way of Germany's international ambi- 

France had pinned her faith to her Three Years Law. She 

had called up two classes and dismissed the third class. Her army 

would be much stronger in 1915, 1916 and 191 7. The French Socialists 

* Suftj. Fart I.. Ch. V., "The Kaiser's Government." 

203 



The Conflict of the Two Civilizations 

had voted in favour of a general strike in case of war. French 
finances were in disorder. Several Ministers had voted against the 
Three Years Law. A senator, M. Humbert, had exposed many cases 
of flagrant maladministration in the army. It would be a case of 
the 1870 army over again, and this time without a commander of 
renown. 

Great Britain was still spending millions on her fleet. Germany 
would be exhausted before British determination and resources 
were vitally impaired. It was essential to make the best use of 
what they had, and therefore the occasion was favourable for a 
preventive war. 

By declaring war in 1914 the Kaiser only antedated the event to 
secure more favourable conditions of success, for this war was the 
inevitable consequence of his policy, which was the expression of the 
doctrine which places militarism above all the needs of civilization, 
war being a necessity to the State. 

M. Leon Hennebicq, a Belgian, waxes enthusiastic over Germanic 
Imperialism in his book, " LTmperialisme Economique Anglais " : 

" Germany, aggressive and methodical, has increased her trade and industry 
by applying the principles of her General Staff in the field of economic warfare. 
It is a military Imperialism" (p. 276). 

Imperialism, economic or otherwise, is only a consecration of force, 
the ultima ratio. The economic policy of the German Empire is a 
relic of the system in which the State made trade for the citizens. 
But the expression " Economic Imperialism " is a contradiction in 
terms, for Imperialism implies acquisition by force, without exchange, 
whereas economic action implies acquisition by production or exchange. 

A productive civilization is based on freedom of contract, a militarist 
civilization on the limitation of liberty. 

The motive force of a productive civilization is economic competition ; 
that of a militarist civilization is political rivalry. 

The most characteristic types of the two civilizations are those 
of Great Britain and Germany. 

Hence the insane jealousy of Great Britain displayed by Germany. 

The present war is a conflict between these two civilizations. 
It can only end in the final triumph of the productive over the 
militarist civilization. 



203 



PART III 

THE HISTORICAL CAUSES 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 



CHAPTER I 
THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE AND THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA 

The coronation of Charlemagne — The Treaty of Verdun (843) — Historic la v 
— Lothair's portion — Germany — The Holy Roman Empire — Anarchy in 
Germany — The Electors — The Hapsburg — France and the Thirty Years 
War — The relation of France with Alsace — France the Peace-maker — The 
services rendered by France — The Elector of Brandenburg — Character 
of the Peace of Westphalia — Prussia undermines French influence. 

WHAT are the characters and antecedents of the foes with 
whom the Allies are fighting to-day ? 

The German Empire, Austria-Hungary and Turkey are not unitary 
States like Great Britain, France or Russia. We must analyse 
the different elements which have gone to make up the enemy empires 
before we can estimate their solidarity and the chances of dissolution 
or reorganization. 

A survey of their history is indispensable but we will start with the 
day on which Charlemagne, kneeling in the basilica of St. Peter at 
Rome, received the imperial crown at the hands of Pope Leo III. 
during the Christmas festival in the year 800 a.d. This coronation 
gave him unlimited powers to " defend the Faith against the heretic 
and to carry it abroad into heathen lands." 

Charlemagne's Empire was divided up by the Treaty of Verdun 
(a.d. 843). 

It has always been said that this treaty was the origin of the 
historic law of Europe. The law of what ? And for whom ? It 
gave to Lothair, with the title of Emperor, Italy and a large stretch 
of territory which had not even the Rhone for its western boundary, 
but included Vivier and Uzes. On the north-west it took in 
Cambrai, but not Ghent. It is said that it was bounded on the 
east by the Rhine, but it actually extended to the mouth of the Weser. 
Louis the German had Speyer and a large enclave on the left bank of 
the Rhine. The frontiers were not conterminous with the boundaries 

207 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

of the archbishoprics of Cologne, Reims and Lyons, nor with those of 
the dioceses of Mainz and Besancon. 

The Frankish Kings on one side and the German Emperors on the 
other fought to conquer or keep the territories which the Treaty 
of Verdun had assigned to neither party. All it had done was to 
create a territorial bone of contention. 

The Germans assert that the national existence of Germany dates 
from the Treaty of Verdun ; yet the history of Germany is the story 
of a feudal anarchy in which the seigneurs bear a close resemblance 
to bandits, a resemblance which has not disappeared with the lapse 
of centuries. 

There were four original German duchies, Bavaria, Swabia, Fran- 
conia and Saxony. Their dukes were absolute sovereigns with their 
own courts, armies and diets. Each duchy was divided into counties. 
The counties on the frontiers were called " Marks," the rulers of which 
were the " Margraves " (Markgraf). 

The peoples of these duchies spoke different languages and had 
different customs and laws. There was, indeed, a nominal king, 
but it was not before the reign (a.d. 919) of Henry the Fowler, of the 
House of Saxony, that he began to exercise any real authority. In 
962, Otto, summoned to Italy by the Romans, the Lombards and 
probably Pope John XII., re-established the Empire. He spent his 
reign in conflicts with the anarchical tendencies of Germany, foreign 
invaders and especially the Popes and Italian factions. Rome was 
the capital of the Empire, but when the Emperor desired to visit it 
he generally had to lay siege to it. 

The struggle of Pope and Emperor is a familiar story. The legends 
that have gathered round the name of Frederick Barbarossa are the 
highest expression of the power of the Hohenstaufens. When the 
conflict came to an end in the middle of the thirteenth century, both 
the antagonists were exhausted. 

The Pragmatic Sanction, drawn up by the States at Frankfort in 
1338, asserted that the majesty of the imperial authority came from 
God alone ; that it was confirmed solely by the election of the prince 
electors, and that the Holy See had no right to approve or veto the 
choice of the electors. The Golden Bull of 1356 prescribed the regula- 
tions for the election of the Emperor. The number of electors was 
fixed at seven, three of them to be ecclesiastics, the Archbishops of 
Mainz, Treves and Cologne, and four secular, the King of Bohemia, 
the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Duke of Saxony and the Mar- 

208 



The Holy Roman Empire and the Peace of Westphalia 

grave of Brandenburg. The Emperor maintained the electoral rights 
of the great ecclesiastics of the Rhine valley because he needed their 
support against the feudal nobility, virtually independent and always 
hostile. 

The title of Holy Roman Emperor gave its possessor neither lands, 
men, nor money. The electors were concerned to see that the 
Emperor was not too powerful. Hence their preference for princelings, 
such as Rudolph of Hapsburg. They were anxious that the dignity 
should not become hereditary, but it none the less became hereditary 
in the House of Hapsburg after 1438. Maximilian (1493-15 19) 
added large stretches of territory to the ancient Austrian possessions. 

Every Emperor felt himself under an obligation to undertake an 
expedition into Italy. There they came in contact with the Franks. 
The hostility of both Pope and Emperor to the Kings of France, 
subject to the jurisdiction of neither, was a bond of sympathy between 
them. 

In 15 19 Francis I. of France was a rival candidate to Charles, 
grandson of Maximilian, for the imperial dignity. Thus began that 
series of wars between Austria and France, broken only by the Seven 
Years War, which lasted to 1859. 

Richelieu intervened in the Thirty Years War when he appealed 
to the King of Sweden to save Germany from the ravages of Tilly 
and Wallenstein's hordes. By the Treaty of Paris of November 1st, 
1634, the Swedes asked the King of France to take possession of 
Alsace, as protector, on condition that the Protestant princes and 
States concluded no peace or truce with the Emperor without the 
consent of France and Sweden. 

The war continued for a further fourteen years with armies which 
consisted largely of personal followers of their generals, who could 
only offer them pillage for pay. When all the booty was exhausted 
the armies perished of hunger, without any vital military operations 
having taken place. The French, so far from prolonging these 
misfortunes, put an end to them by their intervention in concert with 
Sweden. 

The Treaty of Westphalia was inspired by the book of the jurist 
Chemnitz, " De Ratione Status in Imperio Nostro Romanico-Ger- 
manico." The diplomats merely applied it.* Chemnitz laid down 
that the German constitution ought to be regarded as a product of 
the national soil, and that it was impossible, and indeed ridiculous, 

* Bryce : The Holy Roman Empire. Ch. xix. 

209 14 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

to apply to Germany the so-called Ux rsgia and the whole absolutist 
system of Justinian which the Emperors had established. He went on 
to denounce the House of Hapsburg and its incessant quarrels with 
the nobility and to anticipate the downfall of the House of Austria. 

The Emperor was to recognize the sovereignty of all the princes, 
Catholic and Protestant without distinction, over their respective 
territories. The Princes and States of Germany were to enjoy in 
all the national assemblies a free and deciding voice on all questions 
of imperial policy, new legislation, the declaration of war, the raising 
of troops, and the imposition of taxation in the interests of the 
Federation. The free towns were to have a deciding voice in the 
local diets. The electors and princes might make alliances together, 
and even with foreign powers, provided that these were not aimed at 
the Emperor or the Empire. 

Among those who profited most by the Treaty of Westphalia was 
the Elector of Brandenburg to whom d'Avaux, the French Minister, 
wrote : " Monsieur, I have done all that I could to serve you." He 
lost Upper Pomerania, but gained the fertile country of -Magdeburg, 
the bishoprics of Cammin and Halberstadt and the principality of 
Minden. 

France had paid the Swedes and given various subsidies during 
the Thirty Years War. She demanded no indemnity from the 
stricken lands but contented herself with the recognition of her 
claims to the three bishoprics of Verdun, Toul and Metz, and Alsace 
without Strasburg. She gave the Archdukes of the Tyrol three million 
livres for Alsace and Sundgau. She retained old Breisach and its 
dependencies and the right of garrisoning Philipsburg. Strasburg 
attached itself to France in 1682, and later she acquired Pignerol 
and Casal in full sovereignty, independent of the Empire. 

Holland and Switzerland were declared autonomous States. An 
eighth electorate was created in favour of the Palatinate. 

The Protestant and Catholic States were put on the same footing. 
Lutherans and Calvinists were to be outside the jurisdiction of the 
Papacy and all other Catholic States. 

This treaty marked the abrogation of the temporal authority of 
Rome. The Emperor Ferdinand had deprived the Protestants of 
the privileges won by the Peace of Passau, and France and Sweden 
were of one mind to restore them. They reverted to the religious 
situation of 1624, the sixth year of the war, except in the Palatinate 
and the Palatine territories, where the situation of 1619 was restored. 

210 



The Holy Roman Empire and the Peace of Westphalia 

The possession of the ecclesiastical property which had passed into 
the hands of the Protestants was duly confirmed to them. Austria 
was excluded from the scope of the treaty except for Silesia, where 
the Lutherans gained the right to build new churches. 

The Treaty of Westphalia was signed at Miinster and Osnabruck 
on October 14th, 1648, as a " fundamental and perpetual law." The 
Pope launched a Bull against it, but the Bull was without effect. 
However, it was manifest that the Emperor had been shorn of the 
absolute powers conferred on Charlemagne by the Pope " to defend 
the Faith against the heretic and to carry it abroad into heathen 
lands." 

This treaty gave peace to Germany, harried and distracted, but 
she owed it to the efforts of France and Sweden. Germany continued 
to be spoken of as the Empire, as the seat of the Roman Empire ; 
but the Emperor had no longer any possessions in Italy, and even in 
Germany he was only the titular head of a republic of principalities 
and towns. 

It was by virtue of his imperial authority that the Emperor 
Leopold I. conferred the title of King of Prussia on the Elector of 
Brandenburg. Prussia, however, was a little patch of territory on 
the banks of the Niemen, and was not incorporated in the Empire. 
The King of Prussia remained Elector of Brandenburg. 

The Treaties of Utrecht (171 3) and Rastadt ( 1 7 1 4) gave the 
Emperor the Low Countries, Naples, Sardinia, the Milanese and 
Tuscany, and once more turned imperial policy towards Italy. 

Prussians are in the habit of speaking of the French as " the 
hereditary enemy," yet the importance of Prussia dates from the 
Treaty of Westphalia in which France played a part they cannot 
ignore. 

Frederick William, the father of Frederick the Great who was the 
ally of Austria, was anxious to destroy French influence in Germany. 
In 1733 he concluded an agreement with Austria and Russia to prevent 
the election of Stanislaus Leszczinski, the French candidate, to the 
throne of Poland. 



211 14* 



CHAPTER II 

FRANCE AND PRUSSIA FROM 1735 TO 1814 

France as the ally of Prussia — The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) — France 
allied to Austria during the Seven Years War — The Brunswick manifesto 
in 1792 — The Treaty of Bale in 1795 — The Franco-Prussian Agreement — 
The Treaty of Luneville — The gains of Prussia and Austria — The Holy 
Roman Empire becomes Protestant — The Diet of Ratisbon — Napoleon's 
mistake — The Convention of Potsdam and the results of Austerlitz — The 
Peace of Pressburg — The Confederation of the Rhine (July 12th, 1806) — 
The end of the Holy Roman Empire — Napoleon the heir of Charlemagne — 
The war with Prussia — The Treaty of Tilsit — Napoleon's acts — Stein — 
General Scharnhorst — Prussia's offers to France — Yorck and the Prussian 
forces after the Russian campaign — Hardenberg : bribes to France — 
Prussia's indifference to the fate of Germany — The Treaty of Kalisch — 
The King of Prussia's summons to his people — The Treaty of Paris — The 
Germanic Confederation. 

WHEN Frederick the Great set out to conquer Silesia he asked 
for an alliance with France. France sent 40,000 men into 
Bavaria instead of invading the Low Countries. Maria Theresa 
abandoned Silesia to Prussia. The French army was besieged in 
Prague, and France found herself in arms against all Europe after 
having fought for the sole advantage of Prussia. After continuing the 
war for five years France surrendered, by the Treaty of Aix-la- 
Chapelle, all the Low Countries, the larger part of which was in her 
occupation. Madame de Pompadour had said to the French envoys : 
" Do not return without peace. It is the King's wish." 

It is true that during the Seven Years War France was the ally 
of Maria Theresa against Frederick the Great. The situation marked 
a revolution in her diplomacy. Frederick beat the Saxons so 
thoroughly that he incorporated their forces in his own ; but if he 
triumphed over the coalition against him, it was largely due to the 
incompetence of the French generals. He was able to pit Prussia, 
a powerful Protestant and unified State, against Austria, Catholic 
and a medley of different races. 

Maria Theresa bought the succession to the Electorate of Bavaria 

212 



France and Prussia from 1735 to 1814 

from its direct heir, the Elector Palatine. Frederick opposed this 
step and was supported by France and Russia (1779). 

During the eighteenth century France was at one time the enemy, 
at another the ally, of Prussia. On the 27th of August, 1791, the 
King of Prussia, Frederick William, and the Emperor Leopold II. 
met at Pilnitz, near Dresden, and announced their intention of inter- 
vening in favour of Louis XVI. On the 25th of July, 1792, the Duke 
of Brunswick, commanding the Prussian army, issued a manifesto 
threatening to deliver over the capital of France to a military execu- 
tion unless Louis XVI. were restored to all his rights. This mani- 
festo produced the events of the loth of August. The Prussians 
were beaten at Valmy on the 20th of September, 1792, and in 1795 
the King of Prussia abandoned the enemies of the Revolution by the 
Treaty of Bale. The instructions given to Count Golz, the Prussian 
Minister, included the intimation that " Prussia had always had a 
friendly feeling for France, as his Majesty had proved more than once 
in the course of the war."* 

This treaty and its supplementary articles gave France the Rhine 
Provinces, while the circles of Westphalia, Lower and Upper Saxony, 
and the part of the two circles of the Rhine situated on the right 
bank of the Main formed a line of demarcation, the neutrality of 
which Prussia undertook to respect. 

France was virtually granting Prussia a protectorate over Northern 
Germany. Prussia, by making a separate peace, betrayed the Holy 
Roman Empire. 

By the Treaty of Luneville (February 9th, 1801) Prussia offered to 
adapt her foreign policy to that of the First Consul, to conclude a 
formal alliance with him and to guarantee all his territorial arrange- 
ments in Italy. The treaty provided that all the lay princes with 
possessions on the left bank of the Rhine which passed to France 
should be indemnified. The indemnities were raised by a method 
which had already been employed during the Reformation, and at 
the time of the Peace of Westphalia — the secularization of the eccle- 
siastical states. Catholic Austria, as well as Lutheran Prussia, 
regarded those territories, with their inhabitants, as so much 
property, the fair subject of bargain. Austria took for the Emperor's 
relations, two Italian archdukes, and Prussia for the Stadtholder of 

* Histoirc de la Prusse depuis la mort de Fridiric II. jusqu'a la hataille de 
Sadowa, by Eugene Veron (Paris, F. Alcan). Thiers : Histoire du Consulat et de 
I' Empire. 

213 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Holland, none of whom had any interest in Germany, a quarter of 
the secularizations. 

The First Consul, faced with the difficulty of satisfying so many 
demands, asked the Emperor of Russia to intervene at the same time 
as himself. 

Prussia had lost on the left bank of the Rhine the duchies of Geldern 
and Jiilich, the principality of Mceurs, and a part of the duchy of 
Cleves, territories with a population of 137,000 and a revenue of 
£120,000. By a compact of the 13th of May, 1802, with France, 
Prussia received in exchange the bishoprics of Paderborn and Hildes- 
heim, Eichsfeldt, Erfurt, Untergleichen, the town and bishopric of 
Miinster, with several other towns and abbeys. She gained a popula- 
tion of more than 400,000 by the exchange. The Prince of Nassau 
received the bishopric and abbey of Fulda and the abbeys of Corwen 
and Weingarten which were to revert to Prussia if the direct line failed. 

The First Consul next came to an understanding with Baden, 
Wiirtemberg and the two Hesses, which were handsomely treated. 

Austria, too, could not complain, for she received for the Archduke 
of Tuscany the bishoprics of Brixen, Trent, Salzburg, Passau (without 
the fortress of Passau) and Berchtesgaden, representing a revenue 
of 3,500,000 florins as compensation for the loss of a revenue of 
2,500,000. 

This remodelling involved a profound change in the constitution 
of the Holy Roman Empire. The electoral college was previously 
composed of eight members, but of the three ecclesiastical electors 
two had disappeared, the Archbishops of Cologne and Treves. There 
remained Bohemia, the Elector Palatine for Bavaria and the Pala- 
tinate, the King of Prussia for Brandenburg and the King of England 
for Hanover. Finally, the number of Electors was raised to ten, 
but the Protestants commanded six votes against four Catholic votes. 
If the Protestants had elected a new Emperor of their own faith, the 
Holy Roman Empire would have had for its head a heretic from 
whom the Pope could not have demanded a renewal of Charlemagne's 
oath against heretics. 

The Catholic majority in the College of Princes, fifty-four votes to 
forty-three, likewise disappeared. Almost all the princes who succeeded 
to the ecclesiastical votes were Protestants, and therefore on the side 
of Prussia. Yet there were cross-divisions. Catholic Bavaria voted 
with Prussia against Austria and Protestant Saxony was always in 
opposition to Prussia, of whom she stood in fear. 

214 



France and Prussia from 1735 to 1814 

On February 25th, 1803, the Diet of Ratisbon adopted the pro- 
visions of the Treaty of Luneville. Sweden alone opposed them. 
The members of the Diet, far from concealing their satisfaction at the 
results achieved, were anxious that the execution of the treaty should 
be entrusted to France. Austria ratified it on the 24th of March, 
and, in breach of faith, seized the thirty million florins which had 
been deposited in the Bank of Vienna by the States recently secularized. 

Bonaparte's policy had been clever, but after the rupture of the 
Treaty of Amiens in 1803 he sent forces to occupy Hanover, and 
the Czar was a guarantor of the execution of the arrangements come 
to at the Diet of Ratisbon. He had also extended his protection to 
the kingdom of Naples which Napoleon proceeded to occupy likewise. 
The seizure of the Duke d'Enghien on territory belonging to Baden 
was the immediate cause of the break with Russia. Napoleon was 
anxious to secure the help of Prussia, but that Power was alarmed 
at the occupation of Hanover and the closing of the Elbe and Weser. 
The Prussian aristocracy hated France. Queen Louisa had been 
won over by the Czar of Russia, Alexander. King Frederick William 
remained neutral. Before Austerlitz he dared not accept Hanover 
which Napoleon offered him, but while he made the Russians respect 
the neutrality of his territory the French armies violated it. 

Then came the Convention of Potsdam between Alexander and the 
King of Prussia ; but immediately after Austerlitz, the Prussian 
envoy at Vienna, Count Haugwitz, congratulated Napoleon on his 
victory. " That is a compliment the direction of which has been 
changed by fate," came the answer. But he made good use of it. 
On December 15 th he signed with Haugwitz an offensive and defensive 
alliance giving Hanover to Prussia. He robbed her of 400,000 sub- 
jects and gave her a million. This treaty, however, was not ratified 
in Berlin. While the King of Prussia was wasting time in hesitation 
and vacillation, Napoleon decided to create the Confederation of the 
Rhine. 

The Peace of Pressburg had expelled Austria from Italy and 
conferred important benefits on Bavaria. Napoleon gave the title 
of King to the Princes of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg. He first dis- 
closed his scheme of confederation to those two sovereigns and the 
Grand Duke of Baden without troubling himself about the views of 
the other princes and the free cities, much less those of the popula- 
tions concerned. He even made no attempt to preserve appearances, 
as he had in 1803. He handed the treaty for signature to the other 

215 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

princes who were included in the Confederation without asking their 
opinion. 

The Confederation was composed of two colleges. The College of 
Kings comprised the Prince Primate, ex-Elector of Mainz, the King 
of Bavaria who was given the free cities of Nuremburg and Ratisbon, 
the King of Wtirtemberg, the Grand Duke of Baden, the Grand Duke 
of Berg, the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt. The College of Princes 
was composed of the Dukes of Nassau, Usingen and Weilburg, the 
Princes of Hohenzollern-Hechingen and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 
the Princes of Salm-Salm, Salm-Kirburg, Isamburg, Aremberg, Lich- 
tenstein and Leyen. The old nobility of the territories comprised 
in these States were incorporated. They lost their rights of legislation, 
jurisdiction, police, taxation and recruiting. 

On the ist of August the French ambassador announced to the Diet 
of Ratisbon that the French Emperor, who consented to become the 
protector of the Confederation, no longer recognized the existence of 
the Empire. The Emperor Francis II., in a circular of August 6th, 
announced that he considered dissolved the old ties that bound him to 
the Germanic body, released from their allegiance the States which 
formed it, and confined his authority to the government of his 
hereditary dominions under the title of " Emperor of Austria," 
which he had adopted in 1804. The Holy Roman Empire, founded 
in 800 by the coronation of Charlemagne, had lasted one thousand 
and six years. Its disappearance was final. 

The Holy Roman Empire existed no longer, but Napoleon was 
obsessed by the memory of Charlemagne. Bourrienne tells us that 
he remarked one day : " I have succeeded Charlemagne, not 
Louis XIV." He intended to have a medal struck with the inscrip- 
tion, " Renovatio Imperii." He meant to become Emperor of the 
East, with a cortege of kings, grand-dukes, dukes and counts as his 
vassals. 

He sent a note to the King of Prussia to congratulate him on his 
release from the Imperial bonds. " It would give him great pleasure 
if Prussia would gather to his side, by means of a confederation 
like the Confederation of the Rhine, all the States of Northern Ger- 
many." He specified Hesse-Cassel, Saxony with its various branches, 
the two branches of Mecklemburg, and several Northern princelets. 
The King of Prussia, delighted with the proposal, wished to profit 
by it, but Napoleon, intoxicated by his victories, calmly invited the 
Prince of Hesse-Cassel to join the Confederation of the Rhine, holding 

216 



France and Prussia from 1735 to 1814 

out as bait the promise of Fulda which belonged to the Prince of 
Orange, the King of Prussia's brother-in-law. He forbade the Han- 
seatic towns, Bremen, Hamburg and Liibeck, to enter the Confedera- 
tion of the North. Simultaneously he treated with England 
for the restoration of Hanover which he had already given to 
Prussia. 

The King of Prussia resigned himself to the war which he had 
refused to make in concert with Austria and Russia. The famous 
army which he had inherited was disastrously beaten at Auerstadt 
and Jena (October 14th, 1806), and in seven weeks Prussia was no 
more. Russian help prolonged the campaign for seven months, 
and the Treaty of Tilsit was only concluded on the 9th of July, 
1807. The King of Prussia gave up all his possessions between the 
Rhine and the Elbe and these went to form the Kingdom of West- 
phalia. He had to recognize Jerome Bonaparte as its legitimate 
sovereign. He also gave up all Prussian Poland which was handed 
over to the Elector of Saxony. He kept East and West Prussia, 
Pomerania, Brandenburg and Silesia, about five million inhabitants 
out of ten. The King's commissioners calculated the deferred 
indemnity payable to the conqueror at 19 million francs. Daru 
claimed 154 millions, but agreed to take 35 millions. While this 
sum was being paid off, two hundred thousand men occupied Prussia 
and lived on the inhabitants. Prussia had two silver currencies 
at the time, of different standards. Naturally it was only the debased 
currency which remained in the country and it was three years before 
it could be withdrawn from circulation. Prussia was also affected 
by the Continental blockade. She could no longer export wood and 
was unable to import national necessities. 

After her defeat, the Confederation of the Rhine comprised four 
kingdoms, five grand duchies, twenty-three duchies and principalities, 
and had a population of twenty millions. Napoleon wished to create 
principalities and kingdoms for the members of his family. He 
created the Grand Duchy of Berg and gave it first to Murat, his 
brother-in-law, and afterwards to one of the sons of the King of 
Holland, an infant in the cradle. He had created the Kingdom of 
Westphalia for his brother Jerome, whom he married to the daughter 
of the King of Wiirtemberg. He married Eugene de Beauharnais to 
the daughter of the King of Bavaria. He made the Elector of Saxony 
a king as a rival to the King of Prussia and endowed him with the 
Grand Duchy of Warsaw and New Galicia. He alarmed and disgusted 

217 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

the whole world b ny in this id his sole 

faithful friend and ally was the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmsl 

Napoleon tain number of reforms which, 

while unquestionably of general utility, irritated the priv 

5CS. I the land of their birth by his 

and his Continental system made his rule 

universally loath;". (irected Europe's sympathies *. 

Britain. He had made k. iukes and dukes, but he made 

. secret oi s contempt for the puppets which he thus dignified. 

m of hatred. 
A P - minister, Stein, nee in Pi. 

. '.eon had him expelled from the minis: .red his arrest 

ion of hi- y. Hies him seem 

itriotk martyr in the eyes U Prussia] - 
To beal ... d the Napoleonic Stein introduced the prin- 

ciples of i - ".' into Prussia. He transformed th< serfs . country 

cts into gricultural and commercial 

.: to hold land just as the nobility were all< 
gage ind industry. He gave the towns the French 

municipal constitution of i~ s 

The army had bee :duced te ad men. Ge. 

.a unive: ice with die Landwehr 

.sturm, so that the whole m ived military 

;. and he opened die higher ranks to the middle cl isses, 
uiwhile Austria had been reorganizing under the direction of 
Count Stadion ... [8c believed that the moment was rir 
revenge. She issued an appeal to the German ss. Except 

for the Tyrol, her . aatWagram, 

and had to cede Salzburg Berchtesj .d the Inn region to 

- 1 ern Galicia to the Duchy of W; 
Galicia to Russia. France took ( Cars Friuli and Trieste, 

which woe [stria and i to form the Illyrian Provii 

Tlie Tyrol opposed a most determined resistance to Bavarian domi- 
nation and when it v come B.. - compelled to hand 
part of it to the m oi Italy, She had also to cede Ulm 
to Wiirtemberg, but received in exchange the princip. 
Radsbcn and Bayreuth. 

X.-.roleon had made his brother Louis King of He". 

::ot sufficiently zealous in enforcing the Continent.:" System and 
was made to abdicate. Holland and the Hanseatic towns of Hamburg, 

2l8 



France and Prussia from 1735 to 1814 

Bremen and Liibeck, the Duchy of Oldenburg, a part of Hanover 
and several petty States were incorporated in the French Empire 
(December, 1810). This Empire then comprised one hundred and 
thirty departments, extended from the Elbe to Carigliono in Italy, 
and had as its feudatories the kingdoms of Italy, Naples, Spain, 
Westphalia, Saxony and Bavaria. 

In April, 181 1, the King of Prussia, prompted by his minister 
Hardenberg, offered France his alliance, and on February 28th, 181 2, 
Napoleon condescended to accept it. On the 9th of March he left 
Paris and took up his residence in Dresden, where he held a court of 
kings until the 22nd of June, the date of his declaration of war on 
Russia. He incorporated in his army twenty thousand Prussians, 
thirty thousand Austrians, and other troops raised by conscription 
in all the States of the Confederation of the Rhine. 

After the retreat from Moscow, General Yorck, commanding the 
Prussian contingent, was induced by Clausewitz, then in the service 
of Russia, to go over to them. The King of Prussia was terrified when 
he heard of this betrayal. At the suggestion of Hardenberg, he 
wrote to Hatzfeld, his minister in Paris : " I am the natural ally of 
France. If I change sides, I only give the Emperor the right to regard 
me as an enemy. If he will give me a subsidy I will raise and equip 
fifty to sixty thousand men for his service."* At the same time he 
offered the Czar Alexander to make an alliance if the Russians would 
make an immediate advance towards the Vistula and the Oder. 

A few days after Yorck's defection, Hardenberg suggested to Saint- 
Marsan, the French Ambassador, that the King of Prussia should be 
made King of Poland. " The sea and land frontiers of Prussia and 
Poland would enclose a compact mass which would be a formidable 
barrier against encroachments of Russian power." The King of 
Prussia and Hardenberg were only thinking of Prussia. They cared 
little for the liberation and unity of Germany which the Hohen- 
zollerns have since wished to incarnate in their own persons. Saint- 
Marsan wrote to Maret : " If the Emperor would do something 
for Prussia, it would be very easy, notwithstanding the exasperation 
of the nation, to keep Frederick William in the path he has followed 
hitherto." The King proceeded against Yorck as Napoleon ordered, 
but Yorck, established at Konigsberg in the old kingdom of Prussia, 
and disregarding the King's commands, was organizing the country 

* See Eugene Veron : Histoire de la Prttsse depuis la mort de Fridiric II., 
p. 180 (Paris, F. Alcan). 

219 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

with Stein who had been furnished with plenary powers by the 
Czar, and putting the finishing touches to his army. The Cossacks 
advanced to Berlin. Scharnhorst raised the levies in Silesia at the 
very moment when Napoleon completed the ruin of the country by 
his requisitions for the garrisons of the Oder. 

At the same time Napoleon informed the Corps Legislatif that he 
intended to maintain the integrity of the territories of all his allies. 
The King of Prussia could thus no longer count on the compensa- 
tion he expected. Stein met him secretly at Breslau on the 27th of 
February. 

After the crossing of the Niemen the Russian army had been 
reduced to about fifty thousand men. The Emperor Alexander was 
ready for peace, but Kutusoff, representing Russia, and Scharnhorst, 
representing Prussia, signed a treaty between the two countries at 
Kalisch on the 28th of February. The King of Prussia followed, and 
on March 17th he issued an appeal to his people and by two edicts 
called out the Landwehr and Landsturm. The preamble of the 
summons to the Landsturm ran thus : " At the approach of the 
enemy all the inhabitants of the villages must fly after filling up the 
wells and destroying or carrying away the corn stocks. The struggle 
to which you are called justifies all means. The most terrible are 
the best." In two and a half months Prussia, a State with a population 
of hardly 4,500,000, produced an army of 148,000 men, to which 
another 100,000 men were added two months later. Napoleon, who 
had failed by incredible negligence to see through the Landwehr 
and Landsturm scheme, said : " Prussia can bring 40,000 men 
against me in two months and never more than 75,000." 

On April 10th Napoleon suggested to Austria the partition of 
Prussia. On June 15th, Austria, Russia and Prussia signed a treaty 
of alliance at Reichenbach. On August 20th Austria declared war 
on France. On October 19th the Saxons deserted the French army 
on the battlefield of Leipzig. 

The suppression of the Kingdom, of Westphalia had been proclaimed 
on September 28th. Bavaria had united her forces with those of 
Austria on October 8th. The Confederation of the Rhine was already 
dissolved. The King of Wiirtemberg, the Grand Duke of Baden 
and the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt had made treaties with the 
Allies. The dispossessed rulers, Frederick William of Brunswick, 
the Prince of Oldenburg, the Elector of Hesse, returned to their States. 
Napoleon's work on the right bank of the Rhine had been undone by 

220 



France and Prussia from 1735 to 1814 

the end of 1813. On January 1st, 1814, the allied armies crossed 
that river. On the 1st of March Russia, England, Austria and Prussia 
concluded the Treaty of Chaumont, by which each engaged not to 
make a separate peace and not to treat with Napoleon. 

On the 30th of May the Treaty of Paris was signed, confining 
France within her frontiers of January, 1792. It contained this 
expression : " The States of Germany will be independent and united 
by a federal bond." The Congress entrusted with the work of 
reorganization met at Vienna in September. 



2a 1 



CHAPTER III 
THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 

The programme of the Treaty of Kalisch and the achievements of the Congress 
of Vienna — Talleyrand — The rule of law — Public law — The contempt of 
the Prussians and the Czar of Russia for public law — Austria, Talleyrand 
and Lord Castlereagh — The Treaty of January 3rd, 18 15 — The disastrous 
mistake of Talleyrand and Lord Castlereagh — Acquisitions of Prussia, 
Austria and Russia — Switzerland — The provisions of the Congress of 
Vienna relating to the Germanic Confederation — Prussia's discontent — 
" Only accept the Rhine Province for the defence of Germany " — The Holy 
Alliance — The final decree of the Congress of Vienna. 

ACCORDING to the proclamation of Kalisch (March 25th, 1813), 
the Czar of Russia and the King of Prussia " intended to 
re-establish an ancient Empire." However, the treaties of Teplitz, 
Chaumont and Paris said nothing about any resurrection and the 
matter was not mentioned at Vienna. 

Catholic Austria made no attempt to undo the secularizations of 
1803, to re-establish the mediatized nobility in their ancient status 
or to return to the election of the Emperors and restore to them 
the title of " Roman " Emperor. 

Friedrich von Gentz, the secretary of the Congress, admitted in a 
report of February 12th, 1815, that 

" The high-sounding phrases about the reconstruction of the social order, 
the regeneration of the political system of Europe, a lasting peace founded on 
a true distribution of power, and so on, were uttered with a view to the calming 
of national unrest and to give that solemn assembly an air of dignity and 
grandeur. But the real function of the Congress was to distribute the spoils 
of the vanquished among the victors."* 

By the Treaty of Chaumont (March 1st, 18 14), the four great 
Powers, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia had resolved that 
France, reduced to the frontiers of 1792, should have no voice in the 

* Debidour : Histoire de la Diplomatie — MSmoires de Metternich, Vol. II., 
p. 474- 

222 



-: 



The Congress of Vienna 

disposal of the territories to be partitioned. At Vienna they had 
decided that important questions should be determined by themselves 
alone. 

Talleyrand, the representative of France, cleverly grouped round 
him all the smaller powers by his declaration that the assembled States 
might be unequal in size, but had equal rights, and owing to him, 
France, Spain, Portugal and Sweden were associated with the 
committee instructed to draw up the programme. 

Talleyrand enunciated the principle of " Legitimacy " in these 
terms : " The first task of Europe is to banish the view that rights 
can be acquired by conquest alone." He demanded that the words 
" all arrangements shall be in conformity with public law " should be 
inserted in the declaration of the 8th of October. The plenipoten- 
tiaries of Prussia, Hardenberg and Humboldt, made a violent protest. 
On October 23rd the Czar of Russia said to Talleyrand : " Public law 
is nothing to me. What value do you think I set on your parchments 
and treaties ? " Thus those who had assembled to draw up a treaty 
announced beforehand their contempt for the undertaking on which 
they were engaged. 

When Talleyrand contrasted " Legitimacy " with force, he was 
adopting the point of view that rulers and sovereigns are pro- 
prietors. He never mentioned the feelings of their subjects because 
that aspect of the question was never considered by anyone. 

Prussia wanted to incorporate the Kingdom of Saxony and Russia 
supported her. Austria did not want Prussia as her next-door 
neighbour. Talleyrand made with England and Austria the Treaty 
of January 3rd, 1815. The King of Saxony kept his title and rather 
more than half of his territories. The rest was given to Prussia with 
other portions which added 855,000 to her population. It is ex- 
tremely regrettable that Talleyrand did not abandon Saxony to 
Prussia instead of giving her on the west the Rhine Province and 
Westphalia which have been the source of her wealth. He thereby 
brought Prussia into immediate contact with France. The French 
representative made Prussia the bulwark of Germany against 
France.* 

The new Prussia was twice as large and populous as the Prussia 
of Frederick II. It fell into two groups. One consisted of East 
Prussia and Brandenburg, connected by Pomerania, the valley of the 

* For Talleyrand's mistake see the " Memoires du Chancelier Pasquier," 
Vol. III., Ch. 4 and 5. 

223 



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ich shall be 

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&4 



The Congress of Vienna 

become general and Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria and Hanover shall 
have four vot':. each, 'ih<: total number of votes shall be sixty-nine, 

"The Diet shall be permanent buf may adjourn for periods not exceeding 
four months. 

"Article 63 provides thai the confederate Princes engage to undertake the 
defence, riot merely of ail Germany, but of all the individual the Union, 

and mutually guarantee ail their ;•■ bich are included in the 

f< derate territories, J he confederate Princes may at any time conclude alliances 
with foreign Princes wrho arc not members of the Confederation, provided that 
such alliances are not aimed at the Confederation or any of the individual 
States. They shall undertake also not to make war upon each other foi 

) and to submit their differences to th<: arbitration of the Diet. If this 
method fails and a decision shall become necessary, it shall be furnished by a 
court (Aw.traf'al Tnstanz) to which the contending parties shall appeal. 

" The seal of the Di< I shall be .-it Frankfort, and the presidency in perpetuity 
shall pertain to Austria." 

From 1795 to 1X06, and again from 18 10 to the middle of 181 2, 
Prussia had worked for her own hand, caring nothing for the inf- 
of Germany. If Napoleon had shown rather less contempt for her 
King, Frederick William, the Prussian monarch had been his humble 
servant. As a reward for his particularist policy he induced the 
Congress of Vienna to double the area of Prussia. Yet both he and 
his ministers, Hardenberg and Stein, were dissatisfied. Prussia had 
had to surrender Franconia to Bavaria which had remained attached 
to Austria. Further, her long stretch of territory from Memel to 
Sarrebriick was cut in twain by Hanover, which also separated her 
from the North Sea. She had also been compelled to cede East Frisia 
to Hanover. The inhabitants of the Rhine valley were Catholic, 
strongly imbued with French traditions and influences, and formed 
a heterogeneous element which weakened Prussia. The Prussian 
statesmen consented to receive the Rhine Province " solely for the 
defence of Germany," and gave Prussia the role of champion of 
Germany. 

This pretence of devotion was wasted on the princelets of Germany, 
who knew Prussia's covetous nature and feared absorption. They 
grouped themselves round Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden, and 
maintained their timorous and suspicious particularism. 

The promises of reform made by Stein and other Prussian and 
German patriots (to the German people), and more or less endorsed 
by their rulers, were not so much as mentioned at the Congress of 
Vienna. 

On September 26th, 1815, the Czar of Russia, the Emperor of 

225 15 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Austria and the King of Prussia signed the compact of the " Holy 
Alliance." England stood aloof. 

On August 19th, 1 8 19, eleven members of the Confederation met 
at Carlsbad and passed resolutions which became the final provisions 
of the Congress of Vienna. They proclaimed that " the fundamental 
principle of the Germanic Confederation requires that the sovereign 
power should reside in the supreme head of the Government." They 
admitted the right of intervention in cases where an internal rebellion 
menaced the security of the other States of the Federation. The Diet 
assumed the right to take action against the Press for any publication 
or newspaper in any of the federal States and power to carry out 
these laws, if necessary by force, was entrusted to a commission of 
five members. Measures were taken against the universities and 
a commission was appointed to search out those suspected of Liberal 
sympathies. 

Every princelet, not to mention the King of Prussia, exploited and 
tyrannized over his subjects to his heart's content. 



226 



CHAPTER IV 

PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA. 1847— 1866 

Frederick William's opposition to a written constitution — The Revolution of 
1848 and German unity — "Prussia transformed into Germany" — The 
Parliament of Frankfort — The elimination of Austria — Offer of the Imperial 
crown to the King of Prussia — The Treaty of the Three Kings — The Parlia- 
ment of Erfurt — The Diet of Frankfort — The Convention of Olmutz — 
Prussia's desire for revenge — Bismarck and the prussification of Germany 
— Ferro et igne — Governing without Parliament — " Might is right " — 
Bismarck and the Polish insurrection — The question of the Duchies — 
Napoleon III., Austria and Prussia — Bismarck and Napoleon III. — The 
war of 1866 — The preliminaries of peace at Nikolsburg — The Treaty of 
Prague — Prussia's gains — The question of compensation — M. Benedetti's 
ignorance — His fears in 1868. 

IN 1847 Frederick William IV. consented to give Prussia a Parlia- 
ment, but on the nth of April, at the convocation of the Diet, 
he said : 

" I could never allow a piece of parchment to interpose as a second Providence 
between God, Our Lord in Heaven, and this country, to govern us by its clauses 
and substitute them for holy and time-honoured fidelity." 

Then came the revolution of 1848. The King worked on the 
popular fear that France would try to recover the Rhine Provinces. 
Yet he was obliged to promise domestic reforms, though he tried to 
alter the character of these concessions. 

" We demand before everything that Germany shall be transformed from 
a federation of States into a federal State. We demand a uniform military 
system for the whole of Germany, a replica of the Prussian system with a federal 
Commander-in-Chief. We demand a German flag and a German fleet, a German 
federal court to deal with differences between the peoples and States." 

He tried to rouse the passion for German unity in the hope of 
distracting his subjects from questions of constitutional reform and 
liberty. Immediately after the rising of the 20th of March he pro- 

227 15* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

claimed that " he felt himself called to save German liberty and 
unity." On the 21st he ordered his troops to wear the German 
cockade with the Prussian cockade and announced in a proclamation 
that " from that moment Prussia was transformed into Germany." 

Austria and the other Powers found Frederick William IV.'s inter- 
pretation of the " federal decree " of the Congress of Vienna somewhat 
singular. If it was thus torn up as regards the Germanic Confederation, 
what value could it have in relation to the other States ? 

Meanwhile a congress of fifty delegates, self-appointed delegates, 
sitting at Heidelberg, had decided to convene a German national 
parliament. This parliament was only an assembly more or less 
regularly elected. It evolved, after much effort, a constitution for 
the German Empire. It declared that a German state could not 
form a single state with non-German states. This was to leave the 
Emperor of Austria only a personal tie with Hungary, Bohemia 
and Italy. At that time there was a sharp dissension between the 
" Little Germany " party, which would only admit Germans into the 
German Empire, and the " Greater Germany " party, which wished 
to include all the dependent peoples of the Austrian Empire. The 
Assembly pronounced in favour of the former (November 27th), 
and thus made Prussia thenceforth the mistress of Germany. 

On January 14th, 1849, it turned Austria out of the Germanic 
Empire. On March 27th it voted that the Imperial crown should be 
hereditary in the house of the sovereign it might select, and on the 
28th it offered the Imperial crown to the King of Prussia by 290 votes 
against 248 abstentions. Austria recalled her deputies. On April 26th 
the Prussian Chamber ordered the Ministry to recognize the Constitu- 
tion of Frankfort. The Chamber was dissolved next day. The King 
refused the Imperial crown, protested against the Constitution and 
invited the sovereigns to a congress. It was just after the Russians 
had invaded Hungary, and fear of Austria, freed from anxiety as 
regards the revolt of Hungary, must be regarded as a factor in the 
decision of the King of Prussia. 

The Parliament of Frankfort vanished, but Frederick William was 
seeking an occasion to seize the Imperial crown, which he had refused. 
With the Kings of Saxony and Hanover he concluded the Treaty of 
the Three Kings, of which the declared object was to " maintain the 
internal and external security of Germany." Austria did not admit 
the validity of a commission of five members which met at Berlin for 
that object. The King persuaded this commission to convoke a 

228 



Prussia and Austria, 1847-1866 

new federal parliament to meet at Erfurt, a town in Prussia. 
Twenty-seven German Governments approved of this project, but 
it turned out to be a phantom. On April 26th, 1850, Austria sum- 
moned the members of the ancient Diet to Frankfort. The Diet 
resumed its functions in spite of a protest from Prussia. On Septem- 
ber 7th, 1850, the Elector of Hesse proclaimed a state of siege because 
the Assembly of States refused to authorize him to raise a loan 
without specifying its object. He demanded the help of the German 
Diet when Prussian troops invaded his country. War seemed inevit- 
able. Prussia gave way and submitted to the Convention of Olmiitz, 
whereby she abandoned the Erfurt scheme and accepted Austria's 
policy with regard to Schleswig-Holstein. She also withdrew her 
troops from Hesse and Baden and pledged herself to conform to the 
decisions of the Congress which was to meet at Dresden. 

Thenceforth the Prussian Government devoted itself to schemes 
of revenge for this rebuff. During the Crimean War Prussia main- 
tained neutrality while Austria threatened to intervene against Russia. 

In 1857 Frederick William's mental affliction had reached such a 
stage that the Prince Royal, William, had to take over the govern- 
ment. He represented the Liberal party but that party's idea of 
Liberalism was the prussification of Germany. Bismarck published 
a manifesto which contained a frank declaration : 

" Prussia can no longer remain with Austria in the Germanic Confederation 
as constituted by the federal decree of 181 5 and the final decree of 1820. She 
could never have permitted its reconstruction in 1851, and it is to her interest 
to bring about its dissolution." 

The regent William showed his approval of this view by appointing 
Bismarck as his minister to Russia and Bismarck set himself to secure 
the support of that Power by efforts which were not without result. 
He was next sent to Paris. Bismarck, in his correspondence, 
denounced " the federal constitution from which Prussia suffered," 
which he desired to destroy ferro et igne. In 1862 the King of 
Prussia selected him as President of the Council and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs with a view to compelling the Chamber of Deputies 
to vote the military credits they had refused. 

During the four years 1862 to 1866 the King of Prussia and Bis- 
marck governed without the Chamber voting any supplies. Each 
dissolution was followed by the return of the same members. From 
the start Bismarck had declared that since the deputies refused to 

229 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

vote supplies and the King and himself were of one mind in their 
determination to carry on the government, the affair had become 
a question of force, and that since force was on the side of the King 
and himself they would not give way. It was during this dispute 
that the famous expression " Might is Right " occurred. Bismarck 
denied having ever used it, but his opponents, when quoting it, were 
only condensing his thoughts. Bismarck carried on the government 
on the basis of the financial provisions of the year prior to his entry 
into the ministry and devoted the surplus to the military credits 
demanded by the King. 

The year 1863 was marked by the insurrection in Poland when 
Prussia earned the goodwill of Russia by handing over to the Russian 
authorities the insurgents who took refuge on her territory. 

Towards the close of that year Christian IX. mounted the throne 
of Denmark. The Constitution of November 15th, 1863, provided 
for the incorporation of Schleswig into the Danish States and the 
separation of Holstein. Prince Frederick Augustenburg replied by 
taking possession of the two Duchies in a proclamation of November 
1 6th, 1863. Prussia and Austria demanded that the constitution 
should be repealed. On January 20th, 1864, Prussian troops invaded 
the Duchies. Austria followed suit. The Danes resisted heroically 
until October 30th. The King of Denmark then had to cede Holstein, 
Schleswig and Lauenburg to Austria and Prussia. The two Powers 
immediately began to quarrel over the spoils. Bismarck successfully 
opposed all the claims of Austria and the Germanic Confederation. 
The Convention of Gastein on August 14th, 1865, decided that the 
Duchies should remain in possession of the conquerors and that 
Schleswig should revert to Prussia and Holstein to Austria. Prussia 
bought the Duchy of Lauenburg and Bismarck received the title of 
Count, but the undivided sovereignty was maintained. 

The Emperor Nicholas, related by marriage to the family of 
Holstein-Gottorp, might have claimed a reversion in some part of the 
Danish possessions, but he was grateful for Prussian support in 
crushing the Polish insurrection and acquiesced in the new situation. 
England proposed an international agreement, and Napoleon III. 
a congress ; but England was lacking in determination to have the 
Treaty of London of 1852 respected, and Napoleon III. was too busy 
in Mexican affairs to intervene effectively. 

I am not writing a history of French diplomacy but at times it is 
necessary for me to refer to French relations with Germany. 

230 



Prussia and Austria. 1847-1866 

The Germanic Confederation, an inert mass incapable of collective 
effort, was a guarantee of peace for France. Napoleon III. could only 
live down the memory of his coup d'etat by drawing public attention 
to questions of foreign policy, and this remorseless necessity imposed 
upon him so alarmed all the nations of Europe that, in spite of his 
declaration at Bordeaux in 185 1 that " the Empire means Peace," 
England, Russia, Austria and Prussia signed a secret agreement 
together on December 3rd, 1852. It must be admitted that the 
Emperor's foreign policy, involving the demise of the treaties of 
1815 and the principle of nationality, was capricious and alarming. 

The Crimean War united France and England in the prosecution 
of an ill-chosen task which ended in the guaranteeing of Turkish 
integrity by the Congress of Paris (1856). This war could only have 
drawn Russia and Prussia together. 

In the Italian War of 1859 Napoleon III. weakened Austria to the 
advantage of Prussia and helped to associate the interests of Prussia 
with those of Germany. Summoned by the Diet of Frankfort to 
intervene on Austria's behalf, Prussia did so, and it was owing to 
this action that Napoleon III. consented to the Peace of Villafranca 
which disappointed all the aspirations he had roused in Italy. Bis- 
marck went to Biarritz and fascinated Napoleon III. so thoroughly 
that the Emperor kept his photograph on his work-table. Bismarck 
came away with the conviction that Napoleon III. was an impractical 
dreamer who would always accept, with or without ill-grace, a 
fait accompli. 

Bismarck proposed a new federal constitution by making the 
Schleswig-Holstein question a federal affair. On June 10th he pre- 
sented to the Governments of the Southern States a scheme of constitu- 
tional reform which would make Germany a federal State from which 
Austria would be excluded. The supreme command of the armies 
of the North would pertain to the King of Prussia, that of the Southern 
armies to the King of Bavaria. Austria, while referring the Schleswig- 
Holstein question for decision to the Confederation, convened the 
State Assembly of Holstein for June nth, 1866. 

Prussia immediately invaded Holstein to compel the two Duchies 
to accept a single government. On June 9th Austria asked the Diet 
to decree the mobilization of the whole federal army with the excep- 
tion of the Prussian contingent. The Diet acquiesced in this demand 
by nine votes to six. On June 15th Prussia summoned Electoral 
Hesse, Saxony and Hanover to accept the new federal constitution 

231 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

and declare their neutrality. On their refusal they were invaded. 
Bavaria threw in her lot with them. 

Six weeks after the opening of hostilities, on the 26th of July, 1866, 
the preliminaries of peace between Prussia and Austria were signed at 
Nikolsburg. Immediately after the victory of Sadowa Bismarck had 
opposed the Prussian military clique which demanded the annexation 
of the territory taken from Austria and a triumphal entry into 
Vienna. He had three reasons for wishing to make peace as quickly 
as possible. He feared French intervention. He wanted to make 
Austria abandon the States which had fought with her, so that her 
weakness and the strength of Prussia would be manifest. Lastly, 
he hoped for a future alliance with Austria. 

The Emperor of Austria agreed to the dissolution of the Germanic 
Confederation and the exclusion of Austria from a reconstructed 
Germany. By the Treaty of Prague on August 23rd the independence 
of four German States south of the Main was recognized. Prussia 
waived the annexation of Saxony on condition that she entered the 
North German Confederation and put her army under the command 
of the King of Prussia. The Kingdom of Hanover, the Electorate of 
Hesse, the Duchy of Nassau, and the free city of Frankfort-on-the 
Main were incorporated in Prussia, the area of which was increased 
from 108,494 square miles to 134,622 square miles, while her popu- 
lation advanced from 19,600,000 to 23,900,000. Her territories also 
became compact. 

The commission of the Prussian Diet declared that they had 
searched in vain for a legal basis for these annexations to Prussia. 
" Prussia has made war," declared Herr Kirchmann, " and shall 
gather the fruits of war." Her wishes were her justification. 

M. Benedetti, in his plea for French diplomacy which he repre- 
sented at Berlin, has displayed the same unaccountable ignorance 
which characterized Napoleon III. Before the declaration of war 
Bismarck suggested a triple alliance of Prussia, France and Italy. 
He was prepared to accept rectification of frontiers, but Benedetti, 
in a letter of the 8th of June, said that " the King would be unwilling 
at the moment to consider the possibilities of such sacrifices." 
Bismarck generously offered compensation in Belgium. General 
Govone, who represented Italy, remarked to him that the present 
" of a country which had such strong national life and sentiment " 
was not a very tempting offer. Napoleon III. was warned that 
Prussia promised nothing but as soon as war broke out he said in his 

232 



Prussia and Austria. 1847-1866. 

speech at Auxerre : " If Prussia takes an inch of ground France 
will require compensation." 

If he spoke those words in good faith, he could not have known the 
dispatches of his ambassador. If he did know them, he was wittingly 
deceiving France. 

Immediately after the war, while Drouyn de Lluys refused to recog- 
nize Prussia's conquests, the Emperor recognized them without 
informing his minister. He replaced him by La Valette, who issued 
a note declaring that " France could only rejoice in the aggrandize- 
ment of Prussia," but discreetly expressing regret that Prussia did 
not have recourse to a plebiscite before annexing territory. This 
attitude was so extraordinary that no one believed in its sincerity. 
Bismarck refused all compensation in Germany but directed France 
to seek compensation in Belgium. At the same time, assigning to 
France the ambitions he had himself suggested, he used them to unite 
yet more closely the German States so recently hostile and excite 
alarm in Russia and England. 

Immediately after the triumph of Nikolsburg M. Benedetti wrote 
to Paris (July 26th, 1866) : 

" I shall tell Your Excellency nothing new when I say that Herr von Bis- 
marck's opinion is that we ought to seek compensation in Belgium and that he 
has offered to come to some arrangement with you." 

When Bismarck returned to Berlin he refused finally to give any 
sort of compensation on the Rhine. Benedetti confesses : 

" We have thus reached the point of drawing up a scheme of arrangement* 
which would settle the future of Belgium. I admit that we should get Luxem- 
burg at once, thanks to an understanding with the King of Holland, and that 
we should be authorized to take steps towards the ultimate union of Belgium 
with France, with the help of Prussia." 

Benedetti forwarded the scheme to Paris as Bismarck's own. The 
Emperor, in a letter to M. Rouher, makes no mention of the annexa- 
tion of Belgium, which he evidently regarded as unattainable at the 
moment. He only speaks of Luxemburg and the restoration of the 
federal fortresses to the different States, Luxemburg to France, 
Mainz and Saarlouis to Prussia, Landau to Bavaria, Rastadt to Baden, 
Ulm to Wiirtemberg. He mentions the annexation of Saxony, a 
Protestant state, to Prussia, and the transfer of the King of Saxony 

* Benedetti : Souvenirs Diplomatiques. L'Empereur Guillaume I. et le Prince 
de Bismarck, p. 58 et seq. 

233 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

to the left bank of the Rhine — Catholic territory. Napoleon III., 
in fact, returned to the scheme which Talleyrand and Lord Castle- 
reagh, in concert with Austria, had prevented the King of Prussia 
from realising in 1815. But now it was too late. 

Bismarck said nothing further about Belgium. As for the Em- 
peror's infantile schemes, it is unlikely that they ever saw the light. 
Napoleon III. dealt with Luxemburg by buying it from the King of 
Holland, William III. Prussia, changing her attitude, immediately 
forbade the execution of the bargain. France demanded that Prussia 
should give up her right to maintain a garrison in the fortress of 
Luxemburg. The representatives of the Powers which had signed 
the Belgian treaty of 1839 met in conference and decided to assure 
the independence of Luxemburg by guaranteeing its neutrality. 

The only definite result of these negotiations was that after bringing 
France and Prussia to the verge of war a conflict was made sooner 
or later inevitable. 

Napoleon III., who had been attracted to Mexico by the dream 
of founding there a Latin Empire which would be a makeweight to 
the United States, abandoned Maximilian, withdrew his army before 
the expiration of the agreed period and shared the responsibility for 
his execution at Queretaro on the 19th of June, 1867. The other 
States of Europe accepted the Treaty of Prague. But it was only the 
first stage. M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, foresaw 
that Prussia would want to incorporate the Southern States in the 
Confederation of the North and restore the imperial dignity for the 
benefit of the Hohenzollerns. On January 5th, 1868, he wrote : 

" The more I see of the conduct of the Prussian Government the stronger is 
my conviction that it intends to impose its authority on the whole of Germany, 
and every day I have fresh evidence that it pursues that object, knowing that 
it will be unattainable unless France is reduced to a condition in which she will 
be unable to place any obstacle in its way. 

" We shall therefore have to reckon on a terrible war in which a whole nation 
will take part against us."* 

Thus forewarned, Napoleon invited Berlin, through London, in 
January, 1870, to summon a conference to consider the question of 
general disarmament. Bismarck replied that as Prussia could 
acquiesce in no such suggestion, it was idle to discuss its principles 
and consequences. 

* Benedetti : Souvenirs Diplomatique*. L'Empereur Guillaume I, et le Prince 
de Bismarck. Ma mission a Ems. 

334 



am 



CHAPTER V 

THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 

The Federal Constitution — Procedure — The King of Prussia Bundes Presidium 
and Bundes-Feldherr — The same attributions as those of the Deutsche 
Kaiser — The Chancellor — The Bundesrat — The Reichstag — Electoral con- 
ditions unchanged after 1867 — Treaties of defensive alliance with the 
Southern States — The Zollverein. 

AFTER the 10th of June, 1866, Bismarck had sent to the German 
Governments a circular, in which he proposed to them " a 
scheme for the establishment of a new Confederation." On June 14th, 
the Prussian representative in the Federal Assembly declared that 
the Prussian Government withdrew from the Confederation, but was 
disposed " to form a new Confederation with such of the German 
States as felt attracted by the proposal." By the compact of the 
1 8th of August, sixteen States agreed to send delegates to Berlin to 
draw up a scheme for a federal constitution on the basis of an offen- 
sive and defensive alliance with Prussia and the disposal of their 
forces under the supreme command of the King of Prussia. A 
parliament was to be summoned as provided by the Imperial electoral 
law of April 12th, 1849, and it was to ratify the scheme of the federal 
constitution drawn up by the representatives of the States.* 

The operation met with some opposition. The Prussian Chamber 
of Deputies was unwilling that the Reichstag should have the right 
of voting the Constitution. They wanted to confine its powers to 
discussion only. Next, the Constitution had to be submitted to the 
Prussian Landtag and the other twenty-one State Assemblies. The 
Government had to accept the amendments to the electoral law 
carried in the Chamber of Deputies. Only a majority of the States 
granted the future Reichstag the right of " discussing " the 
Constitution. 

The form of the Constitution was settled in the conferences of the 
representatives of the States, which came to an end on the 7th of 

* Labaud : Le Droit Public et l' Empire Allemand, Vol. I., p. 38 et seq. 

235 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

February, 1867. On April 16th the Reichstag voted the constitutional 
scheme by 230 votes to 53. The representatives of the allied States 
accepted it at once. 

The King of Prussia obtained more than Bismarck had dared to 
hope, the supreme command of the army. The Constitution gave 
him the title of Bundes Presidium (Federal President) and Bundes- 
Feldherr (Federal Commander-in-Chief). As President, the King of 
Prussia had the right of summoning, opening, adjourning or dissolving 
the federal parliament, appointing and dismissing the federal Chan- 
cellor and officials, declaring war and making peace. As Commander- 
in-Chief of the army he had the supreme direction of the military and 
naval forces ; he could fix their establishment, order the construction 
of new fortresses, declare a state of siege in any part of the federal 
States and mobilize the federal army against a recalcitrant member 
of the federation. Lest he should be thwarted by the Reichstag, he 
was empowered to have army bills voted for several years. 

These were the powers which the King of Prussia retained when he 
became Deutscher Kaiser (German Emperor) in 1871. The new title 
added nothing to the powers he already enjoyed in the North German 
Confederation. 

The Chancellor was the sole source of executive power. He was 
responsible solely to the President of the Bundesrat, the German 
Emperor. He concentrated in his person the executive and legis- 
lative power. The plenipotentiaries who met together in the 
Bundesrat were only officials. 

The Reichstag had only one right — that of refusing supplies. Its 
members enjoyed no parliamentary initiative. They only dealt with 
bills which had already been examined by the Bundesrat and their 
amendments were subject to the veto of that body. No responsible 
minister ever appeared before them. 

Their powers were not increased in 187 1. 

The deputies of the Reichstag were elected on the principle of one 
member to every 100,000 inhabitants in addition to a member for 
every fraction of more than 50,000 inhabitants of a State. Although 
Lauenburg had a population of less than 100,000, it sent a represen- 
tative. The elections took place on the basis of the census of 1867. 
This electoral division underwent no change in 1871, otherwise the 
Reichstag would now have 600 deputies instead of 397. Berlin, with 
two million inhabitants, still sends only six deputies. Many industrial 
districts, the population of which has trebled and even quadrupled, 

236 



The North German Confederation 

thus entitling them to three or four deputies, have only one member 
to-day. 

The North German Confederation comprised twenty-two States : 
Prussia, Saxe-Weimar, Adenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe- 
Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Schwarzburg- 
Rudolstadt, Waldeck, Reuss (the younger branch), Schaumburg- 
Lippe, Lippe, Liibeck, Bremen, Hamburg, the two Mecklemburgs, 
Reuss (the older branch), Saxe-Meiningen and the Kingdom of Saxony. 

The King of Prussia and Bismarck regarded the war of 1866 as 
only the first stage. Peace had hardly been signed when the King 
set about the reorganization of the army, which was to be swelled 
by the forces of the annexed States and those which entered the 
Confederation with Prussia. The number of army corps was increased 
from nine to twelve. 



*37 



CHAPTER VI 

THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDATURE 

Astuteness of King William and Bismarck — Beginnings of the Hohenzollern 
Candidature question in March, 1869 — Prince Leopold's refusal — He is 
compelled to accept — Proceedings at Ems — the Prince of Hohenzollern 
withdraws — M. de Gramont's inconsistent demands — The Ems incident — 
Bismarck's telegram — The opposition of the southern States. 

BISMARCK and King William were at one in their conviction 
that they must proceed step by step. They were both 
anxious that they should have appearances on their side. In 1866 
they managed affairs so that the declaration of war came from 
Austria. In 1867 they were not sufficiently certain of the support 
of their German allies to risk a new war. They were also afraid of 
alarming Europe. 

But while Von Moltke and Roon were preparing the army, Bismarck 
was seeking the occasion. Early in 1869 he put forward the Prince of 
Hohenzollern as candidate for the Spanish throne. King William, 
however, thought his forces were not ready. 

M. Benedetti has told us that it was on the 27th of March, 1869, 
that he first drew the attention of the Quai d'Orsay to the Hohen- 
zollern affair. On the nth of May he questioned Bismarck on the 
subject, and received the answer that " if the Prince became King 
of Spain his rule could only be a short one, and would expose him 
to personal danger as well as disappointments." 

However, in November, 1869, with Bismarck's approval, Herr von 
Werther, Prussian Minister to Bavaria, presented to the Hohenzollern 
princes, in one of their castles, a Spanish envoy, Sefior Salazar, who 
had been commissioned to offer the Spanish crown to one of them. 
He offered it to each in turn, and even to King Charles of Roumania, 
but all declined the honour. Sefior Salazar paid a second visit to 
Germany in January, 1870, but on this occasion went straight to 
Berlin. Prince Leopold was hesitating. On March 20th, 1870, Prince 
Anthony wrote : " Bismarck wishes the offer to be accepted for 

238 



an 



The Hohenzollern Candidature 

dynastic and political reasons. On the 15th we held a very exciting 
and important conference. The King presided, and the Crown Prince, 
Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, Schleinitz, Thile and Delbriick were present. 
They all agreed in recommending us to accept, saying we could not 
refuse as good Prussians. Leopold has declined." Prince Frederick 
was suggested instead, but Prince Leopold, " pressed by all," ended 
by accepting. 

At bottom no one cared a fig for the Spanish crown. What was 
wanted was a pretext for a war with France. But the King of Prussia 
hesitated to make war over an affair which was the peculiar concern 
of the Hohenzollern dynasty. 

When the issue became clear in the month of July, the Prussian 
Government told the Powers that if the King had furthered the 
candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern it was as head of his 
family and not as King of Prussia. The affair was no concern of the 
Government. Besides, the Cortes had not yet ratified the selection 
of Prince Leopold. 

At the moment of crisis the system of absence and alibi was con- 
spicuous, as again in 1914. Bismarck was at Varzin, the King at Ems, 
the Ambassadors were on leave and only the Under-Secretary of 
State, Herr Thile, was in Berlin. Herr Thile disclaimed all interest 
in the matter. 

M. Benedetti went to Ems, armed with a letter from M. de 
Gramont telling him to obtain the following declaration from the 
King: 

" The King's Government does not approve of the Prince of Hohen- 
zollern's acceptance, and orders him to wiihdraw it." The minister 
added : " I must be informed if the Prince, in obedience to that 
command. . . ." M. Benedetti did not adopt the hectoring terms 
which had been dictated to him. " It shall be my special care 
not to precipitate the Government with myself into the trap laid 
for us." 

M. de Gramont did his best to lead France into the trap. The 
Prince of Hohenzollern withdrew his candidature. It is true that 
France only learned this from a source outside the negotiations at 
Ems, but M. Thiers rightly declared that the withdrawal was enough. 
The affair was closed. Unhappily the Ollivier ministry hankered 
after some patent proof of success. M. de Gramont, without 
telling M. Benedetti, asked the Prussian Ambassador to invite the 
King to address a letter to the Emperor stating that he had never 

239 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

intended to encroach on the interests and honour of the French 
nation in authorizing the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern. 
Leaving M. Benedetti in ignorance of this step, he instructed him to 
ask the King of Prussia " to give an assurance that he would never 
again authorize the candidature of a Hohenzollern prince." This 
meant that the Ambassador was to ask more of the King than the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs was himself asking 

On the morning of July 13th the King met M. Benedetti out walking 
and went up to him. M. Benedetti asked him " to authorize him 
to convey to his Government the assurance that His Majesty would 
use all his authority to forestall any attempt to renew the can- 
didature withdrawn." 

" You ask me," the King replied, " for an undertaking unlimited 
in point of time and for all circumstances. I cannot give it." He 
expressed regret that he could not make so " novel and unexpected 
a concession." In the afternoon the King had the Ambassador 
informed that Prince Leopold had withdrawn and that he approved 
of the withdrawal ; further, that he regarded that intimation as 
the end of the negotiations. The King did not refuse to receive 
M. Benedetti. He merely informed him that he refused to continue 
the discussion as to guarantees for the future. 

Was the goal of the Ollivier ministry a patent diplomatic score to 
exhibit to the Corps Legislatif or was it war ? In either case, its 
position was such as to serve the ends of the King of Prussia. Bis- 
marck was immediately authorized to do all he could to bring about 
war. He recalled the German Ambassador from Paris. He gave 
his own version of the Ems incident to all the Governments. The 
King telegraphed to him : 

" Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand from 
me, finally, in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize him to tele- 
graph at once that I bound myself for all future time never again to give my 
consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. I refused at last 
somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor possible to undertake engagements 
of this kind & tout jamais. Naturally I told him that I had as yet received no 
news, and as he was earlier informed about Paris and Madrid than myself, he 
could clearly see that my government once more had no hand in the matter."* 

Bismarck, who had Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, and Roon, 
the War Minister, dining with him, asked them if the army were ready. 

* Bismarck : Reflections and Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 96. 
240 



The Hohenzollern Candidature 

On their reply in the affirmative, Bismarck boasts that he " edited " 
the telegram in such a way that it ended thus : 

" His Majesty the King thereupon decided not to receive the French am- 
bassador again, and sent to tell him through the aide-de-camp on duty that 
his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador."* 

Bismarck adds that he said to his guests : 

"It is important that we should be the party attacked, and this Gallic over- 
weening and touchiness will make us, if we announce in the face of Europe, so 
far as we can without the speaking trumpet of the Reichstag, that we fearlessly 
meet the public threats of France." 

The two generals, hitherto silent and dejected, " suddenly recovered 
their pleasure in eating and drinking," and Roon said piously : 
" Our God of old lives still and will not let us perish in disgrace."f 

The treaties with the South German States were defensive. Count 
Bray, the Bavarian minister, prompted by his friend Beust, and 
Varnbiiler, the minister of Wiirtemberg, hoped to be released from 
their obligation to follow Prussia over a question which, as it con- 
cerned the Spanish throne, could excite neither interest nor passion 
in Germany. Between July 13th and 16th the Second Chamber 
and a body of the Press in Bavaria were opposed to war. The 
Government of Napoleon III. played wholesale into the hands of 
the King of Prussia and Bismarck by declaring war on the 15th of July. 
Yet even on the 19th the Commission of the Bavarian Chamber 
decided that there was no ground for raising the casus foederis, and 
its resolutions were only defeated by 89 votes to 58. The Treaty of 
1866 had been received without enthusiasm in Wiirtemberg and 
the Duchy of Baden. As Bismarck had foreseen, the unity of Germany 
was created, willy-nilly, by war.t 

* Bismarck : Reminiscences, Vol. II., p. 99. 

t Ibid., p. 100. 

t Supra, Part I., Chap. IV., " The German Autocracy." 



241 16 



CHAPTER VII 
THE CERCAY PAPERS AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE 

The Due de Gramont against Austria and Italy — The Bavarian minister Bray — 
His policy and conversion — Count Beust follows suit — The Cercay papers — 
M. de Ruville's explanation — Bavarian opposition — The ceremony at 
Versailles — The Emperor disagrees with Bismarck — The Emperor prefers 
the title of " Emperor of Germany " to that of " German Emperor " — 
The necessity of dissolving the German Empire. 

NAPOLEON III.'s foreign policy seemed conceived entirely in 
the interests of the King of Prussia. He declared war on him 
at the moment most favourable to Prussia. France might have had 
powerful allies, for both Count Beust, for Austria, and Italy offered 
him their alliance. In the case of Italy, however, there was a con- 
dition — the abandonment of Rome. On the 25th of July the Due de 
Gramont heard that a compact had been concluded and imme- 
diately tore it up with the words, " France cannot defend her honour 
on the Rhine by sacrificing it on the Tiber." On the 27th he wrote : 
" Count Beust's conduct fills us with disgust and aversion." All 
Gramont's desires were fulfilled. He had the war he longed for. 
He lost the alliances he did not want,* and he added the finishing 
touches to the edifice of the German Empire. 

In Bavaria Prince Hohenlohe who pursued a policy favourable 
to Prussia, had been replaced by Count Bray, who had certainly had 
some share in Count Beust's project of an alliance between France 
and Austria. 

In spite of Gramont's refusal to accept Beust's proposals, the 
Austrian minister suggested that Austria should take advantage of 
the absence of the German armies to recover Silesia and march on 
Berlin. According to his opponent, Hohenlohe, Bray even went so 
far as to say to Count Sradion : " Austria made a grievous mistake 
when the Bavarian Chambers admitted the casus foederis. She ought 

* Bolton King : The History of Italian Unity. Emile Bourgeois : Manuel 
Historique de Politique Etrangire, Vol. III. p. 722. 

242 



The Cer^ay Papers and the German Empire 

to have threatened them with an immediate declaration of war if 
they did not reverse their resolution and declare their neutrality. 
The King is losing himself in his castles." 

During the siege of Paris Bismarck elaborated his scheme for the 
foundation of the German Empire. He wanted the initiative to come 
from Bavaria. In October he invited Baden and Wurtemberg to 
send delegates to Versailles, but he dared not put pressure on Bavaria, 
and " left her free to act in accordance with her interests." Bray 
declared that he would himself go to Versailles and Beust reminded 
him that " Article 4 of the Treaty of Prague provided that His 
Majesty the Emperor of Austria consented to the German States 
south of the line (the river Main) forming a union the national ties 
of which with the North German Confederation should be the subject 
of a subsequent treaty between the two parties and which should 
have an independent national existence." 

Bray arrived at Versailles on October 23rd. After a few days, dread- 
ing the addition of Baden, Hesse and Wurtemberg to the Northern 
Confederation, he conceived the idea of a new Bavarian Confederation. 
" The King of Bavaria should appear side by side with the German 
Emperor as the representative of the German Empire. These two 
sovereigns would each represent a part of Germany and together the 
whole." It is perfectly clear that neither William nor Bismarck 
would have accepted this combination. Bray told Bismarck that he 
intended to leave Versailles and return to Munich ; but on the 5th of 
November he had a long interview with him and came away from 
it a changed man. From being an opponent of the German Empire 
he became an ardent enthusiast for it. 

At the same time Count Beust, who pretended that he was taking 
his wife to Switzerland, visited Munich. Pie saw the Bavarian 
ministers and induced them to accept the German Empire. Wurtem- 
berg drew back. King Charles wrote to his representatives at Ver- 
sailles to sign nothing which Bavaria would not accept. Bray 
advised the ministers at Stuttgart to sign and on the 23rd he was 
authorized to sign by King Louis. 

What had happened at the interview of November 5th between 
Bismarck and Bray ? 

This is the explanation given by a Professor of Halle University, 
Herr A. de Ruville, a German, though his name sounds French, in 
his book, " The Role of Bavaria in the Restoration of the German 
Empire." Some Mecklemberger chasseurs discovered a bundle of 

243 16* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

i the chftteau o . near Brunoy, belonging: to M. 

Rouhei them to Bismarck. These documents 

C< s R : their falling into German 

5, That 

to remained i able. Herr de Ruville 

tei see them, but has managed to reconstruct son 

them from the : the men referred to and the books pub- 

ibout them. He - - that thev must have 

tine of Benedetti's letters, the Emperor's instructions, 

the lettc: s ad the Marquis de la Valette, the 

the French s ind ministers in Germany 

ae letter at Beust. Bismarck 

s imiliar with some part of their contents. In iS"*i he 
pub!'- r of theEmp s me letters of Benedetti. 

written in .\ a IIl.'s annexat 

Rouhei . arms inserted in the r. . 

L;' PempU Frm :ti's ktters are not the only documents 

•. have fallen into the hands of the Prussian Government. All 

; and 1866 between the 
French Governing oents Bavaria and Wiirtem- 

X) left at D e now in the possession of Prince 

Bismarck." - a threat against the ministers who had become 

Bism ~ 'ies. It was Bismarck's a m not to com- 

promise them and he ce publish extracts from the Cercay papers. 

Wachenhuse . the corres i of the Cole: s that 

at Cercay he B letter from Dalwigk, the Hessian Minister, to 

Rouher apropos of the Lux. in which occurred the phrase : 

u I: there is war, the French will be received with open arms in Ger- 
." In 1867 Ducrot had furnished numerous reports of his 
vith the Grand Duke of Hesse, who said to him : M How 
could the Emperor have left us to the vengeance of these unspeakable 
Pn^ ms i Ducrot also recalled the autograph letters of this 
d Duke, the King of Wurtemberg and the King of Bavaria to 
the Emperor, both before and after Sadov . begging him for help. 

These letters were taken to the Chancellor about the 1 2th of 
October. More than a year later Bismarck told Hohenlohe that there 
were still M whole boxes oi letters he had not yet examined,'' and 
that the seizure of the papers had put him in possession of w the 
entire diplomatic correspondence of Napoleon III." He told Count 
Beust himself that all his correspondence had been taken at Cercay. 

3« 



The Ce^ay Papers and the German Empire 

Hen* de Ruville's conclusion is that Bismarck received at the end of 
October the most important of the documents, such as the correspond- 
ence of Count Beust with Bray and Gramont, the letters of Varn- 
biiler and Dalwigk, and the letters of the Grand Dukes and Kings of 
the Southern States. Bismarck possessed a powerful blackmailing 
weapon against them and used it immediately. Hence the change of 
front of Bray, Beust and Dalwigk. 

" This is the key," says Herr de Ruville, " to the foundation of the 
German Empire, a phenomenon of which no satisfactory explanation 
has hitherto been given." 

Bavaria only accepted the Empire on January 21st, though the 
Imperial Constitution had been in operation since January 1st and 
the ceremony in which the King of Prussia was proclaimed German 
Emperor took place on the 1 8th. That great scene was enacted in 
the Galerie des Glace s at Versailles. It was Prussia's revenge, in the 
palace of Louis XIV., for the humiliations she had suffered at the 
hands of Napoleon. 

However, William's ambitions were not completely realized by his 
enthronement as successor to Louis XIV. He desired the title of 
Emperor of Germany which would have implied sovereignty over 
the non-Prussian States, the rulers of which were unwilling to acknow- 
ledge it. Bismarck had persuaded the Reichstag to vote the Constitu- 
tion and give the King the title of German Emperor only. On the 
morning of the Versailles ceremony Bismarck had called on the 
Grand Duke of Baden who had been selected to speak immediately 
after the reading of the proclamation, and asked him what title he 
proposed to give the new Emperor. " Emperor of Germany, as his 
Majesty has decreed," was the answer. Bismarck showed him that 
the King's desire could not be fulfilled, and the Grand Duke got out 
of the difficulty by acclaiming " the Emperor William." Bismarck 
says :* 

" His Majesty was so offended at the course I had adopted, that on descending 
from the raised dais of the princes he ignored me as I stood alone upon the free 
space before it, and passed by me in order to shake hands with the generals 
standing behind me. He maintained that attitude for several days until 
gradually our mutual relations returned to their old form." 

The Imperial Constitution was the execution of the November 
treaties which provided for a Confederation formed by the amal- 

* Reminiscences and Reflections, Vol. II., p. 132. 
245 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

gamation of the North German Confederation with Hesse, the 
Grand Duchy of Baden, Wiirtemberg and Bavaria. 

Alsace-Lorraine was incorporated in the German Empire by the 
Law of the 9th of June 1871, which transferred the exercise of 
sovereignty in the two provinces to the Emperor, though certain 
executive acts required the approval of the Bundesrat and Reichstag. 

Such is the German Empire, a work of " iron and fire," of lies 
and threats, consummated thanks to the weakness, indifference and 
diplomatic errors of the other nations of Europe, and notably France. 
Bismarck and the Emperor William only brought it into being for 
the benefit of Prussia. Their aim was the prussification, not the 
unification, of Germany. 

In the first two parts of this book we have seen the system they 
inaugurated at work. It has given countless proofs that it is the 
greatest moral and material danger the world has ever faced. That 
danger can only be removed by the dissolution of this political power. 
How can that be done once and for all ? The treaty which will mark 
the end of the present war must provide the solution of the problem. 



246 



PART IV 

THE HISTORICAL CAUSES OF THE WAR 
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHT 



CHAPTER I 

RACES AND NATIONALITIES 

Definition of a race — Lack of agreement — The different elements of ethnic 
groups — The secondary role of somatic characteristics — The race question 
in Austria-Hungary — Historical and linguistic characteristics. 

EVERY anthropologist knows the difficulty of comparing the 
somatic characteristics of one human group with those of 
another. The word " race," which is used so glibly in current speech, 
is indefinite from the point of view of scientific language. 

Topinard's classification, based on the grouping of five charac- 
teristics, the nasal index, hair, cephalic index, colour and height, 
distinguishes nineteen races. 

M. A. Hovelacque, in his article " Races Actuelles " in the Die- 
tionnaire des Sciences Anthropologiques* says : " Unquestionably 
different characteristics distinguish the different human races. 
But there is no exact relationship between these characteristics. 
Classifications are out of touch with reality and do not correspond 
to scientific distinctions. It is mere fantasy to claim to have 
reduced a complex of characteristics to a system." 

M. Deniker, in his learned work, " Races et Peuples de la Terre," 
explains that he only uses the word " race " because it is in general 
use, but that the groups designated by that word are " ethnical 
groups," constituted in virtue of community of language, religion and 
social institutions, but never of zoological species. They may 
include human beings of one or several species, races and varieties.! 
Somatic characteristics only play a secondary part. 

* Dictionnaire des Sciences Anthropologiques: Magyars, by Emile Picot ; 
Races, by A. Hovelacque ; Roumains, by A. Hovelacque. Les Races et les 
Nationalitis de V Autriche-Hongrie, by B. Auerbach (1898 ; Paris, F. Alcan). 
J. Deniker : Races et Peuples de la Terre, 1900. W. Z. Ripley : The Races 
of Europe, 1900 (Kegan Paul & Co.). 

f Deniker : Op. cit., p. 3. 

249 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

In the three provinces of German Austria the population is pre- 
dominantly brackycephalic with brown eyes and hair * With the 

exception of the Slovenes, the Dalmatians and the Croats, who are 
hycephalic and tall, all the groups present certain broad 
eristics. 

M. Louis Leger relates that in 1S06 Thiers maintained that 
Austria was populated by Germans. Yet the race question is the 
predomii -sue in Austro-Hungarian polities. 

In 1849 Palacky, the famous historian of Bohemia, counted seven 
rmans, Bohemians, Poles, Italians, Jugo-Slavs. 
Mag-. Wallachians. 

These g an be divided into two classes. On the one hand 

the German and Hungarian groups which desire to dominate 

the others ; on the other the rest, which all possess their history and 

E to testify to their powers of resistance, often carried to the 

point ism. 

Austria has been called a u polyglot polyarchy." 
The his: ad linguistic groups, the origin of which is extremely 

1 bscure, invoke in their favour historic rights based on documents 
and facts more or less disputed and disputable. To realize their 
and the political complexity of the Austro-Hungarian 
question, it is necessary to review the history of the more important 
among them. 

* Auerbach : Op. cii. 



250 



CHAPTER II 

AUSTRIA 

The Austrian Marches — The Duchy — The Hapsburgs — The monogram 
A.h.I.O.U. — Austria was never among the Electors of the Empire — A 
Duchy — Austria has no history — The title of " Emperor of Austria " dates 
from 1804. 

THE word " Austria " is a translation of the German Osterreich 
(Eastern Kingdom), which appears for the first time in a 
document of 996 : " In regione vulgari nomine Ostirrichi." But it 
was not a kingdom. It was composed of two Marches governed by 
Margraves {Mark Graf, Count of the March, or border) ; that of 
Friuli, comprising Lower Pannonia south of the Drave, Carinthia, 
Istria and Dalmatia, less the littoral which had been ceded to the 
Emperor of Constantinople ; that of the East, comprising Lower 
Pannonia north of the Drave, Upper Pannonia and the Ostmark 
(East Mark) proper. The population was German and Slav. The 
frontiers of this mark underwent frequent changes. At one moment 
it included Bavaria, at another it lost Pannonia. The Hungarians 
invaded a part of it, but were driven out after the battle of Augsburg. 
Leopold of Babenberg, whose name is commemorated in that of the 
town of Bamburg, received the East Mark in 973, and founded a 
dynasty which died out in 1246. His early successors carried the 
boundary of the mark to the Leitha after struggles with the Hun- 
garians for the advantage of the Holy Roman Empire, which gave 
them assistance. Their policy conformed to that of the Emperors, 
whom they usually supported in their conflict with the Papacy. 
Leopold III. married the sister of Henry V., by whom he had eighteen 
children. By the marriage of his daughters the House of Babenberg 
became connected with the families of Saxe-Thuringen, Montferrat, 
the Piasts of Poland and the Premyslides of Bohemia. 

This policy of matrimonial alliances, begun by the Babenbergs 
was continued with great skill by the Hapsburgs. 

251 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Henry II., after being compelled to surrender Bavaria, which he 
had acquired through his marriage with the widow of Henry the 
Proud, but which was claimed by the son of the latter, Henry the 
Lion, after his mother's death, made Austria into a duchy free of all 
suzerainty of Bavaria, and even hereditary in the female line (1141- 
1177). He was one of the founders of Vienna. 

Leopold V. acquired Styria, populated by Slovenes and Germans. 

After King Ottokar II. of Bohemia had twice refused to recognize 
him, Rudolph of Hapsburg was elected Emperor in 1273. He com- 
pelled Ottokar to give up Carinthia, Carniola, Austria and Styria and 
regarded Bohemia as an integral portion of the Empire. 

But the imperial dignity was not hereditary. As became a man 
of prudence Rudolph presented Austria, Styria and Carniola to his 
sons Albert and Rudolph at Augsburg in 1282. Skilful though the 
Hapsburgs were in adding to their possessions, they were not success- 
ful in their efforts to get the Dukes of Austria included among the 
Electors of the Holy Roman Empire. By way of compensation, 
Rudolph IV. invented the Privilegium Majus, consisting of a series of 
forged documents, which gave all kinds of privileges to Austria. These 
franchises nearly brought on war and led to the treaty of 1364, by 
which the Houses of Hapsburg-Austria and Luxemburg-Bohemia 
guaranteed each other's hereditary possessions. Rudolph IV. added 
the Tyrol to his inheritance. Albert V. acquired Moravia through his 
marriage with Elisabeth, the daughter of the Emperor Sigismund, 
in 1422. At Sigismund's suggestion the States of Bohemia and Hun- 
gary chose him as King (1438). From that time forward the imperial 
dignity became hereditary in the Hapsburg dynasty. Frederick V., 
grandfather of the Emperor Charles V., and Ferdinand of Austria, 
made Austria an archduchy. He was the author of the famous 
monogram A.E.I.O.U. : Austria Est Imperare Orbi Universo ; Aquila 
Electa iuste omnia vincit ; Alles Erdreicb 1st Oesterreich Unterthan 
(" The whole earth is Austria's vassal "). 

The real greatness of the House of Austria dates from the reign 
of Maximilian. He annexed Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and the 
Tyrol, possessed Trieste and Friuli, and inherited Gorica, Gradisca, 
Nuttesburg and the Pusthertal. He fought France to secure his 
succession to the Duchy of Burgundy. He used his influence as 
Emperor to make another attempt to include Austria in the number 
of the Electors. The seven Electors all refused to allow any addition 
to their number. Thus Austria, which had the dignity of Holy Roman 

252 



Austria 

Emperor hereditary in her ducal line, was not one of the electoral 
powers. 

Maximilian's son, Philip the Fair, was the father of Ferdinand [. 
and Charles V., who was elected Emperor in 15 19. But though 
Charles kept the title of Duke of Austria, he handed over his German 
possessions to his brother Ferdinand, to whom the Hungarians and 
Czechs offered the crown in 1526 after the defeat of Mohacs. Nothing 
survived of Charles V.'s Empire, comprising the Low Countries, Spain, 
part of Italy and America, but Ferdinand consolidated the position 
of Austria. 

Austria has no history of her own. Her dukes had all manner of 
relations with Hungary, Bohemia and the other nationalities over 
which she extended or sought to extend her sway. They were elected 
Emperors, though the imperial dignity was hereditary in the House of 
Hapsburg, and as such they played an active part in the general 
history of the world. But Austria has never been a nation, nor 
even a kingdom. Before 1804 Austria was an archduchy. When 
Napoleon had himself proclaimed Emperor of the French, Francis II. 
had himself proclaimed Emperor of Austria, and the Holy Roman 
Empire came to an end in 1806. 



253 



CHAPTER III 
THE CZECHS 

I. Slavs and Teutons — The Czech civilization — The bishopric of Prague — 

German " peaceful penetration " — Relations with France — The King of 
Bohemia as an imperial Elector — The struggle against German influence — 
John Huss — The Czech language — Prague University — The Council of 
Constance — The resistance of the Hussites — Ferdinand of Hapsburg — The 
Confessio Bohemica — The Lettre de Majeste — The defenestration of Prague 
— The Battle of the White Mountain — Reaction in Bohemia. 

II. The awakening of national feeling — The Judgment of Libusa — Palacky's 

letter to the Committee of Fifty — The Congress of Prague — The three issues 
in Austria : Centralism, Dualism and Federalism — The Constitution of 
1849 — The reaction — German policy — The electoral system — Dualism — 
The progress of the Czechs — The decay of German influence — The Germans 
and the Czechs — The Wacht am Rhein and the Marseillaise. 

THE Germans assert that the country of Bohemia, originally 
conquered by the Teutons, was invaded by the Slavs between 
the fifth and seventh centuries.* But according to Posidonius, the 
Cimbri, in their march on Rome, came into collision with the Boh, 
who gave their name to Bojohcemum — Bohemia. The frontiers of 
Bohemia and Moravia have been, according to the German historians 
Ranke, Treitschke and Lamprecht, the scene of the struggle between 
Slav and Teuton. This fact gives its importance to the history of 
Bohemia, the people of which form the most clearly defined of the 
national groups which make up the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
In 874 Bohemia was governed by a Christian prince, Borivoj. His 
son sought the protection of Germany and substituted the Latin 
Liturgy for the Slav Liturgy, which was in the vernacular. Henry 

* The German Colonisation of the East, by Professor Richard Mayer, in the 
"History of the World;' of Dr. H. F. Helmolt, Vol. VI. (London, W. 
Heinemann). Les Races et les Nationalites en Autriche-Hongrie, by Bernard 
Auerbach (Paris, F. Alcan). Histoire de V Autriche-Hongrie depuis Marie- 
Thirise, by M. Asseline (Paris, F. Alcan). Louis Leger : Histoire de l' Autriche- 
Hongrie, le Monde Slave, etc. Austria-Hungary , by Geoffrey Drage. 

254 



The Czechs 

the Fowler, with the assistance of Arnulf of Bavaria, invaded 
Bohemia and compelled King Vacslav, canonized by the Church and 
better known under his Latin name of St. Wenceslaus, to pay tribute. 
The bishopric of Prague was founded towards the close of the tenth 
century but was attached to the archbishopric of Mainz. Its first 
bishop was St. Adalbert who baptized the Priest-King Stephen of 
Hungary, went to Poland, and was murdered by the Prussians in 997 
during his missionary labours amongst them. 

Vratislav II. rendered assistance to the Emperor Henry IV. in his 
Italian expeditions and was rewarded with the title of King in 1086. 
Bohemia, torn by the quarrels of the princes, the nobility and the 
Bishops of Prague, was in a state of feudal anarchy. The small land- 
owners, exploited by the nobility, grouped themselves round the 
great barons from whom they received protection while increasing 
their influence. 

When Premysl Ottokar II. ascended the throne in 1250 Bohemia 
had become a powerful State. This sovereign, at the invitation of 
Pope Innocent IV., sent an expedition to East Prussia which founded 
Konigsberg, the future capital of the Kingdom of Prussia. 

Surviving every species of political turmoil, Bohemia soon became 
the centre of mid-European civilization and Prague one of its 
commercial emporia. The silver mines of Kutua Hova and Nemeky 
Brod were worked there. On the occasion of the marriage of 
Wenceslaus II. in 1297, there assembled twenty-eight princes and 
their suites, with thousands of horses, it is said, and the ceremony was 
reckoned as one of the greatest pageants of the Middle Ages. 

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Germans, on the 
invitation of the Kings of Bohemia, had been busy clearing the forests. 
Germans engaged in trade and occupied the episcopal see of Prague 
and other important state offices. 

The dynasty of the Premyslides came to an end in 1306 with 
Wenceslaus III., who was compelled by the Emperor Albert to 
renounce all interest in the relations between Bohemia, Poland and 
Hungary, and was assassinated shortly after. 

John, son of the Emperor Henry of Luxemburg, was so devoted to 
France that, although blind, he fought and was slain at the battle 
of Crecy ; but he had had his son Charles brought up in France and 
this prince brought away a passion for economy and order, a striking 
tribute to the superiority of French government at that period. He 
restored the administration of finance and justice in Bohemia and 

355 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

suppressed brigandage. In 1348 he founded the University of Prague 
which brought together nearly twenty thousand students and was 
second only to that of Paris. He invited a Frenchman, Mathias of 
Arras, to rebuild the cathedral of Saint Vit, built the great stone 
bridge and the royal castle of Prague, and founded the first school 
of painting of the Middle Ages. Czech literature developed greatly 
during his reign. In 1355 he added to his Bohemian kingdom the 
Duchy of Silesia, the Marquisate of Lusatia and two districts of 
Poland. He became Emperor as Charles IV., and in 1356 settled the 
German imperial constitution by his " Golden Bull." This document 
provided that the King of Bohemia was to be one of the seven electors 
of the Holy Roman Empire, but that Bohemia itself was not to be a fief 
of the Empire. If the royal family died out, the King of Bohemia 
could only be elected by the States and the Emperor could not 
interfere. All appeals abroad were forbidden to Bohemian subjects. 

The German influences which threatened to strangle the country 
were strongly resisted by a powerful national movement which, under 
a religious form, centred in the figure of John Huss. Dean and 
preacher of the Bethlehem chapel, he delivered sermons in the Czech 
tongue in 1402. He reformed it, fixed its orthography, adapted the 
Latin alphabet to it and weeded out the germanisms. Having 
attacked clerical abuses, he was accused of sympathy with the doc- 
trines of WyclifTe. Supported by the King, the Bohemian nobility, 
who were attracted by the prospect of sharing in the secularization 
of ecclesiastical property, and the people, he proclaimed that " the 
Czechs ought to be the first in the Kingdom of Bohemia, as the French 
are in the Kingdom of France and the Germans in Germany. The 
laws, the divine will and natural instincts decree that they should 
fill the high places." King Wenceslaus ordained that thenceforth the 
Czech nation should have three votes in the universities and foreigners 
only one. The Germans, angry at losing their control, went away 
to found the University of Leipzig and bided the day of revenge. 
John Huss was appointed Rector of Prague University, but Pope 
John XXII. laid every town which he visited under an interdict. 
Huss continued his propaganda in the castles of the nobility and the 
countryside. 

A council assembled at Constance. The Emperor Sigismund 
invited Huss to appear before it and provided him with a safe 
conduct. Huss went to Constance, but the Council, alleging that 
the imperial safe-conduct was an encroachment of the temporal on 

256 



The Czechs 

the spiritual power, threw him into prison on a charge of heresy. 
After being refused a hearing, he was handed over as a heretic to the 
secular arm and burnt alive on July 6th, 141 5. 

His death only inspired his followers. Under the name of 
" Utraquists " they set up the communion in both kinds in opposition 
to the Roman communion. The University of Prague made its 
stand before the Council. The peasantry gathered round leaders 
like the old knight, John Ziska, and took the name of " Taborites." 
The Emperor Sigismund proclaimed a crusade against them but 
met with defeat, and in a few months they held all the towns of 
Bohemia except Pilsen and Budejovice. The Germans were driven 
out in every quarter and lost all the advantages gained in five cen- 
turies of effort to establish their supremacy in Bohemia. 

The Hussites offered the crown to Wladislaw of Poland who, 
prompted by Pope Martin V., perpetrated the blunder of not accepting 
it. The German princes, led by Sigismund, prepared a new crusade. 
The Hussites were distracted by dissensions. Some of the nobility 
seceded. Nevertheless, the imperial army was again routed by the 
blind Ziska on the banks of the river Sazava (1422). Ziska's 
troops were possessed by a fanatical religious mania which is not easy 
to understand to-day, but at the same time they were defending Czech 
and Slav nationality against the Germans. Unfortunately the 
Taborites came to blows with the party of the " Compactata," who 
had made great concessions to the Utraquists. The Taborites were 
disastrously defeated on May 30th, 1434, at Lipau, where Procop and 
sixteen thousand of his men were slain. " The Czechs were never 
beaten save by themselves," says M. Louis Leger, who has familiarized 
France with the history of the Slav nationalities, a subject hitherto 
and elsewhere ignored.* 

In the end the Emperor Sigismund agreed to exclude all foreigners 
from public appointments, to allow Hussite preachers at his court, 
and to guarantee the prosperity of the University of Prague. 

The nation was exhausted, but the nobility had grown rich at 
the expense of the Church and the Crown. The national movement 
of John Huss had died away in theological quibbles. Sigismund's 
death in 1437 brought the male line of the House of Luxemburg to 
an end and the union of Bohemia with Hungary was still unachieved. 

The struggle of Bohemia against the Germans and Hungarians 
continued with varying fortunes. In 1526, after the defeat of the 

* Histoire de V Autriche-Hongrie. 

257 *7 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Hungarians by the Turks in the famous Battle of Mohacs, a com- 
mission of the Diet elected Ferdinand of Hapsburg as King, and from 
that time forward the Bohemian crown has been hereditary in his 
dynasty. Being a brother of Charles V., he was anxious to help on 
the work of stamping out Protestant heresy, but the Utraquists of 
Bohemia and the Bohemian brethren sympathized with the Lutherans. 
After the defeat of the German Protestants at Miihlberg (1547) 
Ferdinand established the Jesuits in Bohemia and revised the 
franchises of the towns. The " Compactata " were abolished under 
Maximilian who, King of Hungary as well as Emperor, and an astute 
politician if a sceptic, hoped to hold his widely varying dominions 
together by the bonds of religious unity. The majority of the Diet 
adopted a profession of faith known as the " Confessio Bohemica," 
which was inspired by Calvinism. Maximilian expressed his personal 
approval, but refused to allow it to be published or kept in the State 
charters (1575). In 1609, however, Rudolph recognized the Confessio 
Bohemica in a Lettre de Majeste, and gave the Protestants control of 
Prague University. In 161 7, during the reign of Mathias, the Arch- 
bishop of Prague ordered the suppression of Protestant services. The 
Bohemian Protestants, acting under the direction of Count Thurn, 
protested, and resolved to punish the King's confidential advisers. 
They hurled two out of five of them and their secretary from a 
window of the Castle of Prague. Their cloaks acted as parachutes 
and they fell nearly a hundred feet on to a rubbish heap and were 
not killed. The " defenestration of Prague " was the signal for the 
outbreak of the Thirty Years War. 

No country suffered more than Bohemia during that upheaval. 
The Battle of the White Mountain on June 21st, 1621, left her helpless 
before Ferdinand. The leaders of the national movement were 
executed and their heads exposed on the bridge at Prague. Others 
were banished. All their property was confiscated and given to 
adventurers, mainly Germans, who had joined the imperial ranks. 
Even at the present day the Bohemian nobility are for the most part 
descended from these upstarts. The Catholic religion was the only 
one allowed. The Jesuits controlled the University and Archbishopric 
of Prague. In 1627 the Bohemian Constitution was abrogated, and 
the crown declared hereditary in the Hapsburg dynasty. German 
became the official language side by side with the Czech, and later, 
in the reign of Joseph II., was proclaimed the sole official language. 
The history of Bohemia, as a nation, stops here. Overrun and 

258 



The Czechs 

ravaged in turn by the armies of Wallenstein and the Swedes, by the 
end of the war she had lost a large proportion of her population. 

At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the resurrec- 
tion of Czech nationality was heralded in literature. Old Czech books 
were brought to light. M. Louis Leger, in his " Histoire de l'Autriche- 
Hongrie," says : " The discovery of poems of the Middle Ages, like 
the Judgment of Libusa and the manuscript of Kralove-Dzvor, was 
received with enthusiasm." The authenticity of these poems has 
been questioned, but they none the less had an irresistible influence. 
" Shame were it on us to take our law from the Germans," said the 
Judgment of Libusa. " The stranger has entered by force into our 
heritage and commands us in an unknown tongue," said the Kralove- 
Dwor manuscript. In 1824 the poet Kollar published the SlavyDeera 
(" The Daughter of Slava "), and cried : " Shame on Bohemia that 
she has let herself be colonized by the Germans." And in a passionate 
appeal he proclaimed the unity of the Slav race : 

" Russians, Serbs, Czechs, Poles, unite ! From Athos to Pomerania, from 
the fields of Silesia to the plain of Kossovo, from Constantinople to the Volga, 
everywhere where the Slav tongue is spoken, let us all rejoice and embrace ! " 

In 1848 the National Party demanded union with Moravia, the 
restoration of Silesia to Bohemia, the reconstitution of the kingdom 
of Bohemia, and the establishment of equal rights for the two 
nationalities of Austria and Bohemia. It was not an extravagant 
programme. 

The German Committee of Fifty at Frankfort assembled to arrange 
the convocation of the German Parliament, invited Palacky, the 
historian of Bohemia, to join them. He replied : 

" The avowed object of your meeting is to replace a federation of princes 
by a federation of peoples and revive the national sentiment of Germany. . . . 
I am no German, but a Czech, of Slav origin, and such as I am, I am at the 
service of my nation. It is perhaps a small nation, but it constitutes a historic 
individuality." 

The Government of Vienna had given Bohemia certain undertakings 
which it proceeded to disregard in the Constitution of April 25th. 
A Congress composed of Czech, Moravian, Slovak, Polish, Ruthenian, 
Croat and Serb delegates, was then summoned at Prague. Hardly had 
it met before it was broken up after a riot, the causes of which have 
never been known. 

259 17* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

There were three parties, the party of " Centralism," supported by 
the Germans, which wished to unite all the nationalities under a 
single government at Vienna ; the party of " Dualism," represented 
by the Hungarians who stood for Hungarian autonomy and domina- 
tion ; the party of " Federalism," which desired to maintain the 
Austrian Empire while satisfying all the various nationalities which 
composed it. Palacky had drawn up a federal constitution providing 
for four joint ministries and a central Diet composed of seven nations 
— Germans, Bohemians, Poles, Italians, Jugo-Slavs, Magyars and 
Wallachians. 

At this moment the Frankfort Parliament was declaring that no 
part of the German Empire should be united in a single State with 
any non-German countries, and that if a German and a non-German 
State had the same sovereign, the tie between them was to be regarded 
as purely personal. The Austrian Emperor, so far from acquiescing 
in his exclusion from Germany, maintained his claim to the hegemony 
of Central Europe. The Diet which met at Vienna was dissolved, 
and the Government conceded the constitution of March 4th, 1849, 
which never materialized and was suppressed on January 1st, 1852. 
This constitution guaranteed equal rights, both to the historic nations 
(Volker) and the individual races {V oik erst amme). These " races," 
not defined, had the right of maintaining their language and nationality. 
The Government's mental reservation was not obscure ; all these 
races were equal, but the German was their superior.* 

Alexander Bach, the new head of the Ministry, resumed the tradi- 
tional policy of Metternich until after the war with Italy. On the 
outbreak of that war the Bohemian peasants said : " If we are beaten 
we shall get a constitution, but if we win we shall have the Inquisition." 
The Emperor was beaten and dismissed Bach, but the Schmerling 
ministry persisted in his endeavours to maintain the German domina- 
tion. They organized the provincial diets on the system of the 
representation of interests by establishing three classes of electors — 
the great landowners, the burgesses of the towns, and the country 
peasants. The distribution of the constituencies also favoured the 
Germans at the expense of the Slavs. In Bohemia the German 
hamlet of Panhen, with five hundred inhabitants, had a deputy, 
while the Slav town of Kladno had none. In 1863 the accession to 
power of Belcredi, a Moravian, brought a glimmer of hope to the 
Slavs. 

* Auerbach, p. 29. 
260 



The Czechs 

Unhappily, after Sadowa, the Emperor Francis Joseph summoned 
Count Beust, formerly Saxon Foreign Minister, whose one idea was 
to establish the Dual System and ruthlessly sacrifice the Slav peoples 
to the Magyars and the Germans of Austria. The Czechs of Bohemia 
and Moravia resisted, and in 187 1 the Austrian minister, Karl Hohen- 
wart, revived their hopes for the restoration of the kingdom of 
Bohemia. But the Germans destroyed these hopes at the meetings 
between Francis Joseph and William at Ischl, Salzburg and Gastein. 
The only concessions Bohemia secured were the recognition of the 
equality of the two languages in 1878 and the foundation of a Czech 
university at Prague in 1879. 

Nevertheless, the Czechs go from strength to strength. Prague, 
which was a German city in 1850, is wholly Czech to-day. The same 
may be said of Pilsen and the smaller towns, which are recruited 
from the Czechs of the country districts. Germans predominate only 
in certain mining districts in the mountains. 

The Germans of Bohemia, wearing the old colours of Germany and 
singing the " Wacht am Rhein," never attempted to conceal their 
hatred of the Czechs. They not only celebrated the anniversary of 
Sedan, but wished to raise a statue of Bismarck in memory of Sadowa. 
The Czechs replied with the " Marseillaise " and open professions of 
their sympathy with France. 

In 1910 the Czechs of Bohemia, the Slavs of Moravia and the 
Slovaks of Transleithania numbered 8,500,000. If the Austro- 
Hungarian monarchy is dismembered they must form an independent 
State. 



261 



CHAPTER IV 
THE HUNGARIANS 

Their origin uncertain — They belonged to the Finno-Ugrian family — Their 
choice of Western civilization — St. Stephen — A State independent of the 
Roman and Eastern Empires — Struggles with the Turks — Ferdinand of 
Austria elected King of Hungary — The Ottoman invasions — Religious 
persecution — Resistance to German influence — The Hungarian aristocracy 
— Szechenyi — The Magyar language — Fiscal privileges — Historic rights and 
formalities — Revolts by and against the Hungarians — Retrogression — 
Hungarian policy is anti-German towards Hungarians, but Prussian towards 
others — Hungarian ambitions and their realization to-day. 

THE origin of the Hungarians is very obscure. Their language 
is supposed to belong to the Finno-Ugrian family mingled with 
Turkish elements. It is surmised that among the subjects of the 
Khazars, a combination of Huns and Turks, whose Kha-Khan dwelt 
in the Crimea, was a race to whom the Greeks and Romans gave the 
name of Hungares or Hungarians. Vambery pronounces them to be 
Turco-Tatars. 

In the course of the ninth century they crossed the Carpathians 
under the leadership of their semi-mythical chief, Arpad, and spread 
over that great plain between the Danube and the Theiss, which they 
have called the " Alfold." There they found a remnant of the Khazar 
nation which went under the name of " Mogers," or " Magyars," a 
word meaning " men of the soil," according to the derivation generally 
accepted. Vambery, however, alleges that it is synonymous with the 
Turkish word " bajar," meaning " powerful " or " ruler." 

The Emperor Arnulf summoned them to war against the Moravians, 
and they destroyed the Moravian kingdom. In 899 they ravaged 
Carinthia and Friuli, and penetrated into Lombardy. In 900 they 
invaded Bavaria and imposed tribute. Their horsemen overran 
Alsace, Lorraine and Burgundy, leaving behind them the word " ogre " 
as a souvenir of the terror they inspired ; but in 955 they were routed 
at the Battle of Augsburg and driven out of Germany. 

262 



The Hungarians 

The Hungarians had to choose between Eastern and Western 
civilization. They adopted the Latin alphabet and the Roman 
faith. In iooo a.d. Stephen received the crown at the hands of the 
Pope. The state he thus founded was subject neither to the Eastern 
nor the Western Empire. The Magyars have preserved the crown 
of St. Stephen as the symbol of their nationality. 

They shared in the defeat of the Serbs on the fatal field of Kossovo 
in 1389. Occasionally allied to the Ottomans, they more usually 
suffered defeats by them. After the battle of Mohacs in 1526, in the 
hope of increasing their military power they offered the crown of 
St. Stephen to Ferdinand of Austria, subject to a declaration on his 
part that " we bind ourselves to preserve your nation and language 
and never to betray them " (" Nationem et linguam vestram servare, 
non perdere, intendimus "). 

Few nations have suffered greater misfortunes than the Hungarians. 
Before 1689 Hungary was invaded and partially occupied by the 
Turks. She adopted the Reformation and suffered abominations, 
like the Pressburg trial of 1673, when ninety Protestant ministers 
were condemned to death. In 1687 Leopold proclaimed that he had 
the right to treat Hungary as a conquered country and transformed 
the elective monarchy, an institution that had lasted seven hundred 
years, into a monarchy hereditary in the Hapsburg family. The 
" germanization " of Hungary proceeded apace. 

Maria Theresa helped on the process by the arts of diplomacy, but 
Joseph II., saturated with the theories of the French philosophers, a 
man before his time and contemptuous of historical tradition and the 
claims of race and nationality, attempted to make the use of the 
German language compulsory. On his death in 1790, the Hungarians 
broke into revolt and tried to sever their connection with the Haps- 
burg dynasty. But the champions of Hungarian nationality were 
only the nobles and country magnates who oppressed the peasantry 
by shifting the burden of taxation on to their shoulders. They were 
in mortal terror that some echo of the French Revolution might be 
heard in the countryside and were very relieved when Leopold II. 
assumed the crown of St. Stephen. 

When Francis II. proclaimed himself Emperor of Austria in 1804, 
their national pride was stung to the quick. 

The wars of Austria with revolutionary France and Napoleon led 
to no secession by Hungary. After Wagram, Napoleon issued to the 
Hungarians a proclamation skilfully inspired by the poet Bacsanyi, 

263 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

who had spent nine years in prison for having translated the 
Marseillaise. But to the Hungarian magnates Napoleon stood for 
the revolutionary ideas which they detested. 

After 1815, Francis II., thinking that he had no further need of 
their services on the battlefield, neglected to convene the Diet and 
he and Metternich devoted their attention to germanizing them. In 
1825, however, he wanted men for his campaign against Italy. He 
was compelled to summon the Diet. In previous diets a kind of 
dog-Latin had been spoken, but now Szechenyi spoke in the Magyar 
tongue in the House. Between 1833 and 1835 there were lively 
debates on the question of reforming the condition of the peasantry, 
but the magnates were extremely jealous of their privileges. When 
a toll was imposed on all, without distinction of rank, who crossed 
the bridge of Budapest, the great judge, Cziraki, vowed he would never 
set foot on that debasing highway. 

Basing their claims on historic tradition, the Hungarians attach 
great importance to the formalities associated with it. Ferdinand IV. 
offended them deeply by neglecting to be crowned at Budapest. 

The revolution of 1848 entailed the collapse of Metternich's policy. 
All the German princelets granted constitutions. All the nationalities 
of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were in a ferment. On March 3rd 
the Chamber of Magyar Deputies, assembled at Pressburg, acting 
on the suggestion of Kossuth, passed a resolution demanding a 
constitution. 

The Hungarians, however, were only a minority in the countries 
of the crown of St. Stephen. The Serbs, Croats and Roumanians 
over whom they tyrannized rose in revolt against them. The Hun- 
garians likewise broke into rebellion against the Emperor who had 
commissioned Jellachich, ban of Croatia, to restore order. The 
populace of Vienna, loathing the Slavs, took the part of the Hungarians. 
On the 2nd of December, 1849, Ferdinand abdicated in favour of 
Francis Joseph, the present Emperor. 

The new Sovereign called on Russia for aid. The Russians inter- 
vened actively and Hungary was reduced to silence. 

Next came Austria's two disastrous wars, the struggle with Italy 
in 1859 and her defeat at Sadowa in 1866. That moment marked 
the triumph of Dualism. The Hungarian " sage," Deak, produced 
a programme of ten points, and in 1867 he secured the " Compromise " 
which " fixed the relations of Hungary towards the other lands under 
His Majesty's rule." Hungary recognized no central Parliament, 

264 



The Hungarians 

and constituted an independent constitutional monarchy with the 
Emperor of Austria as King. Hungary nominated delegates to the 
two chambers to deliberate on common affairs. The defence of the 
integrity of the monarchy was the common concern of Hungary and 
the other states of the Empire. Foreign affairs were a common 
concern, likewise finance so far as it related to the army and 
foreign policy. Common affairs were in the hands of a special 
Ministry. 

This pact, however, only bound the Hungarians and the Emperor. 
Count Beust, who had been summoned from Dresden to take up 
the post of First Minister, is reported to have said to Deak : " Look 
after your own hordes and we will look after ours." By " hordes " 
he meant the Croats, Serbs and Roumanians. 

From that time forth, while the Government at Vienna has pro- 
ceeded with the germanization of Cisleithania, the Hungarians have 
patiently persevered with the task of magyarizing the Roumanians, 
Slovaks and Serbo-Croats who inhabit Transleithania. Nevertheless, 
their recriminations against Austria have not diminished. They have 
been anxious to transform the Compromise of 1867 into a simple 
personal union and there was a violent conflict over the question of 
giving orders in German in the army. For several years Hungary 
was in a state of anarchy. 

As a race the Magyars are charming and friendly, but they never 
forget that they owed the Compromise of 1867 to the victories of 
Prussia and if their domestic policy has been anti-German, Andrassy 
showed that their foreign policy is Prussian. 

To judge by the charges levelled by some Hungarians against the 
Government of Vienna it might be thought that they desired the 
separation of Hungary and Austria. Yet that is not the goal even 
of the extremists, for they have no wish to be ten million Hungarians 
isolated among the twenty-one million inhabitants of Transleithania. 
They do not look forward to the return of the three million Rouman- 
ians of Transylvania to Roumania, the constitution of a Czech state 
by the addition of two million Slovaks to the Czechs and Moravians, 
and the foundation of greater Serbia by the amalgamation of the 
Croats and the Serbs. Such an eventuality would find them a small 
State surrounded by peoples whom they had habitually harassed and 
oppressed. What influence would they have ? What would be 
their part in the world ? Hungary, confined within her true limits, 
would be cut off from the sea. 

265 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The Hungarians, so far from pining for separation, are the most 
active opponents of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy. Their ambition is to dominate in that monarchy, and 
the present moment sees them under Count Tisza and Baron Burian 
in the act of realizing their desires. 



266 



CHAPTER V 
THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 

The Croats — Latin influences — The Serbs and Byzantine influences — Historic 
claims : Koloman II. — Croats v. Magyars — The defeat of Kossovo — Serbia 
— A Turkish pashalik from 1459 to 1804 — The Croats escaped Turkish rule 
— Illyria — Subject provinces or allied kingdoms — Croat nationality — The 
Nagoda of 1868 — Subjection to the Hungarians — The oppression of Croatia 
— The liberation of Serbia — Bosnia and Herzgovina — Antagonisms and 
aspirations — The Congress of Abbazia. 

THE Romans were in occupation of Pannonia in the year 35 b.c. 
When the Eastern Empire was founded in 315 it remained 
an appanage of the Western Empire. 

We first hear of the Croats, or Chrobati, Chrovati, and Khzvraty, 
as the contemporary chroniclers call them, in the first half of the 
seventh century after the invasions of the Goths and Avars in the 
fifth and sixth. They formed the left wing of the Great Slav invasion 
which extended from Bulgaria to the Adriatic. They occupied the 
regions between the Drave and the Save, now known as Croatia- 
Slavonia, Dalmatia and North-West Bosnia. They came under 
Latin influence, and when they entered the Frankish Empire in 806 
they accepted the Church of Rome and the Latin alphabet. 

The Serbs crossed the Danube perhaps just before the occupation 
of Pannonia by the Croats. They were only a collection of clans, 
more or less related, but without political unity. Each of these clans, 
called " zhupaniyas," attempted to subdue the others. Drawn this 
way and that by the Eastern Empire and Church and the Church of 
Rome, and living in fear of the Bulgarians, who had formed a powerful 
kingdom on their eastern and south-eastern frontiers since the close 
of the seventeenth century, their political life had been strenuous 
and eventful. 

Towards the end of the ninth century they recognized the suzerainty 
of the Eastern Empire, and adopted the Greek Church and the 
Cyrillic alphabet. At the close of the twelfth century Serbia 

267 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

renounced all allegiance to the Eastern Empire and established a 
national church with a Slavonian liturgy and sacred books in the 
Slavonian tongue. 

The differences which have separated the Croats and Serbs in the 
past, and even keep them apart to-day, must be traced to the rivalry 
of these two competing influences. The somatic characteristics of 
the two groups are identical ; both Croats and Serbs are tall, dark 
and brachycephalic. 

The Croats, like the Serbs, had to defend their independence both 
against the Bulgarians and the Hungarians. In 1102 they offered 
their kingdom to Koloman II. 

The character of Koloman's sovereignty has always been a theme 
of lively debate between the Magyar and Croat historical schools. 
Magyar writers like Pesty allege that Croatia surrendered her in- 
dependence to the Magyars out of fear, and thenceforth submitted 
to Hungarian domination. The Croats assert that Koloman was 
King only by personal right, and that they kept their capital Agram, 
their army, coinage and fiscal system and the right of controlling 
the administration and nominating the bishops. Even at the present 
day they appeal to the maxim, Regnum regno non 'prcescribit leges, 
and cite in proof the undeniable fact that they have never ceased to 
resist the encroachments of the Magyars. 

Stephen Dushan, King of Serbia, was proclaimed Emperor of the 
Serbs and Greeks at Uskub in 1346, and in 1349 published the " Laws 
of the Tsar Dushan," which show the high degree of development 
to which Serbian civilization had attained. He died in 1355 at tne 
moment when, marching on Constantinople, he was hoping to establish 
a powerful State to stay the advance of the Turks. The Turks, after 
a victory on the Tenarus in 1371, won a crushing victory at Kossovo 
in 1389 which delivered Serbia and Bulgaria into their hands. Yet 
though Serbia became a vassal state of Turkey, she retained her own 
government until 1459, when she became a mere pashalik, governed 
directly by the Porte. This state of affairs continued for three 
hundred and forty-five years to 1804. 

It is difficult for a Western nation to imagine the lamentable 
condition of peoples suffering from the effects of centuries of Turkish 
misrule. All the more remarkable is the pertinacity with which 
they have preserved their personality and inherited characteristics 
and their refusal to regard their servitude as perpetual. 

The Hungarians, even when fighting the Turks, never relaxed 

268 



The Southern Slavs 

their hold on Croatia. In 1490 Matthias Corvinus had to abandon 
Slavonia to them, but his successor, Ladislaus of Poland, styled 
himself King of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia. 

After the battle of Mohacs in 1526 the Turks extended their sway, 
not only over Hungary, but over Croatia, and by 1606 only Western 
Croatia with the towns of Agram, Karlstadt, Warasdin and Zengy 
retained their independence. The Turks, however, made no attempt 
to colonize Slavonia and Croatia and left no permanent mark on 
these provinces as they did on Bosnia. The variation in treatment 
explains the differences between the Bosniacs and the Serbo-Croats 
of to-day. 

By the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699 and the Treaty of Passarowitz 
in 1718 the Turks ceded Slavonia and all Hungary in their occupation 
to Austria. 

The name " Croatia " was applied officially to the Slavonic pro- 
vinces of Visovitza, Pozega and Syrmia. From 1767 to 1777 these 
provinces, to which Dalmatia was added, received the name of Illyria, 
and were governed from Vienna, but afterwards they were divided. 
The port of Fiume was taken from Croatia and given to Hungary. 
In 1809, after Wagram, Napoleon formed a new amalgamation of 
Croatia, Dalmatia, Istria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorz and Gradisca, 
which he called the Illyrian Provinces. They remained until 18 1 3 
under French administration, from which they derived substantial 
benefit, but they never reconciled themselves to the quid pro quo in 
the shape of conscription. In 18 14 Dalmatia was incorporated in 
Austria, while Istria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorz and Gradisca became 
the Kingdom of Illyria, which lasted until 1849 ; but Croatia 
and Slavonia were declared appanages of the crown of 
Hungary. 

The Hungarians assert that they were considered as partes adnexce, 
or subject provinces, but the Croats and Slavonians maintain that 
their true position was that of regna soda, or allied states. The Croats 
were allowed to retain their language as an official language, and an 
elective Diet. A Ban or Viceroy governed them in the name of 
Hungary. 

Throughout this period there were efforts among the Croats, as 
among the Czechs, to revive national feeling. The leaders of this 
movement were a writer, Ljudevit Gaj, and, later, Bishop Strossmayer 
and Baron Joseph Jellachich, who became Ban in 1848, when the 
Illyrists assumed power. They made war on the Hungarians and 

269 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

were defeated but Jellachich immediately took action against them 
in the name of the Government of Vienna. The Constitution of 1849 
separated Croatia-Slavonia from Hungary and it became a province 
of the Austrian crown. Fiume was added to it. The period of 
reaction, during which there was neither ban nor diet, lasted from 1850 
to i860. Immediately after the war with Italy the Government of 
Vienna conceded the " October Diploma," which was followed by 
the constitution of February, 1861 ; but the elected diet was dissolved 
as soon as it demanded the formation of a great Southern-Slav 
confederation under the Imperial Government. 

After Sadowa, in the heyday of Dualism, Croatia-Slavonia became 
part of the Hungarian crown lands. By the " Nagoda " of 1868 
it was placed under the Government at Budapest. The Viceroy, or 
Ban, is appointed nominally by His Imperial and Royal Majesty, 
but in reality by the Prime Minister of Hungary. The provincial 
government is in the hands of three ministers who are responsible 
to the Ban, who is himself responsible only to the Hungarian Ministry 
and the National Assembly (Narodna Skupshtina), which has no 
control. This assembly consists of members elected by electors 
who vote orally before officials in the pay of the Ban, and privileged 
members drawn from the nobility, the upper clergy and the civil 
service. All legislative acts must be signed by a minister without 
portfolio who is a member of the Hungarian cabinet. The Assembly 
sends forty members to the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, but 
they can only take part in questions immediately concerning Croatia- 
Slavonia. The situation of Fiume makes it the port of Croatia and 
it performed that function from 1848 to 1870, when it was handed 
over to Austria along with its enclave of some eight square miles. It 
is now administered by the Government at Budapest. 

Croatia has always objected to this dispensation. In 1875 and 
1876, when the train fired by Bosnia led to the Turkish war which 
ended in the Berlin Treaty of 1878, a party calling itself the " Party 
of the Right " began an agitation for a " Greater Croatia." It was 
rewarded with repressive measures and the imprisonment of its 
leader. Since that time Croatia has suffered all the evils of despotism. 
In 1888 Bishop Strossmayer was compelled to resign for having sent 
a telegram to the Russian Church. 

The Croats have accordingly agitated for union with Bosnia and 
Herzgovina. In 1908 Baron Rauch, Ban of Croatia, refused to 
summon the Diet. 

270 



The Southern Slavs 

The abominable treatment of the Croats has been related 
elsewhere.* 

It has been shown that Serbia was a Turkish province from 1459 
to 1804. From 1804 to the autumn of 181 3 it enjoyed self-govern- 
ment as an independent State. By the Treaty of 1 81 2 with Turkey 
Russia did not secure sufficient protection for the Serbs, and in 18 17 
the Serbs broke into revolt and, after a conflict, regained their 
autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan. In 1829 Russia 
guaranteed that autonomy in the Treaty of Adrianople, but Belgrade 
and other Serbian towns retained their Turkish garrisons until 1867. 

In 1875, when Bosnia tried to shake off the Turkish yoke, the Serbs 
declared war on Turkey ; but though they were defeated, their action 
brought Russia into the war which ended in the Treaties of San 
Stefano and Berlin. The Treaty of Berlin recognized the complete 
independence of Serbia, but placed Bosnia and Herzgovina under 
Austrian administration. 

The Austrian minister Andrassy, a Hungarian by birth, who had 
concluded the alliance between Austria-Hungary and the German 
Empire, resigned rather than accept the gift. 

Thus there are Serbo-Croats on one side of the frontier, Serbians 
on the other, and Bosniacs and Herzgovinians in immediate contact 
with both, the bond of sympathy between them being hatred of 
Austria. On May 13th, 1848, when the Serbians formed them- 
selves into an independent nation, they demanded union with Croatia. 

It is often said that the two aspirations — a Greater Serbia and a 
Greater Croatia, with Bosnia, Herzgovina and Dalmatia as buffers 
between them — are incompatible. The question is whether these 
two Slav groups are capable of subduing their national pride and 
reconciling their religious and linguistic differences ? Can they 
profess and practise equality between all the groups, which include 
the Slavs of the south as well as those of Northern Istria and the 
districts of Udine and Carniola, Slovenes, Serbo-Croats, Serbs and 
Dalmatians ? 

If prolonged national misfortunes can teach men anything, the 
answer is in the affirmative, and, indeed, in this case that answer 
seems to have been already given. 

Yet the Serbian clergy showed hostility to the IHyrian movement 
because they wished to preserve Slavonic as the language of the 
liturgy. They affected to detect papal encroachments in the adoption 

* Supra, Part I., Chapters IV. and V, 
271 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

oi .-. igue. The difference of creed unquestionably keeps 

the two &ati< >art, though the Concordat of 1014 

. : the Holy See is a iliation. 

It will be remem 1 led to disasti 

at Agram. However, to rds th< March, 1913, the 

Southern Slavs held a congress at Abb which a memorandum 

was read which had been placed before the Irchduke Francis 

id, the imperial heir, I oi members of the Croat 

asked that the Dual System of 1867 should be 

.• a cod - Se bo Croatia should form part. 

"All our youth," ran the memorandum, " Eoi a union with 

... and Eeels itself drawn to the south by the recent successes 

of the Balkan League. The Governments Austria and Hungary, 

preparing the 

great separatist movement, and perhaps for a rcvolur. 
the Southern Slavs." 



2 ~ J 



CHAPTER VI 

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY 

Joseph II. 's germanizing zeal— The policy of Metiernich and Francis if. - 

Divide ut imperes — Constitutional and centralist policy— The Diet of 
Kromcriz — Bach The G rmans oi Austria are one with the Germans oi 
Germany — The three bonds oi the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — The 

Emperor — His titles — The army — 'J he bureaucracy 'I he selection oi ol 

— The dissolution oi the Austro-I Jungarian Monarchy — Both Germans and 

Hungarians have striven for its dismemberment — Magyar centralism. 

IT 1ST0RY records the failure of all attempts by the Dukes and 
JL Emperors of Austria, the Kings of Bohemia and Hungary 
and others, to germanize the different ethnical groups over whom 
they held sway. Joseph II. 's systematic efforts towards the unifica- 
tion of language and institutions met with passionate resentment 
and open hostility. Yet his motive was unquestionably to advance 
the welfare of the various peoples of his dominions. In 1790 he 
relieved his successors of the burden of carrying out his reforms by 
revoking them on his deathbed. 

Francis II. issued a penal code in 1803 and a civil code in 181 1. 
Hungary and Transylvania refused to accept the civil code. 
Although obsessed by the ideas of the eighteenth century, he main- 
tained a special code of laws for the Church, the Jews, and the land- 
owning interest. Without reviving serfdom he vexed the peasantry 
with all manner of feudal exactions. 

After 1 815 Metternich abandoned the work of unification and 
took for his motto the maxim " Divide ut imperes" Francis II. 
defined his policy in the following terms to the French Ambassador : 

" My peoples are foreigners to each other. All the better. They will not all 
have the same diseases at the same time. I put Hungarians in Italy and Italians 
in Hungary. They do not understand each other and hate each other. From 
their antipathies comes order, and peace from their mutual dislike." 

We have, however, seen proofs of the resentment of the Magyars, 

273 18 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

and when the Revolution of 1848 broke out the whole fabric seemed 
on the point of collapse. 

^ Intelligent statesmen would have met the wishes of the various 
nationalities by adopting a federal system, but the Germans had no 
intention of abandoning their control of the Empire. Schwarzenburg 
was the apostle of absolutism but Ferdinand was compelled to 
abdicate in favour of Francis Joseph, the present Emperor, then 
eighteen years old and declared of age for the occasion. His minister 
Stadion followed a constitutional and centralist policy : " To unite 
all the lands and peoples of the Monarchy in one great State with a 
single Government at Vienna." He was none the less so conscious 
of the insuperable difficulties of his programme that he did not summon 
the representatives of Hungary to the Diet of Kromeriz. He then 
used their absence, for which he was responsible, to declare the Diet 
invalid and dissolve it. The Emperor looked also to Frankfort and 
the Germans of Austria hoped to dominate the Germanic Confederation 
at the same time as the nations of the Austrian Empire. 

Austria was declared an independent, indivisible and indissoluble 
state. From 1850 to i860 Bach continued the despotic tradition of 
Metternich. He maintained a state of siege until 1854 an< ^ n ^ s name 
is associated with police government and Clericalism, the two elements 
most hostile to individual national sentiment. In 1856 a Concordat 
put public education in the hands of the clergy and the Jesuits. 
All religions other than Catholicism could only be practised in private. 
Juries and public trial were suppressed. The publication of news- 
papers in the Czech tongue was forbidden. 

This centralizing German Government was shattered by the 
disasters of 1859 and 1866. The emancipation of Vienna's subject 
peoples was brought about by the victories of Austria's enemies and 
defeat has been the instrument of progress in that Empire. But the 
Compromise of 1867 satisfied only the Germans of Cisleithania and 
the Magyars of Transleithania, both of whom threatened the Hungarian 
monarchy with disruption. 

The Germans of Austria have compared Bohemia to Schleswig, 
and, associating themselves with the Germans of Germany, pro- 
claimed in the Reichsrath that " they had not won at Sedan to become 
the helots of the Czechs." After the establishment of the Dual System 
the first Austrian ministry was composed of eight Germans and a Pole. 

The peoples of Austria-Hungary are the people of the King- 
Emperor in an almost feudal sense. 

274 



The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 

He triumphed over the Hungarians in the affair of the military words 
of command, when he threatened to abdicate. Not even the most 
uncompromising of the extremists was ready to assume responsi- 
bility for such a catastrophe. The Hapsburgs have always had one 
fundamental policy : Foluntas imperatoris suprema lex esto (" The 
Emperor's will is the highest law "). The Kaiser parades it before 
the eyes of the world, but the Emperors of Austria have preferred 
to put it into practice. 

Ministers and other public servants must devote all their patriotic 
sentiment to the service of 

Francis Joseph (Franz-Joseph) I. Charles, Emperor of Austria, Apostolic 
King of Hungary, King of Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Galicia, Lodo- 
meria and Illyria, King of Jerusalem, etc., Archduke of Austria, Grand-Duke of 
Tuscany and Cracow, Duke of Lorraine, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and 
Bukovina, Prince of Transylvania, Margrave of Moravia, Duke of Upper and 
Lower Silesia, Modena, Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, Auschwitz and Zator, 
Teschen, Friuli, Ragusa and Zara, Prince Count of Hapsburg and Tyrol, Kyburg, 
Goritz and Gradisca, Prince of Trent and Brixen, Margrave of Upper and Lower 
Lusatia and in Istria ; Count of Hohenembs, Feldkirch, Brigantia, Sonnenberg, 
etc., Lord of Trieste, Cattaro and the Wendian March, Grand Voyvode of Serbia, 
etc., etc., Maj. Imp. and Roy. Apostolic* 

The Emperor has two instruments of government — the army and 
the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy is the State. The universities 
train the officials and professors themselves become ministers in the 
Austrian cabinets, which are not composed of ministers responsible 
to Parliament. They are heirs to the traditions of Joseph II. As 
men they are generally very charming and highly expert in depart- 
mental business, but they are utterly unscrupulous in their methods 
of government and have the most profound contempt for individual 
rights. t 

The other instrument of government is the army. A Viennese 
poet said to General Radetzky in 1848 : "Austria is there, in your 
camp." The army cannot be national because, collectively, it does 
not represent a nation, but is a hotch-potch of nationalities thrown 
together and more or less at enmity with each other. The element of 
unity is supplied by the person of the Emperor, the General Staff 
and the corps of officers. Many officers, poor but of high birth, look 

* Almanack de Gotha. 

I See the Journal des frconomistes , 1914, Aug. 14th, p. 177-187 and Sept. 15th, 
P- 2 73- 

275 18* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

to the military profession as a career for their sons. Between the 
ages of ten and twelve the sons are admitted without payment 
to the primary cadet Realscbulen, and from there go on to the 
superior cadet Realschulen. Between seventeen and twenty they 
choose their arm and enter one of the two academies, from which 
they emerge second lieutenants, not after a competitive examination, 
but after their studies have been completed. Those who distinguish 
themselves most become officers, while the others become cadets, with 
rank varying from acting-officer to that of sergeant (corpoul). For 
wealthy families which do not wish to part with their sons at once, 
there are cadet schools which they enter between the ages of fourteen 
and seventeen. The cadets are never allowed to mix with the men. 
The higher ranks have been increased to facilitate promotion and 
encourage the officers. There are few Magyar officers in the active 
army but many Slav officers. 

The Sovereign's bodyguard is of five different kinds. The rank and 
file of Arcierengarden and the Hungarian Guard is composed of 
senior and junior regimental officers, while the duties of non-com- 
missioned officers are performed by generals and colonels.* 

The Archdukes have special titles and honours. 

Each soldier takes an oath of personal allegiance to the Emperor. 
Each man must have a religion, and a religious service is held at mid- 
day every day, when the posts turn out of the guardhouse and line 
up for devotions. 

Great efforts have been made to foster the esprit de corps of the 
different regiments by the grant of distinguishing marks and special 
uniforms, but there are few regiments composed solely of men of 
the same nationality. Some consist of a medley of Germans, 
Roumanians, Croats and Magyars. German is the only army lan- 
guage, but the officer must explain the ordinary German military 
terms to the men in their own tongue. The explosion in 
Hungary over the question of commands in German is of recent 
memory. 

The regiments are broken up to form the various garrisons, a step 
dictated by political considerations but detrimental to military 
efficiency. The men are sent out oif their own country and changed 
frequently from one depot to another. At the time of the fall of the 
Badeni ministry a Bosniac regiment was employed to repress the 
German agitation at Gratz. Every German in the Monarchy imme- 

* Armie, Race et Dynastie en Autriche-Hongrie, by E. Terquem (Cerf, 1903). 

276 



The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 

diately denounced the intervention of the " barbarian Slavs." It was 
intended to renew the military band concerts, but the populace 
threw dirt at the bandsmen. 

In Bohemia the Germans caused such a disturbance at a Czech fete 
that the military had to be called out. When the German dragoons 
appeared on the scene they were greeted by the " Wacht am Rhein " 
from the German ringleaders and a shower of stones from the Czechs. 

It is not merely in war time that the regulation is enforced which 
provides that if " a soldier, at a critical moment, suggests disobedience 
to orders, he may be killed by any superior who happens to be near." 

Every general is accompanied by a socius, an officer, usually of 
equal rank, with the title of Assistant Corps Commander, whose duty 
is to keep him under observation. The same procedure is observed 
in the case of the divisional commanders of the " Honved," the Trans- 
leithanian landwehr. In 1866 the regiments recruited from the 
Venetian district refused to march against the Italians. From various 
sources information has been received that the Slav and Czech troops 
have displayed their hostility to the present war, though it is im- 
possible to establish the truth of this until confirmation is forth- 
coming. It is inherently probable, because they are keenly alive to 
the interests of their own nations. The dissolution of the Austro- 
Hungarian army would mean the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. 

The object of Francis Joseph's policy, like that of his predecessors, 
has been to maintain the dynasty. Yet what does that dynasty 
stand for ? It was as the Kaiser's tool that Francis Joseph brought 
about the catastrophe of 1914. 

What guarantee can his successors give to the other nations of 
Europe ? To preserve the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would be 
to resume a task as futile and dangerous as that of maintaining the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, the dismemberment of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy will not be the work of the Allies. 
The process began with the triumph of Dualism in 1867. Since 1870 
the Germans of Austria have been feeling the irresistible attraction of 
the German Empire and the Magyars have thrown them into the 
arms of Germany. Count Beust resigned himself to the " compulsory 
visit " which Francis Joseph paid to Berlin, but Bismarck distrusted 
him with good reason. His successor, Andrassy, on the other hand, 
suggested to the German Emperor on November 14th, 1871, the alliance 
which was not concluded until 1879, because of Russia. The Dual 

277 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

System was transformed into Magyar domination over the whole 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In 1914 this policy was continued. 
Count Berchtold was a Hungarian, but it was Count Tisza who con- 
ducted the campaign of the Ballplatz from Budapest. After the 
departure of Count Berchtold, over whom his control was not complete, 
he remained at Budapest but sent Baron Burian, a man after his 
own heart, to Vienna to occupy the post of Joint Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. He himself went to confer with the Kaiser, thus exposing 
the utter subordination of Vienna to Budapest. 

The Dual System of 1867 has become Magyar centralism and 
Magyar foreign policy dates from the victory of Prussia over Austria. 






278 



PART V 

THE CONSEQUENCES 



CHAPTER I 

THE END IN VIEW* 

International law — An aspiration rather than a reality — Treaties resulting from 
wars are instruments of extortion — Neither victors nor vanquished regard 
them as final — The sovereignty of the State — The absence of morality in 
international dealings — " Might is Right " — The law of the strongest — 
Historical law — The great treaties — The coming treaty will be the 
resultant of force — Use and misuse of force — The coming treaty and accept- 
ance of the inevitable. 

THE object of the preceding chapters has been to isolate the 
issues raised by the present war from its remote or immediate 
causes. To realize them it is essential to regard them from the 
objective point of view alone and resolutely to avoid the nebulous 
phrases which have covered those political aberrations of the past 
which are responsible for the crisis of the present. 

We have heard much of international law since the war began, but 
Mr. A. V. Dicey pokes fun at his " friend the Chichele Professor of 

* Les Grands TraiUs Politiques, by P. Albin. A collection of the principal 
diplomatic text from 1815 to the present day, with a commentary and notes. 
Preface by M. Herbette ; 2nd edition, revised and brought up to date ; 1912. — 
Le " Coup " d'Agadir. La Querelle Franco- A llemande, by the same ; 1912. — 
L'Allemagne et la France en Europe ; 188 5-1 894. La Paix Armee, by the same ; 
1913. — Bismarck et son Temps, by P. Matter. — Bismarck (1815-1898), by H. 
Welschinger, of the Institut ; 2nd edition. — L' Esprit Public en Allemagne vingt 
ans apres Bismarck, by H. Moyssel (Crowned by the Academie Francaise). — 
La Crise Politique de V Allemagne Contemporaine, by William Martin. — Cent 
Projets de Partage de la Turquie, from the thirteenth century to the Treaty of 
Bucarest (1911), by J. J. Djuvara, Roumanian minister in Belgium. With a 
preface by M. Louis Renault and eighteen maps. — La Vie Politique dans les Deux 
Mondes, published under the direction of MM. A. Viallate and Caudel, professors 
at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques, with the collaboration of MM. D. Belief, 
J. Blosciszewski, P. Chasles, M. Courant, M. Escoffier, G. Gidel, Paul Henry, 
Rene Henry, G. Isambert, J. Ladreit de Lacharriere, G. Lagny, A. de Lavergne, 
A. Marvaud, P. Matter, Ch. Mourey, R. Pinon, P. Quentin-Bauchart, H. Sage, 
A. R. Savary, A. Tardieu, R. Waultrin, professors and former pupils of the 
Ecole des Sciences Politiques ; seven volumes (1906- 1907) — all these works 
published by F. Alcan. 

28l 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

International Law, ... he being a teacher of law which is not law, 
and being accustomed to expound those rules of public ethics which 
are miscalled international law. . . ."* "International law" is an 
aspiration rather than a reality. 

The Hague Conventions'' are an attempt to establish rules of inter- 
national law, but one of the signatories to those conventions has 
violated them with impunity. Once again events have shown that 
international law, as at present constituted, lacks the assistance of an 
independent and disinterested judicial power to ensure its enforce- 
ment. It has no sanction. 

The relations of States with each other are always anarchical. 
True, some States make treaties with others ; but, as a rule, these 
treaties are the result of armed conflict, and therefore only the accept- 
ance by the vanquished of the terms imposed upon them by the 
victors. Such treaties correspond to the agreements obtained by 
duress which are void in law. 

As soon as the treaty is concluded the victor uses it as the basis of 
his claims, the vanquished to preserve what has been left to him — 
for example, his frontiers ; but the victor none the less lives in fear 
that the vanquished is only awaiting a favourable opportunity to 
tear it up, while the vanquished only accepts it with the ulterior 
intention of seizing the first opportunity of destroying the document 
which testifies to his defeat. The victor's distrust often leads him 
to tear up the treaty himself, with a view to crushing his foe more 
completely. Such has ever been the attitude of Berlin towards the 
Treaty of Frankfort ; and if Germany waited until 1914 for the new 
war, which would enable her to wipe it out, it is only because she did 
not consider herself ready or because she feared intervention by 
other States. 

The Kaiser appeals to Right Divine, by virtue of which he is King 
of Prussia, and therefore Emperor of Germany. Since he incarnates 
the God from Whose hands the crown was received at Konigsberg, 
everything is permitted to him. For one with a divine mission, the 
end justifies the means. 

Many politicians, who care no more for the divine mission of the 
Kaiser than for the " divine right " of Louis XIV., are nevertheless ob- 
sessed by the theory of the sovereignty of the State as an axiomatic 
dogma. They count up the votes on a parliamentary division, 
and even though those votes only reflect the opinions of a minority 
* The Law of the Constitution. 






282 



:u 



The End in View 

in the country, if they are a majority in the parliamentary sense they 
attribute to the decision resulting from the processes of addition and 
subtraction an unlimited authority to override all private and moral 
objections, an authority incapable of alienation. Those in favour of 
income-tax have been heard to state that it would be a derogation 
from the State's sovereignty to forego taxation of its loans. Yet 
when one State makes a treaty with another it sacrifices a part of 
its sovereignty. When it makes a contract with its officials, it parts 
with some of its sovereignty in their favour. When it makes a 
contract for the purchase of material, or invites tenders for public 
works, it becomes an ordinary contracting party in the eye of the 
law. When it borrows money it acknowledges the principle that one 
cannot both give and keep ; it could only violate that principle 
by force. 

I shall not enlarge here on the definition of sovereignty, a word the 
subject of keen controversy, but I hold emphatically that if a State 
makes an agreement, whether with other States or with individuals, 
it must act honourably. 

Nevertheless, the majority of politicians in all countries think 
lightly of that moral precept as applied to inter-State dealings, no 
less than to the dealings of States with individuals. When they sign 
a treaty, they do so with the ulterior design of tearing it up at the 
moment dictated by their passions, convenience or supposed interests. 

The German Mommsen said : 

" Every nation rightly makes it a matter of amour fropre to undo disastrous 
treaties it has been compelled to sign."* 

On January 27th, 1853, Bismarck is reported as having said in the 
Prussian Landtag, " Force overrides the law." The remark was made, 
not apropos of any question of foreign policy, but as a comment on his 
manoeuvre of governing without any financial provision being made. 
At the end of the sitting he denied having used the words attributed 
to him by the deputy for Schwerin who gave the following explanation 
in his reply : " I did not say that the President Minister used the 
words ' Force overrides the law,' but his speech led up to that con- 
clusion. He seems to have meant : * Force must decide when the 
law is helpless.' "t 

* History of Rome. 

I See Le Figaro of April 10th, 191 5 : The discussion of l'Abb6 Forme and Polybe 
(Joseph Reinach). 

283 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

What does it matter whether Bismarck used these exact words or 
not. The man who made no secret of his programme of imposing 
Prussian domination on Germany ferro el jgfli, need make no secret 
of his conviction that Force was the source of Law. This view 
was by no means peculiar to him, but is that held bv all who 
appeal to conspiracy or insurrections for the settlement of domestic 
problems, and war as a solution of external difficulties. But it 
may be admitted that the use of force to destroy an existing law 
and replace it by another has often been a factor of progress 
and a means of bringing liberty to individuals and States.* 

All so-called international historical law is based on treaties 
associated with marriages, grants, inheritance and family arrange- 
ments, some approved by both parties, others forced by one on the 
other. In many cases their terms are enshrined only in forged docu- 
ments. The validity of such historical claims cannot be admitted 
by those who refuse to confuse sovereignty with ownership, and to 
believe that nations are like flocks — the private property of certain 
families. When Talleyrand, at the Congress of Vienna, opposed the 
principle of " legitimacy " to the ambitions of Prussia, he was 
advocating the theory of royal ownership. 

But although sovereigns invoke traditional claims in favour of 
their own rights, they do not hesitate to tear them up if they clash 
with the claims of others. 

Traditional claims are the sole basis of the Austrian Empire, but 
the Government of Vienna have never relinquished their efforts to 
undermine the traditional claims of the nations which form the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The King of Prussia invokes tradi- 
tional claims based on M divine right," a divine right bought in 1 701 
from the Emperor Leopold who made East Prussia a kingdom. But 
the Kings of Prussia have extended and consolidated their power 
solely by overriding the traditional claims of other potentates. 

In addition to dynastic sources historical international law appeals 
to treaties for its sanction. Yet how many treaties are there which 
have not been the outcome of wars ? The great treaties on which the 
so-called " public law " of Europe is based — the Treaty of West- 
phalia (164S), the Treaty of L T trecht (1713), the treaties in 1815, 
the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the Treaty of Prague in 1866, the Treaty 
of Frankfort in 1S71, the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, and, finally, die 
Treaty of Bucharest in 191 3 — none of these was the outcome of 

* See Manuel de Diplomatique, by Giryj 
284 



The End in View- 
peaceful agreement. They were the consequences of wars and 
instruments of peace which were themselves the cause of fresh wars. 

The treaty to come will be the result of a war. If the Allies were 
defeated, their downfall would mean an unlimited licence to the 
Governments of the Kaiser and the Emperor-King of Austria-Hungary 
to oppress the peoples which wish to escape or which have hitherto 
escaped their domination. 

The Allies will triumph. Our peace will be the result of victory. 
It will therefore be the result of force. This is the problem that 
faces us : 

This work of force must not be an abuse of force. Imposed on 
Governments which are based on traditional authority or force, its 
object must be the liberation of the national groups which have been 
their victims and a final restoration of the world's peace. We must 
have clear ideas of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to carry 
out this apparently inconsistent programme. The inconsistencies 
should be reduced to a minimum and their existence must not make 
us recoil from our task. 

We have to impose a peace on States which believe that their 
power entitles them to oppress other States, a peace which they will 
not be able to violate, and yet one which would not subject them to 
the tyranny they meant for others. The peace must leave these 
States so situated that their future policy shall be dominated by no 
desire for revenge, and their statesmen will be led to resign themselves 
to the fait accompli. 



285 



CHAPTER II 
WHAT IS MEANT BY NATIONALITY IN POLITICS 

Political anthropology — The Teutonic race — Its rights are the invention of the 
Historical School — The principle of nationality is not a principle of law — 
Is it a traditionalist principle ? — The Turks, Germans and Hungarians are 
incapable of assimilating the groups they govern — Their power of resistance 
constitutes their nationality — The incompetence of their rulers is their 
right to separation — The end of the Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns and the 
Ottoman Empire. 

THE question of nationality has already been discussed. The 
Germans have attempted to justify their conquests of 1870 
by arguments drawn from political anthropology. They tell us that 
they annexed Alsace because its population was German. They could 
not say the same of Lorraine, but that consideration hampered them 
no more than it had done in the partitions of Poland. 

The Prussians are an offshoot of the Wends, who are Slavs, and 
Wends are still to be found, with their own speech, customs and 
manners, within forty miles of Berlin.* 

Mr. William Z. Ripley, of Harvard University^ in his book, " The 
Races of Europe : a Sociological Study," has something to say of 
the Teutonic type. In reality, its somatic characteristics vary widely 
among the peoples who claim membership of the same race. The area 
of Germany inhabited by tall dolichocephalic with blue eyes and 
fair hair is very small, comprising only Hanover, Mecklemburg and 
a part of Brandenburg and Pomerania.J 

The rights of the Teutonic race have been invented by the German 
Historical School, which has sought their origin in a past so dim and 
distant that any theory can be successfully maintained.^ 

In Europe, races are differentiated by language, tradition and 
historical associations. All three must be considered, for language 

* William Martin : La Crise Politique de VAllemagne, p. 153. 
| Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co., Limited, 1900. 
J W. Ripley : Plan, p. 222. 

§ V. E. Bourgeois : Manuel Historiquc de Politique Ltrangere, Vol. II., 
Chap. VI., " Les Doctrines de Races en Europe." 

2S6 



What is Meant by Nationality in Politics 

and traditions have formed groups. The principle of nationality, 
dear to Napoleon III., who played so disastrous a part in European 
history during the second half of the nineteenth century, is not a 
principle of law at all, but a traditionalist principle in antagonism 
with the general theory of law enunciated by the French eighteenth- 
century philosophers. 

When the moment arrives for settling the future of Germany and 
Austria-Hungary the Allies must start from the following basis. 

From the battle of Kossovo (1389) to 1878 the Serbs were under 
Turkish rule, but all that Turkish misrule could do was insufficient 
to destroy their nationality and the hope of regaining their independ- 
ence. The Germans and Hungarians have shown the same inability 
as the Turks to assimilate the groups they govern. The common 
features of all these groups have been their speech, legends, history, 
aspirations and hatred of the States whose domination they endured. 
Those features made them nations, and give each of them a right 
to independence to-day. Some writers suggest that economic interests 
have been the predominant factors among these groups, but they are 
wrong. The common interests which unite their members and 
differentiate them are religious, traditional, intellectual, philological— 
in a word, psychological. Their rulers, instead of assimilating them, 
have never ceased to abuse and oppress them. Prussia is detested 
by the Poles of the Duchy of Posen, and after more than forty years 
Germany finds Alsace-Lorraine as obdurate as on the first day. 

The inability of the Germans of Germany and Austria and the 
Hungarians to assimilate the groups over which they tyrannize gives 
those groups the right to independence. Those two great Empires, 
each of them a standing despotism and menace, must be broken 
up for the same reasons which apply to Turkey. 

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy must be divided between a 
number of small nations of eight to twelve millions, such as Bohemia 
with Moravia and the Slovaks, Greater Serbia with Croatia and 
Slavonia, and Greater Roumania. The part of the Cisleithan provinces 
in which Germans predominate can form a nation of ten millions. 
Vienna will be no longer an imperial city, but it may keep its geo- 
graphical situation and its monuments. Its only loss will be His 
Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. 

The dynasties of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern, for so long bitter 
enemies and become friends for evil purposes alone, must disappear 
together. 

287 



CHAPTER III 

THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY 

The Compact of September 6th, 19 14 — Neutrals will have no locus standi — 
Only the belligerents can be parties to the treaty — The precedents of 18 14 
and 181 5 — The Hohenzollerns and the Imperial Chancellor are disqualified 
— The plenipotentiaries to the Bundesrat — The Reichstag possessed the 
treaty-making power in the Germanic Confederation. 

THE compact signed at London on September 6th, 1914, is fresh 
in the public memory : 

" The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to 
conclude peace separately during the present war." 

I have no need to enlarge on the significance of that engagement, 
nor to insist that it will be kept. 

Several well-intentioned people, like my friend Mark H. Judge, have 
offered the suggestion that neutrals should be invited to co-operate 
in drawing up the treaty. Now of the forty neutrals which signed 
the Hague Convention, some have shown that they had not the will, 
others that they had neither the will nor the ability, to make that 
Convention respected. They have thus no claim to intervene. 

I know the maxim : " One cannot be both judge and suitor," and 
its corollary is that the belligerents must not settle the questions at 
issue by and for themselves. Yet the constant appeal to force as 
the final solution of disputes has proved the difficulty hitherto 
experienced of composing international differences by peaceful means. 

The belligerents know what the war has cost them. The vital 
necessity for the Allies is to ensure that its repetition may be made 
impossible. Besides, if one of the belligerents refused to accept the 
decision of the neutrals, what sanction would it have ? How far 
could it be effective ? 

The issues will be settled by the Allies on one side, Great Britain, 
Russia, France, Italy, Belgium, Serbia and Japan ; on the other, 
Germany and Austria-Hungary . 

288 



The Parties to the Treaty 

Turkey, having become a mere vassal State, has lost the right she 
gained in 1856 of being represented at a congress. 

In 1 8 14, when the Allies entered Paris, Napoleon abdicated at 
Fontainebleau. They did not treat with him. After his return 
from Elba they announced that they would entertain no thought of 
peace until he was delivered up to them. That course of action 
is a precedent entitling the Allies to refuse to treat with any member 
of the House of Hohenzollern. 

When the Kaiser and his Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
in the name of the Empire, spoke of the treaty guaranteeing the 
independence of Belgium as a " scrap of paper," and when they pro- 
ceeded to disregard the Hague Conventions relating to the conduct 
of war, they disqualified themselves. What faith could anyone put 
in any declarations made in a treaty by those who had proclaimed 
that, although an undertaking was binding on neutrals, they did not 
regard it as binding on themselves ? 

The German Empire is a confederation of States, but the Emperor 
makes treaties without consulting the Bundesrat. As M. Labaud 
says : " As the sittings of the Bundesrat are not public, a foreign 
Power cannot tell if that body has given its assent to a treaty." In 
the old Germanic Empire, on the other hand, the treaty-making 
power resided in the Reichstag, not in the Empire. 

The Allies must restore the earlier system. By refusing to treat 
with the Emperor of Germany they will refuse to treat with the King 
of Prussia. They will treat with the representatives of the States as 
accredited to the Bundesrat, with the exception of Prussia and 
Alsace-Lorraine, 



28) 19 



CHAPTER IV 

THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS 

The effect, not the cause — Results in 1806, 1856 and 1870 — Foreign interference 
in contrast to political independence. 

THERE are some who talk of the limitation of armaments and 
the demolition of fortresses, but they are only suffering from the 
illusion which confounds cause with effect. History is full of examples 
of the futility of such measures. 

After Jena Napoleon limited the size of the Prussian army to forty 
thousand men. Scharnhorst met that situation by his system of the 
" Landwehr." The army was kept nominally at that figure, but 
all able-bodied men were passed through it, received military training, 
and were ready in 181 3 to take part in the King of Prussia's revenge. 
Again, Article 13 of the Treaty of Paris in 1856 prohibited any Power 
from constructing or maintaining arsenals on the Black Sea. To 
this was added a clause forbidding the high contracting parties — 
in reality, Russia — from keeping in the same waters more than six 
steamships of eight hundred tons at the most, and four smaller 
ships of two hundred tons each. In 1870 Prussia's consent to the 
abrogation of those clauses was one of the reasons for Russia's bene- 
volent neutrality during the Franco-German War. Russia took 
advantage of that war to have them repealed by the treaty of March 
31st, 1 87 1. It will thus be seen what disastrous consequences a 
measure of that kind may entail. 

When peace comes the conquerors must set up no claim to police 
the territories of the conquered. Police and gaoler work of that 
kind is exhausting for those who perform it and leaves behind it 
feelings of hatred and vengeance which can only lead to future 
disasters. 

The most stringent rules for the limitation of armaments can be 
rendered useless by an invention. At one time it is smokeless 
powder revolutionizing explosives, at another the 75mm. field-gun. It 

290 



The Limitation of Armaments 

is usual to reckon naval strength in " Dreadnoughts," yet submarines 
and mines have altered the character of naval warfare. Aviation has 
made cavalry reconnaissance a thing of the past. 

Those who look to disarmament to give war its death-blow are 
confounding cause with effect. Our first duty is to remove the causes 
of war. 



29T 19* 



CHAPTER V 
THE GOAL IS THE REMOVAL OF THE CAUSES OF WAR 

A political task — How to remove the causes of war — We must be satisfied with 
that aim — The maintenance of peace — It is impossible with the present 
constitution of the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — 
Prussia to be dismembered at the start of negotiations. 

PEACE in the future will be impossible unless the causes of war 
are removed. The task before the Allies is thus a political 
one and it must be rigidly confined to the one end in view. 

On January 25th, 18 14, at Langres, the Czar of Russia, the Emperor 
of Austria, the King of Prussia and the representatives of England 
drew up " a resolution concerning the form of government to be 
given to France."* 

The Allies of to-day ought not to interfere with the form of govern- 
ment in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Yet the future peace of 
Europe is plainly incompatible with the existence of the German 
Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as at present con- 
stituted. We must be careful that the changes in the structure 
of these two Powers shall not be inspired by any desire of the Allied 
Governments to meddle in their domestic affairs. The sole ambition 
of the Allies must be to prevent their enemies from threatening the 
world with another war in a few years' time. 

Before 1866 many Germans like Bluntschli dreamed of a Germany 
united by some great Liberal movement. Count Beust, when Minister 
of Saxony, and Bray, the Minister of Bavaria, had schemes of other 
kinds ; but it was Bismarck who made good the hegemony of the 
Hohenzollerns. The system he inaugurated has not been proof against 
adversity. The Crown Prince is certainly not the man to undo the 
disastrous work of his father, whom he is popularly supposed to have 
egged on. 

The State which began in 1866 and ends in 1916 must give place 

* Metternich : Mimoires, Vol. I., p. 182. 
292 



The Goal is the Removal of the Causes of War 

to another. As soon as negotiations begin, Prussia must be reduced 
to the old frontiers she had before the partitions of Poland in 1772, 
1793 and 1795. The Duchy of Posen, at least a part of Silesia, all 
Prussia between (and including) Danzig and the mouths of the 
Vistula and East Prussia must be restored to Poland. The Rhine 
Province and Westphalia must be declared autonomous. Saxony 
must recover what she lost in 181 5. Frankfort must return to the 
status of a free city. The annexation of Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse 
and Nassau must be declared null and void, for from the point of 
view of positive law, the Prussian Diet was not competent to 
sanction it.* 

* See William Martin : La Crise Politique de V Allemagne Contemporaine. 



2Q3 



CHAPTER VI 

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 

The two autocracies : the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
— -The remodelling of Germany — Commercial unity : the Zollverein is 
permanent — Political unity : the Empire must be dissolved — The annexa- 
tions of 1866 — Not by agreement — Those annexed accepted the inevitable — 
King George V. of Hanover — The Emperor's powers — The powers of the 
individual States — We must respect the independence of the individual 
States while destroying the diplomatic and military autocracy of the King 
of Prussia. 

THE autocracy of the Emperor of Germany and the autocracy 
of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary 
are responsible for Europe's condition of nerves since 1S71 and the 
present war. The security of Europe can only be gained through the 
disappearance of those two autocracies. 

Germany has been remodelled six times since the opening of the 
nineteenth century : first by the Treaty of Luneville in 1802 ; then 
by the Peace of Pressburg in 1S05 ; next by the constitution of the 
Confederation of the Rhine; then in 1815 by the constitution of 
the German Confederation ; then in 1866 by the constitution of the 
Confederation of the North ; finally in 1S71 by the foundation of 
the German Empire. 

The policy of both Austria and Prussia, pursued in devious ways 
but clear enough in its main outlines, was to exclude each other from 
the Confederation of German)', an unwieldy organization which was 
incapable of action. The petty States of Germany, each with its 
tariff, coinage and separate diplomacy, formed an unexampled 
political medley. 

Prussia first gained commercial unity through the Zollverein, and 
that commercial unity may be regarded as indestructible. She went 
on to secure political unity by a policy of " blood and iron." That 
political unity must be destroyed. 

In 1866 the Prussian Diet decreed the annexation of Hanover, 

294 



The Dissolution of the German Empire 

Nassau and Frankfort. It was not by agreement, and those annexed 
had no voice in the decision which settled their fate.* 

In 1866 the dispossessed princes bowed to the logic of facts, and 
the King of Hanover, George V., alone remained at war with Prussia. 
His grandson, however, now the Kaiser's son-in-law, has been invested 
with the Duchy of Brunswick, and as an officer in the German 
army has taken the oath of allegiance which impliedly records his 
renunciation of Hanover. 

The ancient free city of Frankfort, so ill-used in 1866, is now quite 
resigned to the Prussian yoke. 

In 1871 the Confederation of the North of 1866 was extended to 
form the German Empire. The Emperor is the President of the 
Bund and the supreme head of the army. Bismarck thought the 
King's desire to obtain that supreme command so ambitious that 
he dared not hope to get it accepted ; but in spite of his misgivings he 
was successful. 

The Bundesrat represents the princes. These princes are officers 
of the army, and, as such, owe military obedience to the Kaiser. All 
important questions are decided by the Emperor and Chancellor alone. 
When the Emperor William made speeches, like the celebrated 
outburst at Bremen before his departure for Tangier, when he sent 
the Panther to Agadir, when he declared Germany's solidarity with 
Austria in her action against Russia, the kings and grand-dukes of 
Germany stood by as idle spectators. Neither the Emperor nor the 
Chancellor has ever condescended to take their advice. They have 
not even thought it necessary to inform them of their intentions. 
These princes learned the Kaiser's decisions through the Wolff 
Bureau or their newspapers. 

The Allies find themselves faced with the problem of a Confedera- 
tion of States, all of which have, speaking broadly, all the sovereign 
powers of independent States, but which have parted with control 
over their military forces and their relations with foreign nations to 
Prussia. That problem is the task of respecting the autonomy of 
these individual States, while putting an end to the diplomatic and 
military autocracy of the King of Prussia. 

* William Martin : La Crise Politique de V AlUmagne Contemporaine, p. 229 
et seq. 



295 



CHAPTER VII 

THE FACTOR OF PARTICULARISM 

Opposition to military ambitions — Dissension in the German Empire — The 
Guelfs — The " Party of the Right " — The illusion of safety and the fetish 
of prestige — The Prussification of Germany — The psychological effects of 
defeat — The powers of the States — The Confederation of the South and the 
Confederation of the Rhine — The chances of permanence — A Saxon's opinion 
of Prussian influence — The fear of France — The necessity of dispelling it. 

WILL the dissolution of the German Empire encounter any 
violent or permanent opposition ? It would be presumptu- 
ous to answer in the negative, but we can consider the possibilities. 
We imagine that all Germany rose up as one man to destroy 
France, because we have seen her at war. Nevertheless, it is im- 
portant to remember that her martial passions have been subject to 
restraining influences in times past. Between 1862 and 1 866 Bismarck 
governed without Parliament, but the victory of Sadowa came to 
operate as an Act of Indemnity. The war of 1870 gave Prussia the 
hegemony of Germany. The military expenditure, far from diminish- 
ing, increased, and the Reichstag began to oppose the successive 
Army Bills. In 1893 an Army Bill was opposed by the Democrats, 
the Centre, the Liberals, the South German party, the Alsatians, the 
Danes and the Guelfs, but was supported by the Conservatives, the 
National Liberals, the Imperialists, the Poles, the Anti-Semites, and 
the members of the Free Association. The opposition represented 
4,233,000 votes in the country, while the Government's supporters 
only represented 3,225,000, and were therefore in a minority of 
1,008,000. 

The Reichstag, haunted by the spectres conjured up by the Kaiser 
and the Chancellor, voted the credits involved in the Army Bill of 
191 3 ; but there were many Germans who reflected anxiously over 
the policy which had brought the German Empire into jeopardy 
forty years after Sedan. 

296 



The Factor of Particularism 

The imposing German Empire has hypnotized us into a belief in 
its solidity, but there are cracks.* More than once the attitude of 
the Bundesrat has compelled the Chancellor to draw back. Bismarck 
had to withdraw his scheme for an imperial railway system. In 1877 
he wanted to make Berlin the seat of the Supreme Court, but the 
Bundesrat preferred Leipzig, and at Leipzig it remained. 

The Guelfs have always refused to recognize the constitution of the 
Empire. As supporters of the King of Hanover, they have lost their 
raison d'etre. They long ago abandoned hope of a restoration of the 
Monarchy, but in 1889 they founded the " Party of the Right," 
which has gained few adherents, although there are many active 
sympathizers in the other States. In reality, this party is the only 
" Conservative " party in Germany.f 

What will be its policy and influence in the immediate future ? 

The autocracy of the Kaiser has given the Germans the illusion of 
omnipotence and the fetish of prestige. Yet the destroyer of the 
peace of other nations has not been able to give peace to his own. 
Neither the omnipotence nor the prestige will survive defeat. 

Will defeat be followed by the disintegration of the German Empire, 
or will it cement the union of States which Bismarck established, 
in blood, indeed, but by victory. 

In Germany, King, princes and people alike have been prussianized. 
All have rejoiced in terrorizing other nations and preaching the gospel 
of Germany's divine mission. In their new-won satisfaction the 
vanquished of 1866 have come to regard their defeat as a victory. 
The King of Bavaria has forgotten that he owes his lameness to a 
Prussian bullet. 

Nevertheless, this great Germany has not brought Germans the 
security they expected. The Kaiser has thrown all Germany into war 
without consulting the States which speak through the Bundesrat. His 
aggressive policy, of which they were accustomed to brag over their 
beer, has passed from the stage of words to that of acts. The irre- 
sistible army, under its masters of strategy, rushed at the pigmy 
Belgium which resisted, and proved that its deeds were in every 
respect worthy of its spirit. 

The French, so careless and light-headed, so thoroughly beaten 
in 1870, have refused to be stamped in the dust by the German masses. 
The Crown Prince, instead of entering Paris, was forced to retreat 

* See Part L, Chap. V., " The Kaiser's Government." 
j W. Martin : Op. cit., p. 243. 

297 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

twenty miles in one night and the German hosts, so far from repeating 
the triumph of Sedan, find themselves helpless in both east and west. 

The glory and the peace have departed, while the constitution of 
Germany crumbles away in the most overwhelming catastrophe that 
has ever overtaken her. Will the spirit of German particularism 
raise its head in the hour of defeat ? Will the various nations of 
Germany say : " We are no longer Prussians. We are once more 
Saxons, Bavarians, Wiirtembergers, Badeners, Hanoverians and free 
Frankforters ? " 

It must be remembered that considerable powers are reserved to 
the individual States. They all make their own financial provision 
and administer their own revenue, including their share of imperial 
revenue from the customs and certain specific taxes. They all have 
sole authority in questions of public education, the relations of Church 
and State, mines and forests, hunting and fishing, and police 
administration. 

Bavaria, Wurtemberg, the Grand Duchy of Baden, would form 
a thriving confederation with the Rhine Province and Westphalia. 
Saxony could be the nucleus of a Central German Confederation 
formed by restoring the independence of the States annexed by 
Prussia in 1866. 

What chance of permanence would there be for the new order ? 
The answer is furnished by the history of Germany after the Peace 
of Luneville, the Peace of Pressburg and the Treaty of Tilsit. The 
Germans would have readily resigned themselves to their situation if 
Napoleon had not displayed open scorn of the kings and princes he 
set up, introduced conscription into the Confederation of the Rhine 
and carried off the recruits thus raised to die in Russia, and deprived 
the Germans of sugar and tobacco by his continental blockade. The 
Rhine Province had already become thoroughly French. 

Has Prussia really won the affection of the other peoples of Ger- 
many ? A foreigner is not able to say, but a Saxon, Herr Paul 
Rohrbach, in his book of Pan-German propaganda, " Der Deutsche 
Gedanke," published before the war, has deplored the narrow- 
mindedness of North Germany, and especially Prussia. Though an 
unstinted admirer of all that Prussia has done for the unification of 
Germany, he shows that she has never been able to make " moral 
conquests," and sees in that failure a vista of peril for Germany. 

During the famous ceremony in honour of Germany celebrated on 
the Wartburg a hundred years ago, the young Saxons brought as 

298 



The Factor of Particularism 

their offering for the altar of the " German Ideal " a corporal's cane, 
the breastplate of an Uhlan, and a copy of the new Prussian Police 
Code of Kamptz. 

" Prussia," said a German statesman just after the war of 1 87 1, 
" has always enjoyed the privilege of inspiring the most violent anti- 
pathy in all the nations of the Germanic Confederation. She does 
not seem to have lost it." 

Bismarck and the Kaiser's great instrument for holding the German 
Empire together was the national fear of France. It will be for France 
to dispel that fear, after the war, by limiting her territorial ambitions 
to the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine. 



299 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE DISMEMBERMENT OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy — The mutual hatreds of its 
component peoples — An unnatural combination replaced by natural 
groupings — Vitality of the Czechs — Illyria and Greater Serbia — Italy and 
the Adriatic — The Trentino — The German provinces — Girault's scheme 
for the reconstruction of a German Austro-Hungarian Empire — No 
counterpoise possible — Docility of the Germans of Austria and Germany 
since 1871. 

ACCORDING to the Almanack de Gotba, the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire consists, in accordance with the Fundamental Law 
of December 21st, 1867, of the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom 
of Hungary, two inseparable constitutional Monarchies, hereditary 
in the male line of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine and descending 
in the female line on the extinction of the male. 

The professors of Constitutional Law have wasted much ingenuity 
over the question whether the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is a 
federal State, a federation of States, a State of States, a Kingdom of 
States, an unitary State, a dual State, and so forth. Without ven- 
turing into such deep waters, we can say that at the present moment 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is breaking up. The Slavs and 
Roumanians in the Austrian Empire have never ceased to agitate for 
their independence. They are all filled with loathing of the Germans 
and Magyars. The Roumanians of Transylvania and the Bukovina 
look forward to union with Roumania, the three and a half million 
Ruthenes are longing for union with Russia, while Croatia and 
Slavonia, Catholic though they are, seem anxious to throw in their 
lot with Serbia in the new " Greater Serbia." 

Austria-Hungary is only a medley of races at loggerheads. There 
is no bond of sympathy between them. The Monarchy is merely a 
government and an army. Its so-called parliamentary system is but 
a travesty, with race-antagonism as its distinguishing feature. The 

300 



The Dismemberment of Austria-Hungary 

statesmen of Austria seem to concentrate their energies on playing 
off the various nationalities against each other. 

Those peoples which have not been absorbed by the Magyars and 
Germans of Austria must recover their independence ; some, like the 
Bohemians, Moravians and Slavs, to form new States, others to be 
united with their compatriots over the frontier in Poland, Russia, 
Roumania, Serbia and Italy. The treaties of 1916 must substitute 
voluntary groupings for the compulsory associations of the past. The 
dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is the inevitable 
corollary to the grasping and aggressive policy of the Hapsburgs. 

The Czechs have never ceased to demand the fulfilment of the 
promise of Bohemian autonomy which Austria gave them in i860. 
Their national development has proceeded uninterruptedly. German 
influences have been rooted out. Thirty years ago the Germans 
were masters of Prague. To-day they hardly show themselves there. 
In the Middle Ages the Czechs boasted of the most advanced civiliza- 
tion in Central Europe. Their John Huss had been one of the 
heralds of the Reformation. Bohemia's perpetual struggles for self- 
realization constitute her right to independence. 

The Czechs, the Moravians and Slovaks form a group of some 
8,500,000 persons, ready and anxious to form a new independent State 
in the future, in which they have maintained an unshaken belief. 

Since 1867 the Slovenes have agitated for a Kingdom of Slovenia or 
Illyria, to include Trieste, Istria, Gorica, Gradisca, Carniola, Southern^ 
Carinthia and Southern Styria. These ambitions are more likely ( 
to be realized in the formation of a Greater Serbia, which may be a J 
confederation of all these districts. 

The ultimate disposition of Trieste and the ports of Dalmatia is 
a thorny problem. The Adriatic is Italian as far as Trieste, of which 
the Italians represent the active, intelligent and wealthy element ; 
but the rest of the coast is Croat. Fiume is the port of Hungary and 
must be the port of Croatia and Slavonia. The small ports of Dal- 
matia have Italian sympathies, but Dalmatia itself is Slav. The 
question is open to more than one solution. 

In 1848 the Italians and Ladins who inhabited the Tyrol south of 
the Brenner Pass protested vigorously against the action of the 
Frankfort Parliament in treating them as members of the German 
Empire. In 1866 the Germans accused them of wishing for union 
with Italy, like Venice. There, as elsewhere, Germans have proved 
their inability to assimilate subject races. The Italians and Ladins 

301 




The Causes and Consequences of the War 

form a group of 804,000 out of a total Tyrolese population of 940,000. 
In the figure of 804,000 Latins and Ladins are included the Italians 
of Istria and Dalmatia ; but the Latins and Ladins constitute an 
enormous majority in all that part of the Tyrol which lies south of 
the Brenner. It must be restored to Italy. 

"The Vorarlberg, a small district, with an area of 1,004 square miles 
and 145,000 inhabitants, whose only channel of communication with 
Austria is by the Arlberg tunnel, should be reunited with Switzerland, 
but probably the Swiss would not welcome the gift, for Vorarlberg is 
both Catholic and German. The German Swiss are disinclined to add 
to the number of Catholics in the Confederation, and the French 
Swiss are not anxious to reinforce the German element which is 
already in the ascendency. 

The German provinces of Austria, Lower and Upper Austria, 
Salzburg, Northern Styria and Carinthia and the German Tyrol, may 
form a State of some twelve million people, with Vienna as its capital, 
or else they may be united with Bavaria, the lot which befell some 
of them after Napoleon wrung the Treaty of Pressburg from Austria. 
Thus these German provinces of Austria will have access to the sea 
only by the Danube or through Trieste, destined to be Italian or 
independent. 

The Hungarians will shrink to a small nation of some ten million 
souls in an advanced stage of decadence. " Pride will be the ruin of 
my people," said Szechenyi in 1849. Hungary will still have the 
fertile plain of the Alfold, but her dream of ruling the earth by subor- 
dinating Vienna to Budapest will be at an end. She will not be 
allowed to keep Fiume. The embittered and disillusionized Hun- 
garians will never forgive others the errors they have committed. 
They will never cease to be a factor of unrest ; but, as they have also 
never inspired any emotion but ill-will, they will not be dangerous. 

The inability of the Germans of Austria and the Hungarians to 
assimilate their subject races is the weightiest indictment of their 
rule. Why, then, should we trouble to maintain the authority of a 
State which has shown conspicuous incompetence in its domestic 
affairs and proved a standing menace to the world's peace by its pas- 
sions and ambitions ? 

The dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is the 
course urged by the majority of its political thinkers, a truth acknow- 
ledged even by the school of politicians which maintains that the 
continued existence of Austria-Hungary as a great Power is necessary 

302 



The Dismemberment of Austria-Hungary 

to the equilibrium of Europe. Of this doctrine a distinguished 
exponent is M. Arthur Girault, Professor of Political Economy in the 
Faculty of Law of Poitiers. He admits that Austria must lose 
Galicia (30,307 square miles, population 8,025,700), the Bukovina 
(4,030 square miles, population 800,000), Bosnia and Herzgovina 
(16,206 square miles, population 1,898,000), Dalmatia (4,940 square 
miles, population 645,900), Croatia-Slavonia (16,417 square miles, 
population 2,627,000), Fiume (8 square miles, population 40,000), 
Istria (2,000 square miles), Trieste (38 square miles), Gorz and 
Gradisca (1,126 square miles), the population of these last districts 
amounting to 894,000, and, lastly, the Trentino (population of 
Italians and Ladins 800,000) and Transylvania (22,000 square miles, 
population three millions). He leaves to Austria Bohemia, Moravia 
and the Slovaks, although the policy of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government towards them has been conspicuously oppressive.* 

After these changes Austria-Hungary would be a State of some 
160,000 square miles, instead of 240,000, with a population of 
30,000,000 instead of 51,500,000. It would thus be smaller, but 
have a larger population than Spain. 

M. Girault concludes : 

" That situation would be very dangerous, not only for the independence of 
Austria-Hungary, but also for the European balance of power. First in the 
economic sphere, then in the political, Austria would speedily sink into bondage 
to Germany. The Germans of Austria would be inevitably drawn into the 
German Empire. Austria would become a second Bavaria. Vienna would 
descend to the rank of Munich. The Hohenzollern Empire would find the 
acquisition of Austria a solid compensation for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and 
the Polish provinces. Lastly, Germany would emerge greater than before 
from a war in which she would have been beaten." 

How can this danger be avoided ? M. Girault indicates a way of 
salvation : 

" To avert this disaster it is absolutely essential that Austria-Hungary should 
remain a great Power, and Vienna the capital of an Empire capable of acting as 
a counterpoise to that of the Hohenzollerns. Curtailed on the east and south, 
she will only be able to maintain her position among the Powers by expanding 
on the north and west ; in other words, at the expense of the German Empire. 
Silesia, the loss of which Austria has never forgotten, and South Germany, with 
its natural leanings towards Vienna rather than Berlin, would attach them- 
selves readily enough to the Hapsburg Monarchy. They are preponderatingly 

* The figures given are those of the census of 19 10. The estimates for 191 3 
would show larger totals. 

303 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Catholic. Their incorporation in an Empire which stands as the hereditary- 
champion of Catholicism among the Powers of Europe could not violate their 
local sentiment. Silesia has a population of five millions, Bavaria six millions 
(nearly seven with the Palatinate), Wurtemberg nearly two and a half, the 
Grand Duchy of Baden more than two. 

" That part of the Grand Duchy of Hesse which lies south of the Main and the 
ancient free city of Frankfort should also be incorporated in Austria. These 
sixteen or seventeen million Germans, passing from the Hohenzollern to the 
Hapsburg Empire, would restore the balance of power, and enable Austria- 
Hungary to remain what she is to-day, a great Power of fifty million souls, while 
her new population would equal that of Germany thus reduced, and would no 
longer be distracted by domestic differences due to the clash of tongues and 
nationalities." 

This solution is based on the assumption that Bavaria and Baden 
would welcome incorporation in Austria. Their history, however, 
especially since the Treaty of Luneville, does not support that view. 
It also assumes that Vienna will be entirely emancipated from the 
influence of Berlin, though since 1870 the Germans of Austria have 
submissively followed the lead of the German Empire. When Hun- 
garians, such as Andrassy and Tisza, drove them into alliance with 
Germany they made no demur. There was no thought of resistance. 
To group all the Southern Germans round Vienna and allow Prussia 
to revive the Confederation of the North would be to create for her 
a new German Empire, held together by universal hatred of France 
and Russia. The Hapsburgs would remain what they have been 
since 1871, the tool of the Hohenzollerns. 

The only permanent solution is the dissolution of the two Empires. 



304 



CHAPTER IX 

ROUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA 

I. Roumania — The Kingdom of Dacia — Tradition — Turkey and Russia— The 

union of Moldavia and Wallachia settled by the Treaty of Paris in 1856— 
Union in 1859 — A constitutional monarchy in 1866 — Sympathy for France 
in 1 87 1 — Becomes a kingdom in 1881. 

II. Transylvania and the Banat. 

III. Daco-Roumanian ambitions — The advantage of having a strong buffer 
State between Russia and the Balkans — The importance of a final settlement. 

I. Roumania 

MODERN Roumania is composed of two separate States : one 
is called Wallachia by Europeans, though its inhabitants call it 
" Muntenia," or " Tsara Romaneasca " (Land of the Roumanians), 
and the other Moldavia. Their amalgamation into a single State was 
recognized only in 1862, and in diplomatic documents they were 
known as the " United Principalities " or the " Danubian Princi- 
palities." The name of " Roumania " only began to be used officially 
in 1874, but was established by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878. 

According to M. Xenopol,* the Roumanians are the descendants of 
the colonists sent by Trajan in a.d. 107 to occupy and populate Dacia. 
They did not come from Italy, but ex tote orbe romano, from every 
corner of the Roman world. Their official language was Latin. 

The Hungarians claim as their historic patrimony the ancient 
Kingdom of Dacia, the capital of which was Sarmizegethus in Tran- 
sylvania. It stood in a valley now known as the Hatszeg which is 
the bed of a tributary of the Maros, which joins the Theiss. 

All national claims are based on traditional rights, and it is there- 
fore necessary to glance at the history of the Roumanians. 

Before the thirteenth century the history of the Moldo-Wallachian 
provinces is wrapped in obscurity. They were often at war with the 

* Histoire des Roumains de la Dacie Trafane (in French, 1895). 

305 20 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

Hungarians, and in 1389, having allied themselves with the Serbians 
against the Turks, they shared the disastrous defeat of the former 
at Kossovo. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the King of 
Hungary, Matthias Corvinus, wrote to the King of Poland : " The 
voi'vodes of Wallachia and Moldavia fawn upon the Turks, Tartars, 
Poles and Hungarians in turn, and, with this multiplicity of masters, 
their perfidy goes unpunished. Knowing their weakness, they play 
all manner of tricks upon their more powerful neighbours." 

The septennial elections of a hospodar by the boyars led to a con- 
dition of anarchy from which the provinces did not even escape when 
they became a Turkish protectorate. The Turks governed them 
through phanariotes, who systematically robbed them. Then a new 
factor appeared — Russia. On July loth, 1774, she restored the two 
provinces and Bessarabia to the Porte, but reserved to herself a share 
in the government and an interest in their foreign relations. 

These rights were recognized in the treaties of 1779, l 7%3 anc ^ 1 79 2 - 
The Treaty of Bucharest of 1812 restored Bessarabia to Russia. On 
March 17th, 1826, the Emperor Nicholas required the Porte to 
evacuate the Principalities and settle the Serbian question. The 
Treaty of Akerman completed the Treaty of Bucharest, and a separate 
agreement gave Russia a protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia. 
The Porte tried to disregard its obligations and brought down on its 
head a Russian expedition, which compelled it, on the 14th of Sep- 
tember, to grant Russia free trade on the Black Sea and throughout 
the Ottoman Empire, to open the Straits, and to pay a war indemnity 
of some .£5,500,000. The hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, 
instead of being elected for seven years, were to be elected for life. 
Russia appointed as Governor of these provinces Count Kisseleff, 
who gave one of the rare examples of an enlightened despotism, 
though he left the peasantry subject to burdensome corvees, while the 
amount of land assigned to them by their landlords was reduced 
from twenty-two hectares to six.* 

In August, 1834, Alexander Ghica was appointed hospodar of 
Wallachia, and Michael Stourdza hospodar of Moldavia. Ghica was 
deposed in 1842 and replaced by George 0. Bibesco. The only con- 
nection between the hospodars and the Porte was the homage they 
rendered at their election. The internal disorders of Wallachia do 
not concern us here. 

The union of the two provinces was decided in principle at the 
* One hectare = 2.47 acresi 
306 



Roumania and Transylvania 

Congress of Paris in 1856. Napoleon III. hoped by establishing a 
comparatively powerful State to separate Russia from the Slav 
provinces of the Balkans, Prussia wanted to weaken Austria, 
Piedmont to set up a precedent in favour of the principle of nationality, 
Russia to weaken the Ottoman Empire. Austria and Turkey alone 
opposed the change. Great Britain accepted it with reserve. In 1859 
the union was brought about by the double election of Prince Alex- 
ander John Cuza by Moldavia and Wallachia. The Constitution of 
1866 established a constitutional monarchy, and Prince Charles, 
second son of Prince Charles Antony of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 
and an officer in the Prussian army, was elected Prince Regent. He 
was twenty-seven years old. 

In 1 87 1 the Roumanians made no secret of their sympathies for 
France. The ringleaders in a popular demonstration were brought 
to trial, but were acquitted. Shortly afterwards a German named 
Stransberg, who had obtained a railway concession through the 
Prince's favour, went bankrupt. There was a loud outcry against 
the German colony. The Prince summoned the Council of Regency 
and offered to abdicate. The Roumanian Conservative party took 
fright. The elections went in the Prince's favour and he remained 
in power. 

In 1878, Roumania not only allowed the Russian army to cross her 
territory, but assisted actively with her own forces, which played an 
important part in the campaign. The result of the war was to make 
Roumania entirely independent of Turkey, but Russia rewarded her 
for her assistance by seizing from her, in exchange for the Dobrudja, 
the part of Bessarabia which had been ceded to Moldavia after the 
Crimean War. It was in reference to this affair that Lord Beaconsfield 
wrote : " Ingratitude in politics is often the reward of the greatest 
services." 

Roumania became a kingdom in 188 1. In 1884 tne constitution 
was to some extent remodelled. 

Roumania's part in the Balkan War is a matter of history. In 
spite of the manoeuvres of Austria-Hungary, she intervened on the 
outbreak of war between Bulgaria and Serbia. Without firing a shot 
she compelled Bulgaria to sign the Treaty of Bucharest, surrendering 
some 3,340 square miles of her territory and a population of 354,000. 

The present area of Roumania is some 56,000 square miles, and her 
population 7,600,000. 

307 20* 



.-.<, ■< • '/ Jc •>;*: . ;.-.;< ' W.U 



:h the M*gv*rs« T 

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the proportion of voting power of each nationality to the : 

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The new frontier R< i on the west must enclose the 

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Roumania and Ttansyhrania 

of KouJTi 

mil':l ( : ; '• ■•": , \* 

rnom< ' :/ 7/ '" ^' 

realize d 1 1 i 






CHAPTER X 

TURKEY 

Lord Beaconsfield introduces Germany to Eastern politics — Constantinople a 
hot-bed of intrigue — The Anatolian Railway in 1889 — The " Sick Man " — 
The Treaty of Paris — The dogma of Turkish integrity — Lord Derby and 
the suicide of the "Sick Man " — High-sounding theories both conventional 
and false — The Khalifatc — The break-up of the Turkish Empire — Russia 
and Constantinople — The Balkans. 

IN 1878 Lord Beaconsfield brought Germany into Eastern politics 
with a view to counteracting Russian influence. I know that 
Bismarck once attempted to demonstrate his friendship for Russia by 
saying that he " never opened the Constantinople despatches." He 
even went so far, according to his Reflections and Reminiscences, as 
to declare that he believed it necessary, from the point of view of 
German interests, that the Russians should be firmly established at 
Constantinople.* 

For the last two centuries the Turkish Government has been nothing 
more than a battle-ground for rival European intriguers, a breeding- 
ground of controversies between the great Powers, skilfully nursed 
by Turkish politicians like Abdul Hamid. 

Bismarck was still in power when the Germans, under Gerad Pasha, 
began to teutonize Turkish policy. The Convention which gave 
them the Anatolian Railway dates from 1889. William II. paid two 
visits to the Sultan, secured orders for the necessary material, became 
his bosom friend, and finally obtained the concession of the Bagdad 
Railway. 

In 1853 the Czar Nicholas I. remarked in a conversation with the 
British Ambassador, Sir George Hamilton Seymour : " We have a 
sick man on our hands." He declared : " I do not desire the per- 
manent occupation of Constantinople by the Russians, but I am 
anxious that it shall never fall into the hands of the English, the 

* Vol. II., p. 286. 
310 



Turkey 

French, or any other great Power." He went on to say that the 
interests of Russia and Austria were one, and that he did not object 
to the British occupation of Egypt and Candia. 

Sir George Hamilton Seymour replied that by occupying Egypt 
England only wished to secure free and rapid communication with 
India. 

Great Britain and France joined hands in the Crimean War. The 
Treaty of Paris restored the Straits to the Porte and forbade Russia 
to keep a navy in the Black Sea, a clause which she disregarded after 
1 871. Since the opening of the Suez Canal Great Britain has occupied 
Egypt. 

At that period Great Britain was anxious that Russia should not 
advance beyond the Caucasus and approach Persia. Russia built 
the Trans-Caspian Railway, and has come to an agreement with Great 
Britain as to their respective spheres of influence in Persia. 

The integrity of Turkey was a dogma of French diplomacy from 
the days of Francis I. It was solemnly affirmed by the Congress of 
Paris in 1856. 

In 1875 Lord Derby said : " Twenty years ago, by the Treaty of 
Paris, we guaranteed the Sick Man against being killed — we did not 
guarantee him against committing suicide." The Sick Man has 
committed suicide after all. If so much effort had not been directed 
towards keeping him alive for so long, in all probability there would 
have been no present war. 

The importance of Constantinople is a tradition that dates from the 
time of the Crusades. In those days it was the second or third city 
of the world, whereas to-day it is only the fourteenth or fifteenth. 
Although most geographical, historical and diplomatic treatises are 
fond of repeating that the route to India lies through Constantinople, 
the facts are otherwise. It was one of the great world routes only 
for the Crusaders on the way to Jerusalem. It has been frequently 
said that the possession of Constantinople means world domination. 
In that case, the Turks have been masters of the world for centuries. 
Constantinople is, however, the gate of the Black Sea and it is ridiculous 
that a Government which is no more than a glorified anarchy should 
have the communications of Russia with the outside world at its 
mercy. 

Sir Edward Grey's note of November 1st, 1914, recalls that on the 
outbreak of the war Turkey received from Great Britain, France 
and Russia an assurance that if she remained neutral her independence 

311 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

and integrity would be respected during the war and when terms of 
peace came to be considered. It seems that the Turkish Government 
allowed German officers to usurp its authority. 

Turkey is even less a nation than Austria-Hungary. The break-up 
of the Turkish Empire is already an accomplished fact. Another 
political system must take its place to ensure that the Bosphorus 
and Dardanelles will always be kept open. The Sultan will in future 
be merely the Khalif of Islam, as the Pope remained head of the 
Catholic Church after the entry of the Italians into Rome. He 
will retain his religious functions and dignities, but will lose all 
temporal authority. 

Constantinople is not a Turkish city. It is cosmopolitan, a town 
of many tongues, in which Greeks, Armenians and men from many 
lands live their lives of intrigue. 

Would a joint administration by Great Britain, France and Russia 
be able to secure order and the freedom of the Straits ? The experience 
of joint administrations in times past is not encouraging. Their 
lease of life has usually been short. The only practicable solution of 
the problem is to hand over Constantinople and the Straits to Russia 
in full confidence that she will not abuse her position. As the 
Spectator pointed out, while Turkey's occupation of Constantinople 
has been a historical scandal, it is to be expected that Russia will 
thoroughly justify her possession of the city if only because she has 
given incontestable proof of her ability to govern Mohammedans. 
According to the religious census of 1897, there were no less than 
fourteen million Mohammedans in the Russian Empire. The number 
has certainly increased since then. The Spectator went on to ridicule 
the fear that the possession of Constantinople would make Russia too 
powerful. Those who are haunted by that fear may be easy in their 
minds. The Czar of all the Russias will not abandon Petrograd to 
make Constantinople his capital. Saint Sophia will never take the 
place of the Kremlin. 

The dissolution of the Turkish Empire might be carried out on the 
following lines : Russia would have all that part of Turkey which 
forms the coast of the Black Sea. Great Britain would acquire 
Mesopotamia and the courses of the Euphrates and the Tigris, while 
Syria and part of the coast would go to France. I say nothing of 
Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Albania, because the settlement 
of their affairs will be only a minor matter in the peace negotiations. 



312 



CHAPTER XI 

RUSSIA 

The development of the Slav States as an antidote to Pan-Slavism — Russia's 
power of " assimilation " — The tolerance of Mohammedans — The Slav 
peril — Mazzini's opinion — An Italian alliance with the Slav family. 

HERR GUMPLOWITZ, a professor at the University of Gratz, 
gave an excellent piece of advice to the statesmen of Austria, 
haunted by fears of Pan-Slavism, when he counselled them to foster 
the development of national feeling among the Slav groups. He 
urged Prussia and Austria to promote the sentiment of Polish 
nationality. The only effective method of saving Bohemia from 
Pan-Slavism is to allow Czech nationality to develop unhampered. 
He recommended the same course for the Southern Slav groups of 
Austria-Hungary. Liberty would mean the preservation of their 
individuality, whereas oppression would drive them into the arms of 
Russia. 

In support of this view he cited the case of Bulgaria, which was 
emancipated from Turkish rule by the efforts of Russia, and had yet 
always put independence as regards Russia before gratitude for her 
services. He recalled that Queen Nathalie was expelled from Serbia 
on account of her marked leanings towards Russia. 

This advice was exceedingly wise, because it was based on reality ; 
but the Governments of Vienna and Budapest have continued to 
pursue a policy which alienates the Slavs and makes them look to 
Petrograd for deliverance. 

Herr Gumplowitz* denounces Russian diplomacy as being equally 
skilful and dangerous, and a marked improvement on the teachings 
of Machiavelli. " Rome," he says, " conquered first and assimilated 
afterwards." Prussia took a piece of Poland, then tried to assimilate 
her Poles, but, so far from succeeding, her germanizing methods in 
Prussian Poland have roused a strong Russophile sentiment in 
Russian Poland. The weakness of the Turks is due to the fact that 

* La Lutte des Races (Paris, F. Alcan). Sociologie et Politique, I vol. (Giard 
et Briere). 

313 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

when they have made conquests they have made no effort to assimilate 
the conquered. 

The Russians, he says, begin at the other end. They start with 
spiritual assimilation. Peter the Great styled himself Pope of the 
Greek Church. Every member of that Church owes allegiance to the 
Czar. Russia adds to spiritual pressure temporal assistance to the 
Greek clergv. The kinship of the various Slav tongues facilitates 
penetration. Moral conquest precedes military conquest. 

This generalization of Herr Gumplowitz as to Russian methods errs 
in the direction of exaggeration, but he explains their comparative 
failure in Poland on the ground that Poland represented a higher 
civilization than that of Russia. The Russians went to Tashkend 
and Samarcand before sending Greek priests there. They have made 
no attempt to convert the Mohammedans of Asia to the Greek Church. 
Yet it is incontestable that Russia has assimilated her Mohammedan 
subjects with ease, whereas the Germans and Magyars have failed 
conspicuously to assimilate their subject populations. 

Will the Russians develop the war-madness of the Prussians ? 
Those who know them best say that the Russian peasant is the most 
gentle and least quarrelsome of men. 

The German Socialists, taking their cue from the Wilhelmstrasse, 
have attempted to justify their attitude towards the war by talking 
of the Slav peril. No doubt they see it, but the French have seen 
the German peril for the last fifty years and it became more formid- 
able from day to day, though the German Socialists tried to convince 
the Belgians, French and English that it was a phantom of their 
imagination. To-day the acts of their countrymen with whom they 
have sided prove that the German peril is the peril of barbarism let 
loose, while their treacherous and lying diplomacy, their flagrant 
disregard for their plighted word, prove that they are lost to all sense 
of shame. If the behaviour of the Germans in Belgium, France and 
Poland be compared with that of the Russians in Galicia, the latter 
appear as models of virtue. 

The Slav peril has often been held out as a terror for Italy in the 

hope of fomenting discord over the future of the Adriatic coast. 

Signor Rodolico, however, writing on the 8th of November in the 

Mazocco of Florence, recalled a letter of Mazzini's, in which he said : 

" The true objective of Italian international policy, the shortest route to her 
future greatness, is an alliance with the Slav family. The Turkish and Austrian 
Empires are irrevocably condemned to death, and the sword which will deal 
them their deathblow is in the hand of the Slavs." 

314 



CHAPTER XII 

POLAND 

Austria's right to Galicia — The partitions of Poland— The arrangement of 1815 — 
The incorporation of Cracow in Austria — Germany's failure to assimilate 
the Poles — The Kaiser's appeal to the Teutonic Knights — The proclamation 
of August 14th, 1914. 

IN the twelfth century Hungary warred with Venice and the 
Russians of Galicia, the capital of which was Przemysl. They 
were helped by the Poles. Bela III. compelled part of Galicia to 
render homage. Andrew II. took the title of King of Galicia and 
Lodomeni, but had no authority. His title formed the basis of 
Austria's claim to Galicia in 1772, six centuries later, at the time of 
the partition of Poland. 

That partition formed a bond of union between Austria, Russia 
and Prussia. Frederick II. wrote in his Memoirs : " The acquisition 
of Poland was one of the most important events for us, because it 
joined Pomerania to East Prussia, and gave us control of the Vistula." 
Maria Theresa wept with grief over the partition, but accepted Galicia. 
In 1793 there was a second partition. Prussia received the provinces 
of Posen, Kalisz and Sieradz, and the towns of Danzig and Thorn, 
Austria eighteen thousand square miles and more than a million 
new subjects, and Russia the rest. 

At the Congress of Vienna three rival schemes were put forward. 
The Emperor of Russia wanted a Russian protectorate, while the 
British and French desired the establishment of an independent Polish 
nation. Russia, Prussia and Austria made a private agreement for 
the disintegration of Poland. The Congress was not even consulted, 
and they merely brought their private arrangement to the eight 
Powers for signature. As if half ashamed of their action, the inde- 
pendent Republic of Cracow was created under the protection of 
Austria, Prussia and Russia ; but in 1846 the three protectors, 
violating their assurances to England and France, joined in incor- 
porating it with Austria. 

315 



The Causes And Consequences oi the War 

The Ge pi K) ed dmilate i 

the I 
. -. 1867 the Duchj 

688,000 G< . ; . s ; ; - : ill 1 10, 8< ' 

■ . : -e.e. I Poles Out Oi i,e 
> to 381 j. In Silt 

1,774,00c Germans . in V. est Prussia ..-. 

Poles, The parts the Poles are in a 

.:•. must be res It is a work of ventilation 

which can be out generously. 

[n 1900 the K >eech in the ax 

Teutonic King hts at Marienburg, in which he summoned : 

1st the Poles. 1: is plain that >lain if he 

gets rid of the 

On August 14th, 1014, tame of the Czar, die ^ : rand Duke 

Nicholas pre 

" PoleG 5 yOUT fathers ,, K | o rA nd- 

- 

the sceptre oi the C 
tm.free in iguage, and 

■ 

re sm te c tioo oi 
is 

The the Kingdom of Poland is the Czar of Russia's 

■ \-.e\ . Gj ilicia to I >w will form pa 

it, as e Polish districts of Si 

and West Prussia. The mouths cd the Vistula and Danzig will be 

lish frontier will be withii 
hundred miles of Berlin. If the King of Prussia w visit 

1 unless he goes through Polish 
In [848 . sd erne - i the restorati c of Poland was pre- 

:. "It would sever the most 

I issia," said Bismarck. 

Poland will form a buffer State between Russia and Prussia, a 

suggestion put I at the Congress of Vienna, when Prussian 

its real:. stOl ition of Poland is the 

best guarantee that Russia can give against the ambitions that some 

attribute to her. 



316 



CHAPTER Xlll 

THE GERMAN COLONIES 

^HE German colonies, which can never be oilier than a bone of 
J~ contention, will be divided between Gre; t Britain, Belgium, 

France and Japan. This arrangement must be regarded not less 
as the sanction of territorial gains than as a guarantee of peace. 

The Kaiser's declarations at the beginning of the war proved that 
his colonial ambitions were one of his motives in taking the pli 
This motive must not be left to him. 

The disinterestedness of Great Britain, France and Russia as 
regards the acquisition of territory in Europe is a guarantee of their 
agreement over the settlement of the world-questions raised by Ger- 
many and Austria-Hungary. The Allied Towers entered the war to 
win peace and assure it to Europe. 



V7 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE RESTORATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE 

I. The declaration of the Deputies fan 1871 G< -.uilate 

swn BS population of the 

annexed provinces — The proportion of German immigrants — The n\v ..- 
stitution of the four departments. 

II. Restoration a matter of right — The question ..rise — 

Ti. ~ s s ft, but unsatisfactory — 

Article 5 of the Treaty of Pr.. . of securing a genuine 

. rendum. 

OX February 10th. 1871, in the National Assembly at Bordeaux, 
die thirty-six Deputies of the Haut and Bas-Rhin, the Moselle, 
Meurthe and the Vosges, declared that they did not recognize 

the validity of the Treaty of Frankfort. 

ght of the Alsace-Lorraincrs to remain members 
of the .-.tion, and we swear, for our constituents, our children and their 

ess :han for ourselves, that we will never cease to claim it by 
all means and against all usurper? 

Aft© -foul years tins claim ought to have lapsed. It has not 

done so. The Germans have had no more success in assimilating the 
Alsace-Lorrainers than in assimilating the Poles. 

The re-incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine with France is a matter 
as much above dispute as the complete evacuation of Belgium by 
the Germ 

M. Andrt* \\ eiss raises this quest:. 

" Further - without saying that this restoration, of right, to French 

•.-.sequence of the eviction of the Germans r.v 

> thOG - which were established in the lost 

-:. The immigrants of German origin will have no claim 
to it. Will it not be possible, by means of privileged, though individual, nation- 
alizations, to throw open French nationality to those who have given guarantees 
of their attachment and fidelity by their conduct and culture ? " 

318 



The Restoration of Alsace-Lorraine 

M. Maxime Leroy says very truly : 

" We must sternly oppose all measures which may seem aimed at the lawful 
interests of the Germans well disposed toward us : I mean that France must 
respect private property belonging to Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, not only 
in ipirit, but to the letter. Anything resembling the abominable expropriations 
in Poland must be avoided. In this way, and chiefly in this way, France will 
show that she is as incapable of stealing a mill as of stealing a province. 

The following figures show the area and population of the territories 
torn from France in 1871 :* 

Square Population 

miles. in \Vf>. 

Alsace 3, 1 iG 1,066,000 

Lorraine 2,488 535,000 

5,604 1,601,000 

These provinces comprised the whole of the Department of the 
Bas-Rhin — that is, some 1,756 square miles — and four-fifths of the 
Department of the Haut-Rhin. 

The new frontier was purely artificial. It was not determined by 
natural features, nor did it correspond to distinctions of language. 

In the census of 1910 the civil population of Alsace was assessed in 
round figures at 1,800,000, distributed in the following manner : 

Percentage. 

Alsatians and Lorrainers 1,495,000 83.42 

Germans 220,000 1 2 . 30 

Foreigners 76,000 4 . 28 

The inhabitants classified as Germans are those who are natives of 
a State of the Empire other than Alsace-Lorraine. If only the place 
of birth be considered, the figure for Germans drops to 164,000 ; 
but among the children of immigrants a certain number may have 
become naturalized Alsatians and this element increases the German 
element to an unknown degree. 

In view of the marked exodus of Alsatians and Lorrainers into 
France and the immigration of officials, it is curious that the propor- 
tion of Germans is not higher. Of the 220,000, 120,000 are Prussians. 
There are 35,000 each from Bavaria and Baden and 15,000 from 
Wiirtemberg. 

* Journal de la Socttte de Statistiqae. Paul Merriot : " La Statistique comparee 
des territoires cedes par la France en 187 1 ." 

319 







• • QQO 






ffe 








- 000 



The Causes *\nd Consequences of the War 

lv. Low c: Alsao BS as 

. than 68,000 [he ma 

M. 1 part- 

I B ~ 1 : 

;8I 

- ; 

*; I 



g the ultimate dis 
of Alsa< - i biscitt . . s agg< 

. for it would mean the recog Itioo oi v : . jht of 

to its cc 

StOJ J d '. 
ining befori . ar of i S ~ i . 
Hm bt stitu- 

. . 5 Of ] 

[he sys cal in g 

was dear to Napoleon III., ho d< ted how useful if could be 

i the Battle of Sadowa by 

le 5 in die Treaty oi 

"His His Majesty the K. 

granted him 

le northern 
of Schleswig s (press are lor 

Tliis article was carried out. Even if it had been, what 

rantee would it h.:. ded 1 Who would have been in cfc 

of the ballot-boxes on the pollii Who would ha\ inteed 

the genuinenes gores : Would 

the • - solutely unf< decision ? In 

any c . gt the unknown future ; Far 

this system is dw the traditi 

..ich unite certain human groups and disintegrate others. 



«o 



CHAPTER XV 
THE WAR INDEMNITY 

War is an affair between States, not between individuals — " Strangling " the 
Germans — The poliey of pressure and the policy of reconciliation — The war 
indemnity — Herr von Zedlitz's claims — Pecuniary responsibility — Some 
crimes against the law of nations ought to entail personal responsibility — 
Securities — The Prussian State railways — The State mines — No State will 
secure material profit from the war. 

THOSE who are swayed by sentiment and passion and will not 
listen to the dictates of reason have a very simple prescription 
for the treatment of Germany. 

" They have made war on us," they say, " after having kept U3 
perpetually in an agony of suspense. They have lied impudently in 
the hope of changing their role of aggressor into that of injured inno- 
cent. They have violated the neutrality of Belgium, and committed 
atrocities unnameable, which they repeated in France. Their intel- 
lectuals have declared themselves at one with their Government 
and proclaim their approval of the war methods of their commanders 
and troops. They must be made to pay for it ! We must strangle 
Germany ! " 

Now what does " strangling " Germany mean ? Do they wish to 
undertake the responsibility of governing the Germans ? It is all a 
country can do to govern itself. Do they wish to repeat the experi- 
ment of 1806 on a nation which will still number sixty-four to sixty-five 
millions after the war ? Do they want to have a permanent army 
of occupation in Germany ? Officers and men would deteriorate and 
degrade themselves in the task. 

A far different policy must be pursued if peace is not to be gained 
at too high a price. Rousseau, Portalis and a multitude of writers 
on international law have laid down as axiomatic that war is an affair 
between States, not between individuals. In war, each belligerent 
aims at the destruction of the military forces of his opponent, so 
that that opponent, finding himself disarmed, will be compelled to 

121 21 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

accept his terms. The terms may be political or territorial changes, 
but whatever form they take, they ought to be imposed on the State 
and not intended to touch individuals. They should not aim at the 
ruin of the peasantry, the landowners, or the industrial proletariat, 
and, above all, should not be devised to deprive the working classes 
of work. 

" But then," cry the extremists, " the Germans will revive. Our 
victory will avail us nothing." Those who talk in this fashion should 
calmly put one question to themselves. If a Power reduces its 
enemies, not collectively, but individually, to despair, it inevitably 
makes them rally round their Government, or its memory if the Govern- 
ment has disappeared. These tactics pave the way for revenge. The 
right course for the conqueror is to strive to dissolve the hostile forces. 
When the conquered realize that they can resume their old existence 
and take up their old business and pursuits, when they find themselves 
as secure in their lives and property as before, bitter memories fade 
away, the feeling of enmity and desire for revenge vanish, and hatred 
dies a natural death. 

During the peace negotiations we must advocate this policy with 
unyielding resolution in opposition to the policy of the uttermost 
farthing. 

Yet, in spite of all our efforts, if victory entails suffering for the 
victors, it will mean far more to the vanquished. The victors will 
have a right to a war indemnity as compensation. 

Herr von Zedlitz, an ex-director of the Prussian State Bank, firm 
in his belief in an Austro-German victory, has expressed some interest- 
ing views on the question of the war indemnity which a victorious 
Power has the right of imposing on its adversary. He includes in 
the account the cost of mobilization, the maintenance of the fleet 
and army during active operations, the re-stocking of armament, the 
repair of fortresses, compensation for losses to shipping, the restoration 
of the railways, an indemnity for local and provincial war expenditure 
(allowances, local relief), compensation for losses of all kinds suffered 
by individuals, rural districts and towns, and, lastly, the capital 
represented by pensions to the injured and the families of deceased 
soldiers. He remarks that Count Henkel (afterwards Prince Donners- 
mark) advised the Government in 1871 to take £200,000,000 in specie 
and short-date bills, and another £200,000,000 in Government rentes, 
in order to be able to lower French credit at any moment that German 
policy required. The idea was based on a fallacy, as M. A. Raffalovich 

322 



The War Indemnity 

points out, because when a nation's vital interests are at stake, its 
determination is not shaken by any depreciation of Government 
stock. He adds ; 

" When the time comes for the Allies to examine this question of a war in- 
demnity, they must begin by giving priority as a matter of justice to the losses 
suffered by individuals at the hands of the Germans, Austro-Hungarians and 
Turks. State demands must take second place, and at the moment of the 
distribution of the indemnity we suggest a formula based on the effective daily 
strength of the officers and men at the front. That would present a common 
divisor." 

Article 3 of the Hague Convention dealing with the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, dated August 17th, 1907, lays down that 
" the belligerent who violates the provisions of the said Regulations 
will be liable to pay an indemnity. It will be responsible for all acts 
committed by those who form part of its armed forces." 

The Germans seem to have made a point of swelling the figure of 
the indemnity they w T ill have to pay. But the question arises as to 
whether personal responsibility attaches to those who have com- 
mitted, or ordered the commission of, crimes like the massacre of 
women, children and the aged, wholesale burning, rapine and indis- 
criminate destruction. If not, who is responsible ? The answer must 
be the army leaders who authorized and encouraged the commission 
of these crimes and took no steps to prevent them, however horrible, 
as well as those who supervised the execution of the orders. Such 
crimes are violations of public law. They must be punished as such. 
If we could only rid ourselves of certain ancient prejudices, the Kaiser 
and the Crown Prince would be treated as common criminals. 

The cost of the war already exceeds all anticipation. When the 
German Empire and Austria-Hungary sue for peace, their resources 
will be drained. The estimates that were made of the interest on 
their debts at the beginning of the war have been falsified by their 
successive loans during its course. 

Some revenue may be obtained from the State railways. The 
estimate of the revenue of the Prussian State railways for the year 
1914-1915 was 374 million marks (approximately ^18,400,000). If 
this was the genuine revenue, it would represent capital which could 
be distributed in realizable bonds. But even taking the rate of 
interest at five per cent., this capital would only be ^368,000,000. It 
would only be a trifle on account. 

323 21* 



The Causes and Consequences of the War 

The same observation applies to the State mines and salt works 
in Prussia. Their profits were estimated at 37 million marks 
(£1,820,000). In these cases also conversion into bonds might be 
effected, but the capital would probably not exceed £40,000,000. 

This method of obtaining a war indemnity has the double advan- 
tage of depriving the conquered State of its revenues and, consequently, 
reducing its resources. At the same time, its weight would not be 
felt by the taxpayers. 

There are no Imperial railways. The Allies might extend the 
operation to the other States of the German Empire, but with great 
regard for their interests. The estimate of the profits of the Bavarian 
State Railway was only 3,000,000 marks (£147,000). In view of the 
prospective condition of the railways after the war, their capital will 
be comparatively insignificant. 

We must not deceive ourselves. The war will not bring material 
profit, even to the victors. The most they can do is to reduce their 
loss. 



324 



CHAPTER XVI 

GERMAN TRADE AND FREE TRADE 

EVER since the war began there has been a multitude of speeches 
and articles on the destruction of German trade by French and 
British trade. 

French Protectionists demand the repeal of Article 1 1 of the Treaty 
of Frankfort, which assured most-favoured-nation treatment to 
France and the German Empire. Many who are most anxious to 
annihilate German trade propose to keep out German goods by means 
of more or less prohibitive customs duties. They forget, in their 
simplicity, that customs duties are paid by the consumers, not the 
producers. Suppose they treble the duty on coal coming from 
Germany. It is the French metallurgical industry which surfers. 
If they increase the duties on dyes they injure the French textile 
industries. If they want to make at home the machinery which 
France imported to the value of .£5,000,000 in 191 3, they adversely 
affect all French industries dependent on it. 

For France to fine herself for introducing the German products 
of which she stands in need would be a singular method of injuring 
the Germans. The only way for her to set a limit to the expansion 
of German trade and industry is not to close her own frontiers, but 
to open those of Germany. 

Herr Diepenhors has said that " Germany's conquest of foreign 
markets must certainly be ascribed mainly to the syndicates."* 
These syndicates thrive on the practice of " dumping," made possible 
by customs duties. To prevent future dumping Germany must be 
made a Free-Trade country. To compel Germany to adopt Free 
Trade would not be to work for her ruin, but to rebuild the founda- 
tions of her prosperity. If France remains a Protectionist country, 
the condition of her trade and industry relative to that of Germany 
will be less favourable than it is now. 

* Part II., Chap. VIII,, supra*. 
325 



CONCLUSION 

I HAVE tried by a dispassionate examination of facts to arrive at 
the international consequences of the war. My method has 
been as much as possible analytical, and I have studiously avoided 
the atmosphere which pervades speeches and articles on the war. I 
have said nothing of justice, immemorial right, still less of the eternal 
verities. The mythical has formed no part of my study. 

My one object has been to discover the means of arriving at a 
lasting peace by satisfying once and for all the aspirations of the 
numerous groups which have never ceased to protest against the 
foreign domination under which they groan. 

The political dissolution of the German Empire is the essential 
outcome of this war, but it will only be effective if it is accompanied 
and followed by its moral dissolution. We must work for that moral 
dissolution by refusing to be carried away by hatred, a passion which 
German statesmen, officers and soldiers have spared nothing to 
arouse. We can demonstrate the superiority of our civilization by 
showing that we are above a policy of reprisals. 

We must not be turned aside from our task of replacing the civiliza- 
tion of brigandage by the civilization of exchange. 



326 



APPENDIX 

THE BULGARIAN QUESTION 



APPENDIX 



THE BULGARIAN QUESTION^ 



L Balkan interests and peace -II. The Bulgarians before and after 1878 — III. 
Bulgaria and the Wars of [912 [913 IV. The Bulgarians and Macedonia — 
V. Diplomatic illusions — VI. The difficulties of the problem. 



1 



I. Balkan Interests and Peace 

HAVE said : I 



" I say nothing of Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Albania, because the 

s< ttlement of theil affairs will be only a minor matter in th< oliations." 

Present events do not lead me to adopt any other point - 
Those States will not settle their own future by themselves and their 
Governments will have no case for intervention in the peace negotia- 
tions, because their destinies are in the hands of the Allies. Jt is 
therefore advisable at this moment to appreciate the situation of 
those peoples, in order that it may be duly considered when the day 
for a final settlement of the Eastern Question arriv . 

When the Balkan War broke out I pointed out in the Journal des 
Economistes for October and November, 191 2, the insignificance of 
the interests at issue, the negligible economic value of the region 

* Bibliography : La Question d' Orient, by Ed. Driault. — La Vie l J 'jlitique 
dans les Deux Moncles, by A. Viallate and M. Caudel. — L'Lurope el la Politique 
Orientale, 1878-1912, by Count de Landemont, 1912.— Les Origines de la Guerre 
Europeenne, by A. Gauvin, 191 5. — Macedonia and the Reforms, by Diagonof, 
London, 1908. — Light on the Balkan Darkness, by Crawford Price CSimpkin, 
Marshall & Co.), 1915. — Germany and Eastern Europe, by Lewis B. .'.armor 
(Duckworth & Co.), 1915. — Nationalism and War in the Near East, by A Diplo- 
matist ; edited by Lord Courtney of Penwith ; Vol. I. (Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace) ; Oxford, Clarendon Pr< 

| Part V., Chapter X., p. 312. 

329 



Appendix 

known as the Balkan Peninsula and the false notions entertained 
wilfully or ignorantly by statesmen and publicists as to the importance 
of the routes through the Balkans. I demonstrated the absurdity 
of phrases like these : " Salonica will be one day the half-way house 
on the highway from Port Said to Vienna or Hamburg, the meeting- 
place of Germany and India ; " " Constantinople lies on the highway 
to India ; " and " is the gate of the East," although in sober fact its 
sole importance is due to the fact that Turkey has been permitted 
to remain in a position to close the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles 
at will. I also exposed the popular illusions to which the Bagdad 
Railway gave rise in the minds of those who had never stopped to 
compare maritime freights for long distances with the cost of rail 
transport or the cost of transport part by rail and part by sea, 
involving the expense of transfer. 



II. The Bulgarians before and after 1878 

The Bulgarians, whose original home was in Asia, are much more 
akin to the Turks than to the Slavs. In 679 a.d., led by their Khan 
Asporukh (or Isperikh), they crossed the Danube and made them- 
selves masters of the scattered Slav populations, while adopting 
their language, customs and institutions. In the ninth century their 
Tsar Boris was converted to Christianity. The independence of the 
Bulgarian Church was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople, 
and their primate himself received the title of Patriarch. From 893 
to 927, under Simeon, the " Emperor and Autocrat of all the Bul- 
garians and Greeks," their Empire extended from the Black Sea to 
the Adriatic and from the frontiers of Thessaly to the Save and the 
Carpathians. However, Basil II., BovXyapoKrovog, the " Slayer of 
Bulgarians," brought their empire to an end, and for more than a 
century and a half (1018-1186) Bulgaria was subject to the Emperors 
of Byzantium. 

From 1 218 to 1241 Ivan Asen II. established Bulgarian sway over 
Albania, the Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace, and Bulgaria attained 
a comparatively high stage of civilization ; but in 1330 the Tsar 
Michael Shishman was beaten by the Serbs at the battle of 
Kustendil, and Bulgaria became part of the Empire of Stephen 
Dushan (1 331-1355). Then the Turks came on the scene. In 1340 
they ravaged the valley of the Maritza, captured Philippopolis in 

330 



Appendix 

1342 and Sofia in 1382. By 1396 the last vestige of Bulgarian 
independence had vanished. 

The Turkish conquest was so complete that four centuries later 
Bulgaria took no part in the movement for the liberation of Serbia 
from the Turkish yoke, which began in 1804. In 1862, however, 
when the Serbians drove out the remaining Turkish garrisons from 
their towns, the Bulgarians also began to organize ; but it was the 
Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, Ignatieff, who inspired the 
revival of their national feeling. Citing the precedent of their 
patriarch, who was recognized by the Greek patriarch in the ninth 
century, he put such pressure on the Porte that it consented to issue 
the firman of February 28th, 1870, providing that : 

Article I. — A separate ecclesiastical district shall be established under the 
official name of the Bulgarian Exarchate. The administration of spiritual 
and religious affairs in these districts shall pertain exclusively to the said 
Exarchate. 

Article II. — The metropolitan of the said districts shall bear the title of 
Exarch. 

In Turkey religion and nationality are the same thing. Ignatieff 
thus created Bulgarian nationality, notwithstanding the protests of 
the Fanar. The Russians next taught the Bulgarians to realize that 
they had twice possessed an empire, gave them schools, supplied them 
with war material and inspired them with ambitions. 

Yet Bulgaria was still an embryonic State when in 1870, Karaveloff, 
one of the Bulgarian leaders, wrote in the Swoboda of November 18th : 
" The hopes we have put in Russia are the cause of our sufferings in 
the last century. Our safety depends upon a Danubian federation, 
and not upon Russia." In 1872 he resumed his argument : " We 
must win our independence ourselves without foreign aid." On 
July 20th, 1874, he said to the Bulgarians in his paper Negazvissimost 
(" Independence ") that " the Slavs of the South ought not to want 
either help or sympathy from foreigners."* 

Yet without Russia Bulgaria would still be under the Turkish yoke. 

In 1875 the inhabitants of Herzgovina refused to pay taxes, or to 
work in the corvees, and resisted the Turkish authorities. Foreign 
consuls intervened in the affair and Turkey promised a wide scale of 
reforms, but the rising spread. The Bulgarians massacred Turkish 

* The Early History of the Balkan League, by L. Barber. — The International 
Review, October 5 th, 19 14. 

331 



Appendix 

police agents. Abdul Hamid had become Sultan after the com- 
pulsory suicide of Abd-ul-Aziz and the deposition of his brother 
Murad. Chefket Pasha was commissioned to stamp out the revolt, 
and carried out his work in a revolting manner which roused the 
wrath of Gladstone, who made the mistake of supposing that the 
Bulgarians were the only victims. The method of massacre was, 
in fact, extended to the Greeks and Serbs of Macedonia. Russian 
intervention saved Serbia, but roused the suspicions of Lord Beacons- 
field. There followed the Conference of Constantinople, which forced 
a constitution on Turkey, but only delayed the Russian declaration 
of war. 

On April 24th, 1877, the Czar commanded his armies to ignore the 
protest of Great Britain and cross the Danube. Roumania joined 
forces with them, but Bulgaria took no part in the struggle. 

Colonel Verestchagin, brother of the painter, has left an account 
of his experiences in the war of 1877-1878. He reveals the terror 
which the Turks inspired in the Bulgarians who did not know how 
to use a gun, having been brought up under a regime which allowed 
any Turk to kill offhand every Bulgarian found armed with that 
weapon. But covered by the Russian armies, they took their revenge. 
The Turks found themselves manacled with the fetters they had 
destined for the Bulgarians and subjected to wholesale pillage. On 
one occasion, when the Bulgarians wanted to get some loot across a 
Russian camp, they feigned a Turkish attack. 

Bismarck prevented Austria from intervening. England was 
mortally afraid that the Russians would enter Constantinople, but 
they stopped short at San Stefano, and the treaty they imposed on 
Turkey established an autonomous principality of Bulgaria, which 
comprised the provinces of Bulgaria proper, Roumelia and Mace- 
donia. Bismarck thought that by preventing the intervention of 
Austria-Hungary in the war, he had paid off his debt to Russia for 
her friendly neutrality in the Franco-German War.* He represented 
himself as the " honest broker " acting as intermediary between 
Russia, Austria and Great Britain. The Treaty of Berlin (1878) 
radically revised the Treaty of San Stefano. Macedonia was restored 
to Turkey. The new principality of Bulgaria was cut down to the 
territory between the Danube and the Balkans. It was to remain 
tributary to Turkey. Independently of Bulgaria, Eastern Roumelia 

* See supra, p. 39* 
332 



Appendix 

was created with a Christian governor, appointed for five years by 
the Sultan. The Bulgarians considered themselves robbed, and 
resolved never to respect those clauses of the Treaty of Berlin which 
injured them. 

They chose Prince Alexander of Battenberg as Prince of Bulgaria. 
Although this selection was inspired by Russia, Prince Alexander 
found himself obliged to side with the anti-Russian party. In 1885 
a revolution broke out at Philippopolis. Prince Alexander of Batten- 
berg went there, and in violation of the Treaty of Berlin assumed 
the title of " Prince of the Two Bulgarias " and annexed Eastern 
Roumelia. The Greeks demanded territorial compensation ; but 
a naval demonstration soon compelled Greece to recognize Bulgaria's 
right to flout the Treaty of Berlin, bearing the signatures of its 
authors, the Germans, Austrians, British, Italians and Russians. 
France, also a signatory of the treaty, indicated to Greece in friendly 
fashion the necessity of accepting this unexpected interpretation 
of it. 

The Serbians, egged on by Austria, attacked the Bulgarians, but 
were defeated at Slivnitza (November 19th, 1885). 

The Russian Government never forgave Alexander of Battenberg. 
He was kidnapped one night and carried off to Reni. Recalled by 
the people, he was compelled under pressure from Russia to abdicate 
a few days later. Stambuloff became Regent. He governed by the 
most barbarous methods, and on the 7th of July, 1887, induced the 
Sobranje to elect Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a lieutenant in 
the Hungarian army, whose claims were supported by Austria and 
Germany. The new ruler had been born in Vienna, was twenty-six 
years of age, and a grandson of Louis-Philippe through his mother, 
Princess Clementina. He was a great landowner in Hungary, very 
rich, very ambitious, anti-Russian by birth. He boasted of having 
French blood in his veins, but he was francophobe by training. In a 
famous letter he once complained of being treated as the Nero of 
Sofia, and represented himself as an innocent victim wholly devoted 
to his people. Stambuloff put incredible energy into the work of 
government which was characterized by affairs such as the execution 
of Major Paniza in 1890. 

It has been observed that Ferdinand was invariably absent whenever 
one of these little political accidents occurred. By a singular coin- 
cidence he was absent when Stambuloff was assassinated in 1895. 
In an unguarded moment he once remarked to an Englishman : 

333 



Appendix 

" When I came to Bulgaria I made up my mind that if there were 
to be assassinations, I would be on the side of the assassins." 

To Mr. Dillon he said one day : " You were very devoted to my 
predecessor, Prince Alexander of Battenberg." 

" Yes," replied Mr. Dillon, " I admired him sincerely, though his 
qualities were those of the heart rather than of the head." 

" I shall never deserve that reproach," was Ferdinand's retort. 

His election was not confirmed by the Porte until 1896. He 
assumed the title of " Royal Highness." He then tried to curry 
favour with Russia by having his son Boris baptized in the Orthodox 
religion, with the Czar Nicholas for his godfather. 

On October 5th, 1908, in further violation of the Treaty of Berlin, 
he proclaimed himself Tsar of the Bulgarians at Tirnovo. The Great 
Powers had already shown how little they cared for the maintenance 
of the treaty and they acquiesced without protest. 

It is true that Bulgaria has a national parliament, the Sobranje, 
and responsible ministers ; but in reality Ferdinand wields despotic 
powers. There are ten political parties in the country : (1) The 
Nationalists, under M. GheshofT ; (2) the Liberal Progressives, under 
Dr. Danef ; (3) the Democrats, led by M. Malinoff ; (4) the Stam- 
buloffists, under Dr. Ghenadieff ; (5) the Liberals, under Dr. Rado- 
slavofT, the present Prime Minister ; (6) the Young Liberals, led by 
Dr. Tontcheff, the present Finance Minister ; (7) the Radicals, under 
M. Isanow ; (8) the Agrarian Party, led by M. Stambouliski ; and 
the two wings of the Socialist Party, led by M. Yanko Sakazoff and 
M. Blagoyer. It has been child's play for Ferdinand to keep the 
Press and all these parties, torn by jealousies, under control. 

He has also worked through the comitadjis, marauding bands 
whose function was to stir up trouble in Macedonia, and whom he 
employed to make attacks on Serbia in the present war, even when 
Bulgaria was still nominally neutral. He always disavowed these 
agents while secretly supporting them,* and by creating an atmosphere 
of universal terror, he continued the traditions of Stambuloff, which 
are represented by Ghenadieff, an ardent pro-Austrian. 

* The Aspirations of Bulgaria, by Balkanicus (translated from the Serbian). 
London, Simp kin, Marshall & Co., 19 15. 



334 



Appendix 



III. Bulgaria and the Wars of 1912-1913 

On October 8th, 191 2, the very day on which Montenegro declared 
war on Turkey, there appeared a note beginning with these words : 

" The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments will inform the Balkan 
States that the Powers reprobate any step likely to lead to war, and that if, 
notwithstanding, war breaks out between the Balkan States and the Ottoman 
Empire, they will not permit any modification of the territorial status quo in 
Turkey in Europe at the conclusion of the struggle." 

The fact was that Austria-Hungary and Germany had pushed the 
allies of the Balkan League into war with Turkey, not in the interests 
of the Balkan nations, but to further their own designs. They were 
certain that Turkey would beat the Balkan Christians. Hence 
the provision as to the maintenance of the territorial status quo. 

Yet, in spite of Von der Goltz's reorganization of the army, the 
Turks abandoned Kirk Kilisse without resistance, and the Bulgarians 
who occupied it became popular heroes. The Austrian and German 
diplomatists and Press announced the pending triumphal entry of 
Ferdinand into Constantinople and his coronation at St. Sophia. 
It was true that before Ferdinand could hope to realize this ambition, 
it was necessary to carry the fortified Tchataldja lines, but he did not 
attribute his disillusionment to that military reason. He laid the 
blame for his failure on the Russian Government, to whom he sent 
General Radko DmitriefL The answer to this envoy was a direct 
negative. It is said that by way of compensation he was promised a 
lucrative financial deal. The upshot was that Ferdinand henceforth 
regarded as enemies the Pan-Slavs of Petrograd, who had reminded 
the Bulgarians at a banquet that " the Balkan question is bound up 
with the age-long dream of Russia to plant the cross on St. Sophia.* 

Towards the end of October the Powers abandoned the provision 
of the 8th of October relating to the maintenance of the status quo. 

M. Poincare, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, proposed to the 
Powers a joint declaration of their territorial disinterestedness. 
Austria-Hungary refused, and reinforced her troops in Bosnia, while 
Russia retained with the colours the class which would normally have 
been disbanded. 

* L'Europe devant Constantinople, by Max Hoschiller, p. 73. 
335 



Appendix 

The Serbian Government claims to have proof that in the spring of 
10,12, before the outbreak of the first Balkan War, the Bulgarian 
Government, by agreement with the Ballplatz, had arranged the 
following career for the Balkan League. Bulgaria was granted per- 
mission to fight Turkey with the assistance of Serbia. If she won 
Serbia was to be rewarded with some insignificant territorial con- 
cessions ; but if she lost Austria would guarantee her integrity. 
After this first war there was to be a second, in which Serbia would 
be finally crushed. 

The Turks began negotiations with the Bulgarians on November 
15th. On the 28th Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference in 
London of ambassadors (Germany, Austria, France, Great Britain, 
Italy and Russia), who should keep in touch with the delegates in 
London of the warring nations, and draw up the terms of a general 
settlement of the questions raised by the war. 

From the start Austria demanded that the autonomy of Albania 
should be recognized. The Ottoman Government accepted the terms 
of the Balkan League, but the Young Turk party overthrew it, and 
the new Turkish Ministry of Mahmud Chefket issued a note on 
January 3rd, 191 3, in which it referred the whole matter to the Powers. 
However, on February 3rd hostilities were resumed. On March 6th 
the Greeks took Janina ; on the 26th, the Bulgarians, with Serbian 
assistance, captured Adrianople, and the Serbians proceeded to drive 
the remnants of the Turkish forces out of Macedonia. 

Bulgaria stood in fear of the Roumanians, who demanded com- 
pensation. The Montenegrins went on fighting until April 23rd, 
on which date they occupied Scutari, but the Powers, to appease 
Austria, made a naval demonstration with a view to forcing them 
to evacuate the town. The preliminary treaty of peace was signed 
in London on May 30th. The Sultan referred to the Powers the 
disposal of all Turkey in Europe to the west of a line from Enos on 
the Aegean Sea to Midia on the Black Sea, with the exception of 
Albania. The delimitation of the frontier and cognate questions 
were left to them, as also the destiny of Crete, the Turkish islands in 
the Aegean Sea and the peninsula of Mount Athos. 

Disputes immediately ensued between the members of the Balkan 
League and the Great Powers. The Greeks demanded Upper Epirus, 
inhabited largely by men of their own race, while Italy desired its 
union with Albania. The Greeks also claimed all the islands of the 
Aegean Sea, the Greek population being 394,000 out of 423,000 souls. 

336 



Appendix 

The Italians wished to keep the Dodecanese, with a view to its ultimate 
restoration to the Turks along with the islands off the coast of Asia 
Minor and the Dardanelles. 

The alliance between the Serbians and Bulgarians was established 
by the treaty of February 29th, 191 2, and the military convention 
of June, 19 1 2. The real compact was a secret treaty.* The treaty 
gave Bulgaria an exclusive right to annex all territory east of the 
river Struma and the Rhodope Mountains. Serbia was to annex the 
territory to the west and north of the Char-Planina Mountains. As 
regards the territory between the Char, the Rhodope Mountains, 
the Aegean Sea and Lake Ochrida, Serbia undertook to restrict her 
claims to the territory bounded by a line from Mount Golem on the 
Turco-Bulgarian frontier (to the north of Krivoretchna-Palanka), 
passing south-west through a mountainous tract to the monastery of 
Gubavatz on Lake Ochrida. Bulgaria agreed to accept that frontier 
if Russia, " as final arbitrator," approved it. By Article 4 the con- 
struction of the treaty or any part was assigned to the Czar of Russia 
as arbitrator. 

This treaty ought to have been carried out in strict accordance with 
its terms, but the Powers themselves were the first to flout it when 
they handed over to Albania part of the territories it assigned to 
Serbia. The Serbs demanded compensation in the Monastir district. 
They added that the terms of the military convention had not been 
kept, that they had put in the field 300,000 men instead of the 150,000 
stipulated, and that the 100,000 Bulgarians who were to operate in 
Macedonia had failed to make their appearance, while the Serbians 
had rendered invaluable assistance in men and material during the 
siege of Adrianople. 

The terms of the treaty of May 16th, 191 2, between the Bulgarians 
and Greeks were not definitely settled at the conclusion of the war, 
for both parties claimed Salonica, and, in fact, the troops of the two 
nations came into open conflict in that district. Both the Bulgarians 
and Serbians ignored the fact that they had agreed, by the first treaty, 
to submit disputes to an arbitrator. The Czar Nicholas sent a tele- 
gram to both parties reminding them of their original intentions. 
The four Governments — Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Turkey — 
agreed to send delegates to St. Petersburg. 

According to the report of an American, Mr. Jacob Gould Schuman, 

* See The Aspirations of Bulgaria, by Balkanicus, p. 89, and Nationalism 
and War in the Near East (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 

337 22 



Appendix 

who was in Sofia at the end of June, 191 3, M. Daneff, then Prime 
Minister, spoke to him of the tension between Bulgaria, Serbia and 
Greece, but said it would not end in war. On the 28th, however, 
he issued the official declaration of war. That same evening, at eight 
o'clock, General Savoff, the Bulgarian Commander-in-Chief, issued an 
order in cipher to the General commanding the 4th Army to attack 
the Serbs along the whole front on the evening of the 29th. The same 
day he issued orders to the other army commanders to attack the 
Serbs and Greeks and secure Salonica, stipulating that " these attacks 
should not be preceded by an official declaration of war." The 
orders were duly carried out. No one believes that General Savoff 
inaugurated these operations on his own initiative, and universal 
report assigns the responsibility for them to King Ferdinand, who 
had had a long conference with the Austro-Hungarian Minister. 

The Bulgarians were defeated. On July 30th M. Daneff implored 
Russia to intervene as arbitrator, and begged her " assistance against 
the attacks of Turkey and Roumania which had already begun." 

Russia saved Bulgaria by insisting that the Roumanians should not 
secure the Rustchuk- Varna line nor enter Sofia. M. Daneff resigned, 
and the Bulgarians, the danger having passed, gave to Austria 
Hungary the gratitude they owed Russia. 

The delegates of the four Governments assembled at Bucharest 
on July 30th, and M. Majorescu, the Roumanian Prime Minister, and 
M. Take Jonescu presided. After a month of fighting Bulgaria 
admitted defeat and ceded Adrianople and a large tract of territory 
to Turkey. As regards Serbia and Greece, the treaty of 1912 was 
definitely at an end. 

The new treaty was signed on the 10th of August. Roumania 
acquired a slice of Bulgaria bounded by a line from above Turtukai 
to a point on the Black Sea to the south of Ekrene. Bulgaria was 
to demolish the fortifications of Rustchuk and Schumla, and to give 
guarantees with regard to the Roumanian schools and churches in 
New Bulgaria. The Serbo-Bulgarian frontier started from the old 
frontier at Paratrica and followed the original Turco-Bulgarian 
frontier and the line of the watershed between the Vardar and the 
Struma, with the exception of the valley of the Strumnitza, which 
passed to Serbia. It terminated at Mount Besalica, where it met the 
Bulgaro-Greek frontier. The Bulgarians left Greece in possession of 
Salonica, the territory to the east of Drama, Seres, and the port of 
Kavalla. The Turks resumed possession of Adrianople, in violation 

338 



Appendix 

of the treaty ot May 30th, and Bulgaria ceded to them Dimotika 

and Kirk Kilisse, with a frontier from Enos to Midia. As regards 

Albania, Austria insisted on preserving its integrity because it was 

bound to be a bone of contention between Serbia, Montenegro, Russia, 

Italy and Greece. The other Great Powers acquiesced, a fatal 

concession. The following table shows the gains of the respective 

parties. 

Gain. 



Square Square 

miles. Population. miles. Population. 

Roumania — — 3,220 353,000 

Serbia 18,630 2,957,200 15.057 1,290,000 

Greece 24,867 2,631,000 19,806 1,624,000 

Bulgaria 37.IQ8 4,329,000 6,949 400,000 

Thus Bulgaria's ambition to secure the hegemony of the Balkans 
received a rude shock. On August nth, the day after the treaty 
was signed, King Ferdinand denounced it in a proclamation to his 
army : " No patriotic Bulgarian will abandon willingly and without 
a struggle Monastir, Ochrida, Dibra, Prilep, Salonica, Seres and 
other Bulgarian lands inhabited by our fellow-countrymen." 

From M. Take Jonescu's revelations we know now that from May 
onwards Austria was anxious to attack Serbia. The object of the 
communication to M. Jonescu was the intimidation of Serbia. In 
August Signor Giolitti received a telegram from the Marquis di San 
Giuliano, Minister for Foreign Affairs, informing him that the Austro- 
Hungarian Government had communicated to Italy and Germany 
their intention to attack Serbia and invoking the casus foederis. 
Italy refused to recognize any obligation. Austria had perforce to 
abandon her designs ; but it was plain, after King Ferdinand's mani- 
festo, that he had hopes of obtaining his revenge for the Treaty of 
Bucharest with the assistance of the Triple Alliance. 



IV. The Bulgarians and Macedonia 

The Bulgarians put forward historical and ethnographical claims 
to Macedonia. 

But what is Macedonia ? 

The ancients included Roumelia in Macedonia. The Romans 

339 22 * 



Appendix 

added to it Central Albania with Durazzo. French and English 
geographers understand by that name the whole country between 
the Rhodope Mountains on the north, Olympus and Thessaly on the 
south, the Pindus range on the west, and watered by the rivers which 
flow into the Aegean.* To the Bulgarians " Macedonia " means all 
the territory they covet to the west of the Rhodope range, and old 
Serbia, and forgetting that by the Treaty of Bucharest they obtained 
the valleys of the Struma and Strumnitza, they assert that the Serbs 
and Greeks have wrongfully appropriated the whole of Macedonia. 

I confess I am not impressed by the claim based on historic rights. 
About 950 a.d. Constantine Porphynogeretus wrote that the town of 
Serblia, on the river Bistrita in the district of Salonica, received its 
name from the Serbs who inhabited that region. In the sixteenth 
century Western travellers found Salonica still inhabited by the 
Serbs, and the Russian historian, N. P. Kondaloff, in his Voyages 
Archeologiques en Macedoine (1907), says that the Serbs crossed the 
Danube in the fifth century, and that the first Slav invaders of Mace- 
donia were Serbs, and were followed by the Bulgarian hordes at a 
subsequent date. 

The French officers whom Napoleon commissioned to visit Dalmatia 
and Macedonia mention the Serbs, but never the Bulgarians. 

Little weight must be attached to the opinions of the English or 
French travellers who have visited the Balkans purely as sightseers 
or on political missions. They give predominance to the Bulgarians, 
Greeks or Serbs, but their choice is determined by the views of their 
dragoman. If they do not start out with an opinion already fixed, 
they invariably reflect that of their interpreter. 

The Serbs were brutally persecuted after the insurrection of Kara 
George and the Peace of Bucharest in 181 2, and the insurrection of 
Dobrenovitch in 18 15. The Bulgarians, on the other hand, were a 
model of meekness. The Serbs would call themselves Bulgarians 
when they wanted to assure their own safety. Yet the Serbs possessed 
many schools in Macedonia, though after the Turkish defeats in the 
wars of 1876 and 1877 the Turks closed those schools. The Serbs 
then had to choose between education given by the Greek Patriarchate 
and that given by the Bulgarian Exarchate. Many chose the latter 
from fear of the Bulgarian comitadjis. 

On the principle that religion constitutes nationality, the inhabitants 
of Macedonia were classified either as Greeks or Bulgarians. Officially 

* Dictionnaire de Geographie, by Vivien de Saint-Martin, Vol. III. (1887). 

340 



Appendix 

the Serbs disappeared, more or less absorbed in the Bulgarians, 
though the latter have never enjoyed a numerical majority. 

Macedonia has never been Bulgarian. According to the census of 
1905, taken after the international commission of control was estab- 
lished (police officers, etc.), there were in the vilayet of Salonica, 425,613 
Mohammedans, 360,000 Greeks, 200,488 Bulgarians ; in the vilayet 
of Monastir, 220,369 Mohammedans, 2j6>66j Greeks and 148,426 
Bulgarians. 

The official statistics of education issued by the Bulgarian Exarchate 
and the Greek Patriarchate give the following figures. In 1904, in 
the vilayet of Salonica, the Greeks had 521 schools, with 32,534 
scholars; the Bulgarians, 319 schools, with 9,544 scholars. In the 
vilayet of Monastir, there were 477 Greek schools, with 27,106 Greek 
pupils, and 242 Bulgarian schools, with 8,767 Bulgarian pupils. 
Before 191 3, in all the large towns the Greeks virtually had the field 
to themselves in banking, industry and the higher branches of com- 
merce. Before 1906 a Bulgarian doctor or barrister was not to be 
found either at Salonica or Monastir. The fifteen great works of 
Verroia-Edessa, the district of waterfalls, were established by Greeks 
and are still in Greek hands. 

The Treaty of Bucharest deprived the Bulgarians of the vilayet 
of Monastir, but gave Greece not a single caza (district) in which the 
Greeks had not since 1905 a numerical preponderance over the Bul- 
garians. The vilayet of Salonica comprised twenty-four cazas. There 
was a Bulgarian majority over the Greeks in ten of these — Doiran, 
Avret-Hissar, Strumnitza, Tikvech, Petritsi, Demir-Hissar, Melenikon, 
Nevrokop, Djuma-Bala and Razlog. Of these ten the Bulgarians 
lost only Doiran (which went to Serbia), Avret-Hissar and Demir- 
Hissar (which were given to Greece), and the loss was more than made 
good by the territories acquired in western Thrace at the expense of 
Hellenism. 

A treaty which defined the respective spheres of influence was 
accepted in March, 191 2, by the Greek and Bulgarian deputies with 
the approval of the Patriarchate and the Exarchate, and established 
the following distribution : 

Vilayets. Greek Seats. Bulgarian Seats. 

Salonica ...... 5 3 

Monastir ...... 5 2 

Adrianople .... 8 1 



341 



Appendix 

Thus the three vilayets gave the Greeks a superiority of three to one. 
In western Thrace, which went to Bulgaria, Suffli, Dedeagatch and 
Xanthi are Greek. The Bulgarians claim Kavalla, but of its 45,000 
inhabitants not one is Bulgarian. In 1905, in the whole sandjak 
(province) of Drama there were only 2,120 Bulgarians out of 148,807 
inhabitants ; that is, barely i| per cent. 

" This summer, when travelling in Macedonia," says M. Michel 
Andre,* " I stayed at the town of Vodena, which was delighted to have 
resumed its famous name of Edessa. In the gardens a ' Karagyeuz ' 
(a kind of Punch and Judy show) presented popular plays. In one 
of them a Bulgarian and a Greek set out to share three sheep which 
they had jointly acquired. ' That one,' said the Bulgarian, pointing 
to the first sheep, ' is mine by rights. The second you will give me 
out of friendship, and I shall take the third.' " 

To-day Bulgaria claims to apply the principle illustrated in that 
" Karagyeuz " to the whole of Macedonia. 

It is difficult for us to have any idea of the life of the Macedonian 
inhabitants under Turkish rule, even after the Treaty of Berlin and 
the Miirsteg Programme drawn up by the Czar of Russia and the 
Emperor of Austria. According to a Bulgarian document, in the 
first eleven months of 1905 there were 1,010 murders, of which 330 
were perpetrated by Turks or Albanians, 195 by soldiers, 451 by 
Greeks and 34 by Serbs. For 1906 Sir Edward Grey published the 
reports of the consuls, which show that between January 1st and 
September 30th, 577 Christians were killed in the vilayet of Salonica, 
431 in the vilayet of Monastir, and 183 in the vilayet of Kossovo ; 
a total of 1,191. The reports, however, do not ascribe the majority 
of these crimes to the Turks. Their authors were mainly Bulgarian 
comitadjis. 

What must have been the mental and moral condition of the 
inhabitants of those Macedonian villages, obsessed by mutual hatred, 
suspicion, terror, malice and a passion for revenge ? 

The population was composed of three classes : landowners, 
" tchiftdis " (metayers) and farm labourers. The landowning class 
was mainly Mohammedan. The Metayer system was in operation in 
three-quarters of the estates. The metayer was compelled to take 
his farm produce to market sometimes fifty to sixty miles away. The 
cattle and agricultural implements belonged to him, but he had to 
work ten days a year for the bey. If the bey erected a mill he had 
* Le Temps, December 15th, 1914. 
342 



Appendix 

to take his corn there. He had also to pay the police agent, whose 
principal function was to terrorize him. 

The wage for a year of an agricultural labourer was ioo to 120 
Turkish piastres. A piastre is worth 2jd., so he received 18s. yd. 
to £1 2s. 6d. in money and the rest in corn. Thus he had absolutely 
no certainty of payment, for the bey could deduct what he liked. 

Such are the conditions of life of a population which has been the 
direct cause of the horrible devastation of Europe during the last 
three years. 

V. Some Strange Diplomatic Illusions 

In view of the facts already given, it was certain that the Bulgarian 
Government could only welcome Austria's declaration of war on Serbia. 
It meant that after the lapse of a year they would obtain that revenge 
for the Treaty of Bucharest which they had expected at once, but 
which had to be postponed on account of Italy's refusal to regard 
Austria's unprovoked attack on Serbia as a casus foederis. 

The diplomatists of the Allied Powers must have been perfectly 
familiar with those events. 

Anything the Allies could offer Bulgaria was necessarily at the 
expense of Serbia and Greece, though it is true that they also talked of 
compensation at the expense of Austria, forgetful of the intimate ties 
between Ferdinand and Francis Joseph. Some publicists were 
anxious to procure a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest in favour 
of Bulgaria, " in conformity with the principle of nationality." This 
meant that Bulgaria would be given Macedonia, which she was pleased 
to regard as Bulgarian. The Socialists made the same mistake with 
regard to Bulgaria as they had made with regard to the German 
Socialists before the war. 

The Bulgarian Sobranje was composed of 213 members. M. 
Longuet* says that 116 of them — that is, a majority — were opposed 
to a pan-German policy. It may be true, but a parliamentary majority 
goes for nothing in a government like that of King Ferdinand. 

In the Revue Bleue of September nth-i8th, M. Paul Louis wrote : 

" The Balkan Federation can and must once more be a reality, and that 
in no long time. Every statesman, at Nish, Bucharest, Sofia or Athens, who 
opposes its resurrection, is committing more than an error — a real crime against 
his country, the Balkan world, Europe herself."! 

* L'HumaniU, October 20th, 191 5. 
■f Paul Louis : La Ligue Balkanique. 

343 



Appendix 

The idea of reviving the Balkan League, which had only survived 
a few months, and had been always disregarded by the Bulgarians 
and finally broken up by them on June 29th, was one of those 
Utopian fantasies which are excusable when indulged in by journalists, 
but unpardonable in experts in foreign politics, who are supposed 
to act only on facts and probabilities. 

Yet the diplomatists of England, France and Russia appear to have 
lost all sense of reality in their dream, and in the name of Ferdinand 
they exercised pressure on Greece and Serbia, quivering under the 
blows of Austria-Hungary, in favour of Bulgaria. 

On August 4th, 19 1 5, the Quadruple Entente informed Athens that 
they wished to give Bulgaria part of Macedonia. The immediate 
result was an indignant outburst in Greece and Macedonia. In 
one town the skulls of the Greeks who had been massacred by the 
Bulgarians in 191 3 were exhumed and carried round in procession. 
The same method of pressure was applied to Serbia. On August 18th, 
I was astounded when a French statesman, in answer to no question 
of mine, remarked spontaneously : " I have some good new r s for you. 
We have obtained from Serbia and Greece what Bulgaria wanted, so 
now we are sure of her ! " 

Can the prudent diplomatists of the Quadruple Entente have been 
so ignorant of the behaviour of Bulgaria since the beginning of the 
war ? 

In the autumn of 19 14 bands of Bulgarian irregulars had delivered 
two attacks on Strumnitza. The irregulars had been assisted by 
regulars, acting on instructions from Sofia. Some of the comitadjis 
who were killed had Austrian money on them, and prisoners said 
that their leaders had been in communication with the Austro- 
Hungarian Legation.* On three occasions the Bulgarians had 
attacked the Nish-Salonica railway. They had allowed war material 
and supplies to go through to the Turks, and had even furnished 
munitions and men themselves. Their General Staff was instructed 
openly or semi-secretly by German officers in plain clothes or Bul- 
garian uniforms. Says M. R.-R. Reiss : " I myself saw a German 
officer and his mechanic, whose aeroplane had come down on Serbian 
territory through engine trouble, who were dressed in Bulgarian 
uniforms and carried documents." 

The Allies professed themselves satisfied with explanations which 

* See the article of M. R.-R. Reiss in the Gazette de Lausanne, October 13th. 

344 




Appendix 

were patent lies and went on blackmailing Serbia and Greece for the 
benefit of Bulgaria ! 

Yet the Russian, English and French diplomatists were by no 
means ignorant of the successive phases of Ferdinand's policy. 
How could they so thoroughly have deceived themselves, 
considering their knowledge of his financial relations with 
Germany ? 

After the Balkan Wars various German banks, among them the 
German National Bank, the Berlin Commercial Association, and the 
Commercial and Discount Bank, were in possession of Bulgarian bills 
given in payment for war material. Gold being at a premium of 
forty per cent., certain banks, under the direction of the Disconto 
Gesellschaft of Berlin, formed a syndicate which reduced the premium 
on gold to nine per cent., and thus paved the way in May, 1914, for 
the negotiation of a consolidated loan. 

The Gazette de Lausanne of November 20th gives some information 
of these events which it derived from German sources. In its report 
for 1914 the Disconto Gesellschaft spoke of the " patriotic character " 
of the dealings with Bulgaria. On July 15th, 1914, the Bulgarian 
National Bank was able to repay 25 millions in gold to English banks 
and 10 millions in gold to Austrian banks. Further, the Bulgarian 
Government received 120 millions in gold against treasury bills at 
7 per cent., and the contract for a 5 per cent, loan of 500 millions 
issuable at 84 was signed. This loan was to be paid in two instal- 
ments. In exchange Bulgaria granted a concession of Bulgarian 
mines to the Disconto Gesellschaft. The contract contained a clause 
suspending its operation in case of war. 

However, in November, 1914, the Disconto subscribed 100 millions 
and the Bulgarian National Bank and Agricultural Bank 50 millions. 
The German banks relinquished their option on the first portion of 
the Bulgarian loan. Further negotiations led to a special advance 
of 150 millions in gold against 6 per cent, treasury bills. Seventy-five 
millions were deposited and 10 millions were to be advanced every 
fortnight. This advance of 50 millions and the advance of 100 
millions in July, 1914, were not included in the loan which had been 
negotiated. In March, 191 5, after the attack of the Allied fleet on 
the Dardanelles, it became known that the option on the second 
instalment of the loan had been relinquished, and that liabilities for 
past and present supplies of war material were to be covered by the 
loan of 500 millions. Bulgaria thus received 270 millions in gold, 

345 



Appendix 

500 millions in war material, a total of 770 millions, in addition to 
100 millions for the mines. 

How could anyone have been deceived as to the end she had in 
view ? 

In the provisional estimates for the first quarter of 1916 an increase 
of seventeen million francs was earmarked for secret uses by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. We hope that they will be employed 
to good purpose ; but if the object is a practical knowledge of the 
behaviour and preferences of Ferdinand of Bulgaria, it will be neces- 
sary to buy and read a number of books and reviews, and to keep 
a file, which I hope already exists in the Foreign Office. The entire 
Press had drawn attention to the financial relations of Bulgaria with 
the Berlin banks. 

Any man in the street who haunted the precincts of Downing Street 
or the Quai d'Orsay could have told the diplomatists of England or 
France that if Germany was making loans to Bulgaria it was in 
pursuance of a common aim. 

There are some statesmen who complain that in view of the known 
facts the Allies ought to have kept Ferdinand under the impression 
that they would make him Emperor of Constantinople. They must 
have had a poor opinion of his wits. Ferdinand knows that Russia, 
which has had such signal proofs of Bulgarian ingratitude, would 
never agree to make the Bulgarians guardians of the Straits in place 
of the Turks. How could any statesman be blind enough, even in 
good faith, to think of establishing at Constantinople a king who had 
been a mere tool of the Central Empires ? However low his opinion 
of the Allied diplomatists, whom he has found such easy game, 
Ferdinand could not possibly have believed that they would resume 
with him the thorny problem of the Straits. The more obsessed 
they became, the more they strove to excite his ambitions, the more 
suspicious Ferdinand became. He could not fail to realize that if 
Russia, France and England were victorious, they would never instal 
a vassal of William II. at Constantinople. 

Whilst Ferdinand was playing with the Allies, he had signed on 
July 17th a compact with Prince Hohenlohe, representing Germany, 
countersigned by the representatives of Austria and Turkey. It 
gave Bulgaria all northern and southern Albania, all Serbian Mace- 
donia and Greek Macedonia, with Kavalla, Drama, Seres, Fiorina 
and Kastoria. 
At the beginning of October the Athenian paper Hestia published 

346 



Appendix 

the information that Great Britain had secured the text of the treaty, 
and had communicated it to the Greek Government. On September 
2nd the Austro-Germans began their renewed campaign against 
Serbia with the bombardment of Semendria. On September 22nd 
Bulgaria mobilized. Serbia informed the Allies that the Bulgarian 
mobilization would take seventeen days, and asked permission to 
march at once on Sofia. 

It was the second time she had suggested that course, and, indeed, 
if the Allies had not been hypnotized by their obsession of winning 
over Ferdinand, that attack would have had far-reaching results 
to the advantage of unhappy Serbia and the Allies. 

Yet the true state of affairs might long since have been gathered 
from the visits to Sofia of the Duke of Mecklenburg, accompanied by 
Herr von Rosenberg, chief of one of the departments of the Wilhelm- 
strasse. A few days before the mobilization two German generals 
were established at the War Office. Another German general was 
installed at the Foreign Office. The mobilization was carried out 
under the direction of the general staff, consisting of twenty-eight 
German officers, who paraded the streets of Sofia in uniform, and 
several Bulgarian generals selected from the court party. 

The Sofia correspondent of the Messagero, writing in October, said 
that immediately after the mobilization the War Office drew up a 
list of officers with supposed pro-Russian sympathies and ordered 
them to resign. Many were imprisoned, and some who had given 
open proof of their preferences were shot. The Government em- 
ployed atrocious methods in suppressing an attempted revolt in the 
Fifth Corps, which resented the imprisonment of General Dankeff, 
accused of having revealed his Russophile sympathies to his subal- 
terns. A manifestation of feeling was followed by a massacre, and 
the houses of political suspects were subjected to visitation and 
search. 

M. Radoslavoff summoned M. Ghenadieff and said to him : 

" My dear Ghenadieff, we have now taken all precautions to prevent 
any recurrence of rebellion. You are free to pursue whichever of 
three courses you prefer. You may bow to the inevitable and agree 
to remain confined in your own house, you may choose to be hung, 
or you may prefer to become a minister in my cabinet." 

Ghenadieff, to forestall further sacrifices, chose the first course. 
Ferdinand, on his part, summoned M. Malinoff and put the same 
alternatives to him. Malinoff also yielded. 

347 



Appendix 

M, Gueschofr", to whom so much information had been imparted 
in imprudent conversations in Paris, said to the correspondent of 
the Messagcro : " Monsieur, we shall go with the victor." 

The Bulgarian Government were good enough to acquaint their 
subjects with the motives for their conduct in a document which has 
become known through a communication from Reuter's Agency, 
dated from Amsterdam on October 8th. It was published by the 
Fra?ikfurter Zeitung, where it occupied eight columns. Twenty 
thousand copies had been distributed by the Bulgarian Government 
some time previously in different German cities. The document 
recited the motives of the contending parties in the war, went on 
to show the superiority of the Central Powers, and ended as follows : 

" At the outset no man could foretell how events would shape themselves, nor 
which side would be victorious. If the Government had decided to intervene 
at once in this great war it might have committed the error of throwing in its 
lot with the party ultimately defeated and thus imperilling the Bulgarian 
Empire. 

" We do not know the contents of the famous note which the Quadruple 
Entente presented to the Bulgarian Government, but from what has appeared 
in the Press it would seem clear that Russia and her Allies oifered us nothing 
in exchange for our neutrality, but, on the other hand, demanded (i) that we 
should intervene as soon as possible in the war ; (ii) that Bulgaria should put 
her army at the unfettered disposal of the Quadruple Entente, which should 
control it entirely and send it where they pleased ; (iii) that the Bulgarian army 
should first take Constantinople and immediately hand it over to Russia. 

" In return for this, Bulgaria was to acquire Turkish territory to the Enos- 
Midia line, and there were vague promises of insufficient compensation in 
Macedonia, provided that Serbia gained sufficient compensation from Austria. 

" Although the details of the Austro-German offers are not known, it may 
be said without fear of contradiction that Austria and Germany promised Bul- 
garia, in return for her neutrality, the whole of Macedonia, including Skoplie 
(Uskub), Bitolia (Monastir), Ochrida, etc. In addition, they promised their 
friendly mediation between Bulgaria and Turkey, with a view to the concession 
by Turkey of the Dedeagatch railway line and territories to the west and on the 
right bank of the river Maritza. 

" Even larger promises of compensation at the expense of Serbia were made 
by the Central Powers in the event of our military intervention on their side. 
These promises recognized our desire to obtain a common frontier with Austria- 
Hungary along the Danube. Other parts of old Serbia were also offered 
to us. 

" Besides, the promises of the Quadruple Entente could not be regarded with 
confidence, and we are certainly right in putting our faith in the promises of 
Germany, which has never failed to carry 7 out its treaty obligations. 

" Finally, Bulgaria must range herself on the side of the Central Powers, 
because victory inclines towards Germany and Austria-Hungary." 

348 



Appendix 

Articles have appeared in the French Press under the title, " La 
Trahison de Bulgaria " (" Bulgaria's Betrayal "). The title was 
inaccurate, for Ferdinand has ever been faithful to his Austro-German 
policy. The diplomatists who thought otherwise have only them- 
selves to thank for their disillusionment. 

On October 19th the Emperor Nicholas issued the following 
manifesto : 

" We make known to all our faithful subjects Bulgaria's treason to the Slav 
cause. Perfidiously prepared from the beginning of the war, the thing incredible 
has now become an accomplished fact. 

" Bulgarian forces have attacked Serbia, our faithful ally, bleeding from her 
struggle with a stronger foe. 

" Russia and the Great Powers, our Allies, have striven to dissuade the 
Government of Ferdinand of Coburg from this fatal step. The realization of 
the ancient aspirations of the Bulgarian nation by the acquisition of Macedonia 
was secured to Bulgaria in a manner consistent with the interests of the Slav 
world. But German intrigues and fratricidal hatred of the Serbs have 
triumphed. 

" The Bulgarians, men of our own faith and not long ago freed from Turkish 
thrall by the affection and blood of the Russian people, have thrown in their 
lot with the enemies of Christianity, the Slav cause and Russia. Russia grieves 
at the treason of Bulgaria, so dear to her until these last days, and with bleeding 
heart draws her sword and commits the fate of the traitors to the Slav cause 
to the just punishment of God." 

Yet the Russian Government ought to have been accustomed to 
the ingratitude of Bulgaria. They must have known the relations 
of Ferdinand with their enemies, and experience should have 
familiarized them with the Bulgarian motto : " The only Slav interests 
are the interests of Bulgaria." 



VI. The Difficulties of the Problem 

The events which are happening in the Balkans confirm my 
observations in the body of this book. The affairs of that quarter of 
the world will be settled by the Great Powers now at war with 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. 

Ever since Bulgaria became a nation, resurrected by Russia, she 
has been a constant source of unrest. She erected a statue to the 
Czar Alexander II. in Sofia, but has steadily pursued a policy dic- 
tated by Austria and Germany. She betrayed Serbia and Greece 

349 



Appendix 

even when she seemed to be acting in concert with them. The events 
of her history since 1878 show that peace can never be established 
in the Balkan Peninsula on the basis of the balance of power. Bul- 
garia has ever aimed at a Bulgarian hegemony there, and if she 
had attained it Germany would have exploited it. 

How must the Balkan nations be treated when the day of peace 
arrives ? 

To begin with, the Allies will never forget that Serbia was the 
victim from the first day of the war, and that in August, 19 14, she 
drew upon herself 350,000 Austro-Hungarian troops and inflicted 
upon them the defeat of the Jadar. Serbia must form with Croatia 
and the other Southern Slavs of Austria a Confederation of Greater 
Serbia. 

The Bulgarians must give up Macedonia. No longer must we toy 
with the idea of letting them cut across the Salonica-Belgrade railway. 
They must be kept as far from it as from Salonica and Constantinople. 
Will they be allowed to keep Eastern Roumelia ? It is a difficult 
question. 

But there will also be a domestic problem. King Ferdinand and 
his dynasty must be exiled from Bulgaria. What political system 
will be most suitable for this race ? Their history shows that they 
are not ready for parliamentary government. Impoverished, their 
man-power exhausted, burdened with debt, distrusted by all and 
with their last illusions dispelled, they will cherish feelings of bitter- 
ness and await the first opportunity for taking their revenge. Bul- 
garia will be a centre of unrest, all the more dangerous from its 
proximity to Hungary, which will be in the same plight. When the 
day of settlement arrives they must be separated by a greater distance 
than before the war. 

Bulgaria must be rendered impotent, like the two great empires 
with which she has thrown in her lot. Her intervention has been 
disastrous for Serbia, but can have no serious effect on the operations 
in the French and Russian theatres, where alone a decision will be 
obtained. 



350 



INDEX 



INDEX 



-ZIA COfljgreM ok 2J2. 

Abd-el-Aziz, Sultan oi >, 69 

Abdul-Hamid, 29, 48, 174, 310, 332. 
Adrianople, Treaty of, 271. 
Adriatic Sea, The, 301. 

thai, Count, i;-:> 
Afghanistan, 1 - 
Africa, French Equatorial, 72-74. 

, German Sout:. 

Agadir 2> $6, \: r -^-:\. 90, 173. 

iTi conspiracy trial, 19, \ \ 
— — . Diet df : , 

•, in Germany, 12c- 
'162. 
Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 212. 
Ajam, Mauri:.- [64 I : . ; 

Albania - - 3 • -; 

Aldridge, Francis, 1 

Alexander III., Czar of Rn ,2 

Alexander : 2 

Alexander, h: : - 

33: 
Alfold, The, 262, 302. 
Algeciras Conference, The, 17, 62- 
- 

Convention, 71 -_ 

ria, 168. 
Alsace -Lorr air. - 58,60,61, 

7;, 209, 210 : J 
Althoff, Dr., 102. 
Amiral Ganteaume, The 5 
Anatolian Railway, The, 48, 174, 310. 
Andraasy Count, 14, 35 -. _ _-: 

Andr ;_: 

Angell, Norman : 

me! Entente, The, 51, 6 : 

_' 
. o-Russian agreement, The. 17 
Antwerp, 36, 49, 92, 94. 

iments, Competition in, 193-:;: 

, Limitation of, 290 291 

Armenian m aaaacxca I he 174. 
Army Bills (Germi: 

60, 193-196, 296. 
Asquith, Mi -_ 

Astmrias 1 

Auerstadt, Battle of, 217. 
Augsburg, Battle of, 2^2. 



ria-Hungar \ ■ ■- 1 2 13 -2 . 

22: 22^ 22 --2 ;. 242 Part IV. 

I 
■ro-Germar 

ro-Hungarlan E .rxei- 

D : 15 : ' 

C 

2*7 100-304 

... ------- 

- - - _ - _ -- 
.. ■ if, 7 



Bab^. famse of, 2- 1 

.:...-..-.. _ - _ 

fan 1 - . ' 

2 23, 214, 2 : 24 
Bagdad Railway, 1 

I 

. .: 213. 
Balfour 
Balkan Peninsula, ix, 14, 40 - • ; : ,.- 

Ballplatz (Austrian Foreign Or 

-- 

- : - - 

"-.---- - - 

_:• _-_ 24] 243 
Bea: . a .-. : Lard 15 - ; 

: : : - 
Belgian neutrality, 10, : 24 _ ■ : 
: jo. 
:um, io, 11, 12, ; \2 >_ 

- 2C - ' : 
S .r H_r 140. 
Benedetti, M., 232-234, 2 I : -2 _ : 
Berchtold, Count, xi, .t g :: 12,20, 

99- 27 S- 
Berg, Grand Duchy of , 2 : - 

: 
Treaty oi 17 il i<j _- - .' 2-: 



353 



23 



Index 



! 

SS 

3 

! I 
- 
- 
I 
I 

- 

- 

174 



3 1 

- 

• - ■ 
vges 

- 

; : : 

5 - 

■ • - 
" • ■ 

Bulow. T 51, 

- - 7$,$ HJ. ioi, 

Bundesrat. Th; a 3 art :;■ 

Busch, Maurice 5a ".90. 



-.tch. Nedjklko. X 3 J3 

Caillaux. M.. -: 

Cairoli Ministry, Th. - 

Cambon. M. Paul. -: 

Cambon. M. V.. 141. 

Canieroons, The 74 

Capital. German. Growth of, 180, 

in France 3 3 

. Levy on [1913), 106. 107. 

....: ; 5 5 B 5o, 65, 121. 193. 
Carlowitz. Peace of, 2 



- 

Ans . ; . 

The, 
3 

! 
( 

s 

1 41 . 

I 

SSSC 

■ - 

Con - .-. : 

[ 

i 

Sondes Mi 

. : . 3 - 



mcoi 

- 43 

- . : : : : : : \) 

- ... 

- 

-'-74. 

Cons: - . -., 310, 

311 3 

inns, Matthias. King of Hungary, 

tcow, Republic of, 315. 
I7« 
lean War. 18 : p 311. 
ris, The fir./ - f$ 189, 190. 

Crispi, Signer. -- 

and the " Nagoda " of 1868, 270. 

Cronstadt. Visit of French fleet to, 42, 

Crown Prince. The. ty 

Cubrilovic. Veljko, 3. 

Customs Union, Serbo-Bulgarian, 19. 

German. 5tv Zollverein. 

Czechs, The xv, 40, 253. 254-261, 301. 
and the Germans. 2;6-26i. 



354 



Index 



Dacia, 305. 

Dahn, Felix, 29. 

Daily Telegraph, interview with the 

Kaiser, 29, 69. 
Dalmatia, 78, 269. 
Damascus, 48. 
Daneff, Dr., 338. 
Danish Duchies, Annexation of, 45, 

230, 231. 
Danubian Principalities, The, 305. 
Dardanelles, The, 41. 
Deak, Ferencz, 264, 265. 
De Bunsen, Sir Maurice, 7, 8, 9, 10, 99. 
Decazes, The Due de, 54. 
Delane, Mr., 54. 

Delbriick, Hans, 47, 52, 108, 198, 200. 
Delcasse, M., 65, 67, 72, 175. 
Deniker, J., 249. 
D'Enghien, The Due, 215. 
Denmark, 13, 50, 230, 231. 
Depretis, Signor, 77. 
Derby, Lord, 311. 
Dernburg, Doctor, 170. 
Deroulede, Paul, 57, 60. 
Detaille, Edouard, 59. 
Dicey, Mr. A. V., 281. 
Diedrichs, Admiral, 171. 
Diepenhors, Herr Fritz, 143, 325. 
Djavid Bey, 86. 
Dmitrieff, General, 335. 
Dobrudja, The, 307. 
Dortmund-Ems Canal, The, 92. 
Drang nach Sudostcn, 18. 
" Dualism," 260. 
Dual System, The, 82. 
" Dumping," 127-135. 

Eastern Roumelia, 17, 41, 332, 333. 
Economics, German theories of, 112- 

116. 
Egypt, 45, 311. 
Eisenhart, 47. 

Elections, German, 193, 199. 
Electors, The Imperial, 208. 
Empress Frederick, The, 59. 
Emden, 92. 
Empire, The Holy Roman, 207-216, 

252, 253, 256. 
Ems Telegram, The, 22, 239, 240. 
Enver Pasha, xii, 85. 
Espionage, German, 34-37 . 

Fashoda, Incident at, 63. 
" Federalism," The party of, in Ger- 
many, 260. 
Fenffe, M. de, 90. 
Ferdinand, The Emperor, 210, 258. 

, King of Bulgaria, 333, 334, 335, 

339. 346. 
Fethi Bey, 86. 
Fez,. 65. 



Fichte, Johann, 161. 
Finance, German, 195-198. 
Fiume, 19, 269, 270, 301, 302. 

, Conference at, 19. 

Forgach, Count, 7. 

Fortnightly Review, Revelations of, 71. 

France, 5, 11, 12, 13, 35, 53-75. /6, 

89, 109, 187-192, 209, 212-221. 
Francis I., King of France, 209. 
Francis II., Emperor, 216, 263, 264, 

273- 
Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, viii, ix, 

x, 3- 17. 33- 272. 
Francis Joseph, Emperor, xi, 4, 13, 14, 

19, 20, 30, 39, 77, 82, 261, 264, 265, 

274, 275. 
Franco-Russian Alliance, The, 39, 41, 

42, 60, 61, 67. 
Franco-Spanish Treaty, The (1904), 

64, 67. 
Frankfort, 22, 23, 232. 

, Constitution of, 228. 

, Parliament of, 228, 259, 260. 301. 

, Treaty of, 154, 163, 320, 325. 

Frederick I., King of Prussia, 21. 
Frederick II., King of Prussia, 21, 22, 

212, 315. 
Frederick William I., 21, 22, 112, 211, 

216-220. 
Frederick William IV., 29, 227-229. 
Free Trade, xix, xx, 44, 325. 
Fremdenblatt, 8. 
French Colonies, The, 10. 
Freycinet, M. de, 55, 59. 
Freymann, Herr, 185. 
Friedjung, Dr., 20, 33. 

Gaboon, 73. 

Galicia, 315, 316. 

Galimberti, Mgr., 12. 

Gastein, The Convention of, 230. 

Gentz, Friedrich von, 222. 

German Colonies, The, 317. 

German Constitution, The, 23, 24, 26, 

27, 46, Part III. passim, 246, 294- 

299. 
German diplomacy, 38-103. 
German Empire, Foundation of, 13, 

45, 243-246, 295. 
Germanic Confederation, The, 224-226, 

230, 231, 232. 
Germanv, 8, 10, 11, 12, 21-30, 33-37. 
38-103, Parts II. and III. 
passim, 294-299. 

, Population of, 109-111. 

and China, 171, 172. 

and Turkey, 48, 78, 79, 85-38. 

Gervais, Admiral, 42. 
Ghica, Alexander, 306. 
Giesl, Baron, 8. 
Giffen, Sir Robert, 188, 192. 



355 



Index 



Giolitti, Signor, 79, 339. 

Girault, M. Arthur, 303. 

Gladstone, Mr., 89, 332. 

" Golden Bull," The, 208, 256. 

Gontaut-Biron, Count de, 54, 55. 

Gortschakoff, Prince, 39, 54. 

Goschen, Sir Edward, 10, 91. 

Gotter, Baron von, 22. 

Govone, General, 234. 

Grabez, Trifko, 3. 

Gramont, Due de, 238-242. 

Great Britain, 5, 10, 12, 36, 37, 44-52, 

55, 62, 63, 66, 72, 73, 89-91, 97, 98, 

230, 311, 332. 
Greece, 14, 333, 336-339. 340, 341. 
Grey, Sir Edward, xiv, 9, 12, 52, 71, 

72, 98, 311, 336. 
Guelfs, The, 297. 
Guinea, Spanish, 73. 
Gumplowitz, Herr von, 108, 313. 
Gwynner, Herr von, 72. 



Hague Conventions, The, 101, 103, 

3 2 3- 
Hairi Bey, xii. 
Hamburg, 23, 45, 73. 
Hanover, 22, 45, 214, 215, 217, 224, 

232. 
Hapsburg, Rudolph of, 209, 252. 

, House of, viii, 209, 251, 252, 275. 

, Ferdinand of, 258. 

Harden, Maximilian, 51, 185, 187, 192. 

Hardenberg, Prince von, 219, 223, 225. 

Heidelberg, Congress at, 228. 

Heimburger, General, 90. 

Held, Herr, 114. 

Hennebicq, Leon, 203. 

Henry the Fowler, 208, 255. 

Herbette, M., 55, 60. 

Herreros, The, 170. 

Herzgovina, 15, 331 (and see Bosnia). 

Hesse, 22, 214, 232. 

Historical School, The, in Germany, 

112, 286. 
Hohenberg, Duchess of, viii, ix, 33. 
Hohenlohe, Prince, 26, 41, 42, 57, 121, 

242, 346. 
Hohenwart, Karl, 261. 
Hohenzollern, House of, 238, 239. 

, Frederick of, 21. 

, Prince Leopold of, 238, 239, 240. 

Hohenzollern candidature, The, 238- 

241. 
Holland, 10, 12, 91-94, 210. 

, Neutrality of, 10, 49. 

Holy Alliance, The, 226. 

Holy Places, Protection of, 48. 

Humbert, King, 77. 

Hungary, 14, 82, 83, 251, 252, 253, 

262-266. 



Hungary, Roumanians in, 15, 16, 265, 
301-303, 308. 

, Stephen of, 355, 263. 

, History of, 262-266. 

Huss, John, 256, 257. 

Ignatieff, M., 333. 

Ilio, Danilo, 3. 

Illyrian movement, The, 271. 

Import certificates, German, 123. 

Indemnity, Question of, 321-324. 

(1871), 187-192. 

India, 311. 

Innsbruck, University of, 78. 
International law, Sanctions of, 282. 
Iron, Production of, in Germany, 139, 

140. 
Irredentists, The, 76. 
Ischl, 8. 
Istria, 78. 
Isvolsky, M., 70. 
Italy, xv, 12, 29, 31, 36, 37, 40, 64, 

76-81, 208, 209, 215, 231, 242, 301, 

302, 336, 339. 
Ivan Asen II., 330. 

Jadar, Battle of the, 350. 

Jagow, Herr von, 4, 90. 

Japan, 12, 17, 29, 100, 172. 

Jehad, The (Holy War), 87, 88. 

Jellachich, Baron Joseph, 269, 270. 

Jena, Battle of, 217. 

John XXII., Pope, 256. 

Joseph II., Emperor of Austria, 258, 

263, 273. 
Jovanonic, Misco, 3. 
Journal de Gene've, The, 168. 
Judgment of Libusa, The, 259. 
" Junkers," The, 27. 

Kalisch, The Treaty of, 220, 222. 

Kallay, Von, 17. 

Kant, Immanuel, 112. 

Karageorgevitch, House of, 19. 

Karaveloff, 331. 

Karovic, Mikar, 3. 

Kauifmann, 57. 

Kerovic, Nedo, 3. 

Khazars, The, 262. 

Kiao-Chau, 29, 48. ioo, 170-172. 

Kiderlen-Wachter, Herr von, 71, 7$, 

74- 
Kiel Canal, The, 28. 
Kirchmann, Herr, 232. 
Kisseleff, Count, 306. 
Klotz, M., 163. 
Koike, Herr F., 169. 
Koloman II., King, 268. 
Konia, 174. 
Konigsberg, 21, 219. 
Konopisht, Pact of, vii-ix. 



356 



Index 



Kossovo, Battle of (1389), 263, 268, 

306. 
Kossuth, Louis, 264. 
Kromeriz, Diet of, 274. 
Kriiger, President, 29, 49, 93. 
Krupp's, Kaiser Wilhelm II. and, 182. 

and the indemnity of 1871, 191. 

Kuhlmann, Herr von, 64. 
" Kultur," 34. 
Kustendil, Battle of, 330. 
Kutusoff, General, 220. 

Labour Party, The British, 52, 72. 

Ladislaus, King of Poland, 269. 

Lamsdorf, Count, 175. 

Lansdowne, Lord, 176. 

Laur, Francis, 60. 

League of Patriots (French), 56. 

Leger, M. Louis, 257, 259. 

" Legitimacy," The principle of, 223, 

284. 
Leipzig, Battle of, 220. 
Leo XIII. , Pope, 63. 
Leopold, King of Belgium, 42. 
Leopold II., Emperor of Austria, 213. 
Leroy, M. Maxime, 319. 
Liberals, The German, 62, 63, 229. 
Lichnowsky, Prince, 12. 
Liebknecht, Dr., xv. 
Liefmann, Robert, 127, 134. 
Liman von Sanders, General, 85. 
Lipau, Battle of, 257. 
List, Friedrich, 112, 115, 116, 133. 
Lloyd George, Mr., 51. 
London, Compact of, xv, xx, 288. 
Lothair, The Emperor, 207. 
Loubet, M., 64, 175. 
Louis the German, 207. 
Louis XVI., King of France, 213. 
Loznica, 6. 
Lubeck, 23. 
Lucke, Herr, 197. 
Luderitz, Herr, 62. 
Luneville, Treaty, of 213. 
Luxemburg, 11, 52, 89, 100, 233, 234. 
, Rosa, 199. 

Macchio, Baron, 7, 81. 
Macedonia, 78, 332, 339~343. 344- 
Magyars, The, 15, 16, 18, 194, 262, 268, 

273. 274. 
Mancini, Signor, 77. 
Manifeste des Kulturkrieger, 20. 
Maria Theresa, 22, 212, 263. 
Maritime rivalry, Anglo-German, 1 50- 

153- 
Mauchamp, Dr., 69. 
Maximilian, The Emperor, 209, 252, 

258. 
Mayerling, 32. 
Mazzini, 314. 



Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 23. 
Memorandum of French Government, 

9. 11. 
Mensdorff, Count, 9, 10. 
Metternich, Prince, 264, 273. 
Metz, 53, 56. 
Meuriot, M. Paul, 320. 
Mexico, 234. 
Milan, King, 19. 
Milovic, Jakov, 3. 
Mirabeau, 22, 108. 
Mohacs, Battle of, 253, 258, 263. 
Mohammedans, Appeal to, 48, 86, 87, 

102. 
Moldavia, 305, 306. 
Moltke, Count von, 53, 54, 55, 56, 240, 

241. 
Mommsen, Professor, 283. 
Monastir, 78, 337. 
Monroe Doctrine, The, 49. 
Montenegro, 12, 15, 16, 18, 336. 
Moravia, 259, 262. 
Morocco, 63-75, 172, 173. 
Moscow, French Exhibition at, 60. 
Moula'i-Hafid, 69. 
Mouley-Abd-El-Malek, 65. 
Muhlberg, Battle of, 258. 
Mulhausen, 58, 60. 
Munster, Herr von, 54. 
Mursteg Programme, The, 78. 

Napoleon L, 213-221, 263, 264. 

Napoleon III., 76, 230-234, 241, 307. 

Narodna Odbrana, 5. 

Nassau, 22. 

National economy, Theory of, 1 12-1 16. 

National Liberals in Germany, The, 

162, 193. 
Nationality, Definition of, 286, 287. 
Naval Convention, Anglo-Russian, 98. 
Navigation Act, Repeal of, 44. 
Navy Bills (German), 46. 
Navy League (German), 46, 152. 
Neue Freie Presse, 8. 
Nicholas I., Czar of Russia, 14, 87, 230, 

306, 310. 
Nicholas II., 175, 337, 349. 
Nikolsburg, Treaty of, 232. 
Normandy, German interests in, 183. 
North German Confederation, The, 

235-237. 
North Sea, German frontage on, 91. 
Novi-Bazar, Sanjak of, 15, 17. 

Odessa, xii. 

O'Farrell, Mr. H. H., 190, 191. 

Ofen (Buda-Pest), 13. 

Official Journal of Serbia, 5. 

Ollivier, M., 239. 

Oncken, Herr, 95. 

" Open Door," Policy of the, 168. 



357 



Indes 



Ostei: S 

1 5 2 : ; : . 

S 

- 

- 

Pane. 

:v.s in Ans 

Par: . -9. 

J 

- 

-.an Gulf". The. 151. 17 
Pichori. II 

. .10. 

I - 
Pohl 

: : : 

/ - 

. Partitio: 

ill, 194. 

.ent in Austria. 31-37 
Posada 3 [ aunt, tai. 

-. [94 224 - 
. s Count. 1 1 a c 
pnatic Sanction, The (ij.: v 
Pra a at a - 5 : ; a 5 ; 261. 

. Treaty 01. 2 J a 

Un iversity ol 256 157 . 

Premyslides. P 
Pressburg, Peace of. a : 
Princep. Danilo x 

rhc -5- 

Procop. Andre w 257. 

Protection in Germany, 120-12 1 a 
165 

Prussia. 13. 21-30, 38 45 - 

117-119, 211 212—221, Part 
III. - 286, 290, 25 a 

and France 212-22 1 a 3 B 

and Austria. 227-2 

Race No precise definition of 
Race question in Austria-Hur.^ 

The, 250-278 
Radolin, Prince, 65, 70. 
Radoslavofi. M. 347 
Radowitz. Herr von. 5 1 
Raflalovich, ML Arthur, 127, 1 31-154. 

1 8l , ; - 

Rastadt, Treaty of, 211. 
Raon-1'Etape, Incident at 57, 



Rather.,. v. Doctor 181. 

1 - 

-.-.- I - ; 

Reu . 1 ; 

- 
S g V' . 23 24 27 - 

a jrc 

: I 
S 
Rettich. Heinrich, t< - 
Reumer. Herr 

. a 227 
Rhine. Tbf 

Rhine Province. The. 91. 11 
a a 5 

Ripley. Mr. \V. Z.. 28 

Rohrbach, Herr Paul. ;. 

- - 

■ ■ ■ - ' -' , ; ! 
Roscher. Wilhelm. 1 

rdam. 40. 02. 152. 
Rouher. II 
Roir. 

Rouvier. II 

Rudolph, Archduke. 32 : 

Russell. Lord do 54 

Russia, xvi. 5, 8 [6-1 8 

38-43.55 - 

264. 29c. 















: - : ; : : : | ; : ; 

3^ 33« 

. Population of. no 

- German Treaty, 

The, 124 a 

tariff war. The. 123 124 

Russo-Japanese War. The, 66. 
Russo-Turkish Wars. 14, 3 
Ruville. Herr A. de. 245 s 

Sadowa. Battle of. 13 53 $2 
Salazar. Seuor. : 
Salonica. 18 5 33 - 338 
Ifaxqnis d: 
San-Paolo, 49. 
San Stefano. Treaty of. (4 
Sarajevo trial. 3, 33. 

assassination, x. xi. ;. 52, 79. 

Sarolea, Dr. Charles. 47 
Savigny, Friedrich Karl von, 112. 

General. 338. 
Saxony - : :.-• 45 - B 217, 223 232, 
Say. Leon 
Sazonof. If., S, 10, 99. 

9< n. Count, 99. 
Scharnhorst, General, 21$, 290. 
Schebeko, M., 10, 99. 



358 



Index 



Scheldt, The, 92, 94. 
Schmoller, Professor, 112, 113. 
Schnaebele affair, The, 41, 56, 57. 
Schoen, Baron von, 12, 69, 70, 72, 99. 
Schorlemer-Lieser, Herr von, 200. 
Secularization of ecclesiastical States, 

The, 213, 214. 
Selves, M. de, 70, 72. 

>ia, xiv, 3, 5-12, 14, 16-20, 33, 79, 
80, 267-272, 331, 332, 333, 
336-339. 340, 347- 

, Ultimatum to, 5-12, 99. 

Seven Years War, The, 38, 44, 212. 

Seymour, Sir George Hamilton, 67, 310. 

Shabatz, 6. 

Shantung, Treaty of, 48. 

Sheik-ul-Islam, The, 87. 

Shipping, Relative figures of, 150, 151. 

, German, subsidized, 63. 

Sigismund, The Emperor, 21, 256, 257. 

, John, 21. 

Silesia, 22, 212, 316. 
Simon, Jules, 58. 
Skiernewice, Treaty of, 41, 77. 
Slavs, The, 13-20, no, III, 259. 

, Majority in Austria-Hungary, 

14-16. 
Slivnitza, Battle of, 333. 
Slovaks, The, 15, 265. 
Slovenes, The, 15, 301. 
Smyrna-Cassaba railway, The, 175. 
Sobieski, John, 14. 
Socialists, The German, 32, 80, 118, 

121, 162, 193, 196, 199-201, 314. 
Solf, Doctor, 170. 
Souchon Pasha, 86. 
South African Union, The, 49. 
South German States, The, 22, 2^, 231, 

241-245. 
Southern Slav question, The, ix, 19, 

267-272. 
Sovereignty, Theory of, 282, 283. 
Spahn, Herr, 94. 
Spain, 238, 239, 240. 
Spandau, War-chest at, 189. 
Spanish-American War, The, 48. 
Spencer, Herbert, 107, 108. 
Stadion, Count, 218, 242, 274. 
Stambuloff, 41, 333, 334. 
Steamship services, German, 152. 
Stein, Baron von, 218, 225. 
Stephanie, Archduchess, 32. 
Stephen Dushan, King of Serbia, 268, 

330. 
Strengel, Baron von, 108. 
Strossmayer, Bishop, 269, 270. 
Sudekum, Herr, 80. 
Sweden, 209. 
Switzerland, 302. 

Syndicates, The German, 125, 127-135. 
Syria, 177. 



Szapary. Count, 10, 99. 
Szlavy, Baron Joseph von, 17. 

Taborites, The, 257. 

Tacitus, 107. 

Taillandier, M. Saint-Rene, 64, 65. 

Talaat Bey, xii, 86. 

Talleyrand, Prince, 223, 224, 284. 

Tangier, 64, 66, 172. 

, The Kaiser's visit to, 29,64,65, 

176. 
Tankossitch, Wis lav, 6, 7. 
" Tariff Reform " in England, 167. 
Tariff Wars, Franco-German, 161-168. 

, Russo-German, 123, 124. 

Tattenbach, Count, 

Teutonic Knights, The, 21. 

Thiers, M., 53, 239. 

Thile, Herr, 239. 

Thirty Years War, The, 209, 258. 

Three Emperors, Alliance of the, 39, 77. 

Three Years Law (French), The, 202. 

Thurn, Count, 258. 

Thyssen, Herr, 183. 

Tilsit, Treaty of, 217. 

Times, The, 54, 57, 94, 96. 

Tirpitz, Admiral von, 46, 153. 

Tisza, Count, xi, 4, 278. 

Title of Emperor William I., The, 245. 

Togoland, 73. 

Top-Khane, Convention of, 17. 

Trade, Anglo-German, 143-149. 

.Franco-German, 154-160, 161- 

168. 

, Turkish, 178. 

Transvaal War, The, 29, 49, 63, 92. 

Transylvania, 273, 305-309. 

Treaty, Principles of the future, 293- 

304. 
Treitschke, 47, 107, 108. 
Trentino, The, 76, 77, 7S, 81. 
Trieste, 77, 301, 302. 
Triple Alliance, The, 40, 42, 53, 67, 77, 

85, 97- 

Tripoli, 36, 78. 

Tschirschky, Herr von, 7, 66, 99. 

Tunis, French occupation of, 76, 77, 
168. 

Turco-Italian War, The, 29, 78. 

Turkey, 14, 18, 29, 36, 41, 48, 78, 79, 
85-88, 174-179, 224, 268, 269, 
289, 306, 307, 310-312, 330- 
338. 

, Railway projects in, 177, 178. 

, Trade statistics, 178. 

Tyrol, The, 218, 252, 301,302. 

United States, The, 49. 
Utraquists, The, 2^7, 258. 
Utrecht, Treaty of (1713), 211. 



359 



Index 



VautT, Battle 
Varobuler, 241. 
Vatican Dm -■ 

Venetia, 76. 
Venezuela, 49. 

Vcnjrin, If., 141. 
Hes : } I | \ 

Vetsera, Baroness Marie :: 
Victoria. Queen, 20. 49, ;_ 
Vienna 1 3 - - 

I 4 5 ;;:-;; 

Voltaire 21 

Von der Goltr j - 3 3 5 

. :.-,rlberg. Tb* ;•:: 



toe and Germany, 191. 

Wagner, Adolph. 112, 134, 16: 

■am, Batt^ vi 11S 
Walla cliia . 3 q 5 

g . Dheim Paron von - : Mi 
Dtigin oJ 107 

GOOD [Ofl 

.Profits of 1 ,- ; --i92. 

Weiss, M. Andre. 51S. 

Wenceslaus I.. King of Bohemia 155 

Wends, I. 

Wermuth. Herr. 195. 

Werther. Herr von. a 3 v 



: tS, HO ;: : 

ol (164S). 13, 209-211. 

Kingdom of, 2 17. 

White. Mr. Andrew D., ::: 

White Mountain. Battle of the, : j 

Wickham Steed. Mr. H., \-ii. x 

WillM m Foreign 

Omce) 1 

William I., King of Prussia and Ger- 
man Emperor 1 3 | | 3 g ; ; | ; | - 
241. 

William II., German Emperor, i\ 4 
14-3C *] 4a 45 ;o-oi. 64, 

5 69. ;i, -.; -S 85-I tftt, 

I - 5 1 B 1 1 

Willcox, Sir William. I - - 

Wilson Mr. A. J., vii. 

Witte, Count, 

Wolff Bureau. The, 80, 96. 

Wjnrtemberg 1 1 1 3 a 4 1 1 5 . 24.5. 

Xenofol. M.. 505. 

CK, General, 210. 2:: 
Young Turks, The, xi-xiii. IT, 
Yv.sui" Izzedin, Prince, xi-xiii. 

Zedlitz. Herr vom :::. 

ch, Milan, r - 
Zimmermann, Herr, 94. 
Ziska, John, ^; - 
Zollverein, The. 13, 93, 11 7- 119. 



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